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Corporate governance reform in a developing country– the case of 
Bangladesh 
ABSTRACT 
Bangladesh reformed its corporate governance by adopting Bangladesh 
Corporate Governance Guidelines-2006 (the BCGG-2006 hereafter) due to pressures 
from international financial institutions (IFIs). However, there is huge controversy in 
prior literature regarding the IFIs’ suggested reform initiatives. The thesis asks 
specific research questions: RQ1. Do institutional investors and bankers in 
Bangladesh perceive that the level of compliance with the BCGG-2006 by the 
investee or borrowing company influences the investment and lending decisions 
respectively? RQ2.1. To what extent is the BCGG-2006 implemented in form rather 
than in substance? RQ2.2 Is there a relationship between the nature of compliance 
with the BCGC-2006 and firm performance? RQ3.1. To what extent does reported 
compliance with the BCGG-2006, as reported in annual reports, overstate underlying 
compliance with the BCGC-2006? RQ3.2 Does the overstatement of compliance 
reported in annual reports lead to a different relative ranking of a firm’s corporate 
governance structure? RQ3.3 What factors influence the overstatement of 
compliance with the BCG-2006 in annual reports? 
To investigate RQ1, an inductive approach is taken and data are collected by 
using semi-structured interviews of investment managers and credit rating analysts. 
In order to examine the remaining RQs, a deductive approach is taken and data are 
collected: (1) by using a structured survey questionnaire addressed to company 
secretaries or CFOs; and (2) from annual reports and stock exchanges.  
With respect to RQ1, this study finds (1) strong evidence that institutional 
investors and bankers perceive limited impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
recommended by the BCGG-2006 on investment and lending decisions respectively. 
In order to theorise the above findings, two theories:  agency theory and the theory of 
path dependence are contrasted. Using a grounded theory coding, this study finds 
that (1) companies are locked in the path of control by sponsor families and sponsor 
families then impede the implementation of the BCGG-2006 and (2) institutional 
investors and bankers lock themselves in the path of name-based and relationship-
based investment and lending practices which deters consideration of corporate 
governance mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-2006. Very few interviewees 
provide an explanation consistent with the agency theory. This evidence thus points 
more to the theory of path dependence than to agency theory. 
In relation to RQ2.1, this study finds that local privately-owned companies 
and government-owned companies either do not comply or comply in form but not in 
substance with the BCGG-2006, while subsidiaries of foreign multinational 
companies comply in form and in substance with the BCGG-2006. The relative 
strength of path dependence in local privately-owned companies and government-
owned companies and subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies explains these 
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results better than agency theory. The evidence with respect to RQ2.2 provides an 
indication that the nature of compliance with separation of the chairman and CEO, 
board independence and audit committee does not have an association with firm 
performance in case of local privately-owned companies. However, the evidence in 
relation to RQ2.2 provides an indication that the nature of compliance with the 
corporate governance mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-2006 makes a difference 
in firm performance in subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies.  
With respect to RQ3.1, it is found that companies overstate compliance with 
the BCGG-2006 in annual reports. With respect to RQ3.2, this study finds that the 
rank of a firm’s corporate governance is different when comparing compliance with 
the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports with compliance with the BCGG-2006 
as stated in the survey. With respect to RQ3.3, it is found that overstatement of 
compliance is more pronounced with respect to less-observable provisions of the 
BCGG-2006, is positively associated with control by sponsor families and is 
negatively associated with control by institutional investors. This evidence is again 
more consistent with the theory of path dependence and institutional logic than 
agency theory.  
The findings of this thesis suggest that corporate governance researchers in 
developing countries should consider the role of path dependence rather than agency 
theory exclusively. This thesis also makes a methodological contribution by 
investigating overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006. The findings of this 
study may also assist regulators in developing countries and the IFIs in formulating 
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 Corporate governance (CG) reforms based on an Anglo-American model 
have proliferated in developing countries. It has been argued that these reforms are 
influenced more by legitimacy-based than efficiency-based reasons (Reed, 2002; 
Siddiqui, 2010). More particularly, developing countries execute CG reforms in 
response to pressures from international financial institutions (IFIs) namely the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Finance 
Corporation  (IFC) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (Reed, 2002; Siddiqui, 
2010) and in order to attract foreign direct investment (Rwegasira, 2000; Yakasai, 
2001; Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006). The IFIs exert (1) coercive pressures for 
CG reforms in developing countries by conditioning financial assistance on the 
adoption of CG reforms (Rosser, 2003; p. 330; Singh et al., 2002) and (2) normative 
pressures by suggesting poor CG is one of the important reasons that causes financial 
crisis (Singh et al., 2002; Soederberg 2003) and slows down economic growth (Reed, 
2002).  
The proponents of CG reforms in developing countries (IFC, 2013; Claessens 
and Yurtoglu, 2012; Global Corporate Governance Forum, 2005; Iskander and 
Chamlou, 2000) argue that sound CG is an important precondition for rapid 
economic growth and sustainable economic development. By sound CG, these 
proponents indicate CG mechanisms recommended by an Anglo-American model (cf 
Singh et al., 2002). They argue that sound CG ensures rapid growth and sustainable 
economic development through (1) greater access to external financing by firms, (2) 
lower cost of capital and associated higher valuation of firms, (3) better operational 
performance of firms, and (4) more favourable treatment of all stakeholders (ROSC, 
2013; IFC, 2013; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2012; p. 17; Claessens, 2006; p. 99; 
Global Corporate Governance Forum, 2005; p. 6). An Anglo-American model of CG 
helps attain the aforementioned outcomes by ensuring (1) better protection of 
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shareholder and creditor rights (Claessens, 2006; La Porta et al., 1998), (2) reduced 
self-dealing and insider trading behaviour (Claessens, 2006; Iskander and Chamlou, 
2000); (3) efficient management, better allocation of resources and active 
participation of stakeholders in performance-enhancing mechanisms (Claessens, 
2006; Iskander and Chamlou, 2000); and (4) timely and accurate disclosure and 
transparency on all matters material to company performance, ownership and CG 
(Iskander and Chamlou, 2000). 
However, there is controversy about the effectiveness of an Anglo-American 
model of CG in developing countries and the reform initiative of the IFIs. The unique 
historical background, path of development, political, economic and social 
institutions of developing countries are distinct from that of Anglo-American 
countries (Li and Nair, 2009; Singh et al., 2002). Thus, CG models that may have 
performed effectively in Anglo-American countries may not work in developing 
countries (Singh et al., 2002; Sam, 2007; Young et al., 2008). Moreover, the test of 
association between a measure of sound CG (e.g., board independence) and an 
outcome variable (e.g., firm performance), not to mention systematic causal 
relationships, provides inconclusive evidence (Vives, 2000; Adams et al., 2010; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Furthermore, IFIs have been accused for endorsing 
an Anglo-American model because it is better suited to Western investors 
(Soederberg 2003: 17–18, 23; Soederberg 2004) while giving little consideration to 
the low government capacity (Grindle, 2004; Rodrik, 2006), the existing power 
relations among government, controllers and financiers of corporations (Hout, 2012) 
and the lack of complementary institutions in the developing countries concerned 
(Uddin and Hopper, 2003; p. 29; Dyball et al., 2006).  
The high level of poverty and aid dependency of Bangladesh makes it a major 
test case for IFI-led CG reform (Kochanek, 2000). In response to the stock market 
crash of 1996, the government of Bangladesh initiated a project titled Capital Market 
Development Programme in Bangladesh costing $80.00 million in collaboration with 
the ADB in 1997. The main objective of this programme is to restore investor 
confidence (ADB, 2005; p iv; Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). This programme 
consists of seven types of technical assistance. One objective of this programme is to 
draft a comprehensive CG manual for public limited companies and security issuers. 
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This programme was executed by the ADB with the help of The Aries Group, Ltd. a 
consultant from USA. The consultant formulated CG guidelines in line with the 
OECD’s Principles of CG. The Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission 
(BSEC) adopted the guidelines in 2006 (SEC order No. SEC/CMRRCD/2006-
158/Admin/02-08, dated 20 February 2006).  
The Bangladesh Corporate Governance Guidelines-2006 (hereafter ‘the 
BCGG-2006’) is based on a ‘comply or explain’ principle and it supplements the 
Companies Act 1994 in respect of administration of publicly listed companies. It has 
also been included in the listing rules of the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and the 
Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE). The main recommendations of the BCGG-2006 
are detailed in chapter three, Section 3.6.2. 
Some researchers question the applicability and effectiveness of the BCGG-
2006. Siddiqui (2010) argues that the BCGG-2006 is not suitable for Bangladesh 
given its institutional characteristics and claims that the adoption of the BCGG-2006 
is prompted by ‘exposure to legitimacy threats rather than efficiency reasons’ 
(p.253). This is consistent with Uddin and Chowdhury (2008) who find that the 
traditional culture and values of Bangladesh are in conflict with the rationality 
implicit in an Anglo-American model of CG. On the other hand, the World Bank 
(2009) finds that the average level of compliance with the BCGG-2006 is 82 per cent 
and claims that an improvement in the Bangladesh CG framework has ensued since 
2006. There is no study that investigates whether the level of compliance with the 
BCGG-2006 indicates attainment of any objective of CG reform in Bangladesh as 
advocated by the IFIs. This study, thus, intends to investigate whether the BCGG-
2006 accomplishes a number of its intended objectives.  
Section 1.2 presents research questions. Section 1.3 contains research 
methods to be used in the study. Section 1.4 outlines expected contributions of the 





1.2 Research questions 
This thesis addresses one ‘motivating research question’ asking whether the 
BCGG-2006 accomplishes a number of its intended objectives in Bangladesh as a 
developing country. The main objective of CG reform in Bangladesh is to ‘‘foster 
investors’ confidence and facilitate savings and investment’’ (ADB, 2000
1
; p. 1). The 
underlying argument is that better CG will foster investors’ confidence by (1) 
ensuring better protection of investors’ rights, (2) clearly and appropriately defining 
the responsibilities of the board of directors and management of public limited 
companies and (3) timely and adequate disclosure of information to the public and 
shareholders (ADB, 2000; p. 3).  
The purpose of fostering investors’ confidence is to ensure (1) greater access 
to external financing by firms and (2) lower cost of capital and associated higher 
valuation of firms, the two important outcomes of sound CG perceived by 
proponents (e.g., IFC, 2013; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2012; Claessens, 2006; Global 
Corporate Governance Forum, 2005; Iskander and Chamlou, 2000) of CG reform. 
Hence, this study argues that the first intended objective of the BCGG-2006 is to 
have a positive influence on the investment and lending decisions of institutional 
investors and bankers respectively. Hence, the first research question to be addressed 
in this study is: 
RQ1. Do institutional investors and bankers of Bangladesh perceive that the 
level of compliance with the BCGG-2006 by the investee or borrowing company 
influences investment and lending decisions respectively? 
Another outcome of a CG reform in developing countries as perceived by its 
advocates (e.g., IFC, 2013; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2012; Claessens, 2006; Global 
Corporate Governance Forum, 2005; Iskander and Chamlou, 2000) is to ensure the 
better operational performance of firms. Hence, this study argues that the second 
intended objective of the BCGG-2006 is to influence firm performance positively. 
However, prior CG researchers (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; Connelly et al. 2012) argue 
                                                          
1
 Although the capital market development programme was approved in 1997, the Technical 
Assistance report was signed by government in 2000. 
5 
 
that when CG mechanisms are implemented ‘in form but not in substance’; they 
mainly play a ceremonial role and thus, have no impact on firm performance. Hence, 
it can be argued that the CG mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-2006 need to be 
implemented ‘in form and in substance’ rather than ‘in form but not in substance’ in 
order to have a positive impact on performance.  Hence, the second set of research 
questions to be addressed in this study is: 
RQ2.1. To what extent is the BCGG-2006 implemented both ‘in form and in 
substance’ rather than ‘in form but not in substance?  
RQ2.2 Is there a relationship between the nature of compliance with the 
BCGG-2006 and firm performance? 
Sound CG fosters investors’ confidence by ensuring timely and accurate 
disclosure and transparency on all matters material to company performance, 
ownership and CG (Iskander and Chamlou, 2000; ADB, 2000; p. 3). This implies 
that accurate disclosure on compliance with the BCGG-2006 is important for making 
informed investment and credit decisions. Moreover, accurate disclosure on 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 is essential for the monitoring of compliance as the 
BCGG-2006 is based on the ‘comply or explain’ principle. The monitoring of 
compliance with a CG code based on ‘comply or explain’ principle is left to 
shareholders (FRC, 2006; p. 4; MacNeil and Li, 2006; pp. 488-499; Arcot et al., 
2010; Wymeersch 2006; v. Werder et al., 2005). The results reported in World Bank 
(2009) and a preliminary analysis of 20 annual reports of Bangladeshi companies 
reveal that the disclosed level of compliance with the BCGG-2006 is very high. This 
high level of compliance with the BCGG-2006 as disclosed in annual reports raises 
suspicion about the accuracy of compliance because companies in Bangladesh are 
reported as being reluctant to make disclosure on both mandatory (Akhtaruddin, 
2005) and voluntary accounting items (Belal and Cooper, 2011). The suspicion is 
further reinforced by the scepticism of prior researchers about the disclosed level of 
compliance with adopted CG codes in developed countries (e.g., Arcot et al., 2010; 
v. Werder et al., 2005; Akkermans et al., 2007). Hence, the third set of research 
questions to be addressed in this study is: 
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RQ3.1. To what extent does reported compliance with the BCGG-2006, as 
reported in annual reports, overstate underlying compliance with the BCGG-2006?  
RQ3.2 Does the overstatement of compliance reported in annual reports lead 
to a different relative ranking of a firms’ corporate governance?  
RQ3.3 What factors influence the overstatement of compliance with the 
BCGG-2006 in annual reports? 
In this study, ‘underlying compliance with the BCGG-2006’ indicates 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 as stated in a confidential survey. 
1.3 Research methodology and methods 
The research questions determine the research methodology and methods 
(Punch, 2005; Mason, 2002; Abernethy et al., 1999). With respect to RQ1, this study 
employs an ‘inductive approach’ while with regard to RQ2 and RQ3 it employs a 
‘deductive approach’.  
With respect to RQ1, an inductive approach is appropriate because (1) 
previous archival studies mainly conducted in the USA and UK provides inconsistent 
evidence (c.f. Bansal, 2013), (2) survey-based research provides contrasting evidence 
depending on the context of the survey (c.f. Bansal, 2013) and (3) there is little 
academic research that directly investigates the impact of CG on investment and 
lending decisions in both developed and developing countries (c.f. Barker and Imam, 
2008).  Consistent with an inductive approach, a semi-structured interview method is 
used to collect the data needed to investigate RQ1. 
A deductive approach is appropriate when using prior theoretical and 
empirical literature propositions and when hypotheses can be developed (Dubois and 
Gadde, 2002; Bryman, 2008). Section 2.2 discusses theories that are used in prior 
corporate governance research. This section also argues that agency theory and neo-
institutional theory with an emphasis on path dependence can be explored to study 
RQ2 and RQ3. Using these two theories and prior literature, propositions and 
hypotheses with respect to RQ2 and RQ3 are formulated in chapter 4. Consistent 
with the deductive approach, structured survey questionnaires and other publicly 
available data such as annual reports are used to investigate RQ2 and RQ3. 
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This thesis as a whole employs mixed methods. Semi-structured interviews 
provide evidence relating to RQ1. A survey based on a structured questionnaire and 
annual reports provide data required for answering RQ2. The responses from this 
survey are compared with disclosures in annual reports to answer RQ3.  
1.4 Findings and contribution of the study 
From the interviews, this study finds that CG mechanisms suggested by the 
BCGG-2006 have a limited impact on the investment and lending decisions of 
institutional investors and bankers respectively. This is because companies subject to 
the BCGG-2006 are reluctant to implement it in form and in substance while 
institutional investors and bankers persist with name-based and relationship-based 
investment and lending practices respectively, which deter consideration of the 
recommended CG mechanisms. This evidence is in contrast to prior empirical 
evidence in developed countries that use archival and survey methods and find that 
institutional investors and bankers prefer better governed firms.  
From the survey, this study finds that local privately-owned and government-
owned companies either do not comply or comply-in form but not in substance, 
while subsidiaries of foreign MNCs comply in form and in substance with the 
BCGG-2006. Moreover, this study finds that CG mechanisms recommended by an 
Anglo-American model do not make a difference in performance among local-
privately owned companies even when a company complies in form and in 
substance.   
From comparing the survey with disclosures in annual reports, this study 
provides evidence that companies overstate compliance with the BCGG-2006 in 
annual reports due to institutional pressures; this overstatement leads to different 
ranking of firms and is more pronounced with respect to non-observable provisions 
of BCGG-2006. The evidence of this study, thus, supports the suspicion of prior 
researchers that compliance with CG guidelines as reported in annual reports may 
not present underlying compliance. This study also finds that overstatement of 
compliance is positively related with control by families and is not related with 
control by institutional investors.   
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All three chapters point towards the theory of path dependence, which in turn 
contributes to an understanding of why an agency-based code of corporate 
governance is unlikely to be effective in a developing country such as Bangladesh.  
Although the evidence of this study is specific to Bangladesh, the results are 
perhaps generalizable to other developing countries with similar corporate and 
institutional characteristics such as family controlled companies, weak shareholders 
rights and rampant corruption. In that case, the insights revealed by the findings of 
this study should be of particular interest to advocates of CG reform in all developing 
countries such as the IFIs and domestic regulatory agencies. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured into nine chapters including this introduction chapter. 
A brief outline of the following chapters is detailed below: 
Chapter Two presents a review of existing literature on CG. Section 2.2 
presents a discussion and a critical analysis of a number of CG theories and argues 
that agency theory and the theory of path dependence are appropriate to study CG 
reform in developing countries. Section 2.3 presents a brief discussion of different 
CG models while providing a greater attention to the Anglo-American model as the 
BCGG-2006 is based on the Anglo-American model. In order to understand the 
difference between Anglo-American countries and developing countries, institutional 
characteristics of both kinds of countries relevant to CG are discussed in Section 2.4. 
Section 2.5 reviews prior literature on the impact of CG on the investment and 
lending decisions of institutional investors and bankers respectively and justifies 
RQ1. Section 2.6 discusses the corporate governance problems in developing 
countries, the reasons for the adoption of CG codes based on an Anglo-American 
model in developing countries, the influence of institutional characteristics of 
developing countries on the effectiveness of an Anglo-American model of CG, 
reviews prior research on five CG mechanisms recommended by the BCGG-2006 
and justifies RQ2. Finally, prior literature on compliance with the CG code is 
reviewed and RQ3 is justified in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 concludes the chapter.   
Chapter Three discusses several institutional characteristics of Bangladesh 
which are relevant to this thesis. Section 3.2 presents an overview of the economic 
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condition of Bangladesh. Section 3.3 describes the political regimes in Bangladesh 
since independence with an emphasis on industrial policies and their impact on the 
development of the corporate sector. This section gives an indication that the 
collusion between political leaders and business entrepreneurs lead to the 
development of family capitalism in Bangladesh. Section 3.4 describes the present 
characteristics of the corporate sector and the relevant institutional characteristics of 
Bangladesh. Section 3.5 describes important general institutional characteristics (e.g., 
culture) of Bangladesh. The emergence of CG and the content of BCGG-2006 are 
outlined in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 presents the characteristics of banks and credit 
rating agencies in Bangladesh. Section 3.8 summarises the chapter.   
Chapter Four develops sub-questions related to RQ1 (Section 4.2), 
propositions related to RQ2.1 and RQ2.2 (Section 4.3) and hypotheses related to 
RQ3.1, RQ3.2 and RQ3.3 (Section 4.4). With respect to RQ1, neither a theoretical 
framework nor an association between level of compliance with the BCGG-2006 and 
investment and lending decisions is outlined following the logic of induction. With 
respect to RQ2.1 and RQ2.2, propositions are developed using agency theory and the 
theory of path dependence. Finally, using agency theory, the theory of path 
dependence of corporate governance and neo-institutional theory, I develop 
hypotheses related to RQ3.1, RQ3.2 and RQ3.3. Section 4.5 summarises the chapter. 
Chapter Five addresses the methodological issues of this thesis. A detailed 
analysis on semi-structured interviews (Section 5.3) and self-explanatory structured 
questionnaire survey (Section 5.4) is conducted. The measurement of variables for 
testing propositions related to RQ2 (Section 5.6) and hypotheses related to RQ3 
(Section 5.7) is discussed. Statistical techniques for testing propositions related to 
RQ2.2 (Section 5.8) and hypotheses related to RQ3 (Section 5.9) are also outlined. 
Section 5.10 provides a summary.  
Chapter Six presents the results for RQ1. Using semi-structured interview 
data, results are presented with respect to two questions and a theoretical framework 
is generated from the data.  The results provide strong support that the CG 
mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-2006 have limited or no direct and indirect 
impact on the investment and lending decisions of institutional investors and bankers 
respectively. This is because the investee or borrowing company does not implement 
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the CG mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-2006 due to rent-protection and low-
relative efficiency of the BCGG-2006. Moreover, the investment and lending 
decisions are strongly influenced by the name of the key person in the investee or 
borrowing company.  The past relationship with that key person is also influencial.  
Chapter Seven presents results for RQ2.1 and RQ2.2. With respect to RQ2.1, 
the results show that CG mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-2006 are 
implemented ‘in form rather than in substance’ in privately-owned and government-
owned companies and ‘in form and in substance’ in subsidiaries of MNCs. However, 
the results related RQ2.2 indicates that the association between nature of compliance 
with the BCGG-2006 and firm performance depends on the selected performance 
measure. However, the difference in performance based on nature of compliance 
with the BCGG-2006 does not hold with respect to privately-owned companies in the 
case of the separation of chairman and CEO, board independence and audit 
committee.  
Chapter Eight presents results for R3.1 to RQ3.3. The results show that there 
is an overstatement of compliance with the provisions of the BCGG-2006 in annual 
reports. Moreover, this overstatement leads to different ranking of firms’ governance. 
Furthermore, this overstatement is more pronounced with respect to less observable 
provisions. Finally, overstatement of compliance in annual reports is positively 
related with control by family and not related with control by institutional investors.  
Chapter Nine presents a summary of the key findings and the contributions of 
this thesis. This chapter also describes limitations of this thesis and provides 






The aim of this chapter is to provide a review of the literature on CG which is 
relevant to the main research question of this thesis: Does a CG reform based on an 
Anglo-American model of CG accomplish its intended objectives in a developing 
country? and related sub-questions: RQ1. Do institutional investors and bankers in 
Bangladesh perceive that the level of compliance with the BCGG-2006 by the 
investee or borrowing company influences the investment and lending decisions, 
respectively? RQ2.1. To what extent is the BCGG-2006 implemented in form rather 
than in substance? RQ2.2 Is there a relationship between the nature of compliance 
and firm performance? RQ3.1. To what extent does reported compliance with the 
BCGG-2006, as reported in annual reports, overstate underlying compliance with 
the BCGG-2006? RQ3.2 Does the overstatement of compliance reported in annual 
reports lead to a different relative ranking of a firm’s corporate governance? RQ3.3 
What factors influence the overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in 
annual reports? 
This chapter will help to identify gaps in prior literature on CG, particularly 
in developing countries and thus, provide justification for the abovementioned 
research questions. It will further help to formulate propositions and hypotheses and 
to discuss the findings of this study in later chapters. More specifically, this chapter 
seeks to achieve the following objectives.  
Section 2.2 discusses a number of theories that have been used in prior 
literature on CG and thus, identifies one or more theories appropriate for studying 
CG reform in a developing country, Bangladesh. Section 2.3 discusses different 
models of CG with a special emphasis on the Anglo-American model. Section 2.4 
focuses on institutional differences between Anglo-American countries and 
developing countries. Section 2.5 discusses prior literature on the impact of CG on 
the investment and lending decisions of institutional investors and bankers 
respectively and identifies the gap in this literature. Section 2.6 discusses corporate 
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governance problems in developing countries, the reasons for the adoption of Anglo-
American-based CG codes by developing countries, the influence of institutional 
characteristics of developing countries on the efficient implementation of a CG code 
based on the Anglo-American model and prior literature on CG in developing 
countries. This section also identifies a gap in the CG literature in developing 
countries to justify RQ2. Section 2.7 discusses existing literature on compliance with 
an adopted CG code and identifies a gap in this stream of literature. Section 2.8 
concludes. 
2.2 Theories and definition of corporate governance 
At present, CG literature is relatively mature and highly interdisciplinary. 
Prior researchers employ a number of theories to investigate CG in accounting and 
finance. Some of these theories define CG and suggest respective CG models while 
other theories explain compliance with an adopted CG code.  There are different 
definitions of CG under different theories and the term CG has no agreed upon 
meaning among scholars in accounting and finance (Brickley and Zimmerman, 
2010). This section discusses a number of theories of CG. A definition of CG is also 
provided with respect to a particular theory if the proponents of the theory define 
CG. Otherwise, the theory only is explained. The models of CG relevant to the 
theories are discussed in Section 2.3. 
2.2.1 Agency theory and corporate governance 
  Agency theory is the most frequently used theoretical framework in CG 
literature (Sheilfer and Vishney, 1997, p. 738; Aguilera et al, 2008). Although Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) formally model agency theory and discuss its implications for 
publicly listed companies with dispersed ownership, the concept of agency conflict 
was developed as early as 1776 when Adam Smith in his the Wealth of Nations 
declared that managers might not exercise a similar level of care over shareholders 
money as shareholders did because managers dealt with other people’s money 
instead of their own (cited in Denis, 2001, p. 192). In between, Berle and Means 
(1932) also make a seminal contribution to the development of agency theory.  
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According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), an agency relationship arises 
when the managers (the agents) are entrusted with decision-making rights by the 
shareholders (the principals). An agency relationship is characterized by two major 
types of problems: (1) moral hazard problems and (2) adverse selection problems 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Walker, 1989). The problems of moral hazard arise because 
shareholders cannot directly observe the managers’ effort toward the maximisation 
of shareholder wealth and thus, managers, being self-interest maximising rational 
people, may shirk on effort or opportunistically maximise their personal interest at 
the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The problems of adverse 
selection arise because managers can misrepresent their abilities or skills to 
shareholders and shareholders cannot completely verify these abilities or skills 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) recommend the introduction of monitoring and 
bonding mechanisms to limit the opportunistic behaviour of management. The 
analysis of agency theory by subsequent researchers indicates that they use these 
monitoring and bonding mechanisms as a synonym of CG (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
Hence, according to agency theorists, the main objective of CG is to reduce the 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (Lubatkin et al. 2007; Letza et al., 
2004; Vives, 2000; Eisenhardt, 1989a). As such, agency theorists define CG as a set 
of controlling and monitoring mechanisms that restrain the opportunistic behaviour 
of management and reduce information asymmetries between managers and 
shareholders (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Gillian, 2006; 
Eisenhardt, 1989a).  
Agency theory is used as a basis for the Anglo-American model of CG. This 
model recommends the separation of the roles of chairman of the board and CEO, the 
appointment of a greater number of non-executive and independent directors on the 
board, the appointment of board committees (nomination, remuneration and audit 
committee) fully composed of non-executive independent directors and the 
establishment of a formal board evaluation procedures (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; 
Demb and Neubauer, 1992). The Anglo-American model of CG is further discussed 
in Section 2.3.   
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As the main objective of CG, according to agency theory, is to restrain the 
opportunistic behaviour of management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Lubatkin et al., 
2007), supporters of agency theory believe that the introduction of CG mechanisms 
positively affect firm performance and accounting reporting quality (Eisenhadrt, 
1989a; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). A large body of prior empirical 
literature that investigates the aforementioned assertion, however, provides 
inconclusive evidence (Daily et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 2003, 1998, 1999; Adams et 
al., 2010; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).  
Agency theory is critiqued by stewardship, stakeholder and institutional 
theorists on a number of grounds (Cuevas-Rodríguez et al., 2012; Huse, 2007; 
Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Stewardship theorists criticise agency theory for its 
pessimistic assumptions about human behaviour (Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Davis et 
al., 1997) while institutional theorists criticise agency theory for its failure to 
recognise the influence of social context on the behaviour of principals and agents 
(Wiseman et al., 2012; Filatotchev and Allcock, 2010; Aguilera et al., 2008).  
Institutional theorists equally criticise prior agency theory-based studies 
(Doucouliagos, 1994; Hirsch et al., 1987; Aguilera et al., 2008). For example, 
Aguilera et al. (2008, p. 475) regard agency theory-based studies as ‘closed system’ 
approaches and argue that this approach fails to pay adequate attention to the unique 
circumstances in which firms are operating. 
In addition, several recent researchers argue that the main assumption of 
agency theory, the separation between shareholders and managers, does not hold in 
developing countries (e.g., Young et al., 2008; Jackling and Johl, 2009). This is 
because in developing countries, corporate ownership is concentrated in controlling 
shareholders and controlling shareholders generally hold key management positions 
in companies (Wiwattanakantang, 2002; Joh, 2003; Yeh et al., 2001; Claessens et al., 
2000). The issue of agency problems in developing countries is further discussed in 
Section 2.6.1. 
2.2.2 Stewardship theory and corporate governance  
In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory assumes that managers are 
honest (Hernandez, 2008), motivated more by intrinsic rewards than extrinsic 
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rewards (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003) and self-motivated to maximise collective 
interests (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Wasserman, 2006; Davis et al., 2000; Davis et 
al., 1997; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Stewardship theorists, thus, argue that 
monitoring can be counterproductive because monitoring activities negatively affect 
the motivation of managers to perform pro-actively (Hernandez, 2012).  
Under stewardship theory, the role of CG is to maintain structures that 
facilitate efficient and effective decision making by managers (Davis et al., 1997). 
Consistent with this view, stewardship theorists recommend the appointment of a 
dual CEO (Donaldson and Davis, 1991) and a majority of inside directors on the 
board (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). A number of 
studies argue that a stewardship theory-based board of directors is more applicable if 
ownership is concentrated and the major owners represent the firm’s management 
(Chin et al., 2004; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Huse, 2000)  
However, the meaning of stewardship (O’Connell, 2007) and the impact of 
intrinsic versus extrinsic rewards on managers’ motivation (Huang et al., 2003) 
varies across countries. This theory, like agency theory, provides an under 
contextualised view of the manager-shareholder interaction (Bruce et al., 2005; 
Shapiro, 2005; Lubatkin, 2005).  
2.2.3 Stakeholder theory and corporate governance 
Stakeholder theory assumes that the corporation is a nexus of both implicit 
and explicit contracts among a broad range of stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 1992). 
These stakeholders include ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by 
the achievement of the organization’s objectives’ (Freeman, 1994, p. 46). Donaldson 
and Preston (1995) further refine the concept of stakeholders and state that 
stakeholders include all persons or groups who have legitimate interests in a firm. 
Waddock et al. (2002) following Clarkson (1995) classify these stakeholders into 
two groups: primary and secondary stakeholders. They identify owners, employees, 
customers, and suppliers as primary stakeholders and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), activists, communities, and governments as secondary 
stakeholders. These stakeholders have different interests in firms and thus, there is 
the possibility of favouring the interests of one group over another (Jones and Wicks, 
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1999). Hence, stakeholder theory posits that the interest of each group of 
stakeholders deserves consideration for its direct legitimate interest in a firm and 
thus, the interest of one group of stakeholders cannot be compromised in favour of 
that of another (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  
According to stakeholder theory, the role of CG is to recognise the divergent 
interests of multiple stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) and reduce conflicts 
of interests among stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 1992). A comprehensive definition 
of CG from the perspective of stakeholder theory is given by Tricker (1994). 
According to him, ‘corporate governance addresses the problems facing the board of 
directors, such as the interaction with top management, and the relationship with the 
owners and others interested in the affairs of the company, including creditors, debt 
financiers, analysts, auditors and corporate regulators.’   
 Under stakeholder theory, the objective of a company is to serve the 
divergent interests of multiple stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). In 
contrast, under agency theory the objective of a firm is to maximise the wealth of 
shareholders only. Consequently, agency theorists argue that stakeholder theory 
creates an excuse for managerial opportunism as it lacks a single objective function 
(Jensen, 2001; Marcoux, 2000; Sternberg, 2000). However, Wheeler et al. (2003), 
using prior research that evidenced a positive association of corporate environmental 
and social responsibilities with economic performance, argue that the time has come 
to harmonise agency theory and stakeholder theory within a single paradigm.    
2.2.4 Resource dependence theory and corporate governance  
Resource dependence theory posits that corporations depend on the 
environment and other organizations for required resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978; Pugh and Hickson, 1997). Similarly, other organizations depend on 
corporations for resources (Pfeffer, 1987). As the success of corporations is 
constrained by a network of independencies, corporations need to manage this 
network of interdependencies (Pfeffer, 1987). 
According to this theory, CG is a set of mechanisms that ensure efficient 
management of the network of interdependencies and access to scarce resources and 
their management (Boyd 1990; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Resource dependence 
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theorists propose the appointment of board members with relevant experience and 
knowledge so that the board of directors can: (1) provide advice and counsel 
managers in setting effective policies and strategies for the firm, (2) ensure access to 
scarce resources, (3) ensure access to channels of information between the firm and 
its environmental contingencies and (4) increase legitimacy (Cohen et al., 2008; 
Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Williamson, 1999; Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; Boyd 1990; 
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). This view is supported by a 
recent stream of empirical evidence that organisations consider environmental 
contingencies while appointing their board of directors (Kor and Misangyi, 2008; 
Hillman et al., 2008; Hillman et al., 2007).  
Anglo-American CG codes (e.g., UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012) 
recommended the appointment of a board of directors which has sufficient 
independence and expertise. The recommendation in relation to the expertise of 
directors is consistent with the views of the resource dependence theorists. Hence, a 
board of directors which has sufficient expertise is a resource. However, appointment 
of a board of directors based on expertise only may not ensure compliance with 
Anglo-American CG codes if the appointed board lacks recommended independence. 
(The relevance of resource dependence theory for this thesis is discussed in section 
2.2.8). 
In CG literature in accounting and finance, the impact of the expertise and 
experience of the board of directors and audit committees on firm performance and 
accounting reporting quality has long been studied. The evidence provided by this 
literature is, however, mixed (see Adams et al., 2010 for a review on board of 
directors, and Bédard and Gendron, 2010 for a review on audit committee expertise 
and accounting reporting quality). In spite of this mixed evidence, Christopher 
(2010) argues that the prescriptions of resource dependence theory need to be 
acknowledged in prescribing board size and composition, and selecting the senior 
managers of corporations in order to augment the effectiveness of CG.   
2.2.5 Managerial hegemony theory and corporate governance 
Managerial hegemony theory describes the powerlessness of the board of 
directors as a mechanism to control managerial opportunism (e.g., Galbraith, 1967; 
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Kosnik, 1987). This is because of three reasons: (1) biases in the nomination and 
selection process of outside board of directors (Patton and Baker, 1987); (2) 
constraints on the monitoring and controlling ability of outside directors (Wolfson, 
1984); and (3) weak incentives for outside directors to monitor management (Patton 
and Baker, 1987).  
Firstly, the hegemony of CEOs makes the board of directors ineffective 
because CEOs play a substantial role in the nomination and selection of outside 
directors  despite the presence of a nomination committee (Mace, 1979; Lorsch and 
MacIver, 1989 cited in Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Monks and Minow, 1991; 
Patton and Baker, 1987), the tenure of the outside directors depends on the CEO 
(Monks and Minow, 1991) and the board positions, promotions and salaries of inside 
directors depend on the CEO (Jensen, 1993).  
Secondly, a number of constraints limit the monitoring and controlling ability 
of outside directors such as limited participation in setting the agenda of board 
meetings (Jensen, 1993), limited access to insight information of the firms (Bacon 
and Brown, 1975; Nowak and McCabe, 2003), a lack of adequate expertise and time 
to properly analyse business proposals by the management (Estes, 1980; Patton and 
Baker, 1987) and ‘polite’ boardroom culture (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989 cited in 
Clarke, 1998). Finally, meeting fees and the stock compensations of outside directors 
are not adequate (Patton and Baker, 1987).  
Shivdasani and Yearmack (1999) provide detailed archival evidence that 
CEO’s involvement [proxied by the presence of the CEO on nomination committee 
or the absence of nomination committee] reduces the appointment of independent 
directors and the consequent controlling and monitoring role of the board. 
Furthermore, a number of researchers who find no significant association between 
board independence and their outcome variable state that their results are consistent 
with managerial hegemony theory (e.g., Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Kalyta, 2009). 
2.2.6 Market myopic theory and corporate governance 
Market myopia theory posits that the share price is not a reliable measure of 
long-term shareholder wealth because the stock market, being short-term oriented, 
undervalues long-term investments (Keasey et al., 1997). Consequently, market 
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myopia theorists emphasise the maximisation of long-term shareholder wealth 
instead of the maximisation of share price (Keasey et al., 1997; Charkham, 1994; 
Sykes, 1994).They perceive that CG practices in Anglo-American countries (e.g., 
UK and USA) suffer from four main weaknesses: (1) shareholders are reluctant and 
unable to exercise ownership roles; (2) institutional investors and managers are 
highly concerned about short-term return on investment and corporate performance, 
respectively; (3) high remuneration of management relative to corporate performance 
and (4) excessive threats of takeover  (Sykes, 1994, p. 190; Charkham, 1994).  
In order to overcome the weaknesses of the Anglo-American model, the 
proponents of market myopia theory suggest that institutional investors commit 
‘relationship investing’ over the long-term, play a strong monitoring role either by 
sitting on the board or by appointing independent directors if institutional investors 
cannot sit on the board due to legal reasons (Sykes, 1994). Further suggestions 
include a reduction in takeover threats, restrictions on the voting rights of short-term 
shareholders, and the empowerment of long-term stakeholders such as employees 
and suppliers (Keasey et al., 1997). 
2.2.7 Neo-institutional theory and corporate governance 
Neo-institutional theory has been developed by neo-institutional economists 
(e.g., North, 1991; Aoki, 1994) and neo-institutional sociologists (e.g. Berger and 
Luckmann 1967; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Dobbin 1994; Giddens 1984; 
Granovetter 1985; Whitley 1992). According to neo-institutional theorists, national 
institutions dictate human and organisational interactions in a society (North, 1991) 
and act as constraints as well as expediters of organisational change (Hall and 
Thelen, 2009). Institutions are defined as a set of ‘cognitive, normative and 
regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social 
behaviour. Institutions are transported by various carriers – cultures, structures and 
routines – and they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction (Scott, 1995, p. 33)’.   
Neo-institutional theory differs from ‘old’ institutional theory in terms of its 
relative focus on sources of organisational resistance to change (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991). Neo-institutional theory views that external environmental factors are 
more important sources of organisational inertia than the internalised values, norms 
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and commitments of old institutional theory (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997). Neo-
institutional theory is extensively used in studying persistence and changes in 
accounting (Lounsbury, 2008) and CG practices (e.g., Okhmatovskiy and David, 
2012; Yoshikawa et al. 2007; Henrekson and Jakobsson, 2012).  
2.2.7.1 Institutional path dependence and corporate governance  
A group of institutional theorists view organisational arrangements as 
relatively stable and use institutional theory to explain organisational inertia rather 
than change (Tolbert, 1985; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). The notion is that 
organisational change is a ‘path dependent’ process (Libecap, 1989). According to 
this group of institutional theorists, path dependence occurs because (1) initial 
organisational arrangements, often happen by chance, offers self-reinforcing positive 
feedback and this positive feedback may ‘lock-in’ organisational agents into a 
particular trajectory (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Greener, 2005; Kay, 2005); (2) this 
initial organisational arrangement creates vested interest groups who constrain 
organisational change in order to safeguard their interests (North, 1991) unless the 
beneficiaries of organisational change commit to compensating the loss that the 
vested interest groups suffer (Ostrom, 2005); and, (3) emerging alternative 
trajectories are not compatible with existing institutions and structures and thus, 
changing to an alternative trajectory may result in inefficiency (Greener, 2005; 
Wilsford, 1994).  
Bebchuk and Roe (1999) pioneer institutional path dependence in CG by 
proposing the theory of path dependence of corporate governance. While proposing 
this theory, they refer to the persistence of corporate ownership structures and CG 
practices in USA, Western Europe, and Japan. They argue that in spite of enormous 
pressures exerted by global products and capital markets, divergence in corporate 
ownership structures and CG practices among these countries persists because of 
path dependence. They argue that resistance to new CG practices is legitimate on the 
grounds of the lower ‘relative efficiency’ of new CG practices compared to existing 
CG practices and is opportunistic on the grounds of ‘rent-protection’ on the part of 
existing controllers of companies (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). On ‘relative efficiency’ 
grounds, Bebchuk and Roe (1999, p. 139) argue that new CG practices may not be 
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efficient relative to long-established CG practices due to ‘sunk adaptive costs, 
network externalities, complementarities, endowment effects and multiple optima’.  
Sunk adaptive costs suggest that the implementation of new CG practices 
may be less efficient because firms might have adapted to existing CG practices by 
developing related mechanisms such as authority relations or incentive compensation 
schemes (Gedajlovic et al., 2004; Khanna et al., 2006; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 
2009). Network externalities suggest that the CG structure of a particular firm in a 
country depends on the CG structures of peer firms and thus, a firm cannot switch to 
a different structure of CG due to high switching costs (Khanna et al., 2006; 
Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). Central to the idea of efficiency-based path 
dependence is complementarities (Schmidt and Spindler, 2002; Bratton and 
McCahery, 1999; Aoki, 1994). Complementarities imply that a CG framework is 
embedded in the institutions, legal rules and practices of a country and thus, 
imposing new CG practices may hamper the efficiency of the overall system 
(Khanna et al., 2006; Schmidt and Spindler, 2004). Endowment effects mean that 
individuals having control under the existing CG structure affect the total value of 
the alternative CG structure due to their existing control (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). 
Finally, multiple optima implies that every system of CG has pros and cons (Aguilera 
et al., 2008) and a country may choose different bundles of practices that yield 
equivalent long-run performance (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; Khanna et al., 2006). The 
concept of ‘relative efficiency’ of the Anglo-American model of CG is acknowledged 
by the majority of regulatory authorities around the world (Coombes and Wong 
2004) and thus, they recommend ‘comply or explain’ basis codes (Wymeersch 
2006).  
On the grounds of ‘rent protection’, Bebchuk and Roe (1999) argue that the 
initial CG structure provides ‘private benefits of control’ to certain controllers. They 
argue that these controllers may resist the implementation of new CG practices to 
protect their ‘private benefits of control’ despite the fact that new CG practices are 
more efficient than initial CG practices. The different types of ‘private benefits of 
control’ are discussed in Section 2.6.1.  
This theory has subsequently been used as a theoretical framework by a 
number of comparative studies that investigate the non-convergence of CG practices 
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around the world (e.g., Gilson, 2001; Coffee, 2002; Khanna et al., 2006). The theory 
is also used in a number of country-specific studies that evidence the persistence of 
national CG systems (e.g., Lubinski, 2011 in Germany; Henrekson and Jakobsson, 
2012 in Sweden).  
The theory of path dependence of corporate governance (Bebchuk and Roe, 
1999) explains the persistence of initial CG practices. However, it sheds limited light 
on (1) why other interest groups such as financial market participants and banks do 
not negatively react to this persistence especially when the initial CG practices are 
inefficient and thus, influence change toward new CG practices and (2) how 
companies subject to new CG practices tackle significant institutional pressure for 
compliance with new CG practices. A probable reason for limited or no negative 
reaction to the persistence of initial CG practices by financial market participants and 
banks could be that path dependence occurs on the part of incumbent financiers 
(Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Black and Coffee, 1994). Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
argue that development in financial systems is hindered by incumbent financiers 
because they also protect their rent and do not want to let their existing skills become 
redundant. This is consistent with Black and Coffee (1994) who argue that 
institutional investors play a passive role in changing CG practices because they 
want to protect their corporate business and being specialised organisations, cannot 
easily change their behaviour. Section 2.2.7.2 explains how companies which are 
subject to new CG practices tackle the enormous institutional pressures for 
compliance. 
2.2.7.2 Institutional change and corporate governance  
 As mentioned in Section 2.2.7.1, institutional path dependence provides 
limited focus on how organisations respond to maintain legitimacy under 
institutional pressures. Institutional theorists vary among themselves in 
understanding these organisational responses. One group argue that all organisations 
will inevitably comply with new practices due to institutional pressures today or 
tomorrow (e.g., Scot, 2001; p.170) leading to homogenous organisational practices. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) explain the process of homogenisation with the help of 
Hawley’s (1968) concept of ‘isomorphism’. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify 
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three kinds of institutional isomorphism: 1) coercive isomorphism occurs when 
organisations change their existing practices due to both formal and informal 
pressures from government and non-government organisations; 2) mimetic 
isomorphism occurs when organizations implement industry best practices without 
assessing the appropriateness of the practices in order to regain decaying legitimacy 
resulting from poor performance and environmental uncertainty; and 3) normative 
isomorphism occurs when organizations implement new practices due to pressures 
from professional associations.  
 Prior CG scholars argue that isomorphic processes are working at country 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Enrione et al., 2006; 
Reed, 2002; Siddiqie, 2010) and firm (Hooghiemstra and van Ees, 2011; Seidl, 2007; 
Seidl et al., 2013) level to make CG practices more similar. At an international level, 
isomorphic pressures often come from international capital, product and labour 
markets (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008) and from 
IFIs (Reed, 2002; Siddiqie, 2010). At a firm level, coercive isomorphism stems from 
the issue of CG codes by regulatory authorities or from the inclusion of CG codes in 
the listing requirements of stock exchanges (Burton, 2000; Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004). Moreover, compliance with CG code by peer firms exerts normative 
isomorphism on other firms (Talaulicar and v. Werder, 2008). One possible 
consequence of isomorphic pressures is that firms may adopt CG practices only 
symbolically (e.g., Spira, 1999; Zattoni and Minichilli, 2009). For example, Spira 
(1999) finds that many audit committees in the United Kingdom are playing 
ceremonial roles rather than becoming an instrument of monitoring against corporate 
misconduct. The concept of isomorphism is also used to explain the high level of 
compliance with an adopted CG code and the mimicking explanation for non-
compliance with CG code provided by companies (Hooghiemstra and van Ees, 2011; 
Seidl, 2007; Seidl et al., 2013)  
 Although the studies that evidence institutional isomorphism as an impetus 
for organisational change contributed a lot to understanding institutional dynamics, 
these studies have been criticised for paying inadequate attention to the role of active 
agency and power dynamics (Dillard et al., 2004; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988) and 
thus, ignore a range of potential organisational responses to institutional pressures 
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(Lounsbury, 2008). Several recent institutional theorists, thus, conceptualise that 
organisational responses to external institutional pressures vary because different 
organizations face institutional pressures of different strengths (Guerreiro et al., 
2012; Lounsburry, 2008; 2001; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Oliver, 1991).  
 Oliver (1991) developed such a conceptual framework to predict 
organisational varying responses to institutional pressures. She contends that an 
organization’s response to institutional pressures varies from passive conformity to 
active resistance: ‘acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and 
manipulation’ depending on five predictive institutional factors. These include: cause 
(legitimacy and efficiency), constituents (multiplicity of and dependence on those 
who exert pressure), content (consistency between organizational actors and external 
constituents in terms of goals and organizational discretion in terms of compliance), 
control (legal coercion and diffusion of practices) and context (uncertainty about 
outcome and interconnectedness among organisations). 
 Oliver’s framework has recently been used in studying the organisational 
response to changes in accounting standards (Guerreiro et al., 2012; Albu et al., 
2013) and the adoption of CG codes (Okhmatovskiy and David, 2012). 
2.2.8 Summary 
The analysis in this section indicates that prior literature on CG uses a 
number of theories. This is because scholars from different disciplines take different 
perspectives while dealing with the issue of CG. This creates a lack of unifying 
theory to study CG. Tricker (2009) pointed out this issue and state: ‘Corporate 
governance, as yet, does not have a single widely accepted theoretical base nor a 
commonly accepted paradigm...the subject lacks a conceptual framework that 
adequately reflects the reality of corporate governance’. As all theories suffer from 
several limitations, none of the theories in isolation can provide a complete 
understanding of CG (Daily et al., 2003; Lynall et al., 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 
2004; 2007; Jackling and Johl, 2009). Hence, researchers recently have been asking 
for the use of multiple theories to study CG (Huse, 2007; van Ees et al., 2009). 
 Among the theories discussed, agency theory is extensively used in the 
accounting and finance literature mainly to study the impact of CG on outcome 
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variables. However, as indicated in Section 2.2.1, agency theory is less applicable in 
developing countries. Moreover, agency theory is less applicable to study 
compliance or non-compliance with a CG code because this theory takes a narrow 
view that due to pressure from shareholders, managers themselves effectively 
implement a CG code
2
. Prior research, however, argues that the level of compliance 
with an adopted CG code by a firm is influenced by a large number of internal and 
external factors (Aguilera et al., 2008; Filatotchev, 2007). However, it is not 
worthwhile to abandon agency theory completely because the Anglo-American 
model of CG is based on agency theory and the Anglo-American model of CG is 
extensively adopted in developing countries as part of CG reform. Furthermore, it is 
often claimed that the purposes of CG reform in developing countries is to reduce 
agency problems (Liew, 2007). The issue is again discussed in Section 2.6.1. 
Like agency theory, resource dependency theory is also less applicable in 
developing countries because the board of directors in developing countries is mainly 
dominated by a controlling family (Wiwattanakantang, 2002; Joh, 2003; Yeh et al., 
2001; Claessens et al., 2000). Moreover, a controlling family often selects non-
family members for appointment to the board of directors, based on personal 
relationships. The family places limited weight on the experience and expertise of 
prospective non-family board members.  
Stewardship theory is applicable in developing countries because the honesty 
of managers is not beyond question and lower level needs are not fully satisfied yet. 
Stakeholder theory is less applicable in the sense that prior research shows that 
managers in developing countries are less concerned about the interest of employees 
and about the environment (Belal and Cooper, 2011).  Managerial hegemony is also 
less applicable because professional managers rarely run the company as CEOs in 
developing countries (e.g., Wiwattanakantang, 2002). Market myopia theory is less 
applicable because institutional investors in developing countries do not play an 
effective role (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000; World Bank, 2009) and thus, it is difficult to 
promote accountability by empowering institutional investors as suggested by the 
theory.  
                                                          
2




Neo-institutional theory is the most applicable theory for the study of CG 
reform in a developing country such as Bangladesh for the following reasons. Firstly, 
within neo-institutional theory, the concept of path dependence can explain how 
present controller of companies (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999), country-level institutional 
characteristics (e.g., Henrekson and Jakobsson, 2012 in Sweden) and incumbent 
financiers (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) resist change in CG practices (Section 2.2.7.1). 
In my view, the consideration of both the role of existing institutional characteristics, 
the active role of the present controller of companies and incumbent financiers on the 
implementation of new CG code is a more appropriate approach to study CG reform 
and its impact in developing countries.  
Secondly, neo-institutional theory, especially the concept of isomorphism 
(Section 2.2.7.2), is used to explain the adoption of CG code based on an Anglo-
American model in developing countries (Reed, 2002; Siddiqie, 2010), the 
consequences of isomorphic pressure on level of compliance with CG codes reported 
in annual reports (Seidl, 2007; Seidl et al., 2013) and observed symbolic practices of 
a CG mechanism (e.g, audit committees in the UK by Spira, 1999). I think that the 
interplay between path dependence and isomorphic pressure can better explain 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports. I will discuss in 
Chapter 3 Section 3.6 how firms in Bangladesh are subject to isomorphic pressures 
to comply with the BCGG-2006. 
Thirdly, neo-institutional theory can be applied to explain diverse responses 
of companies to a CG code (Section 2.2.7.2). I expect that in spite of the role of path 
dependence, the dynamics of external institutional pressures and organizational 
internal interest motivate several firms to behave differently than others in 
Bangladesh. Finally, neo-institutional theory takes an ‘open systems’ (Aguilera et al., 
2008; Filatotchev, 2007) logic rather than an ‘under-contextualised’ and a ‘closed 
systems’ approach.  
2.3 Corporate governance models 
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of CG models in light 
of the theories discussed in Section 2.2 and to detail the Anglo-American model of 
CG. A number of studies review CG models (Blair, 1995; Keasey et al., 1997; Letza 
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et al., 2004). Letza et al. (2004) base their analysis on Blair (1995) and Keasey et al. 
(1997).  Blair (1995) and Keasey et al. (1997) identify four models of CG, namely 
(1) principal-agent or finance model, (2) the myopic market model, (3) the abuse of 
executive power model, and (4) the stakeholder model. A summary of these four 
models is presented in Appendix 2.1.  
The principal-agent or finance model rests on the assumptions of agency 
theory (section 2.2.1). According to this model, the objective of a company is to 
maximise shareholder wealth and CG is needed to restrain the self-interest 
maximising behaviour of managers (Letza et al., 2004). The proponents of this model 
believe that markets: particularly the markets for capital, labour and corporate 
control, provide the most effective means to reconcile the divergence of interests 
between shareholders and managers (Keasey, 1997). They suggest minimum 
interference in the operation of market (Fama, 1980). The myopic market model rests 
on the assumption of myopic market theory (section 2.2.6). Consequently, the 
proponents of this model emphasise the maximisation of shareholders wealth (Letza 
et al., 2004). However, it does not consider the markets: particularly the markets for 
capital, labour and corporate control as constraints on managerial discretion (Keasey, 
1997). This model, thus, views CG as a set of rules that encourage the long-term 
performance maximisation behaviour of both shareholders and managers (Keasey et 
al., 1997). The abuse of executive power model rests on the assumptions of 
managerial hegemony theory (section 2.2.5). Thus, the proponents of this model call 
for statutory changes in CG practices such as independent nominations and greater 
powers of non-executive directors (Keasey et al., 1997).  Finally, the stakeholder 
model is based on assumptions of stakeholder theory (section 2.2.2). Consequently, 
proponents of this model call for designing a CG system that acknowledges interest 
of multiple stakeholders. 
Letza et al. (2004) labelled the first two models collectively as the 
shareholder model because these two models rest on the assumption that the purpose 
of a corporation is to maximise shareholder wealth. According to several researchers 
(e.g., Becht and Rӧell, 1999; La Porta et al., 1997), the shareholder model is 
synonymous with the Anglo-American model. However, the arguments of Turnbull 
(1997, pp.188-189) indicate that the principal-agent or finance model is synonymous 
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with the Anglo-American model. Given the context of this thesis, I discuss the 
Anglo-American model of CG in detail below.  
Turnbull (1997, p. 188) labelled the CG practices in UK, USA, Canada and 
Australia as the Anglo-American model of CG (Turnbull, 1997). According to this 
model, one important internal mechanism of CG is board of directors composed of a 
majority of non-executive independent directors (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). 
Shareholders using their residual voting rights elect this board of directors for 
monitoring managers as shareholders cannot directly observe the actions of managers 
(Letza et al., 2004).  
The actual level of voting power shareholders can exercise in electing the 
board of directors, however, is limited (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1996) indicating 
that the success of an Anglo-American model largely depends on the existence of 
efficient markets, namely the markets for capital, labour and corporate control (Letza 
et al., 2004). Hence, proponents of an Anglo-American model advocate no or 
minimum government interference in markets (Fama, 1980). However, they approve 
the introduction of voluntary CG codes because voluntary codes impose minimum 
costs or obligations upon firms (Keasey et al., 1997). Consequently, an important 
principle embodied in the Anglo-American model is the ‘comply or explain’ 
principle (Salterio et al., 2013). 
The ‘comply or explain’ principle indicates that non-compliance with a 
particular provision of CG codes is not a violation of the code as long as an 
explanation for non-compliance is provided in annual reports (Hooghiemstra, 2012; 
Arcot et al., 2010). This principle recognizes that a ‘one size fits all’ approach is not 
justified for CG and thus, permits firms to non-comply with a specific provision of 
the code if firms cannot comply with it cost-effectively (Coombes and Wong 2004; 
Seidl, 2007). Furthermore, shareholders are made responsible for appraising the 
appropriateness of compliance with the CG code (e.g. MacNeil and Li, 2006; Seidl, 
2007; Arcot et al., 2010). Shareholders can either sell their shares or voice their 
discontent if they are dissatisfied with the level of compliance with or explanation 
provided for deviation from the ‘comply or explain’ basis CG code (Seidl, 2007; 
Hooghiemstra, 2012).  
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A representative CG code under the Anglo-American model of CG is OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance-2004.  These principles have been regarded as 
the international benchmark for CG and used as the basis for CG reform by both the 
public and private sectors in both developed and developing countries around the 
world (Krambia-Kapardis and Pasros, 2006). The IFIs use the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance-2004 as a benchmark for assessing the quality of corporate 
CG in developing countries (Soederberg, 2003; ROSC, 2013). The main principles of 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance-2004 are summarised in Appendix 2.2.  
The effectiveness of an Anglo-American model of CG in developing 
countries is discussed in Section 2.6.3.  
2.4 Institutional characteristics of Anglo-American and 
developing countries 
A large body of recent literature argues that the CG framework is embedded 
in a country’s economic, legal, political and social structure (e.g., Doidge et al., 
2007; Khanna et al., 2006; Wanyama et al., 2009; Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003; 2010). According to Khanna et al., (2006; p 71) the CG practices of a 
country are the result of a ‘system of complementary institutions, legal rules and 
practices’. This evidence implies that the effectiveness of a CG code depends on the 
existence of its complementary elements. Hence, this section discusses the 
institutional characteristics of Anglo-American countries and developing countries.  
2.4.1 Institutional characteristics of Anglo-American countries 
The main institutional characteristics of Anglo-American countries, perceived 
as the complementarities of an Anglo-American model (e.g., Paredes, 2004; Clerk, 
2007; Gordon and Roe, 2004), include the following.  
Firstly, the ownership of a company is dispersed among a large number of 
individuals and institutional investors, and the management of the company is 
separate from shareholders (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Institutional investors have 
a significant percentage of ownership (Sykes, 1994) and thus, have the motivation 
and ability to play a monitoring role (e.g., Gillian and Starks, 2003; Donnelly and 
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Mulcahy, 2008). The monitoring role of institutional investors is also mandated by 
law (e.g, Stewardship Code 2010 in the UK).  
Secondly, the rights of shareholders are strongly protected by a legal 
framework (Franks and Mayer, 1990; La Porta et al., 1997; Weimer and Pape, 1999). 
To ensure equal voting rights, the ‘one share, one vote’ principle is generally 
maintained (Weimer and Pape, 1999). Moreover, an efficient court system plays an 
important role in upholding the spirit of laws protecting shareholder rights (Paredes, 
2004). 
Thirdly, stock markets are efficient, deep, and liquid in Anglo-American 
countries (La Porta et al., 1997). A large number of sophisticated market participants 
(Paredes, 2004) continuously determine the share price of a company based on the 
strength of CG and also the financial position of the company. Consequently, the 
movement of the stock price disciplines managers and motivates them to maintain a 
good CG system (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Manne, 1965).  
Fourthly, companies in Anglo-American countries are subject to high 
disclosure standards and enforcement action for non-compliance with those standards 
(Paredes, 2004). Moreover, accountants and auditors in Anglo-American countries 
are sophisticated and ethical. The maintenance and dissemination of quality 
accounting information is triggered by both internal and external demands.  
Fifthly, the managerial labour market is efficient with respect to penalising 
poorly performing managers (Paredes, 2004). Moreover, managerial incentives are 
strongly linked with accounting-based and market-based performance measures 
(Abowd and Bognanno, 1995). These, in turn, motivate managers toward 
maximisation of shareholder wealth (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). The efficiency of 
labour markets increases the mobility of managers across firms (Aoki, 1990) and 
thus, reduces the exploitation of managers and employees by dominant shareholders, 
if any.  
Sixthly, hostile takeovers play a significant role in disciplining managers 
because incumbent managers likely suffer from the loss of their jobs and subsequent 
loss of power, prestige and value of ‘firm specific’ human capital (Humphery-Jenner 
and Powell, 2011; Krug and Hegarty, 1997; Walsh, 1989; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; 
Manne, 1965).  
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Finally, other institutions of Anglo-American countries such as investment 
bankers, securities analysts, accounting firms, lawyers, credit-rating agencies, 
broker-dealers, shareholder watchdog groups, shareholder service firms, proxy 
solicitation firms and financial media are skilled and experienced. These institutions 
ensure the effective working of the rest of the CG mechanisms (Paredes, 2004).  
2.4.2 Institutional characteristics of developing countries 
The main institutional characteristics of developing countries relevant to CG 
include the following. 
Firstly, based on a significant percentage of ownership holding, listed 
companies in developing countries can be grouped into three types: privately-owned 
listed companies, government-owned companies and subsidiaries of foreign 
multinational companies (MNCs) (Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009).  The ownership 
of privately-owned listed companies is highly concentrated, either directly or 
indirectly, in the hands of sponsor families (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; Claessens 
et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1998; 1999). Government-owned companies are 
prevalent in several developing countries such as India, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Singapore and China (Claessens, 2000; Claessens and Fan, 2002; Claessens and 
Yurtoglu, 2013). The subsidiaries of foreign MNCs are significantly owned by their 
foreign parents. Consequently, outside individual and institutional investors own a 
minimum percentage of ownership of corporations (Claessens, 2000; Claessens and 
Yurtoglu, 2013).   
Secondly, developing countries are generally characterised by poor investor 
protection rights (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; La Porta et al., 2000). For example, 
Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) report that the legal protection of minority 
shareholders in emerging countries is 47.3 per cent as compared with 65 per cent in 
the USA and 93 per cent in the UK.  
Thirdly, stock markets are relatively small and do not play a significant role 
in the national economies of developing countries. For example, Claessens and 
Yurtoglu (2013) report that market capitalization as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in emerging economies is 66.8 per cent as compared with 127.1 per 
cent in the USA and 132.3 per cent in the UK. There are limited numbers of 
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sophisticated market participants who are powerful enough to often manipulate stock 
prices and thus, high volatility of stock prices is a norm in developing countries 
(Singh, 1999).  
Fourthly, developing countries are characterised by a relatively opaque 
information environment (Arun and Turner, 2004; Nam et al., 2001). There are 
several reasons behind this. Firstly, legal disclosure requirements in developing 
countries lag behind that of developed countries. For example, Claessens and 
Yurtoglu (2013) report that disclosure requirement in emerging countries is 58.9 per 
cent as compared with 100 per cent in the USA and 83 per cent in the UK. Secondly, 
the institutional characteristics of developing countries (e.g., corruption) reduce the 
level of compliance with disclosure standards and the reliability of disclosures (Peng 
and Jiang, 2010; Rajan and Zingales, 2003a).  
Fifthly, the market for human capital is far less efficient in developing 
countries than in Anglo-American countries (Allen, 2005). The low efficiency of the 
labour market restricts the mobility and autonomy of employees (Khanna and 
Palepu, 2004). Moreover, the rarity of stock-based compensation (Sun et al., 2010) 
and pay for performance (Khanna and Palepu, 2004) hampers the alignment of long-
term interests of managers with that of shareholders. Furthermore, managerial 
compensation is influenced by kinship with controlling shareholders (Fagernäs, 
2006). 
Sixthly, the market for corporate control such as the hostile takeover market 
is typically inactive in developing countries (Nam et al., 2001). The efficiency of the 
market for corporate control is hampered by concentrated ownership and control, 
high use of long-term bank loans (Sing and Zammit, 2006), the prohibition of 
takeover by corporate laws (Khanna and Palepu, 2004) and the dearth of timely 
information and high transaction costs (Singh, 1998).  
Seventhly, enforcement of laws in developing countries is significantly poor 
in comparison with developed countries (Pistor et al., 2000).  The enforcement of 
laws is hampered by a lack of formal (e.g., efficient judicial systems) and informal 
institutions (e.g., cultural traits and customs) (Pardes, 2004; Williamson, 2000), 
extreme corruption and the politicisation of regulatory agencies (dela Rama 2012; 
Okike, 2007; Stulz, 2005; Dyer and Mortensen, 2005). 
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Eighthly, given the limited role of stock markets in developing countries, 
banks play an important role as financers in these countries. There is a close-
relationship between banks and non-financial companies (Singh and Zammit, 2006). 
Under the institutional environment of developing countries such as thin capital 
markets, weak legal protection and poor transparency, relationship-based lending 
strategies work better than arm’s length-based lending strategies (Rajan and Zigales, 
2003a; p. 144).  
Finally, professionals and institutions essential to complementing the Anglo-
American model of CG code as investment bankers, securities analysts, accounting 
firms, lawyers, credit-rating agencies, broker-dealers, shareholder watchdog groups, 
shareholder service firms, proxy solicitation firms and financial media, either do not 
exist or are rarely sophisticated in developing countries (Paredes, 2004, p. 1107).   
2.4.3 Summary 
This section shows that the ownership structure of companies and 
institutional characteristics of Anglo-American countries are distinct from those of 
developing countries. First, the ownership structure of companies in Anglo-American 
countries is dispersed while the ownership structure of companies in developing 
countries is concentrated in the hands of sponsor families, government and the 
parents of subsidiaries of foreign MNCs. This difference in ownership structure 
generates different types of agency problems which are further discussed in Section 
2.6.1. Secondly, institutional characteristics of developing countries may influence 
the efficiency of the implementation of an Anglo-American model of CG. The effect 
of the institutional characteristics of developing countries on an Anglo-American 
model of CG as evidenced in prior research is detailed in Section 2.6.3.  
2.5 Prior research on the impact of corporate governance on 
investment and lending decisions 
The purpose of this section is to review prior literature on the impact of CG 
on the investment and lending decisions of institutional investors and bankers 
respectively and to identify a way to advance this research. To this endeavour, 
Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 respectively discuss prior research on the impact of CG on 
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investment decisions and lending decisions. Section 2.5.3 critically analyses the 
above research and identifies a gap in this research.  
2.5.1 Impact of CG on investment decisions of institutional 
investors 
Prior researchers have investigated the impact of an investee’s CG on the 
investment decisions of institutional investors using surveys (World Bank 2005; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000; McKinsey and Company 2002; McCahery et al., 
2010) and archival methods (Chung and Zhang, 2011; Khurshed et al., 2011; Bushee 
et al., 2009; Li et al., 2008; Dahlquist et al., 2003; Giannetti and Simonov, 2006; 
Leuz et al., 2010; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2005). A summary of 
this research is presented in Appendix 2.3. 
The results of the survey-based studies, mostly conducted by professional 
organizations, are inconclusive and indicate that the context of the survey highly 
influences the outcome of the study (World Bank, 2005; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2000; McKinsey and Company, 2002; McCahery et al., 2010). To illustrate, World 
Bank (2005) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000) surveyed the impact of an 
investee’s CG on institutional investors’ investment decisions in India and Singapore 
respectively. These studies report that the appointment of independent directors on 
the board and the formation of an audit committee by an investee company are not 
considered by the majority of institutional investors while making their investment 
decisions.  
McKinsey and Company (2002) surveys a sample of international 
institutional investors. The results of this survey, however, indicate that institutional 
investors put as much weight on CG as financial indicators when making their 
investment decisions and the majority of them are inclined to pay a premium for 
companies with strong CG structures.  
The results of the above survey studies, more specifically the results of 
McKinsey and Company (2002), motivated a number of finance academics to 
investigate whether institutional investors tilt their portfolios towards better governed 
firms using archival methods (Khurshed et al., 2011; Chung and Zhang, 2011; 
Bushee et al., 2009; Li et al., 2008; Dahlquist et al., 2003; Giannetti and Simonov, 
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2006; Leuz et al., 2010; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2005).  These 
researchers argue that institutional investors are guided by the ‘prudent investment 
hypothesis’ and thus, prefer to invest in firms with ‘effective CG’ structures (e.g., 
Chung and Zhang, 2011; Bushee et al., 2009; Dahlquist et al., 2003; Giannetti and 
Simonov, 2006). Investment in firms with ‘effective CG’ structures indicates prudent 
investment decisions because ‘effective CG’ structures reduce the risks of 
expropriations and other self-dealings (Chung and Zhang, 2011), reduce the 
monitoring effort on the part of institutional investors, reduce information asymmetry 
between management and institutional investors and increase firm performance 
(Bushee et al., 2009).  
The measure of ‘effective CG’ varies from a single dimension of CG, such as 
ownership structure (Dahlquist et al., 2003; Giannetti and Simonov, 2006; Ferreira 
and Matos, 2008; Bushee et al., 2009; Leuz et al., 2009; Khurshed et al., 2011), and 
board composition (Khurshed et al., 2011) to a comprehensive CG index (e.g., 
Chung and Zhang, 2011; Bushee et al., 2009). The evidence provided by these 
studies is not only mixed but also indicates that the association between the 
percentage of institutional ownership and their measure of ‘effective CG’ depends on 
the type of institutional investors, as discussed below. 
Dahlquist et al. (2003) and Giannetti and Simonov (2006) provide Swedish 
evidence on the impact of control to cash flow rights ratio of the principal 
shareholder on institutional ownership. Giannetti and Simonov (2006) show that 
while foreign institutional shareholders dislike firms with high control to cash flow 
rights ratio of the principal shareholder, domestic large shareholders prefer such 
firms.  This finding is not consistent with Dahlquist et al. (2003). Dahlquist et al. 
(2003) find no association between foreign institutional ownership and control to 
cash flow rights ratio of the principal shareholder. Giannetti and Simonov (2006) 
justify their contrary findings with two arguments. Firstly, institutional investors 
dislike firms with high control to cash flow rights ratio of the principal shareholder 
because such firms are highly subject to the extraction of private benefits by insiders 
(Giannetti and Simonov, 2006). Secondly, large domestic individual shareholders 
prefer firms with high control to cash flow rights ratio of the principal shareholder 
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because domestic large individual investors may share private benefits of control 
with controlling shareholders (Giannetti and Simonov, 2006).  
Using US data, Chung and Zhang (2011) and Bushee et al. (2009) study the 
impact of ‘effective corporate governance’ on the percentage of institutional 
ownership while ‘effective corporate governance’ is measured by a comprehensive 
corporate governance index. Chung and Zhang (2011) use Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) CG data and measure firm level CG with two comprehensive CG 
indices – GOV_SCORE1 and GOV_SCORE2. Their GOV_SCORE1 captures anti-
takeover provisions in a firm’s charter, bylaws and state law and GOV_SCORE2 
consists of GOV_SCORE1 and 12 additional governance provisions related to board 
and audit committee characteristics, managerial ownership and compensation. They 
provide evidence that the percentage of institutional ownership is significantly 
determined by both GOV_SCORE1 and GOV_SCORE2. They further present 
evidence that the magnitude of the effect of corporate governance indices on 
institutional ownership depends on the legal types of institutional investors and on 
the information environment of portfolio firms. Bushee et al. (2009), however, find 
no significant effect of the anti-takeover index which is equivalent to GOV_SCORE1 
of Chung and Zhang (2011) on the percentage of institutional ownership. Bushee et 
al. (2009), however, find a weak positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and the board characteristics index of portfolio firms. In a further analysis, 
Bushee et al. (2009) show that the positive association between institutional 
ownership and board characteristics index of portfolio firms is not affected by the 
legal types of institutional investors.  
The evidence discussed in this section indicates that the consideration of an 
investee’s CG by institutional investors while making their investment decisions is 
influenced by the context (World Bank 2005; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000) and by 
the type of institutional investors (Chung and Zhang, 2011; Bushee et al., 2009; 
Giannetti and Simonov, 2006; Dahlquist et al., 2003). More precisely, local 
institutional investors do not consider the investees’ CG (e.g., independent directors) 
in making their investment decisions in non-Anglo-American countries (Giannetti 
and Simonov, 2006; World Bank, 2005; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000) while 
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international institutional investors value the investees’ CG while making investment 
decisions (McKinsey and Company, 2002; McCahery et al., 2010).  
2.5.2 Impact of corporate governance on lending decisions 
A number of recent studies investigate the impact of borrower’s CG on bank 
loan contract characteristics (Chava et al., 2009; Firth et al., 2009; Roberts and Yuan, 
2010; Holder - Webb and Sharma, 2010; Lin et al., 2011; Francis et al., 2012; Ge et 
al., 2012). With the exception of Holder-Webb and Sharma (2010), these studies use 
agency theory as their main theoretical framework and apply archival methods. 
Holder-Webb and Sharma (2010) draw on resource dependence theory in addition to 
agency theory as their theoretical framework and use experimental methods. 
These studies generally hypothesise that sound CG structure of borrowing 
companies influences loan contract characteristics in favour of borrowing companies. 
The rationale behind this hypothesis is that a sound CG structure reduces information 
asymmetry and agency conflicts between a borrowing company and banks (e.g., 
Francis et al., 2012; Ge et al., 2012; Rajan and Winton, 1995). These researchers test 
the impact of a large set of proxies for CG [e.g, Anti-takeover index, comprehensive 
CG index and its sub-components, CEO duality, board independence] on several 
price and non-price characteristics of bank loan contracts [e.g., bank interest rate or 
loan spread, loan maturity period, loan size and loan covenants]. A summary of these 
studies is presented in Appendix 2.4.  
Appendix 2.4 shows that there is a lack of conclusive evidence that sound CG 
structure of borrowing companies affects price and non-price characteristics of bank 
loan contracts. For example, neither the comprehensive CG index nor the sub-indices 
of the comprehensive CG index of Ge et al. (2012) consistently maintains the 
predicted relationship with the price and non-price characteristics of bank loan 
contracts. This evidence reported by Ge et al. (2012) at best indicates that the 
association between CG and the characteristics of bank loan contracts depends on the 
choice of the dependent variable. 
Appendix 2.4 further shows that there is a lack of consistent findings among 
studies. For example, Roberts and Yuan (2010) and Chava et al. (2009) report a 
negative significant relationship between anti-takeover index and the costs of bank 
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loans. This evidence is contrary to Ge et al. (2012) in that they find no significant 
impact of anti-takeover index on the loan spread.  This difference may be a 
consequence of the samples of the study and the measurements of anti-takeover 
index. While Ge et al. (2012) use an international sample and measure the anti-
takeover index by adding six takeover protection indicators, Roberts and Yuan 
(2010) and Chava et al. (2009) use a US sample and measure anti-takeover index by 
adding 24 takeover protection indicators as used by Gompers et al. (2003). Even if 
studies use a similar measurement for CG; they often find different results. For 
example, Francis et al. (2012) find no impact of CEO duality on loan spread, while 
Firth et al. (2009) finds that CEO duality deters access to bank finance and is 
negatively related to loan size.  
Finally, studies that investigate the impact of country-level CG on 
characteristics of bank loan contracts also provide contradictory evidence. For 
example, Ge et al. (2012) find that firm-level CG significantly influences the 
characteristics of bank loan contracts in countries with common-law origins and 
strong creditor rights while Lin et al. (2011) find that the impact of their CG measure 
is less pronounced in environments with strong creditor and shareholder rights and 
efficient debt enforcement.   
2.5.3 An analysis of sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 and identification of 
gaps in this literature 
The research described in Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 premises on at least four 
assumptions which are not always beyond question. Firstly, these researchers assume 
that a CG mechanism plays an effective role in reducing the risks of expropriations 
and other self-dealings (e.g., Chung and Zhang, 2011) and that the effectiveness of a 
CG mechanism does not vary from its perceived ability. A stream of prior literature, 
however, presents evidence that a CG mechanism plays a highly ceremonial role in 
an actual setting (Bédard and Gendron, 2010; Beasley et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 
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Secondly, these researchers argue that ‘effective CG’ positively affects the 
investment and lending decisions of institutional investors and bankers respectively 
in that ‘effective CG’ has a positive impact on firm performance (e.g., Khueshed et 
al., 2011; Bushee et al., 2009). This is based on previous evidence that accounting-
based and market-based past performance have an impact on the investment and 
lending decisions of institutional investors and bankers respectively (Badrinath and 
Wahal, 2002; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000; Falkenstein, 
1996; Badrinath et al., 1989; Holder-Web and Sharma, 2010). However, prior 
empirical research as discussed in Section 2.6.4 does not provide conclusive 
evidence that CG has a positive impact on firm performance. 
Thirdly, these researchers argue that firms’ CG influences the investment and 
lending decisions of institutional investors and banks respectively because 
institutional investors and banks perceive a positive impact of CG on accounting 
reporting quality (e.g., Chung and Zhang, 2011; Khueshed et al., 2011; Bushee et al., 
2009). This is again based on prior academic research and anecdotal evidence which 
shows that institutional investors and bankers prefer firms with better accounting 
reporting quality to firms with poor accounting reporting quality (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996; Healy et al., 1999; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000; Bushee and 
Noe, 2000; Leftwich, 1983; Sengupta, 1998; Bharath et al., 2008; and Zhang, 2008). 
However, there is a lack of conclusive evidence that CG increases accounting 
reporting quality (see Section 2.6.4).  
Fourthly, that research assumes that institutional investors and bankers are 
rational decision makers and that decisions are characterized as arm’s length 
transactions. In the words of Chung and Zhang (2011), the investment decisions of 
institutional investors are guided by a ‘prudent investment hypothesis’. The 
investment and lending decisions in reality, however, are guided by personal 
convictions and basic values of the decision makers as well as formal rules
4
.  
In addition, these researchers mainly use archival methods and thus, provide 
indirect evidence on the impact of observable CG characteristics (e.g., the percentage 
of independent directors, the presence of an audit committee, and the percentage of 
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 Boytsun et al. (2011) propose that corporate governance decisions of shareholders, directors, 
managers and other stakeholders are affected by a country’s formal rules and community values.   
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managerial ownership) on institutional ownership and characteristics of bank loan 
contracts. Although survey studies provide direct evidence, they also present 
inconclusive evidence on the impact of CG on institutional investors’ investment 
decision making. Moreover, similar to archival studies, the survey studies examine 
the impact of observable CG characteristics on the investment decisions of 
institutional investors. Finally, survey studies, especially professional surveys by the 
World Bank (2005), PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000) and McKinsey and Company 
(2002), do not seek any theoretical justification from institutional investors on why 
institutional investors perceive or do not perceive an impact of investees’ CG 
structures on investment decisions.  
Moreover, these studies mainly use agency theory with the exception of 
Holder-Webb and Sharma (2010) who combine agency theory and resource 
dependence theory. Studies using agency theory and resource dependency theory 
have been criticized for using proxies for CG that do not comprehend the actual 
conduct of the CG mechanism (MacAvoy and Millstein, 2004; Doucouliagos, 1994; 
Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Hirsch et al., 1987); for providing an ‘under contextualised’ 
view (Wiseman et al., 2012; Filatotchev and Allcock, 2010; Aguilera et al., 2008); 
and for taking a ‘closed system’ approach (Aguilera et al., 2008, p. 475). Several 
studies have indicated that contextual factors, such as prior relationship with 
borrowers (McNamara and Bromley, 1997) and corruption (Weill, 2011), influence 
the evaluation of credit proposals.  
Furthermore, prior empirical studies are conducted in developed countries 
where stock markets are well-developed and where CG is well-grounded. Holder-
Web and Sharma (2010) present the only evidence that investigates the impact of 
borrower’s CG on the lending decisions of banks in Singapore where Anglo-
American-based CG has recently been introduced. Given the different institutional 
characteristics of developing countries, it cannot be expected that research findings 
in developed countries remain valid in developing countries. In fact, prior research 
shows that banks in developing countries depend on the reputation of the borrowers 
(Koford and Tschoegl, 1999), past relationship with the borrower (Singh and 
Zammit, 2006; La Porta et al., 2003) and quality of collateral (Koford and Tschoegl, 
1999) because of institutional voids of developing countries such as the lack of 
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reliable accounting information, and weak legal protection of creditors (Koford and 
Tschoegl, 1999; Rajan and Zigales, 2003a, p. 144). Those researchers argue that 
reputation-based and relationship-based lending practices substitute for market 
inefficiencies in developing countries (Koford and Tschoegl, 1999; Selmier, 2013). 
The practices of reputation-based and relationship-based lending often lead to non-
consideration of the profitability and financial health of the borrower company 
(Nenovsky, 2003).   
Hence, an in-depth direct study using an ‘open-system’ approach which can 
capture the influence of contextual factors on the impact of CG on investment and 
lending decisions is warranted. This is because theoretical predictions and real world 
practices often differ due to contextual circumstances and the cognitive perceptions 
of decision makers. Furthermore, there is a dearth of direct academic evidence on 
how CG provides comfort to institutional investors and bankers given that CG 
practices and the institutional characteristics of developing countries are very distinct 
from those of developed countries.  
2.6 Corporate governance in developing countries 
This section discusses the CG problems in developing countries as suggested 
by the agency theorists, the reasons behind the adoption of CG codes based on an 
Anglo-American model, the effectiveness of CG codes based on an Anglo-American 
model, and prior research on five important CG mechanisms recommended by an 
Anglo-American model in developing countries.  
2.6.1 Corporate governance problems in developing countries 
Agency theorists argue that the main purpose of CG is to reduce agency 
problems (Section 2.2.1). This section, thus, discusses the type of agency problems 
faced by different types of companies in developing countries (Section 2.4.2).  
The presence of controlling family shareholders in privately-owned 
companies reduces agency problems between shareholders and managers (Bebchuk 
and Hamdani, 2009). However, it increases agency conflicts between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008; Bertrand et al., 2002; 
Bae et al., 2002; Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Kuo and 
Hung, 2012). This is because controlling family shareholders, having greater control 
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on decision making (Bammens et al., 2011; Morck and Yeung, 2004), have the 
opportunity to expropriate minority shareholder interests (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Kuo and Hung, 2012).  
CG researchers labelled this expropriation by controlling family shareholders 
with different terminologies such as private benefits of control (Denis and 
McConnell, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004), tunnelling (Johnson et al., 2000), 
expropriation of minority shareholders’ interest (Faccio et al., 2001), entrenchment 
(Claessens et al., 2000), and more recently principal-principal conflicts (Jiang and 
Peng, 2011; Young et al., 2008, p. 197; Dharwadkar et al., 2000, p. 651) and ‘agency 
problem II’
5
 (e.g., Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Kuo and Hung, 2012). According to 
agency theorists (e.g., Claessens and Fan, 2002; Liew, 2007; Su et al., 2008; Young 
et al., 2008; Love, 2010), an important purpose of a CG reform in a developing 
country is to reduce the private benefits of control enjoyed by controlling family 
shareholders. 
In government-owned companies, the government, being a controlling 
shareholder, can act as an effective monitor of government appointed managers 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Yarrow et al., 1986). However, the objective of 
government monitoring is not always to increase shareholder wealth because a 
government sometimes tries to maximise social welfare (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988), 
appoints board members, senior managers and other employees based on political 
connection with limited consideration of experience and qualification (Barberis et al., 
1996). More specifically, in a highly corrupted environment, government and 
government-appointed managers jointly expropriate the resources from government-
owned companies (Boycko et al., 1996; Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; Bhagwati, 1982). 
As a result, government-owned companies, when listed on stock markets, suffer from 
agency conflicts which are often worse than that in privately owned companies 
(Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009; Vining and Boardman, 1992).  
Finally, subsidiaries of foreign MNCs are significantly owned by foreign 
parent companies. The subsidiaries of foreign MNCs suffer from two types of agency 
conflicts: (1) between managers at headquarters and managers at subsidiaries, and (2) 
                                                          
5
 ‘The large shareholder may use its controlling position in the firm to extract private benefits at the 
expense of the small shareholders’ (Villalonga and Amit, 2006, p. 387). 
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between managers at subsidiaries and local shareholders (Du et al., 2011; Roth and 
O’Donnell, 1996; Keil et al., 2006). Of these two, agency conflicts between 
managers at headquarters and managers at subsidiaries is dominant (Du et al., 2011; 
Roth and O’Donnell, 1996) because local shareholders own only a minimum 
percentage of the subsidiaries of foreign MNCs (Keil et al., 2006). The main reason 
for the agency conflict between managers at headquarters and managers at 
subsidiaries is subsidiary managers’ intention to execute strategies that promote local 
responsiveness at the expense of global integration (Doz and Prahalad, 1984). In 
order to promote global integration, managers at headquarters share institutions and 
corporate governance (Chari et al., 2010) through the appointment of a significant 
proportion of expatriates in top management positions (Boyacigiller, 1990; Jaussaud 
and Schaaper, 2006), staffing key management positions with personnel from 
regional headquarters (Jaussaud and Schaaper, 2006), the transfer of human resource 
practices (Björkman and Lervik, 2007), introduction of international accounting 
practices (Chari et al., 2010)  and corporate culture (Baliga and Jaeger, 1984). 
2.6.2 Reasons for corporate governance reform in developing 
countries 
Prior research explains the adoption of CG codes around the world by using 
two theories: (1) efficiency and (2) institutional legitimacy (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). The proponents of CG reform in 
developing countries defend their strategy using efficiency-based reasons. They 
argue that CG reform will ensure (1) greater access to external financing by firms, 
(2) lower cost of capital and associated higher valuation of firms, (3) better 
operational performance of firms, and (4) more favourable treatment of all 
stakeholders (ROSC, 2013; IFC, 2013; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2012, p. 17; 
Claessens, 2006, p. 99; Global Corporate Governance Forum, 2005, p. 6).   However, 
prior research on the adoption of CG codes based on an Anglo-American model in 
developing countries indicates the domination of legitimacy-based reasons (e.g., 
Reed, 2002; Liew, 2008; Siddiqui, 2010). These legitimacy-based reasons include: 
direct and indirect coercive pressures from the IFIs (Reed, 2002; Siddiqui, 2010; 
Cuervo, 2002; Reid, 2003); intention to attract international institutional investors 
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(e.g., Rwegasira, 2000 in Africa; Yakasai, 2001 and Okike 2007 in Nigeria; 
Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006 in Cyprus; Liew, 2007 in Malaysia); and to 
restore the confidence of the market participants after the financial crisis (Oman, 
2001; Liew, 2007 in Malaysia).    
2.6.3 Inefficiency in implementation of an Anglo-American model 
of corporate governance in developing countries  
The institutional characteristics of a particular country have an important 
bearing on the implementation of a newly adopted CG code (Klapper and Love, 
2004; Doidge et al., 2007; Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006; Auilera et al., 2008). 
This is because the institutional characteristics of a country influence the private 
benefits of control of the existing controllers of companies and the efficiency in 
implementation the CG code. 
Prior research in a cross-country setting finds that private benefits of control 
are positively associated with ownership concentration (Dyck and Zingales, 2004) 
and negatively associated with the depth of capital markets (Dyck and Zingales, 
2004) and legal rights of minority shareholders (Nenova, 2003; Chari et al., 2010). 
This evidence indicates that private benefits of control are substantial in developing 
countries because of the institutional characteristics of developing countries (see 
section 2.4.2). Prior research evidenced use of different methods of extracting private 
benefits of control by controlling families in developing countries: (1) the 
appointment of less qualified family members or friends as executive managers 
(Faccio et al., 2001; Bertrand and Schoar, 2006); (2) execution of related-party 
transactions with organizations owned by, or associated with, controlling 
shareholders at non-arms-length terms (Cheung et al., 2006; Chang and Hong, 2000; 
Khanna and Rivkin, 2001); (3) execution of mergers between affiliated entities to 
extract resources out of the bidder or target (Johnson et al., 2000; Bae et al., 2002); 
(4) performance of strategies to advance personal, family, and political interest of 
controlling families (Backman, 1999; Bammens et al., 2011). A group of researchers 
argue that when private benefits of control are high, existing controllers of 
companies impede change in CG in order to protect these benefits (Bebchuk and 
Roe, 1999; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; 2003a; Rosser, 2003).  
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The institutional characteristics of a country also affect efficiency in the 
implementation of a newly adopted CG code. This is because the CG structure is 
embedded in a country’s economic, legal, political and cultural structure (e.g., 
Doidge et al., 2007; Khanna et al., 2006; Li and Harrison, 2008; Wanyama et al., 
2009; Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; 2010). 
Firstly, the ownership structure of developing countries (see Section 2.4.2) 
reduces the monitoring and advising ability of independent directors (Jackling and 
Johl, 2009; Singh and Gaur, 2009). Moreover, institutional investors, being new and 
owning a minimum ownership percentage of companies, have limited disciplining 
ability to ensure compliance with a ‘comply or explain’ basis CG code by reducing 
the share price of companies that are poorly complied (Hamdani and Yafeh, 2013; 
Belev, 2003; Nam et al., 2001; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000).  
Secondly, poor investor protection rights affect insider’s motivation for 
compliance with the newly adopted CG codes in different ways. When investor 
protection rights are poor, firms need to maintain secrecy (La Porta et al., 2000) and 
to maintain secrecy insiders become reluctant to share information with diverse 
groups such as independent directors. Moreover, poor investor protection rights 
reduce outside investors’ and creditors’ ability to enforce compliance with CG codes 
(Klapper and Love, 2004).  
Thirdly, the illiquid and inefficient capital markets of developing countries 
indicate that there is lack of culture of equity finance (Mueller, 2006). The sponsor 
families are reluctant to issue a significant percent of shares in order to retain their 
private benefits of control (Fan et al., 2011; Singh, 2003; Black, 2001) or as a 
response to an institutional void emanating from weaker market and legal institutions 
in developing countries (Mueller, 2006; Luo and Chung, 2013). Illiquid and 
inefficient capital markets indicates that controllers of companies are not subject to 
adequate disciplinary pressures from stock markets (Paredes, 2004; Krambia-
Kapardis and Psaros, 2006) and costs savings from lower cost of capital due to 
compliance with CG (e.g. appointment of independent directors) is low (Doidge et 
al., 2007). On the other hand, the close relationship between banks and non-financial 
companies (Nam et al., 2001) and the extension of bank credit based on relationships 
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and collateral (Ahunwan, 2002) make banks reluctant to monitor the CG structure of 
non-financial companies.  
Fourthly, quality of accounting information is opaque in developing countries 
(Section 2.4.2). Whittington (1993) suggests that directors cannot carry out their 
monitoring and decision making functions effectively when accounting information 
is opaque. This is consistent with the argument of Aguilera et al. (2008) that 
independent directors cannot work effectively without the presence of adequate 
information disclosure.  
Fifthly, there is limited empirical evidence that takeover activities in 
developing countries helps in disciplining the managers of companies (see review of 
takeover literature in Asia by Sun et al., 2010). Rather, evidence shows that 
controlling families sometimes use the takeover mechanism to expropriate the 
interest of minority shareholders (Bae et al., 2002).  
Sixthly, extreme corruption in developing countries negatively affects 
insiders’ legitimacy to good governance practices (dela Rama, 2012; Berglöf and 
Claessens, 2006; Judge et al., 2008) and regulatory authorities’ enforcement 
capability (Rossouw, 2005; Okike, 2007). High levels of corruption also motivate 
insiders to maintain limited transparency because they often need to manage corrupt 
government agencies through illegal means (Dyer and Mortensen, 2005; p. 253).  
Finally, the culture of a country influences not only insiders’ motivation to 
comply with an Anglo-American model but also efficiency in implementation of an 
Anglo-American model. This is because the culture of a country influences people’s 
attitude towards opportunistic behaviour (Doney et al., 1998), ethical practices (Chan 
and Cheung, 2012), decentralised control systems (Li and Harrison, 2008) and 
transparency (Gray, 1988; p. 11). A society with high power distance, high 
masculinity, high uncertainty avoidance and high collectivism maintains negative 
attitude towards ethical practices (Chan and Cheung, 2012) and decentralised control 
systems (Li and Harrison, 2008). Similarly, a country with high power distance and 
high uncertainty avoidance has a tendency to preserve confidentiality (Gray, 1988; p. 
11) and thus, results in limited accounting disclosure (Dahawy et al., 2002). This 
evidence implies that the culture of a country with aforementioned characteristics 
contradicts the notion of an Anglo-American model. 
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The aforementioned institutional characteristics, however, may have 
differential influence on the CG structure of local privately-owned, government-
owned and subsidiaries of foreign MNCs. This is because subsidiaries of foreign 
MNCs are less directly affected by the institutional characteristics of the host country 
(Kostova and Roth, 2002). 
2.6.4 Prior research on five corporate governance mechanisms 
suggested by an Anglo-American model in developing 
countries  
This section discusses prior research on five CG mechanisms: namely, 
separation of chairman and CEO, board of directors, audit committee, Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) and Head of Internal Auditor (HIA). 
2.6.4.1 Separation of CEO and Chairman of Board 
One of the important CG mechanisms suggested by the Anglo-American 
model is separation of CEO and chairman of the board of directors. This separation is 
suggested based on the agency theory that CEO duality increases CEO’s power and 
makes the board of directors a less effective monitor (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Prior 
archival evidence in the context of developed countries is mixed in this regard. To 
illustrate, prior literature on the impact of CEO duality on firm performance provides 
positive (Donaldson and Davis, 1991), negative (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Pi and 
Timme, 1993) and no association evidence (e.g., Berg and Smith, 1978; Chaganti et 
al., 1985; Rechner and Dalton, 1989; Baliga et al., 1996; Daily and Johnson, 1997). 
An improvement over archival evidence is made by Hendry (2012). This study 
interviewed a sample of FTSE 100 CEOs and chairmen and finds that, in reality, a 
chairman cannot curb the CEO’s discretion due to the practicality of the CEO’s job.   
In developing countries, CEOs are often members of controlling families 
(Claessens et al., 2000). Agency theorists argue that the controlling family affiliation 
of a CEO increases the risk of expropriation of minority shareholder resources (e.g., 
Bertrand et al., 2002). Hence, the appointment of an independent chairman or a 
professional CEO is recommended to reduce the expropriation of minority interests. 
However, there is an argument that controlling families appoint their members as 
CEOs as a response to the lack of market-based institutions in developing countries 
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(e.g., Burkart et al., 2003; Caselli and Gennaioli, 2013). Like developed countries, 
empirical evidence on the impact of CEO duality and firm performance is also 
mixed, as shown in Appendix 2.5. These studies, however, do not distinguish firms 
based on whether firms comply with the separation of chairman and CEO in form but 
not in substance, or both in form and in substance. Luo and Chung (2013) addressed 
this deficiency. They distinguish between family businesses based on ownership, 
strategic and operational control. Their results indicate that the appointment of an 
outside professional as a key operational manager reduces a controlling family’s 
ability to expropriate minority shareholders’ interest.  
2.6.4.2 Board of directors 
The Board of directors is regarded as the apex of a firm’s internal control 
system (Jensen, 1993).  According to agency theory, the board of directors is 
responsible for controlling and monitoring management and for running the company 
in the best interests of shareholders. Two dimensions of the board of directors have 
captured significant attention in prior literature both in developed and developing 
countries: board size and board independence. 
Board size 
 Prior research on the association between board size and firm performance, 
however, provides mixed evidence in a developed country’s context (see Adams et 
al., 2010; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003 for reviews). Researchers relate this mixed 
evidence with the ‘black-box’ approach taken by these studies and argue that the 
board of directors should be studied as an open system (Aguilera et al., 2008).  
The evidence on the association between board size and firm performance or 
accounting reporting quality in a developing country’s context, is also mixed, as 
shown is Appendix 2.5 and 2.6 respectively. Although several of these studies 
speculate that sponsor family members often excessively represent the board in 
developing countries and thus, sponsor families have strong influence on both 
strategic and operational decisions of the companies (Schulze et al., 2001; 2003), 
there is limited research on the details of family representation on the board of 





The appointment of independent directors on the board is advocated by 
agency theorists who perceive that the main role of the board of directors is to 
control and monitor opportunistic managers and thus, protect the interests of outside 
shareholders (Short et al., 1999, p. 339; Stiles and Taylor, 2001 cited in Zona and 
Zattoni, 2007). However, whether the independent directors are effectively executing 
their aforesaid responsibilities still remains an empirical question as archival 
evidence is mixed (see Adams et al., 2010; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003 for 
reviews). Some improvement have been made in this regard by several studies that 
directly survey or interview independent directors (e.g., Hooghiemstra and van 
Manen, 2004; Nowak and McCabe, 2003). Both of these studies find that, in 
practice, the monitoring role of non-executive directors is highly constrained by 
access to information which is under the strict control of the CEO.  
In the context of developing countries, there is a large body of recent archival 
research that investigates the association between board independence and firm 
performance (e.g., Black et al., 2012; Black and Kim, 2012; Chen et al., 2011; Ararat 
et al., 2010; Singh and Gaur, 2009). A summary of these studies is presented in 
Appendix 2.5. The main theoretical framework used by these studies is agency 
theory with limited reference to other theories. The results indicate that like 
developed countries, the effect of independent directors on firm performance is 
mixed.  
The evidence on the association between board independence and firm 
accounting reporting quality is also mixed, as presented in Appendix 2.6.  Being 
archival, each study defends its findings by speculating different reasons such as 
independent directors being a minority on the board cannot play a role (Black et al., 
2012); independent directors lack in-depth knowledge about all firms of a group and 
do not properly understand the value of coordination among affiliated firms and 
unnecessarily interrupt the working of insider directors (Singh and Gaur, 2009); and 
the control of the board by controlling shareholders makes the board a rubber stamp 
(Chen et al., 2011). A limited number of survey-based studies in developing 
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countries find that firms often appoint a person who has some sort of relationship 
with the controlling family or the CEOs of the firms and thus, apparently comply 
with board independence director(s) (Varottil, 2010; Tengamnuay and Stapleton, 
2009). These apparently independent directors are regarded as affiliated directors 
(BRC, 1999; Klein, 2002; Tengamnuay and Stapleton, 2009). Several researchers 
argue that affiliated directors are not able to speak out against the misdeeds of 
controlling shareholder managers or the CEOs in developing countries (Arosa et al., 
2010; Clarke, 2006).  
2.6.4.3 Audit committees 
In the Anglo-American model of CG, the audit committee is responsible for 
monitoring the reporting and audit processes of financial statements (Bédard et al., 
2004; Cohen et al., 2007). International best practices guidelines (e.g., BRC, 1999; 
Smith, 2003) recommend a set of provisions related to the audit committee which 
they believe are essential for its effectiveness.  
A large body of literature investigates the impact of these provisions on the 
quality of financial reporting (Srinivasan, 2005; Beasley et al., 2010; Carcello et al., 
2011; Cohen et al., 2010b; Klein, 2002; Naiker and Sharma, 2009; Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2008). This literature hypothesises that companies which complied 
better with the aforementioned provisions related to audit committees have better 
accounting reporting quality. The empirical evidence is, however, inconclusive. For 
example, Bédard and Gendron (2010) review 51 studies that investigate the 
association between the independence of the audit committee and accounting 
reporting quality. They report that 26 studies (51%) evidence a positive association 
with accounting reporting quality and 25 (49%) find no significant association. Most 
of these studies do not consider the contextual dynamic (e.g., relationship of the CEO 
with audit committee members) while investigating the association between audit 
committee characteristics and accounting reporting quality. One exception is 
Carcello et al. (2011) who report that audit committee independence and financial 
expertise do not have a negative association with financial restatements when the 
CEO is involved in the selection of directors. The qualitative studies on the audit 
committee also provide mixed evidence on its effectiveness. While early qualitative 
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evidence on the effectiveness of the audit committee indicates that audit committees 
mainly play ceremonial roles (e.g., Kalbers and Fogarty, 1998; Spira, 1999), recent 
research indicates that an audit committee plays both monitoring and ceremonial 
roles (Gendron and Bedard, 2006; Beasley et al., 2009).   
With respect to developing countries, there are only a limited number of 
empirical studies on the effectiveness of the audit committee. Appendix 2.5 shows 
that event studies related to the announcement of legal requirements for the 
appointment of audit committees positively increase market-based performance of 
firms in India (Black and Khanna, 2007) and Korea (Black and Kim, 2012). 
However, studies (e.g., Lo et al., 2010; Ararat et al., 2010; Chen and Nowland, 2010) 
that test the association between the audit committee and firm performance provide 
mixed evidence [Appendix 2.5]. Most of these studies do not provide any 
satisfactory explanation to defend their results. The main purpose of the audit 
committee is, however, to ensure quality of accounting reporting (Spira, 1998). 
Hence, a number of studies investigate the existence of an audit committee and 
accounting reporting quality. The evidence is again mixed [Appendix 2.6]. Most of 
these studies investigate the audit committee by recognizing as ‘black box’. Few 
survey-based (Lin et al., 2008; Tengamnuay and Stapleton, 2009) and interview-
based (Zain and Subramaniam, 2007; Salleh and Stewart, 2012) studies respectively 
investigate the characteristics and effectiveness of the audit committee in developing 
countries. These studies find that the audit committee lacks several characteristics 
which are perceived as essential for its effectiveness (Lin et al., 2008; Tengamnuay 
and Stapleton, 2009), and plays a limited role in upholding the independence of 
internal (Zain and Subramaniam, 2007) as well as external auditors (Salleh and 
Stewart, 2012). 
2.6.4.4 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
Although the CFO had traditionally been a ‘bean counter’ (i.e., responsible 
for bookkeeping and budget preparation), the CFO is now an ‘action hero’ (i.e., 
responsible for strategic decision making and oversight of financial reporting 
process) in the Anglo-American countries (Smith and Briggs, 1999). The strategic 
decision making role of the CFO is now well-established and the CFO is ‘often 
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second only to the chief executive officer (CEO) in the organizational hierarchy 
(Zorn, 2004). With respect to financial oversight responsibility, the CFO is 
equivalent to the chief executive officer (CEO) in USA (Tulimieri and Banai, 2010; 
Geiger and North, 2006). In that, under the Anglo-American model of CG CFO is 
regarded as one of the important CG mechanisms. However, simply hiring a CFO 
does not ensure the performance of CG roles (Li et al., 2010). The performance of 
CG roles depends on the qualifications (Aier et al., 2005; Li et al., 2010), level of 
authority (Bedard et al., 2011) and prior experience (Brochet and Welch, 2011) of 
the CFO. It is evidenced that accounting quality of firms is positively influenced by 
qualification (Aier et al., 2005; Li et al., 2010), board membership (Bedard et al., 
2011) and prior experience (Brochet and Welch, 2011). In developing countries, 
there is no research to my knowledge that tests the impact of CFO authority and 
qualifications on accounting reporting quality.   
2.6.4.5 Head of internal audit (HIA) 
Internal audit is a key component of sound CG practice (Spira and Page, 
2003). Internal audit is regarded as a prerequisite for the effectiveness of the audit 
committee. Prior research finds that a sound internal audit plays an important role in 
reducing information asymmetries between the audit committee and operational 
management (Raghunandan et al., 2001; Scarbrough et al., 1998). However, how 
effectively internal audit can play a role depends on several characteristics of the 
internal audit function of the company. More specifically, professional qualifications, 
experience (Prawitt et al., 2009) and the independence of internal audit (Christopher 
et al., 2009) and frequent meetings between internal audit and audit committee 
(Raghunandan et al., 2001; Sarens et al., 2009) are identified as essential 
requirements for the effectiveness of internal audit. The independence of internal 
audit is better ensured if the audit committee is given the sole authority to appoint 
and remove internal auditors (Christopher et al., 2009).  
However, prior evidence, even in Anglo-American countries, finds that the 
internal audit function does not exist in all companies (Christopher et al., 2009) and 
the internal audit function lacks skilled and trained staff (Griffiths, 1999). Hence, it 
may be obvious that the internal audit function either does not exist or work 
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effectively in developing countries (Ebaid, 2011). It may be because the presence of 
sponsor family members on the board of directors reduces the need for an internal 
audit function (Adams, 1994). 
2.6.5 Summary 
The evidence in this section indicates that agency conflicts in the context of 
developing countries are different from those of Anglo-American countries and that 
these agency conflicts depend on the types of ownership of companies (Section 
2.6.1). In addition, CG codes based on an Anglo-American model are more often 
adopted in developing countries due to legitimacy-based rather than efficiency-based 
reasons (Section 2.6.2). A likely consequence of the adoption of CG codes due to 
legitimacy-based reasons is ceremonial compliance. Moreover, the institutional 
characteristics of developing countries may negatively affect the level of compliance 
with CG codes based on an Anglo-American model because (1) institutional 
characteristics of developing countries positively affect the private-benefits of 
control of the existing controller, and (2) the institutional characteristics of 
developing countries hamper efficient implementation of CG codes (Section 2.6.3). 
Furthermore, the fragmented evidence with respect to different CG mechanisms 
suggested by an Anglo-American model indicates that they are to some extent 
ineffective in developing countries (Section 2.6.4). One important caveat of these 
studies is that they suggest reasons for the ineffectiveness of the board of directors 
because of control by sponsor families but they do not provide detailed accounts of 
how control by sponsor family affects different CG mechanisms. Finally, most of the 
archival studies that investigate the association between CG and firm performance, 
or accounting reporting quality, study the CG variable as a ‘black box’ and rarely 
distinguish between compliance in form rather than in substance and compliance in 
both form and substance.  
2.7 Prior research on level of compliance with corporate 
governance codes by firms  
A number of studies investigate the level of compliance (Arcot et al., 2010; 
Salterio et al., 2013; v. Werder et al., 2005; Talaulicar and v. Werder, 2008; 
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Akkermans et al., 2007) and non-compliance (MacNeil and Li, 2006; Hooghiemstra 
and van Ees, 2011; Hooghiemstra, 2012) with adopted CG codes in both Anglo-
American countries and non-Anglo-American countries. Studies that investigate 
level of compliance commonly find that the majority of companies comply with most 
of the provisions of the adopted CG codes, irrespective of their country of 
incorporation. For example, 96.81 per cent of German companies on average comply 
with 90.64 per cent of the provisions of German CG code (v. Werder et al., 2005) 
and 95 per cent or more of UK companies comply with certain provisions of the 
combined code (Arcot et al., 2010). These findings raise questions about the 
underlying logic of the ‘comply or explain’ principle of CG codes. Consequently, 
several researchers (e.g., Arcot et al., 2010; v. Werder et al., 2005; Akkermans et al., 
2007) explicitly caution that some companies may overstate compliance in 
compliance statements or annual reports and the underlying compliance may be 
different from the reported compliance.   
These researchers speculate several reasons for this seeming over-compliance 
with CG codes: pressures from capital markets (Arcot et al., 2010; v. Werder et al., 
2005; Akkermans et al., 2007) and peer companies (Wymeersch 2006; Talaulicar and 
v. Werder, 2008); monitoring by regulatory authorities such as stock exchanges and 
their regulators  (Wymeersch 2006; Arcot et al., 2010; Burton, 2000; Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004); pressures from spontaneous constituents such as academics, 
consultancy firms and the media  (Wymeersch, 2006; Akkermans et al., 2007); risks 
of reputational damage arising from non-compliance (Wymeersch 2006; 
Hooghiemstra and van Ees, 2011) and misinterpretation of disclosed ‘explanations’ 
justifying non-compliance with a CG provision (Moor, 2009; FRC, 2006).  
There is a dearth of direct evidence from companies regarding the reasons for 
high-level compliance with adopted CG codes. One exception is Sanderson et al. 
(2010) who interviewed directors, company secretaries and legal counsellors in the 
UK and Germany. They report that their interviewees perceived enormous pressures 
for compliance from institutional investors, general market participants, peer 
companies and the media. Their interviewees also perceived a huge risk of penalties 
and reputational damage for non-compliance. Furthermore, most of their 
interviewees both in the UK and Germany perceive that there is no difference 
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between a ‘comply or explain’ basis code and hard law in reality with respect to 
compliance. Hence, Sanderson et al. (2010) conclude that their interviewees maybe 
incorrectly, perceive that full compliance is the only acceptable response.  
In summary, the evidence on compliance with CG codes in developed 
countries indicates that companies tend to report full compliance with codes in 
response to different institutional pressures and several researchers doubt that there 
may be a gap between the compliance reported in compliance reports or annual 
reports and the actual underlying compliance. Hence, an important gap remains in 
this stream of research about whether the compliance reported in annual reports or 
compliance statements coincide with actual compliance.  
2.8 Conclusion 
Based on a review of theories that have been used in prior CG literature (see 
Section 2.2), I conclude that agency theory and neo-institutional theory are the most 
appropriate to investigate the accomplishment of the objectives of CG reform in a 
developing country. In respect of neo-institutional theory, I specifically intend to use 
Bebchuk and Roe’s (1999) theory of path dependence of CG.  With respect to RQ1, 
using interview data, I will investigate whether agency theory or theory of path 
dependence (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999) better explain the attitude of institutional 
investors and bankers towards the CG mechanisms suggested by the BCGG-2006. I 
will also use these two theories to formulate propositions related to RQ2. Moreover, I 
will use agency theory and the theory of path dependence supplemented by Oliver’s 
framework to formulated hypotheses related to RQ3.  
In Section 2.3, I presented different models of CG suggested by prior CG 
theorists and some detail on the Anglo-American model of CG. This section 
described the basic features of an Anglo-American model of CG. This analysis will 
help evaluate whether the BCGG-2006 is based on an Anglo-American model and 
interpret the findings of this thesis.  
In Section 2.4, I discussed the institutional characteristics of Anglo-American 
and developing countries. More specifically, based on prior literature, I shed light on 
how the institutional characteristics of developing countries are different from those 
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of Anglo-American countries. This analysis will help formulate propositions, 
hypothesis and help analyse the results of this study.   
In Section 2.5, I showed that prior literature on the impact of CG on 
investment and lending decisions has been studied using mainly archival methods 
and agency theory. This prior research provides mixed evidence, relies on a set of 
assumptions which remain debatable in the literature and takes a ‘closed system’ 
approach (Section 2.5.3). This indicates that there is an opportunity to extend this 
research using an ‘open system’ approach.  Furthermore, there is a dearth of research 
in this area on developing countries where CG codes based on an Anglo-American 
model have been adopted recently. Hence, this study will investigate the impact of 
CG on investment and lending decisions in a developing country context using an 
inductive approach. This justifies RQ1 of this thesis. 
The analyses in Sections 2.6.1 to 2.6.3 raised questions about the 
appropriateness and inefficient implementation of a CG code based on an Anglo-
American model in developing countries. The fragmented research which 
investigates a single dimension of CG does not give a complete picture of 
compliance (Section 2.6.4). Few studies that investigate compliance with CG codes 
mainly use annual report disclosures on compliance. These studies often cannot 
study the internal relationship between different mechanisms of CG in detail, due to 
data limitations. Hence, this study intends to extend the prior research on compliance 
with CG codes using a survey method. This justifies RQ2 of this thesis. 
Section 2.7 shows that prior literature on the level of compliance with CG 
codes finds that the level of compliance is apparently high and several prior 
researchers are suspicious about this high level of compliance. These studies also 
lack a systematic theoretical framework. The findings of these studies are often 
justified by speculation. This gap in the literature justifies RQ3 of this thesis.  
To investigate the research questions outlined in the introduction to this 
chapter, I discuss the institutional characteristics of Bangladesh and the emergence of 
CG in Bangladesh in chapter three. Then, using the reviewed literature of chapter 
two and the discussion in chapter three, I formulate sub-questions related to RQ1, 





Institutional Characteristics of Corporate 
Governance in Bangladesh 
3.1 Introduction 
The theory of path dependence of corporate governance (Section 2.2.7.1) 
posits that existing controllers of companies impede change to new CG practices 
because they want to protect their ‘rent’ produced by initial CG practices and the 
change to new CG practices may lead to ‘inefficiency’ (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). In 
order to understand the ‘rent protection’ motive of the existing controllers of 
companies and how the change to new CG practices leads to ‘inefficiency’, this 
chapter describes the historical development of the corporate sector and the present 
institutional characteristics of Bangladesh. This chapter will help formulate 
propositions and hypotheses and to discuss the findings of this study. 
Section 3.2 presents an economic overview of Bangladesh. Section 3.3 
discusses the political regimes of Bangladesh and their consequences for the 
development of family capitalism. Section 3.4 presents an overview of the present 
status of the corporate sector of Bangladesh. Section 3.5 discusses other important 
institutional characteristics. Section 3.6 discusses the emergence of a CG guideline 
based on an Anglo-American model in Bangladesh, its related characteristics and 
local authorities that are responsible for monitoring CG practices in Bangladesh. 
Section 3.7 provides an overview of the banking sector and credit rating agencies of 
Bangladesh. Section 3.8 concludes.  
3.2 An economic overview of Bangladesh 
The People’s Republic of Bangladesh (‘Bangladesh’) is a developing country 
in South Asia. In recent years, Bangladesh has maintained an impressive growth in 
its macroeconomic indicators. For example, during fiscal years 2006-2012, the 
average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate has been about 6.3 percent
6
. The 
                                                          
6
 Calculated by the author of this thesis based on individual annual GDP growth rate. 
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World Bank (2013) anticipates that the GDP of Bangladesh has a potential to grow at 
8 percent in the near future. Against this impressive economic outlook, concerns are 
raised about an alarming increase in disparity of national income distribution 
(D'Costa, 2012), and failure to attract adequate foreign direct investment (FDI) 
(UNCTAD, 2013). The disparity of national income distribution as measured by the 
GINI coefficient increased at 0.16 percent between 2000 and 2010 (Titumir and 
Rahman, 2011). The percentage of people living below the poverty line was 31.5 
percent as at 2010 (World Bank, 2013). The inflows of FDI decreased by 35.54 
percent from 2008 to 2009, increased by 30.42 percent and 24.42 percent in 2010 and 
2011 respectively and then, decreased by 12.85 percent in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2013). 
The World Bank (2013) argues that to achieve the desired 8 percent growth in GDP, 
Bangladesh needs to attract more FDI and one way to attract FDI is to improve the 
corporate governance structure. 
3.3 Historical development of the Bangladesh corporate 
sector 
Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan in 1971. After independence, 
the new government, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, embarked on socialism 
(Ahmed, 1978). The government nationalised all industries with total assets of more 
than TK 2.5 million (Mir and Rahaman, 2005), suspended the operation of the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange and restricted the role of the private sector (Rahim, 1978). Within a 
few years, the management of SOEs became highly politicised and corrupted 
(Ghafur, 1976; Ahmad, 1976; World Bank, 1993). Efficiency declined and losses 
became so high that the operating loss of SOEs consumed about 30% of annual 
project aid (Uddin and Hooper, 2003).  
General Ziaur Rahman came to power in 1975 (Uddin and Hooper, 2003). 
Zia built alliances with the military, the civil bureaucrats and the businessmen 
(Islam, 1986-1987). Islam (1984) observes that the businessmen dominated the 
Central Executive Committee of Zia’s political party as well as Zia’s parliament. 
Businessmen joined Zia’s alliance to gain state patronage and power (Jahan, 1980; p. 
208; Quadir, 2000). Zia’s industrial policy issued in 1975 encouraged the large scale 
privatisation of SOEs and increased the role of the private sector in the economy 
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(Ahmed, 1978; Rahim, 1978). By December 1979, 159 SOEs were returned to their 
original owners who were members of the bourgeois class created during the 
previous Pakistan regime and 200 SOEs were sold to private businessmen who were 
member of Zia’s alliance (World Bank, 1997; Rahim, 1978). Zia also approved the 
operations of a number of subsidiaries of foreign MNCs such as British American 
Tobacco and Glaxo SmithKline (Islam, 1986-1987). 
General Hossian Mohammad Ershad came to power in 1981 (Ahmed, 1998). 
Ershad built a new alliance and several of the members of Zia’s alliance joined 
(Nuruzzaman, 2004). He intensified the privatisation process by providing licences 
for private entrepreneurs to float banks and insurance companies (Nuruzzaman, 
2004). These licenses to float banks and insurance companies were given to 37 and 
44 entrepreneurial families respectively who had strong political affiliation with 
Ershad (Sobhan and Sen, 1989; Nuruzzaman, 2004). In order to satisfy the 
recommendation of the international financial institutions (‘IFIs’), Ershad sold shares 
of many SOEs under the 51-49 plan
7
 under the industrial policy of 1986 (Uddin and 
Hooper, 2003).  
Private sector-led economic policy, as initiated by military juntas and 
promoted by the IFIs, created a limited number of family-owned industrial groups 
who controlled manufacturing, and the financial and service sectors of Bangladesh 
(Nuruzzaman, 2004). These family-owned industrial groups largely determined the 
process of industrial development in Bangladesh (Niruzzaman, 2004).  
 After the military era, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (‘BNP’) headed by 
Khaleda Zia came to power in 1991. The Parliament of Khaleda Zia was dominated 
by businessmen (Jahan and Amundsen, 2012). The government of Khaleda Zia 
closely followed the IFIs’ economic policy (Kochanek, 1996), accelerated the 
privatisation process by establishing the Privatisation Board in 1993 (Khan and 
Ahmed, 1997) and privatised 449 SOEs up to May 1993 (Nuruzzaman, 2004). Most 
of these companies were sold to businessmen who were affiliated to the ruling 
government (World Bank, 2009; Uddin, 2005). 
                                                          
7 The government maintained control by retaining control 51 per cent of shares in each company and 
49 per cent of shares were sold by initial public offerings (Humphrey, 1990). 
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In 1996, the Bangladesh Awami League (‘BAL’) government led by Sheikh 
Hasina came to power but continued the privatisation and assured IFIs that they 
would strengthen the Privatisation Board (Uddin, 2005). Businessmen constituted 48 
per cent of its total membership (Jahan and Amundsen, 2012). The use of political 
connections with the ruling party and bribing party-leaders by businessmen became 
more predominant (Uddin and Choudhury, 2008).  
During the following decade, the BNP headed by Khaleda Zia (2001-2006) 
and the BAL headed by Sheikh Hasina (2009-to date) alternately ruled Bangladesh 
(Ahmed, 2010). In the present parliament, businessmen constitute 56 percent of total 
membership (Jahan and Amundsen, 2012). Both parties appointed their partisan 
supporters as chiefs of government and non-government institutions, and politicised 
those institutions (Jahan, 2003). The businessmen MPs use their political power to 
capture government contracts, influence government regulations in their favour and 
can easily disregard rules because of the politicisation of government institutions 
(Jahan and Amundsen, 2012). 
The government industrial policy and IFIs suggested reform initiative since 
independence patronise development of a generation of family-entrepreneurs who are 
still directly controlling their corporations (Lal, 2011, p. 161). In addition to the 
privately-owned companies, there are a number of government-owned companies 
which are ‘partially privatised’ through listing on the stock exchanges and a number 
of subsidiaries of foreign MNCs. These three types of companies are significantly 
different in terms of ownership and control, as discussed in Section 3.4.1.  
3.4 An overview of the current status of the Bangladesh 
corporate sector 
3.4.1 Corporate Ownership and Control 
Previous studies show that ownership of Bangladeshi companies is 
concentrated predominantly in non-financial sectors (Imam and Malik, 2007; Haque 
et al., 2011) and these top shareholders mostly belong to sponsor families (Imam and 
Malik, 2007).  
Previous studies do not distinguish among privately-owned, government-
owned and subsidiaries of foreign MNCs, although these three types of companies 
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are significantly different in terms of ownership structure. For example, a calculation 
by the author of this thesis, based on all listed companies at December 31, 2012
8
 
reveals that foreign parents of subsidiaries of MNCs retained between 55.8 and 95 
per cent of ownership while government retained more than 51 per cent of ownership 
in most government-owned companies listed on stock exchanges.  
The aforementioned three types of companies are also different in terms of 
control. Privately-owned companies are managed by sponsor family affiliated 
executive managers and board members. Haque et al. (2011) found that sponsor 
family members represent 61.7 per cent of board membership in non-financial 
companies. The government owned companies are managed by government 
appointed managers while the subsidiaries of foreign MNCs are generally managed 
by local professional managers.   
3.4.2 Institutional investors 
The presence of sophisticated institutional investors is essential for 
monitoring compliance with a ‘comply or explain’ basis code (e.g., Wymeersch, 
2006). In April 2011, institutional investors and foreign investors respectively owned 
10 per cent and 1 per cent of market capitalisation (World Bank, 2011).  Institutional 
investors mainly comprise mutual funds and life insurance companies (The Aries 
Group Ltd., 2012).  
The mutual fund industry of Bangladesh is relatively new, smaller than that 
of other emerging markets and lacks professionally trained managers to efficiently 
run its operations (The Aries Group Ltd., 2012). On 30 June 2011, there were six 
asset management companies managing 35 mutual funds (BSEC, 2010-2011). 
The Insurance industry of Bangladesh is still underdeveloped, suffers from 
undercapitalisation and lacks professional managers and trained insurance agents 
(The Aries Group Ltd., 2012). On 30 June 2011, there were ten life insurance 
companies in Bangladesh (BSEC, 2010-2011). Institutional investors as a whole 
have been found reluctant to play an active role in monitoring the management of 
these companies (ADB, 2005; World Bank, 2009). 
                                                          
8
 Data were taken from the Dhaka Stock Exchange website at December, 2012. 
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3.4.3 Rights of outside shareholders 
The rights of shareholders are protected by the Companies Act 1994. 
However, the exercise of statutory shareholder rights in reality is not straightforward. 
Shareholders’ access to information is not free of charge and smooth (World Bank, 
2009). Managements control the proceedings of the annual general meeting (AGM) 
by appointing a small group of people who prevent the participation of general 
shareholders in the discussion (Uddin and Chowdhury, 2008). Ultimately, 
shareholders have no ability to elect and remove directors (BEI, 2003). There have 
been no prosecutions for insider trading (World Bank, 2009; 2011). Furthermore, the 
judicial systems of Bangladesh are so inefficient and corrupt that shareholders cannot 
enforce their legal rights (The Aries Group Ltd, 2012). 
On the other hand, shareholders are reluctant to attend and have limited 
interest in, and ability to contribute to, the proceedings of AGMs (BEI, 2003).  
3.4.4 Capital Market 
Bangladesh has two stock exchanges. DSE (Dhaka) is the main stock 
exchange in Bangladesh (World Bank, 2009) and most of the securities traded on 
CSE (Chittagong) are listed on DSE. In terms of number of listed companies (242), 
market capitalisation ($29,839 million) and market capitalisation as a percentage of 
gross domestic products (GDP) (26.27 percent), DSE is one of the smallest stock 
exchanges in South Asia as on December 31, 2012 (World Federation of Exchanges, 
2012).  
The companies listed on stock exchanges are less than 10 per cent of total 
public limited companies in Bangladesh (Chowdhury, 2013). The public limited 
companies do not perceive stock markets as a viable source of finance as bank loans 
are easily available on favourable terms (BEI, 2003). The volatility of stock prices in 
DSE since 2009 was so high that prominent Bangladeshi economist Rahman Sobhan 
labelled DSE as a ‘Casino’ (The Daily Star, 2011). DSE is populated mostly by ill-
informed retail ‘momentum’ investors who have a low level of financial literacy 
(The Aries Group Ltd., 2012). Relatively few large investors, thus, can easily 
manipulate share price. The DSE crashed several times during 2009-2011 and street 
protests by general investors compelled government to form a probe committee. The 
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report of the probe committee revealed that 60 influential individuals, most of whom 
were pro-government business magnates and top officials of BSEC, manipulated the 
market (Khalid, 2011).  
3.4.5 Information environment 
Every company in Bangladesh prepares audited financial statements which 
present a ‘true and fair view’ of the state of affairs of the company (Section 181, 
Companies Act 1994). The Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987 supplement the 
Companies Act 1994 and state that companies in Bangladesh shall follow accounting 
standards adopted by Institute of Chartered Accountant of Bangladesh (ICAB) in 
preparing financial statements. Since 1997, the official accounting standards for 
preparing and presenting financial statements are International Accounting Standards 
(IASs) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as adopted by the 
ICAB (Chowdhury, 2012).  
A report by the World Bank (2009, p. 4) however, states that ‘[The] ICAB has 
incorporated a number of international standards, but not all have been adopted, and 
some that have not been updated’. Moreover, there is a company culture of non-
compliance with IASs/IFRSs (Mir and Rahaman, 2005; World Bank, 2003) and 
avoidance of disclosure mandated by IASs/IFRSs (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Uddin 
and Hooper, 2003; Akhtaruddin, 2005). For example, Mir and Rahaman (2005) find 
that the level of compliance with IASs is not satisfactory while Akhtaruddin (2005) 
finds that companies on average disclose only 44 per cent of mandatory items. 
Furthermore, the reliability of accounting reports in Bangladesh has persistently been 
questionable (World Bank, 2003; Wu, 2005). For instance, Wu (2005) finds that 
more than 50 per cent of Bangladeshi firms disclose less than 50 per cent of sales 
revenue on tax returns.  
Prior researchers have identified a number of reasons for poor compliance 
with IASs/IFRSs and the limited reliability of financial statements. Firstly, 
accounting professional bodies lack the capacity to provide quality education and 
training, and monitor adherence to professional ethics (World Bank, 2003). For 
example, there is no independent oversight body for monitoring the quality of 
external audit (World Bank, 2003; World Bank, 2009). The ICAB is responsible for 
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monitoring audit quality but there is limited evidence that this self-regulation process 
works effectively (Siddiqui, 2010; World Bank, 2009). Secondly, the number of 
quality audit firms (Siddiqui, 2012) and qualified professional accountants is still 
insufficient relative to the size of the economy (World Bank, 2009; 2011).  Finally, 
due to competition among external auditing firms, external auditors are poorly paid 
and they often compromise their independence and integrity to company managers 
(Uddin and Chowdhury, 2008; Mir and Rahman, 2005; World Bank, 1998; Karim 
and Moizer, 1996). 
3.4.6 Other related characteristics of the Bangladesh corporate 
sector 
Given a weak managerial labour market, in a country like Bangladesh, it is 
difficult to find competent managers to replace existing ones (Estrin and Wright, 
1999). Bangladesh is characterized as a patrimonial, patron-client relationship-based 
society under which the prosperity of individuals depends on their loyalty to higher 
authority (Franda, 1982, p. 332). As a result, company officials below the top 
management serve the interest of the controlling shareholder managers instead of 
general shareholders (Uddin and Hooper, 2003). There is no legal protection of 
whistleblowers in Bangladesh (World Bank, 2009). 
An active market for corporate control is regarded as an important 
complementary factor of Anglo- American corporate governance models 
(Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011; Weimer and Pape, 1999; Moreland, 1995; 
Sykes, 1994). In Bangladesh, an active market for corporate control is absent 
(Farooque et al., 2007). 
3.5 Other important institutional characteristics of 
Bangladesh 
3.5.1 Rampant corruption 
Bangladesh was ranked the most corrupt country in the world over 2001- 
2005 on the Corruption Perception Index (TIB, 2005) with little improvement 
subsequently (TIB, 2012). This high level of corruption is the result of strong 
interpersonal ties between corrupt high level government officials and businessmen 
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(Ahmed, 2010). Endemic corruption negatively affects accountability and good 
governance (Haque, 2011; Mir and Rahman, 2005). A number of studies that 
investigate the implementation of IAS/IFRS in Bangladesh argue that endemic 
corruption in Bangladesh impedes the effective implementation of IAS/IFRS (Mir 
and Rahman, 2005; Chowdhury, 2012). 
3.5.2 National culture 
Bangladesh is characterised as a country with high power distance, high 
masculinity, high uncertainty avoidance and high collectivism (Hofstede et al., 
2010). The concentration of authorities and power at the top is evident in every 
sphere of life in Bangladesh from political parties to individual families (Kochanek, 
2000; Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). People in a society with high collectivism are 
less opportunistic (Li and Harrisson, 2008; Doney et al., 1998) but people in a 
society of higher power distance and masculinity are more opportunistic (Li and 
Harrisson, 2008; Doney et al., 1998). The high level of corruption from top to low 
spheres of Bangladesh suggests the opportunism of its people. High opportunistic 
behaviour negatively affects trust among members of society (Doney et al., 1998). 
3.5.3 Antagonistic political environment 
As mentioned in Section 3.3, Bangladesh has been ruled by two patrimonial 
political parties: the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, headed by Khaleda Zia, and the 
Bangladesh Awami League, headed by Sheikh Hasina alternately since 1991. 
However, this bipartisan political system has not led to the development of a 
democratic system (Hagerty, 2008; Jahan and Amundsen, 2012).  The political 
environment of Bangladesh is characterised by violence and hostility between the 
two patrimonial political parties (Ahmed, 2013; D'Costa, 2012). 
3.6 Corporate governance (CG) in Bangladesh 
3.6.1 Emergence of the Bangladesh Corporate Governance  
Guidelines-2006 
The CG structure of Bangladesh attracted the attention of IFIs and the 
domestic regulators after the stock-market crash in 1996. In November 1997, the 
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Asian Development Bank (ADB) funded an $80.00 million project to transform 
Bangladesh capital markets towards an Anglo-American model, which included 
institutional reforms within the Bangladesh Securities Exchange Commission 
(BSEC), automation of the stock exchanges and changing capital market laws and 
regulations (ADB, 1997). This programme consists of seven technical assistances; 
one of them is Building Capacity of the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Selected Capital Market Institutions which costs $1.10 million. The first objective 
was to draft a comprehensive CG manual for public limited companies and security 
issuers. This project was executed by the ADB with the help of The Aries Group 
Ltd., a consultant from USA. The consultant formulated a CG guideline in line with 
the OECD’s Principles of CG (ADB, 2005). The Bangladesh Securities and 
Exchange Commission (BSEC) adopted the guideline in 2006 (BSEC order No. 
SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/Admin/02-08, dated 20 February 2006).  
However, another initiative was started by a IFIs-funded private-sector think-
tank organization, Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI). In 2003, BEI conducted a 
comprehensive study on CG practices in Bangladesh and recognised that the 
Bangladesh corporate sector lacked sound CG due to country-level institutional 
weaknesses such as a lack of a qualified accounting and auditing profession, 
ineffective and inefficient government-funded regulatory agencies and a lack of 
effective financial media and shareholder groups. In 2004, BEI issued a CG code in 
line with the OECD Principles of CG-1999. Both projects of the BEI were funded by 
the Department for International Development (DFID), the Commonwealth 
Secretariat and the Global Corporate Governance Forum (BEI, 2003, p. 3). Siddiqui 
(2010) argues that the IFIs use BEI ‘to pass on policies to the government’ (p. 266) 
and raise awareness about CG in private and public sectors. The World Bank (2009) 
finds that most companies in Bangladesh do not comply with the CG code of BEI-
2004, indicating that the awareness that IFIs tries to create through BEI does not 
significantly change the behaviour of public limited companies.  
As mentioned earlier, the BSEC adopted a Corporate Governance Guideline 
in 2006 (hereafter The BCGG-2006) on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. Siddiqui (2010) 
argues that by adopting the BCGG-2006, which is remarkably similar to the CG code 
of BEI, the BSEC proved its legitimacy to the IFIs. According to the BCGG-2006, 
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listed companies have to include a ‘comply box’ in their annual report or otherwise 
explain the reason for non-compliance. The BCGG-2006 is subsequently considered 
as part of the listing rules of both the DSE and CSE. The inclusion of the BCGG-
2006 in the listing rules of stock exchanges creates coercive pressures (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004), as evident by subsequent disclosure of high-level 
compliance by public limited companies. For example, reported average compliance 
with the BCGG-2006 reached 83 percent in 2008 (World Bank, 2009, p.41).  
The financing of CG related projects of BEI by the IFIs and direct 
involvement of the ADB in drafting the BCGG-2006 and subsequent adoption of the 
BCGG-2006 by the BSEC indicate that IFIs create both normative and coercive 
pressures on the BSEC regarding CG reform in Bangladesh and on public limited 
companies regarding improvement of their CG practices. 
3.6.2 Main provisions of the BCGG-2006  
This thesis focuses on compliance with the BCGG-2006, the content of which 
is described in this section. 
3.6.2.1 Board of Directors 
 Different individuals should preferably be appointed in the positions of the 
chairman of the board and the CEO of the company. The respective roles and 
responsibilities of the chairman and the CEO should be clearly defined (The 
BCGG-2006, section 1.3). There is no independence requirement for the 
chairman of the board.  
 The board of directors comprises between 5 and 20 members (The BCGG-
2006, section 1.1). There is no requirement to appoint representatives of the 
minority shareholders on the board.  
 Companies shall appoint 10 per cent of total board members, subject to a 
minimum of one, as independent directors on the board. This suggests that 
independent director (s) will be a minority on the board. The existing board 
of directors is responsible for the appointment of independent director(s). 
This provision may give an opportunity to the sponsor directors to appoint 
someone related to them. The independent director(s): (1) cannot hold any 
shares in the company or can hold less than one percent (1%) shares of the 
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total paid-up shares of the company; (2) cannot be a family member of the 
company’s promoters or directors or shareholder who holds one percent (1%) 
or more than one percent (1%) shares of the total paid-up shares of the 
company; (3) cannot have any other relationship, whether pecuniary or 
otherwise, with the company or its subsidiary/associated companies; (4) 
cannot be a member, director or officer of any stock exchange; and (5) cannot 
be a shareholder, director or officer of any member of stock exchange or an 
intermediary of the capital market (The BCGG-2006, section 1.2). The 
BCGG-2006 is silent about any academic or business-experience related 
qualification for the independent director.  
 The Companies Act, 1994 requires that a company shall convene at least one 
meeting of the board of directors in every three months and at least four such 
meetings during a year. The BCGG-2006 (section 1.4) does not set any new 
requirements regarding the number of board meetings but requires disclosures 
regarding the number of board meetings held during the year and attendance 
by each director at those meetings.  
3.6.2.2 The Audit Committee  
The BCGG-2006 introduced the concept of an audit committee (AC). The 
main responsibility of the AC is to assist the board of directors in ensuring that (1) 
the financial statements of the company reflect a true and fair view of the state of 
affairs of the company, and (2) a good monitoring system exists within the business 
(The BCGG-2006, section 3). The provisions related to AC are as follows: 
 The AC should comprise at least three members of the board of directors.  
 At least one member of the AC should be an independent director. 
 One member of the AC should be selected as the chairman of the AC. The 
chairman should have a professional qualification or knowledge, 
understanding and experience of accounting or finance. 
 The BCGG-2006 is silent regarding the number of AC meetings in a year. 
However, SEC notification and Stock Exchange listing rules require firms to 
publish their quarterly financial statements in at least two daily newspapers 
and quarterly earnings through the website of stock exchanges. If the audit 
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committee’s main responsibility is to ensure transparency of financial 
statements, at least four meetings per year seem obvious. 
 The activities of the AC should be communicated to the board of directors of 
the company, the BSEC and the shareholders and general investors. The AC 
only needs to communicate with BSEC if the board of directors does not take 
necessary action to rectify any weakness in the internal control systems of the 
company discovered by the AC, and it feels that the weakness in the internal 
control systems has a material impact on the financial condition and 
performance of the company.  
3.6.2.3 The Head of Internal Audit (HIA)  
Companies are recommended to appoint a HIA and the board of directors is 
assigned to clearly define respective roles, responsibilities and duties of the HIA 
(The BCGG-2006, section 2). 
3.6.2.4 The Chief Financial Officer (CFO)  
Companies are recommended to appoint a CFO and the board of directors is 
assigned to clearly define respective roles, responsibilities and duties of the CFO. 
The CFO of the company is entitled to attend board meetings of the company except 
that part of the meeting which involves consideration of an agenda item relating to 
the CFO (The BCGG-2006, section 2).  
3.6.2.5 External audit and non-audit services 
 Companies are recommended not to appoint same external auditor for more 
than three years consecutively. 
 Companies are also recommended  not to engage their  external auditors to 
perform the following services; namely:-  
(i) Appraisal or valuation services or fairness opinions; (ii) Financial 
information systems design and implementation; (iii) Book-keeping or other 
services related to the accounting records or financial statements; (iv) Broker-
dealer services; (v) Actuarial services; and (vi) Internal audit services (The 
BCGG-2006, section 4). 
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3.6.3 Organization related to enforcement of CG 
The main organisations involved in the enforcement of CG are the 
Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC), The Bangladesh Bank 
(BB), The Institute of Chartered Accountant of Bangladesh (ICAB), The Registrar of 
Joint Stock Companies (RJSC), the DSE and CSE. As CG in the banking sector is 
not covered in this thesis, I do not discuss BB.   
3.6.3.1 The Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) 
The BSEC is the government agency established in 1993 under the Securities 
and Exchange Commission Act 1993. The BSEC is a statutory body and is attached 
to the Ministry of Finance. The board of the BSEC consists of a chairman and four 
commissioners who are appointed on a full time basis by the government. The 
objective of the BSEC is to protect the interest of investors, maintain fairness, 
transparency and efficiency of the stock market and ensure compliance with 
securities laws (Hossain et al., 2005). To fulfil this objective, the BSEC is entrusted 
with significant rule making and enforcement power such as monitoring issuers, 
investigating any misconduct of issuers, imposing financial penalties on issuers and 
even reconstituting the board of directors of companies.  
Although the BSEC has exercised some of these powers in recent years
9
, it is 
still largely ineffective as a regulator of companies and stock exchanges (The Aries 
Group Ltd., 2012, p. 24). There is no significant improvement in its budgets, number 
of employees and employee remuneration since 1993 (World Bank, 2011). The 
employment and retention of highly qualified employees who are capable to 
discharge the monitoring and enforcement activities efficiently are hampered because 
of poor employee remuneration (The Aries Group Ltd., 2012; World Bank, 2009). In 
addition, the information systems of the BSEC are outdated (The Aries Group Ltd., 
2012). 
3.6.3.2 The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB) 
The ICAB is responsible for setting accounting and auditing standards for 
Bangladesh (The Securities and Exchange Rules, 1978). ICAB is regarded as one of 
                                                          
9
 BSEC recently constitute board of directors of one company (World Bank, 2009) 
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self-regulatory bodies of CG in Bangladesh because of its activities regarding the 
disciplining of members through the development of a code of ethics and a code of 
conduct. ICAB accepts a Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants in SAFA 
Countries (2004) as its Code of Ethics.  The Code of Conduct of ICAB lists 
activities which will be regarded as misconduct and ICAB can take disciplinary 
action against members who are involved in those activities. However, all these 
codes seem to have limited application in practice (World Bank, 2009). The ability of 
the ICAB as a self-regulated accounting oversight body remains questionable (The 
Aries Group Ltd., 2012). The ICAB has no role regarding monitoring of compliance 
with the BCGG-2006 as the compliance checklist that a company needs to include in 
its annual report is not subject to audit. Hence, ICAB can only play a voluntary role 
regarding enforcement of the BCGG-2006.  
3.6.3.4 The Registrar of Joint Stock Companies (RJSC) 
 
The RJSC has legal authority to enforce the provisions of the Companies Act, 
1994 (World Bank, 2003). However, the enforcement capacity of RJSC is limited 
because it: (1) does not have the technical capacity to identify accounting and 
auditing violations, (2) does not even enforce timely filing of annual audited 
financial statements, and (3) lacks up-to-date information to verify the number of 
companies that failed to submit their required annual audited financial statements 
(World Bank, 2009; 2011).  
3.6.3.5 DSE and CSE  
 
The two stock exchanges act as self-regulated bodies and can formulate rules 
with the approval of BSEC under Securities Exchange Rules 1987 (The Aries Group 
Ltd, 2012). It has been found that the stock exchanges of Bangladesh fail to play 
effective oversight roles which resulted in stock market collapse in December 2010 
(Khalid, 2011).  
With respect to the BCGG-2006, stock exchanges in Bangladesh can play an 
effective monitoring role to ensure compliance with the BCGG-2006 as the BCGG-
2006 is incorporated into listing rules of both the stock exchanges. The stock 
exchanges can delist a company for non-compliance with the BCGG-2006. Although 
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the DSE has delisted several companies for non-compliance with rules and 
regulations, there is no incidence of delisting for non-compliance with the BCGG-
2006.  
3.7 Banking sector and corporate credit rating agencies 
3.7.1 Banking sector and lending regulations  
The denationalisation of government-owned banks and permission to float 
banks under private initiatives started in 1982 gave rise to a private banking sector 
controlled by a few industrialist families (see Section 3.3). During 1982-1986, credit 
granting decisions in both private and state-owned banks remained under the control 
of few people who were affiliated to Ershad (Choudhury and Raihan, 2000). In 1987-
1989, the World Bank executed a Financial Sector Reform Programme in order to 
liberalise interest rates, improve the effectiveness of monetary policy, strengthen the 
supervisory and regulatory ability of the central bank, and reduce default loan by 
improving debt recovery process (Bhattacharya and Chowdhury, 2003). However, 
several objectives of the reform were not achieved due to government control over 
the central bank, the oligopolistic structure of the banking sector, collusive behaviour 
between banks and borrowers, and the dominance of few large borrowers 
(Bhattacharya and Chowdhury, 2003). 
Over the years, more licenses for floating new banks in private sectors were 
awarded to politically affiliated sponsors (Bhattacharya and Chowdhury, 2003; Beck 
and Rahman, 2006). On December 31 2011, the number of banks increased to 47 (4 
nationalised commercial banks, 4 specialised banks, 30 private commercial banks 
and 9 foreign owned banks). The banking sector of Bangladesh suffers from fierce 
competition and excess liquidity because of overwhelming growth in deposits 
(Siddiqui, 2010).  
A number of reform initiatives have also been undertaken since 1990. Based 
on the recommendations of the reform initiatives, Bangladesh Bank introduced a 
number of regulations collectively called prudential regulations for banks. Three 
among the prudential regulations for banks are relevant to the lending decisions of 
banks. These are:  (1) Credit Risk Grading (CRG) Manual (Bangladesh Bank, 2005); 
(2) restriction on lending to a Director of a bank or to his relatives (Bangladesh 
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Bank, 1999); and (3) prohibition of lending to a company with any director who is a 
loan defaulter (Bangladesh Bank, 1999). The main purpose of the CRG Manual is to 
quantify the credit risk of a prospective credit facility and help banks make lending 
decisions based on sound fundamentals and thus, avoid name-based lending 
(Bangladesh Bank, 2005). As per the CRG Manual (Bangladesh Bank, 2005), a risk 
grade is to be assigned to a prospective facility by using CRG Score Sheet [Appendix 
3.1]. The CRG Score Sheet does not put any weight on CG. 
, Prior  research documents that the successive reforms failed to eliminate the 
influence of political elites and sponsor shareholder directors on credit management 
and allocation decisions in national commercial banks and private commercial banks 
respectively  (Reaz and Arun, 2006; Bhattacharya and Chowdhury, 2003). In 
addition, there is still a concern among the IFIs regarding the financial oversight 
capacity of the regulator of banks, the Bangladesh Bank (ADB, 2011).  
3.7.2 Corporate credit rating agencies 
The first credit rating agency in Bangladesh was established in 2002. On 31 
December 2011 there were five credit rating agencies, of which three were 
established after January 2010. Credit rating agencies are regulated by the Credit 
Rating Company Rules, 1996 which sets out minimum licensing requirement for a 
credit rating company. According to the Credit Rating Company Rules 1996, a credit 
rating company should appoint at least two professional staff having professional or 
post-graduation degree in finance, accountancy, business, economics and/or law and 
experience for at least two years in credit rating or investment advisory activities. 
The World Bank (2011) raises a concern about the capacity and quality of credit 
rating agencies. The credit rating agencies are obliged to follow the Credit Risk 
Grading (CRG) Manual (BRPD Circular No. 18, dated December 2005) as described 
in Section 3.7.1. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter shows that Bangladesh has promising economic prospects but 
needs to overcome challenges that require good governance (Section 3.2). The 
political patronisation by the military juntas and the IFIs suggested reform initiatives 
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gave rise to a generation of family entrepreneurs (Section 3.3) who are still directly 
controlling their businesses.  
Institutions to complement an Anglo-American CG model are either absent or 
weak. Corporate ownership and control remains concentrated in the hands of 
entrepreneurial families, government or parents of subsidiaries of foreign MNCs, 
depending on the nature of companies (Sections 3.4.1). Institutional investors lack 
motivation and the capacity to play a monitoring role (Section 3.4.2), rights of 
shareholders are not protected and shareholders cannot enforce their rights (Section 
3.4.3), the capital market is thin and highly volatile (Section 3.4.4), the level of 
accounting disclosure and reliability of accounting information are poor (Section 
3.4.5), the market for labour and corporate control do not function properly (Section 
3.4.6). These characteristics suggest that agency theory is less applicable in studying 
CG reform in Bangladesh. Moreover, other important institutional characteristics 
such as rampant corruption (Section 3.5.1), national culture (Section 3.5.2), and the 
lack of a democratic system (Section 3.5.3) are not conducive to an Anglo-American 
CG model.  The corporate specific and other institutional characteristics suggest that 
private benefits of control are high and efficiency in implementation of the BCGG-
2006 is low (see Section 2.6.3). This evidence indicates that the theory of path 
dependence of corporate governance (see Section 2.2.7.1) is more relevant in 
studying CG reform in Bangladesh. 
The development process of the BCGG-2006 suggests that the IFIs influence 
the adoption of BCGG-2006. It has already been argued by prior researchers in 
Bangladesh that the BCGG-2006 is adopted by the BSEC due more to legitimacy-
based reason than efficiency-based reasons (Section 3.6.1). An expected 
consequence of this can be symbolic compliance with the BCGG-2006 by companies 
without changing internal policies and practices.  Furthermore, the organisations 
responsible for monitoring compliance with the BCGG-2006 are incapable or 
reluctant (Section 3.6.3).   
Finally, the development and present characteristics of the banking sector 
suggest that there is an overlap between sponsor families of non-financial companies 
and that of banks (Section 3.7). As a result, few families can exercise control over 
credit granting decisions in both private and state-owned banks. Moreover, there was 
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no CRG Manual until recently and the present CRG Manual does not require an 
assessment of the CG of the borrower company. The credit rating agencies are newly 




Research Questions, Propositions and 
Hypotheses 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to develop research sub-questions, propositions and 
hypotheses relating to the research questions of this thesis (see Chapter One, Section 
1.2): RQ1. Do institutional investors and bankers perceive that the level of 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 by the investee or borrowing company positively 
influences the investment and lending decisions respectively in Bangladesh? RQ2.1. 
To what extent is the BCGG-2006 implemented in form rather than in substance? 
RQ2.2. Is there a relationship between the nature of compliance and firm 
performance? RQ3.1. To what extent does reported compliance with the BCGG-
2006, as reported in annual reports, overstate underlying compliance with the 
BCGG-2006? RQ3.2. Does the overstatement lead to a different relative ranking of a 
firms’ corporate governance? RQ3.3. What factors influence the overstatement of 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports? 
Section 4.2 develops sub-questions related to RQ1. Section 4.3 develops 
propositions related to RQ2.1 and RQ2.2 respectively. Section 4.4 develops 
hypotheses related to RQ3.1, RQ3.2 and RQ3.3.  
4.2 Research questions related to RQ1 
In Section 2.5.3, I show that prior literature on the impact of CG on the 
investment and lending decisions of institutional investors and bankers respectively 
has used mainly archival methods and agency theory. This prior research relies on a 
set of debateable assumptions to formulate hypotheses and takes a ‘closed system’ 
approach. Furthermore, this research is mainly conducted in a developed country 
context and provides mixed evidence.  This indicates that there is an opportunity to 
extend this research using an ‘open-system’ approach in a developing country 
context. This study, thus, takes an inductive approach to investigate the impact of CG 
on investment and lending decisions in Bangladesh. Based on the argument of prior 
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research I formulate two questions (RQ1.1a and RQ1.1b) and in order to provide a 
theoretical explanation of the findings of RQ1.1a and RQ1.1b, I formulate one 
question (RQ1.2) as shown below:   
Firstly, prior archival and experimental research hypothesises that CG of an 
investee and a borrower company has a positive impact on the investment and 
lending decisions of institutional investors (Section 2.5.1) and bankers (Section 
2.5.2) respectively. This prior hypothesis is primarily based on the argument that 
better CG reduces risk of self-dealing and insider trading behaviour. Hence, the first 
research question investigated by this project is:  
RQ1.1a How do the institutional investors and bankers in Bangladesh 
perceive a direct impact of a particular corporate governance mechanism of 
the BCGG-2006 on their investment and lending decisions respectively?  
This prior hypothesis is further based on the following two arguments: (1) 
sound CG positively affects firm performance and accounting reporting quality and 
(2) institutional investors and bankers prefer firms with better performance and better 
accounting reporting quality. Hence, if the interviewees’ response on RQ 1.1a 
indicates that it is worthwhile to investigate the indirect impact of CG on their 
decisions, the following research question is asked:   
RQ1.1b How do the institutional investors and bankers perceive the impact of 
a particular corporate governance mechanism of the BCGG-2006 on firm 
performance and accounting reporting quality?  
Secondly, prior academic research on the impact of CG on the investment and 
credit decisions of institutional investors and bankers respectively is mainly 
conducted in Anglo-American countries and at international level. That research 
mainly draws on agency theory. However, agency theory (1) does not consider the 
impact of social context on the behaviour of shareholders and managers and (2) may 
be less applicable in developing countries (Section 2.2.1). Practice-based research 
which investigates the impact of CG on the investment decisions of institutional 
investors at international level and at individual developing country level does not 
explicitly use any theory and provides contradictory evidence (Section 2.5.1). This 
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research, thus, intends to relate themes generated from the interviewees to a CG 
theory that better explains the impact of CG on the investment and credit decisions of 
institutional investors and bankers respectively in Bangladesh. Hence, the second 
research sub-question is: 
RQ1.2 Which theory of corporate governance explains better the impact of 
corporate governance on the investment and lending decisions of institutional 
investors and bankers respectively in Bangladesh? 
In order to answer the above sub-questions related to RQ1, this study 
interviews the investment managers of mutual fund management companies and life 
insurance companies, and credit rating analysts of banks and credit rating agencies 
using a semi-structured interview method (Section 5.3).  
4.3 Propositions related to RQ2 
The privately-owned companies of Bangladesh are significantly owned and 
strongly controlled by sponsor families (Section 3.4.1) indicating that agency conflict 
between controlling shareholder directors and minority shareholders is high (Section 
2.6.1). Furthermore, protection of minority shareholder interest in Bangladesh is 
weak (Section 3.4.3). Agency theory suggests that when country-level protection of 
minority shareholders rights is weak, companies opt into CG mechanisms that offer 
better protection to minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999; Mittion 2002; 
Klapper and Love, 2004). CG reform provides an opportunity for privately-owned 
firms to reduce agency conflict between controlling shareholder directors and 
minority shareholders (Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). 
Hence, according to agency theory, privately-owned firms implement the BCGG-
2006 in form and in substance in order to reduce high agency costs.  
   However, the ownership and control characteristics of privately-owned 
companies (Section 3.4.1) and institutional characteristics of Bangladesh (Sections 
3.4 and 3.5) suggest that sponsor families have an opportunity to extract private 
benefits of control (Section 2.6.1). These characteristics also suggest that ‘relative 
efficiency’ in implementation of the BCGG-2006, as it is based on an Anglo-
American model, is low (Section 2.6.3). According to the theory of path dependence 
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(Section 2.2.7.1), when private-benefits of control are high and ‘relative efficiency’ 
in implementation of a new CG guideline is low, controlling shareholders impede 
implementation of the CG guideline. However, there are institutional pressures for 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 (Section 3.6.1) and these institutional pressures 
equally apply to privately-owned companies. A logical impact of these on the 
implementation of the BCGG-2006 is that privately-owned companies either do not 
implement the BCGG-2006 or implement the BCGG-2006 in a symbolic manner.  
Thus, two competing theories provide competing predictions on compliance 
with the BCGG-2006 by privately-owned companies. Hence, the following 
propositions are: 
P2.1a1 Privately-owned companies in Bangladesh implement the BCGG-
2006 in form and in substance as implied by agency theory.  
P2.1a2 Privately-owned companies in Bangladesh either do not implement 
the BCGG-2006 or implement the BCGG-2006 in form but not in substance as 
implied by the theory of path dependence. 
Government-owned companies in developing countries which are listed on 
stock exchanges suffer from significant agency costs (Section 2.6.1). The persistent 
high-level corruption and low-level managerial efficiency of government-owned 
companies in Bangladesh (Section 3.3) indicate that agency conflict between 
government-appointed managers and outside shareholders is high (Ahunwan, 2002). 
Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau (2009) argue that pro-market reform
10
 creates an 
opportunity for government-owned companies to reduce high agency costs and thus, 
to increase performance. The BCGG-2006 is initiated by the BSEC with the aim to 
increase investor confidence by reducing agency costs. Hence, using agency theory, 
it can be argued that the government-owned companies take the opportunity to 
redress the conflict between government-appointed managers and outside 
shareholders by implementing the BCGG-2006 in form and in substance.  
However, persistent high-levels of corruption and low-levels of managerial 
efficiency in the government-owned companies of Bangladesh (Section 3.3) indicate 
                                                          
10
 The adoption of a CG Code is a sub-set of premarket reform (Reed, 2002) 
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that government or government appointed managers extract high private-benefits of 
control. According to the theory of path dependence, managers of government-
owned companies have an interest in impeding CG reform to protect their rent-
seeking behaviour (Rosser, 2003). In Bangladesh, Kochanek (1996) finds that the 
bureaucrats impede the implementation of liberalisation, privatisation and 
deregulation policies in order to protect their power and perks. Hence, the 
government owned companies either do not implement the BCGG-2006 or 
implement the BCGG-2006 in a symbolic manner as per the theory of path 
dependence.  
Thus, two competing theories provide opposite predictions on compliance 
with the BCGG-2006 by government-owned companies. Hence, the following 
propositions are: 
P2.1b1 Government-owned companies in Bangladesh implement the BCGG-
2006 in form and in substance as implied by agency theory. 
P2.1b2 Government-owned companies in Bangladesh either do not 
implement the BCGG-2006 or implement the BCGG-2006 in form but not in 
substance as implied by the theory of path dependence. 
As noted in Section 2.6.1, there is a relatively strong agency conflict between 
the managers at subsidiaries of foreign MNCs and managers at their headquarters but 
there is a minimal agency conflict between managers at subsidiaries and local 
shareholders. Local shareholders, having a minimal percentage of ownership, cannot 
exert enough pressure on subsidiaries of foreign MNCs for compliance with host 
country CG regulations (Keil et al., 2006). Prior research has indicated that the 
reduction in agency conflicts between subsidiaries of foreign MNCs and local 
shareholders through pro-market reform is minimal (Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 
2009). The subsidiaries of foreign MNCs in Bangladesh are significantly owned by 
their foreign parent (Section 3.4.1). Hence, using agency theory focused on the local 
relationship, it can be argued that subsidiaries of foreign MNCs implement the 
BCGG-2006 in form and in substance less than local privately-owned and 
government-owned companies.  
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However, the path of development of subsidiaries of foreign MNCs is 
different from that of local privately-owned and government-owned companies. The 
managers at headquarters share institutions and CG (e.g., staffing of key 
management positions with qualified and experienced employees and better 
corporate culture) with subsidiaries of foreign MNCs (see Section 2.6.1). The sharing 
of institutions and CG reduces the opportunity of managers at subsidiaries to extract 
private benefits of control to a minimum level (Chari et al., 2010). Thus, further 
reduction in private benefits of control of managers at subsidiaries due to compliance 
with the BCGG-2006 is negligible. Moreover, inefficiency in the implementation of 
the BCGG-2006 introduced by a local institutional void is less pronounced with 
respect to subsidiaries of foreign MNCs because there is a limited direct effect of 
local institutional environment on the subsidiaries of foreign MNCs (Kostova and 
Roth, 2002; Chari et al., 2010). Thus, according to the theory of path dependence, 
subsidiaries of MNCs will more effectively implement the BCGG-2006 than local 
privately-owned and government-owned companies.  
Thus, two competing theories provide opposite predictions on compliance 
with the BCGG-2006 by subsidiaries of foreign MNCs. Hence, following hypotheses 
follow: 
P2.1c1 Subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies implement the 
BCGG-2006 in form and in substance less than privately-owned and government-
owned companies as implied by agency theory.  
P2.1c2 Subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies implement the 
BCGG-2006 in form and in substance more than privately-owned and government-
owned companies as implied by the theory of path dependence.  
Agency theorists’ view is that CG reduces moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems and thus, compliance with a CG mechanism recommended by the BCGG-
2006 has a positive effect on firm performance (Section 2.2.1). On the contrary, the 
theory of path dependence suggests that existing controllers of companies impede 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 due to rent protection and low relative efficiency 
in implementation of BCGG-2006 (Section 2.2.7.1). However, companies are subject 
to coercive and normative pressures for compliance with the BCGG-2006 (Section 
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3.6.1). Consequently, companies will comply with the BCGG-2006 in form but not 
in substance. Prior research argues that testing the association between CG and firm 
performance is irrelevant because the CG mechanism, when adopted due to 
institutional pressures, only plays a ritualistic role (Cohen et al., 2008). This view is, 
however, criticised by a group of recent institutional researchers who argue that an 
organization’s response to institutional pressures varies because different 
organizations face institutional pressures of different strength (e.g., Lounsbury, 2008; 
Oliver, 1991). With respect to the implementation of a CG mechanism recommended 
by the BCGG-2006, this indicates that some companies may not implement the CG 
mechanism; some companies may implement it in form rather than in substance 
while some other companies may implement it in form and in substance. 
Accordingly, if there is an association between a CG mechanism and firm 
performance, it will vary depending on the nature of implementation of the CG 
mechanism. As agency theory does not make a distinction between compliance in 
form rather than in substance and compliance both in form and in substance, the 
following testable proposition related to RQ 2.2 is suggested: 
P2.2 There is a difference in performance among companies that do not 
implement a corporate governance mechanism introduced by the BCGG-2006, those 
that implement the corporate governance mechanism in form but not in substance 
and those that implement the corporate governance mechanism in form and in 
substance. 
Institutional theory indicates that when a CG mechanism is implemented in 
form rather than in substance, it plays a ritualistic role. Consequently, 
implementation of a CG mechanism in form rather than in substance is equivalent to 
non-implementation of the CG.  However, implementation of a CG mechanism both 
in form and in substance is different from non-implementation and implementation in 
form rather than in substance. It follows that the performance of a company that 
implements a CG mechanism in form rather than substance is not higher than that of 
a company that does not implement the CG mechanism. In addition, the performance 
of a company that implements a CG mechanism in form and in substance is higher 
than that of a company which does not implement the CG mechanism and that of a 
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company which implements the CG mechanism in form rather than in substance. 
This leads to the following propositions: 
P2.2a The performance of companies that implement a CG mechanism 
introduced by the BCGG-2006 in form but not in substance is not higher than that of 
companies that do not implement the CG mechanism. 
P2.2b The performance of companies that implement a CG mechanism 
introduced by the BCGG-2006 both in form and in substance is higher than that of 
companies that do not implement the CG mechanism.  
P2.2c The performance of companies that implement a CG mechanism 
introduced by the BCGG-2006 both in form and in substance is higher than that of 
companies that implement the CG mechanism in form but not in substance. 
Discussion related to P2.1 indicates that the motivation for the 
implementation of the CG mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-2006 varies among 
privately-owned companies, government-owned companies and subsidiaries of 
foreign MNCs. Previous research also shows that the effectiveness of a CG 
mechanism is affected by the ownership and control structure of companies 
(Bebchuk and Hamdani, 2009; Aguilera et al., 2008; Claessens et al., 2006). More 
specifically, CG mechanisms which effectively protect the interest of outside 
investors in a company without a controlling shareholder are often completely 
ineffective or harmful to protect the interests of outside investors of a company with 
a controlling shareholder (Bebchuk and Hamdani, 2009; Claessens, 2006). The 
characteristics of privately-owned companies of Bangladesh indicate that sponsors of 
companies maintain strong control and these sponsors are reluctant to reduce their 
control (Uddin and Chowdhury, 2008). This indicates that the CG mechanisms 
introduced by the BCGG-2006 are not effective in the case of privately-owned 
companies irrespective of their level of implementation. This suggests the following 
proposition related to RQ 2.2: 
P2.2d In the case of privately-owned companies in Bangladesh, corporate 
governance mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-2006 have no impact on firm 
performance irrespective of the level of implementation.  
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In order to investigate above propositions related to RQ2.1 and RQ2.2, 
survey responses (Section 5.4) and other data sources (Section 5.5) are used. The 
measurement of variables and the statistical tests used for testing the above 
propositions are detailed in Sections 5.6 and 5.8 respectively. 
4.4 Hypothesis related to RQ3 
This section develops hypotheses with respect to RQ3.1, RQ3.2 and RQ3.3. 
Agency theory suggests that managers use bonding mechanisms so that shareholders 
perceive managers to be acting efficiently in the interest of shareholders (Morris, 
1987). This is because agency costs are ultimately borne by managers as 
shareholders determine share price after consideration of agency costs (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Production of accounting reports is an important bonding 
mechanism (Morris, 1987). Furthermore, prior research finds that shareholders react 
negatively to the detection of falsified financial statements in both developed and 
developing countries (e.g., Hribar and Jenkins, 2004 in USA and Firth et al., 2011 in 
China). This implies that managers of companies in Bangladesh report actual 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports so that investors and creditors 
can make informed decisions.  
In contrast, based on the theory of path dependence of corporate governance 
(Section 2.2.7.1), it can be argued that firms have limited incentives to actually 
comply with the provisions of the BCGG-2006. This is because (1) private benefits 
of control of present controllers are probably high, and (2) relative efficiency in the 
implementation of the BCGG-2006 is probably low. The high private benefits of 
control and low relative efficiency result from corporate and institutional 
characteristics of Bangladesh (Sections 3.4 and 3.5). However, firms in Bangladesh 
are subject to coercive and normative isomorphism (Section 3.6.1) to comply with 
the provision of the BCGG-2006. When firms are subject to institutional 
isomorphism, they often declare implementation of a CG mechanism without actual 
implementation (Westphal and Zajak, 1998). Coercive and normative isomorphism 
prevailing in Bangladesh, however, rarely result in incurrence of financial costs in 
the form of fines and penalties because of poor enforcement behaviour by regulatory 
agencies and no enforcement power of the IFIs. According to Oliver’s framework 
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(Section 2.2.7.2), firms adopt avoidance strategy when efficiency is low and legal 
coercion is moderate. As part of an avoidance strategy, firms often engage in 
‘window dressing’ to conceal their non-conformity (Oliver, 1991, p. 154). Recent 
research on corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Bangladesh by Belal and Cooper 
(2011), seems to suggest that firms use ‘window dressing’ in order to represent 
themselves as socially responsible. This study reports the opinions of one of the 
company secretaries:  
We don’t have any written equal opportunity policy. But in our job advert we do say that 
we’re an equal opportunity employer (Belal and Cooper, 2011; p. 663). 
   A logical extension of these findings on CSR to reporting compliance with 
BCGG-2006 indicates that Bangladeshi companies may report compliance with the 
majority of the provisions of the BCGG-2006 in annual reports due to pressure from 
regulators and IFIs without actually complying with the provisions of the BCGG-
2006. This study uses survey responses (as mentioned in Section 4.3) to obtain 
information on the actual level of compliance with the BCGG-2006.  
Thus, two competing theories provide opposite predictions on reporting 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports. Hence, the following 
hypotheses: 
H3.1a: Compliance with the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports is not 
higher than compliance with the BCGG-2006 as stated in the survey as implied by 
agency theory. 
H3.1b: Compliance with the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports is  
higher than compliance with the BCGG-2006 as stated in the survey as implied by 
the theory of path dependence. 
A large body of prior literature investigates the association of the CG index 
with stock price (Gompers et al., 2003; 2010; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Brown and 
Caylor, 2006; Bebchuk et al., 2009); abnormal returns (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; 
Core et al., 1999); and the cost of bank loans (Francis et al., 2012; Ge et al., 2012). 
An implicit assumption of these studies is that institutional investors and bankers 
make a relative comparison of firms’ governance structures while making their 
investment and credit decisions. The overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-
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2006 increases information asymmetry between the managers of companies and 
outside investors and bankers and thus, increases agency costs. As the agency costs 
are ultimately born by managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), managers do not 
overstate compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports to an extent leading to a 
different ranking of a firm when it is ranked based on compliance as reported in 
annual reports rather than when the firm is ranked based on compliance as stated in 
the survey. 
However, firms may not actually implement a number of provisions of 
BCGG-2006 due to reasons of rent protection and relative low efficiency (Section 
2.2.7.1). On the other hand, firms may report compliance in annual reports with the 
majority of the provisions of BCGG-2006, due to coercive and normative isomorphic 
pressures (Sections 2.2.7.2 and 3.6.1). In that case, the ranking of a firm on the basis 
of compliance as reported in annual reports will be different from that of the firm 
based on compliance as stated in the survey. 
Thus, two competing theories provide opposite predictions on difference in 
the rankings of firms based on compliance with the BCGG-2006 as reported in 
annual reports and as stated in the survey. Hence, the following hypotheses: 
H3.2a: The ranking of a firm for its CG when the rank is assigned based on 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports is not different from 
that of the firm when the rank is assigned based on compliance as stated in the 
survey as implied by agency theory. 
H3.2b: The ranking of a firm for its CG when the rank is assigned based on  
compliance with the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports is different from that 
of the firm when the rank is assigned based on compliance as stated in the survey as 
implied by the theory of path dependence. 
The discussion related to RQ3.1 and RQ3.2 suggests that, as per agency 
theory, there will be no difference between compliance with the BCGG-2006 as 
reported in annual reports and compliance with the BCGG-2006 as stated in the 
survey. Hence, as per agency theory, the nature of provisions of the BCGG-2006 will 
not affect the extent of overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006.  
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However, the theory of path dependence of corporate governance suggests 
that one of the reasons for non-compliance with new CG practices is sunk adaptive 
costs (Section 2.2.7.1). This implies that firms cannot easily alter internal 
management practices. Hence, according to the theory of path dependence, the extent 
of overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports is more 
pronounced with respect to the provisions of the BCGG-2006 which are less 
observable by outsiders. 
Thus, two competing theories provide different predictions on the association 
between overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual 
reports and nature of provisions. Hence, the first set of hypotheses with respect 
RQ3.3 is: 
H3.3a1: The extent of overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in 
annual reports does not differ between the observable and the less observable 
provisions of the BCGG-2006. 
H3.3a2: The extent of overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 is 
higher with respect to the provisions of the BCGG-2006 which are less observable by 
outsiders. 
Agency theory suggests that family control reduces agency conflict between 
ownership and control but increases agency conflict between majority and minority 
shareholders (Section 2.6.1). However, several prior researchers find that family 
control reduces overall agency conflict both in the USA (Ali et al., 2007) and in 
countries with weak market and legal institutions (Luo and Chung, 2013; Chen and 
Nowland, 2010). As a result, the optimal level of CG requirement for family firms is 
less than for other firms in those countries (Chen and Nowland, 2010). There is also 
evidence that family controlled-firms perform better than non-family firms 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Lin and Hu, 2007). The better performance reduces 
market pressures for compliance with a comply or explain basis CG code (Arcot et 
al., 2010). Moreover, family firms provide better disclosure due to reputational 
concerns (Chen et al., 2008). This implies that family firms do not need to report 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports unless they comply with it.   
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In contrast, controlling sponsor families have the opportunity to extract 
relatively high private benefits of control in an environment characterised by weak 
minority investor protection and weak property rights (Claessens and Fan, 2002; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Franks and Mayer (2001) use family control as a proxy 
for the existence of private benefits of control. In order to protect and maximize their 
private benefits of control, firms controlled by families intentionally maintain a 
weaker CG structure (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Chen et al., 2008; Chen and 
Nowland, 2010). Moreover, sunk adaptive costs (Gedajlovic et al., 2004) and 
endowment effects (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) are relatively higher in family-
controlled firms.  On the other hand, family-controlled companies are equally under 
coercive pressure either to comply or explain non-compliance with the BCGG-2006 
in order to maintain their listing status. Furthermore, the pressures from the IFIs, 
local research organizations funded by the IFIs and regulators do not vary between 
family and non-family firms. This indicates that family firms report compliance with 
the BCGG-2006 in annual reports even though they do not comply with it.   
Thus, two competing theories provide different predictions on the association 
between overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 and control by sponsor 
families. Hence, the second set of testable hypotheses related to RQ3.3 follow: 
H3.3b1: Overstatement of compliance with the BCGG- 2006 as reported in  
annual reports is negatively associated with family control. 
 
H3.3b2: Overstatement of compliance with the BCGG- 2006 as reported in  
annual reports is positively associated with family control. 
 
A large body of agency theory-based literature argues that institutional 
investors, due to their expertise, experience and large ownership stake, have the 
capacity and incentives to monitor firms’ management (e.g., Gillian and Starks, 
2003; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Several prior researchers test this monitoring 
role of institutional investors by investigating the association between institutional 
ownership and several outcome variables. These researchers generally hypothesise 
and find a positive relationship between institutional ownership and outcome 
variables such as accounting reporting quality (e. g., Ajinkya et al., 2005; Karamanou 
and Vafeas, 2005; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Solomon and Solomon, 2006), firm 
performance (Elyasiani and Jia, 2010), executive compensation (Hartzell and Starks, 
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2003) and debt rating and cost of debt (Roberts and Yuan, 2010 and Bojraj and 
Sengupta, 2003). More specific to the monitoring of compliance with CG codes, 
Dedman (2000) and Mizuno (2010) find that the presence of institutional investors 
increases the level of compliance with CG code.  
However, institutional investment organisations are newly introduced in 
developing countries and own a small percentage of ownership (Hamdani and Yafeh, 
2013). Furthermore, institutional characteristics of developing countries such as a 
weak market and legal institutions create an opportunity for institutional investors to 
pursue self-interest and anti-competitive policies (Belev, 2003). It is also argued that 
incumbent financiers in countries with weak market and legal institutions do not play 
a monitoring role as they want to protect their rent (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). This 
argument is validated by the infrequent voting of institutional investors against 
insider-sponsored proposal in Israel (Hamdani and Yafeh, 2013) and lack of 
association between institutional ownership and firm performance in India (Sarkar 
and Sarkar, 2000). In the context of Bangladesh, institutional investment 
organisations are new, own a minimum percentage of ownership, lack professionally 
trained managers and play a limited monitoring role (see Section 3.4.2). Hence, the 
theory of path dependence suggests that there will be no impact on control by 
institutional ownership and overstatement of compliance with the BCGG- 2006. 
Thus, two competing theories provide different predictions on the association 
between overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 and control by 
institutional ownership. Hence, the third set of testable hypotheses related to RQ3.3 
is: 
H3.3c1: Overstatement of compliance with the BCGG- 2006 as reported in 
annual reports is negatively associated with control by institutional investors. 
H3.3c2: Overstatement of compliance with the BCGG- 2006 as reported in 
annual reports is not associated with control by institutional investors. 
In order to investigate the above hypotheses related to RQ3, the survey 
responses (Section 5.4) and other data sources (Section 5.5) are used. The 
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measurement of variables and the statistical tests used for testing above hypotheses 
are detailed in sections 5.7 and 5.9 respectively. 
4.5 Summary 
To investigate the research questions of this thesis, I develop research sub-
questions related to RQ1, propositions related to RQ2 and hypotheses related to 
RQ3. RQ1 aims to (1) explore the impact of the BCGG-2006 on investment and 
lending decisions of institutional investors and bankers respectively and (2) derive a 
theory that explains better the impact of CG on the investment and lending decisions 
of institutional investors and bankers respectively. With respect to RQ2.1, I 
developed three propositions to examine the association between type of company 
and nature of compliance with the BCGG-2006. With respect to RQ2.2, I developed 
four propositions to investigate the association between nature of compliance with 
the BCGG-2006 and firm performance. Finally, five hypotheses with respect to RQ3 
are developed to investigate whether companies overstate compliance with the 
BCGG-2006 in annual reports and what factors are associated with this 
overstatement.  
The research methodology and methods associated with the research sub-




Research Methodology and Methods 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Four, I developed research sub-questions related to RQ1, 
propositions related to RQ2 and hypotheses related to RQ3. The aim of this chapter 
is to present the research methodology and methods used in the investigation.  
Section 5.2 presents the research methodology and mixed method. Section 
5.3 justifies the use of semi-structured interviews for RQ1, describes interviewee 
selection, interview design and procedures, research ethics and analysis of interview 
data. Section 5.4 justifies the use of a survey, explains the administration of the 
survey and reports results of response bias tests. Section 5.5 presents sources of other 
data used to investigate RQ2 and RQ3. Sections 5.6 and 5.7 describe the 
measurement of variables required to test propositions related to RQ2 and hypotheses 
related to RQ3 respectively. Sections 5.8 and 5.9 present the statistical tests used for 
testing propositions related to RQ2 and hypotheses related to RQ3 respectively. 
Section 5.10 summarises.  
5.2 Research methodology and mixed method 
This study uses an inductive approach to investigate RQ1 and a deductive 
approach to investigate RQ2 and RQ3. A qualitative method (in the form of semi-
structured interviews) is used to - collect the data required to investigate RQ1. A 
quantitative method (in the form of a questionnaire survey, annual reports and 
trading data) is used to collect the data required to investigate RQ2 and RQ3. This 
study takes the view that the nature of the research questions is the most important 
determinant of research methods (Punch, 2005; Mason, 2002; Abernethy et al., 1999) 
and uses mixed methods to investigate the accomplishment of the BCGG-2006 by 
(1) interviewing institutional investors and bankers, as these two groups are the main 
beneficiary stakeholders who interact with the companies and thus, know about the 
92 
 
level of effectiveness of the BCGG-2006; and (2) surveying company secretaries or 
CFOs directly
11
. Table 5.1 summarises the research questions and research methods. 
Table 5.1: Research questions and respective methods 
RQs Research Method(s) 
RQ1. Do institutional investors and bankers 
perceive that the level of compliance with the 
BCGG-2006 by the investee or borrowing 
company positively influences the investment and 
lending decisions respectively in Bangladesh? 
Interviews with seven institutional investors (four  
investment managers of mutual funds and three 
investment managers of life insurance 
companies) and 21 bank credit analysts (17 
corporate credit analysts of banks and 4 corporate 
credit analysts of credit rating agencies) (see 
table 5.2 for detail). 
RQ2.1. To what extent is the BCGG-2006 
implemented in form rather than in substance? 
RQ2.2 Is there a relationship between the nature 
of compliance and firm performance? 
Surveys of 91 company secretaries or CFOs; 
annual reports of companies and trading data 
from the DSE (see section 5.4 and 5.5 for detail). 
RQ3.1. To what extent does reported compliance 
with the BCGG-2006, as reported in annual 
reports, overstate underlying compliance with the 
BCGG-2006? RQ3.2 Does the overstatement lead 
to a different relative ranking of a firms’ 
corporate governance? RQ3.3 What factors 
influence overstatement of compliance with the 
BCGG-2006 in annual reports? 
Surveys of 91 company secretaries or CFOs; 
annual reports of companies and trading data 
from the DSE (see section 5.4 and 5.5 for detail). 
 
Mixed methods research, combining qualitative and quantitative approaches, 
has been extensively used in accounting (e.g., Anderson and Widener, 2007; Lillis 
and Mundy, 2005; Modell, 2005) and CG literature (e.g., Mengoli et al, 2009; 
Wanyama et al., 2009; Hooghiemstra and van Manen, 2004; Westphal and Khanna, 
2003). Social science scholars (e.g., Denzin, 1978; Jick, 1979), who initially 
advocate mixed methods, define mixed methods as combining multiple theories, 
methods and data sources with an objective to improve the validity of research 
findings. Mixed methods can reduce bias by capitalising on the strengths of multiple 
theories, methods and data sources while avoiding the accumulation of weaknesses 
(e.g., Punch, 2005; Jick, 1979). Recent scholars extend this initial idea and argue that 
mixed methods offer (1) increased validity or credibility and low known bias through 
                                                          
11
 Jick (1979) states that one way to use mixed methods is to (1) ask the person directly and (2) ask 
someone who interacts with the person about the research issue.   
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triangulation; (2) a more comprehensive understanding of a research issue from 
multiple perspectives and lenses; (3) a more insightful understanding of a research 
issue with new ideas, creative concepts and meanings; and (4) understanding of a 
research issue while acknowledging diversity of values (Greene et al., 2005). As 
such, mixed methods research bridges the traditional dichotomous ontological and 
epistemological divide (functionalist vs. interpretivist) and can be based on critical 
realism (Modell, 2010).  Critical realism, instead of accepting naïve realism, assumes 
that partly mind-independent reality exists but this reality cannot be observed and 
explained without using a theoretical lense (Modell, 2009). Critical realism, thus, 
differs from social constructionsm because social constructionists argue against the 
notion of the existence of partly mind-independent reality (Houston, 2001).  
5.3 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews are the most frequently used qualitative method in 
CG research. Prior CG researchers have used semi-structured interviews in order to 
understand: (1) the roles played by a particular CG mechanism (e.g., Beasley et al., 
2009; Turley and Zaman, 2007; Robert et al., 2005; Spira, 1998; 1999); and (2) how 
outsiders perceive the effectiveness of a particular CG mechanism (e.g., Cohen et al., 
2007; 2010a).  One reason may be that the use of observation is more difficult in the 
case of CG (e.g, access to board and audit committee meeting is extremely difficult). 
Another reason may be that the use of documentation that describes the conduct of a 
CG mechanism is not adequate to understand the roles of a CG mechanism. 
Furthermore, documents (e.g., minutes of board meeting) that describe the conduct of 
a CG mechanism are often confidential.  
This thesis uses semi-structured interviews to collect data to answer RQ1.  A 
semi-structured interview method is appropriate to investigate a focused topic (Rubin 
and Rubin, 1995, p.5) and perceptions of people (Mason, 2002, p. 63). The BCGG-
2006 is a focused topic and this thesis intends to understand the perception of 
institutional investors and bankers about any direct or indirect impact of the CG 
structure of the investee or borrowing company. Moreover, a semi-structured 
interview method enables the researcher to adopt an ‘extremely versatile approach’ 
(Rubin and Rubin, 1995, p.3) and thus, to investigate an issue in more depth by 
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asking further questions (Marginson, 2004). This study takes an ‘open-system’ 
approach (Sections 2.5.3 and 4.2) to capture the influence of contextual factors on 
the impact of CG on investment and lending decisions. Alternative qualitative 
methods could be direct observation of the investment and lending decision making 
processes and analysis of the investment and lending decision manuals of 
institutional investors and banks respectively. However, direct observation of 
investment and lending decision making processes is not feasible as investment and 
lending decisions involve different levels of management and the decision making 
process is confidential. Similarly, the investment and lending decision manuals of 
institutional investors and banks respectively are not accessible due to 
confidentiality.  
5.3.1 Selection and composition of interviewees 
This study initially planned to interview investment managers of mutual fund 
and life insurance companies and corporate credit analysts of banks but was 
extended, as explained later in this section, to credit rating agencies. The researcher 
chose investment managers of mutual funds and life insurance companies because 
institutional investors are more sophisticated in terms of expertise and knowledge 
than individual investors and have incentives to collect and process information 
about their investee companies (e.g. Hand, 1990; Chan and Lakonishok, 1995; 
Walther, 1997; Sias et al., 2006). The researcher planned to interview corporate 
credit rating analysts of banks because bankers have first-hand knowledge about the 
firms’ internal governance structure due to their better access to private information 
and superior information processing capabilities (Armstrong et al. 2010). Moreover, 
in developing countries like Bangladesh, banks are the main financial intermediaries 
to mobilise resources due to the small size and minimum role of stock markets (The 
Aries Group Ltd, 2012; cf Singh and Zammit, 2006).   
In Bangladesh, there are different types of mutual fund companies, life 
insurance companies and banks (Table 5.2). This study initially planned to select 
interviewees with the objective to cover a wide range (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 
28) of mutual fund management companies, life insurance companies and banks as 
representative of institutional investors and creditors. Two issues arose while 
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conducting interviews: (1) it was found very difficult to apply the maximum variety 
method given the poor research orientation among people in a developing country, 
Bangladesh and, (2) several corporate credit analysts of banks recommended 
interviewing the corporate credit rating analysts of credit rating agencies. Hence, 
corporate credit rating analysts of credit rating agencies are included in the target 
interviewees. The inclusion of new informants during data collection is legitimate in 
qualitative research (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 539). Due to the difficulty regarding 
access to interviewees, the personal network of the researcher was used and a total of 
28 semi-structured interviews were finally conducted. Although the use of the 
personal network of the researcher indicates snow-balling sampling (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, p. 28), there is still sufficient variety in terms of classification and 
sub-classification of organisations as indicated in Table 5.2.  





Number of organisations 
in Bangladesh 
Number of interviewee 
organisations 
Banks by ownership  Local - Nationalised 4 1 
Local - Specialised 4 Nil 
Local - Private 30 12 
Foreign 9 3 
Sub-total 47 17 
Banks by nature of 
operation 
Traditional  36 15 
Islamic 7 2 
Specialised 4 Nil 
Sub-total 47 17 
Credit Rating Agencies 
(All traditional) 




Local 5 3 
Foreign  1 1 
Sub-total 6 4 
Life Insurance 
companies (all local) 
Traditional 7 2 
Islamic 3 1 
Sub-total 10 3 
Total 61 28 
Consequently, this study makes no claim that interviewees represent 
institutional investors and bankers of Bangladesh as a whole in a statistical sense. It 
does, however, claim that the interviewees in this study have sound knowledge and 
extensive experience about investment and lending decision processes and the CG 
practices of their investee or borrowing companies. The qualifications and 
experience of interviewees are detailed in Appendix 5.1. 
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5.3.2 Interview instruments and data collection 
I prepared and used three instruments to conduct the interviews: an 
introductory letter, a set of mini-research questions using the ‘tree and branch’ 
approach of Rubin and Rubin (1995, pp. 159-160) and a semi-structured interview 
card based on Mason (2002, p. 71). The introductory letter [see Appendix 5.2] 
described the main objective of this thesis and five broad questions to be asked 
(Rubin and Rubin, 1995, p. 146), promises of confidentiality by ensuring the 
anonymity of the interviewee and his organisation (Rubin and Rubin, 1995, p. 96) 
and offers of flexibility to amend any part of the interview transcripts through email 
(Annisette and Trivedi, 2013).   
The semi-structured interview card is shown in Appendix 5.3. Before every 
interview, I read the mini-research questions and interview card. I also carried a copy 
of the mini-research questions and interview card with me during the interview so 
that I could maintain the sequence of relevant questions and cover all the relevant 
facts.  
At the start of the interview, I thanked the interviewee for participating in the 
study. I set ‘the interview stage’ (Kvale, 1996) by explaining the research topic and 
reaffirming the confidentiality and anonymity of the interviewee and his 
organisation. The interviewees were already acquainted with these as I sent the 
introductory letter beforehand by email. After this explanation, I requested the 
interviewee to sign the consent form and sought permission to tape-record the 
interview.  
I started with a very broad general question about the assessment of board 
performance and accounting quality of a prospective investee or borrowing company 
and then attempted to narrow down the discussion to different aspects of governance 
as outlined in BCGG-2006. Drawing on Rubin and Rubin (1995, p. 148), I use 
‘attention probes’ such as ‘can I quote you on that?’, continuation probes such as 
ritualistic? dummy….directors?’, and clarification probes such as ‘can you clarify?’. 
In respect of follow-up questions (Rubin and Rubin, 1995, p. 150), most of the 
questions were ‘why questions’ (e.g. why do you think that? What leads you to 
perceive that?) because interviewees’ responses contradict the prior agency theory-
based literature (see Section 2.5) that I reviewed in developing interview questions.  
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An electronic audio device was used to record the interview as the main 
interest of the researcher is in the content of interviews (Kvale, 1996, p. 161). 
However, 17 interviewees did not approve recording of their interview. The use of 
digital-recorder has both advantage and disadvantages. There is a risk that use of a 
tape-recorder prevents interviewees from disclosing some data (Rubin and Rubin, 
1995, pp. 125-128). A detailed note of the conversation was taken for these 17 
interviewees. The recorded audiotape was transcribed verbatim on the same day as 
the interview (Kvale, 1996; p. 170). The detailed note taken for interviews that were 
not audio-taped was also revised within 24 hours (Ryan et al., 2002, pp. 155-156). 
The interview transcripts and revised notes were sent to the interviewees by email 
(Bédard and Gendron, 2004, p. 199). None of the interviewees urged modification of 
any part of the transcripts and revised notes. The findings of one interview were 
incorporated in the design of the interview card for the next (Bédard and Gendron, 
2004, p. 199) which helped the researcher improve interviewe responses from one 
interview to the next. This improvement is also evident in the transcripts. However, 
questions related to CG mechanisms recommended by the BCGG-2006 were asked 
of all interviewees.  
5.3.3 Ethical issues 
The interviews were conducted in compliance with Level 1 and 2 Research 
Ethics Guidelines of the University of Edinburgh Business School. Details of the 
research ethics applied while conducting interviewees is described in Appendix 5.4.  
The data collected were securely held on the personal laptop of the 
researcher, with password protection. Only the researcher has access to the laptop. It 
is also assured that the data will be destroyed after completion of the PhD and any 
subsequent publications.   
5.3.4 Analysis of interview data 
This study analysed interview data in two main stages. Following Pratt 
(2008), for some part of the interview data, the analysis numerically counts the 
frequency of a certain type of responses as detailed in Stage 1 below. When 
generating theoretical explanation of the findings of Stage 1 analysis, the analysis 
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used grounded theory methodology based on Pratt et al. (2006) and subsequently 
used by Mair et al. (2012). This part of analysis method is described in Stage 2 
below. This research applies grounded theory methods only for data analysis (cf. 
Efferin and Hopper, 2007). It does not pursue a full grounded theory study and does 
not intend to produce a comprehensive theory. 
Stage 1: Assessing the direct or indirect impact of CG mechanisms on 
investment and lending decisions of institutional investors and bankers 
respectively. In this stage, RQ1.1a and RQ1.1b are used as a lens (Eisenhardt, 
1989b). RQ1.1a and RQ1.1b are oriented to enquire whether CG mechanisms 
recommended by the BCGG-2006 have any impact on lending and investment 
decisions. The response of each interviewee with respect to a particular CG 
mechanism (e.g., independent director) was considered as a unit of analysis 
(Krippendorff, 2004, p. 86). For each response, the interviewee was coded as (1) 
‘perceives no impact’ (2) ‘perceives an impact’ and (3) ‘perceived impact depends 
on context’. Very few responses are classified as ‘perceived impact depends on 
context’.  
I read through every sentence of responses related to a particular CG 
mechanism and identified the reasons for ‘perceives no impact’, ‘perceives an 
impact’ and ‘impact depends on context’.   I then counted the number of interviewees 
who provide identical reasons and grouped them together. This method draws on 
Pratt (2008). 
One challenge at this stage of data analysis was that a few interviewees 
initially indicated a positive impact of a CG mechanism but, while providing an 
explanation regarding the practice of that CG mechanism, the nature of their 
comment pointed to the ineffectiveness of that CG mechanism. As an instance, CRA-
2 responded positively on the impact of the audit committee on his credit rating 
decisions.  However, when he commented on the structure of the audit committee, he 
provided the following comment: 
In a good number of instances we have found that he is the chairman of 
board, he is the chairman of the executive committee and he is the chairman of the 
audit committee. So, in that case this becomes superfluous. Since the board, the 
executive committee and the audit committee are represented by him, it is very 
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natural what is appropriate for the executive committee, is also appropriate for the 
audit committee and the board.  This is a conflict of interest (CRA - 2). 
I classified this kind of response as ‘perceives an impact’, based on initial 
response, on the grounds that it more closely represented the perception of the 
respondent on the impact of CG mechanisms on his decisions. There were two cases 
with respect to audit committee and 21 cases with respect to CFO. 
The results of Stage 1 analysis are reported in Chapter Six, Section 6.2. The 
analysis suggests that the ineffectiveness of CG mechanisms, together with the 
traditional characteristics of investment and lending practices, have direct relevance 
to the limited impact of CG mechanisms on the decisions of interviewees.  Keeping 
these Stage 1 findings in mind, the method for data analysis for RQ1.2 was 
developed as explained in Stage 2.  
Stage 2: Identifying institutional characteristics leading to the 
ineffectiveness of CG mechanisms and traditional characteristics of investment 
and lending practices leading to non-consideration of CG mechanisms. In this 
stage, an iterative approach of travelling back and forth between interview data, 
relevant literature and CG theories (Section 2.2) is used to derive a theoretical 
explanation for the limited impact of CG mechanisms on investment and lending 
decisions. This method is based on strategies for generating theory from qualitative 
data as suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1998), Miles and Huberman (1984) and 
Eisenhardt (1989b).  
Stage 2 analysis consists of three steps (Pratt et al., 2006; Mair et al., 2012). 
In the first step, the analysis identified relevant reasons reported by interviewees to 
explain why they perceived that the BCGG-2006 was not effectively implemented. I 
used open coding (Locke, 2001). These reasons include institutions that have been 
identified in prior comparative CG research (Aguilera et al., 2008; Paredes, 2004; 
Doidge et al., 2007; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; Klapper and Love, 2004; Pistor et 
al., 2000) and individual non-Anglo-American country specific CG research 
(Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006; Wanyama et al., 2009; dela Rama, 2012). The 
analysis also identified new issues such as company specific characteristics.  
A similar coding procedure was used to elaborate on characteristics of 
lending practices identified by credit analysts of banks in the Stage 1 analysis and to 
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identify its relevant constructs. As institutional investors less clearly mentioned that 
investment practices deter consideration of CG mechanisms, a search was made of 
whether the traditional characteristics mentioned by bankers were also directly or 
indirectly mentioned by investment managers of mutual fund companies and life 
insurance companies.  For instance, a number of credit analysts of banks mentioned 
that they value their past relationship with a borrower company so much that they 
ignored formal appraisal of a subsequent loan proposal. A search was made in the 
transcripts of institutional investors to discover whether they also mentioned 
anything about the impact of the relationship on their investment decisions. This 
approach is based on Miles and Huberman’s (1994, p. 249) recommendations for 
detecting similarities across interviewees. Interview transcripts were revisited twice 
to identify fit or misfit of data with the categories identified. Data that misfit with a 
category was abandoned or included in a revised category. For example, two separate 
codes were used for (1) the undue influence of bank directors on lending decisions 
and (2) the potential reduction in banks’ profitability due to consideration of CG 
mechanisms. These two codes were collectively categorised as profit-seeking 
behaviour of banks. However, after reviewing the theory of path dependence 
(Bebcuck and Roe, 1999), it became evident that these two open codes implied two 
theoretical concepts namely (1) rent seeking behaviour of banks and (2) peer 
pressure not to consider CG mechanisms. Accordingly, the two initial codes were 
renamed according to the theoretical labels offered by the theory of path dependence.  
In the second step of this stage, the first-order codes identified as reasons for 
the ineffective implementation of the BCGG-2006 were grouped into themes to 
relate with a CG theory. The first-order codes suggested that data fit better with 
Bebcuck and Roe’s (1999) theory of path dependence for corporate governance. 
Hence, first-order codes were grouped into themes that Bebcuck and Roe (1999) 
suggest as reasons for path dependence. For instance, individual-centred 
management and the small size of companies were grouped into high-sunk adaptive 
costs. This is because these two items indicate that companies develop an internal 
management system aligned with size which hampers effective implementation of 
the BCGG-2006. A similar procedure is used to group first-order codes related to 
characteristics of investment and lending practices. 
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In the third step, the interrelationship between first-order codes is examined 
with the objective to understand how different themes related to ineffective 
implementation of the BCGG-2006 fit together, leading to persistence of sponsor-
family aligned board and individual-centred management and ultimately making 
sponsor families reluctant to implement the BCGG-2006 effectively. Using an 
identical procedure, an attempt was made to understand how themes related to 
investment and lending practices indicated persistence of name-based and 
relationship-based investment and lending practices and thus, made institutional 
investors and bankers reluctant to consider compliance with the BCGG-2006. In this 
case, I was not able to use all the themes of Bebcuck and Roe (1999) due to 
insufficient evidence being available. For example, two interviewees mentioned that 
multiple optima exist between transaction-based and relationship-based investment 
and lending practices and thus, multiple optima theme is not used in case of 
explaining persistence of name-based and relationship-based investment. The results 
of Stage 2 analysis are reported in Chapter Six, Sections 6.3 to 6.5. 
5.4 Survey 
5.4.1 Survey design 
A self-explanatory questionnaire survey was designed to collect detailed data 
on compliance with the provisions of the BCGG-2006, family relationship among 
directors, the composition of boards of directors and the ownership structure of the 
company. With respect to compliance with the BCGG-2006, the questionnaire 
emphasises detailed structural attributes of CG mechanisms recommended by the 
BCGG-2006. These structural attributes were selected based on international best 
practice recommendations and prior research on a particular CG mechanism. For 
example, with respect to the audit committee, the questions were designed to collect 
data on the size and composition of the audit committee; the background of the audit 
committee chairman and members; frequency and duration of audit committee 
meetings both internal and with external directors; and reporting on the audit 
committee activities etc. The questionnaire included both open and closed questions. 
The introductory letter of the survey described the purpose of the survey (Diamond, 
2000), promised confidentiality by ensuring anonymity of the respondent and his 
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organisation (Van der Stede et al., 2005) and provided an assurance that the outcome 
of this research will not be published in Bangladesh [see Appendix 5.5]. The 
questionnaire was pre-tested in person with two company secretaries of local 
privately-owned companies. Based on the feedback of the pre-test, I deleted all 
questions related to internal board process, remuneration committees and nomination 
committees because these questions are not applicable to Bangladesh yet.  
5.4.2 Survey administration and response bias test  
The sample for this study consists of 91 non-financial companies that 
responded to a survey conducted during January – March, 2012. The survey was 
addressed to company secretaries. The names of the company secretaries and the 
addresses of headquarters of companies were retrieved
12
 from Central Depository 
Bangladesh Limited on 31 December 2011.  The survey was mailed to the company 
secretaries of 136 non-financial companies, all non-financial listed companies on the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange, Bangladesh on 31 December 2011. The survey was not sent 
to banks and financial institutions because they are subject to different governance 
rules from the central bank and other regulatory authorities. 
Within one month of the survey being sent, 21 firms responded to the survey. 
Due to the initial low response rate, I visited companies whose registered offices 
were situated in Dhaka and personally persuaded the company secretaries or CFOs to 
take part in the survey in a structured interview manner. I often used my alumni 
connections to reach the respondents. This method of data collection provides 
additional confidence that the survey results represent better the underlying 
compliance with the BCGG-2006. In total, I ended up with 91 usable responses, a 
response rate of 66.91%. In order to test for response bias, distribution of responders 
is compared with that of population on the basis of industry sectors, market 









Table 5.3: An analysis of respondent firms by industry sector, 






  n Percentage   n Percentage 
(a)    Industry sector
a
       
Cement 6 4.41  4 4.40 
Ceramics 5 3.68  5 5.49 
Enginnering 22 16.18  13 14.29 
Food 16 11.76  9 9.89 
Fuel and Power 13 9.56  9 9.89 
IT 5 3.68  3 3.30 
Jute 3 2.21  2 2.20 
Miscellaneous 9 6.62  5 5.49 
Paper and Printing 1 0.73  0 0.00 
Pharmaceuticals 20 14.71  16 17.57 
Services and Real Estate 4 2.94  3 3.30 
Tannery 5 3.68  4 4.40 
Telecommunications 1 0.73  1 1.10 
Textile 25 18.38  17 18.68 
Travel and Leisure 1 0.73  0 0.00 
Total 136 100.00  91 100.00 
(b) Market capitalisation
a 
      
First Quartile 38 27.94  18 19.78 
Second Quartile 35 25.74  21 23.08 
Third Quartile 33 24.26  27 29.67 
Fourth Quartile 30 22.06  25 27.47 
Total 136 100.00  91 100.00 
Test results χ2 = 2.89; p = 0.409 
(c) Total Assets
a
       
First Quartile 38 27.94  17 18.68 
Second Quartile 35 25.74  23 25.28 
Third Quartile 32 23.53  25 27.47 
Fourth Quartile 31 22.79  26 28.57 
Total 136 100.00  91 100.00 
Test results χ2 = 2.99; p = 0.392 
a
Chi-squre tests of significant difference between population and sample based on market 
capitalization group (χ2=2.89; p=0.409) and total assets group (χ2=2.99; p=0.392) are not 
rejected. 
b
Population consists of 136 non-financial companies listed on Dhaka Stock Exchange, 
Bangladesh on 31 December, 2011. 
c




Table 5.3 presents the results of the analysis. As shown in Table 5.3, there is 
no significant difference in the distribution of firms in each category of industry
13
, 
market capitalisation and total assets between the population and the sample of this 
study. Hence, the sample of this study represents the population and the risk arising 
from non-response bias is minimal. 
5.5 Other data 
In order to answer RQ2.2, data on market-based and accounting-based 
performance measures are required. Data required for the calculation of market-
based performance measures (Tobin’s Q and stock returns) were collected from the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange, Bangladesh in a CD which contains trading and dividend 
data from 1991 to 2011. Data required for the calculation of accounting-based 
performance measures (ROA and ROE) were retrieved from Annual reports. Annual 
reports for all non-financial companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange on 31 
December 2011 were primarily collected from the library of the Bangladesh 
Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC). Any annual report which was not 
available in the library of the BSEC was collected from the library of the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange (DSE). Annual reports for accounting years ending 2011 were used 
to retrieve financial data required for investigating RQ3.3. Compliance checklists 
included in annual reports for accounting years ending 2011 were used to measure 
reported compliance with the BCGG-2006. 
5.6 Measurement of variables related to RQ 2  
5.6.1 Classification of companies based on nature of compliance 
with the provisions of the BCGG-2006 
In order to test propositions related to RQ2.1 and RQ2.2, I need to classify 
privately-owned, government-owned and subsidiaries of foreign MNCs into three 
sub-groups: (1) companies that do not comply, (b) companies that ‘comply in form 
but not in substance’, and (3) companies that ‘comply in form and in substance’. In 
                                                          
13
 I cannot perform a Chi-Square test of difference between population and sample based on industry 
because of few observations in several cells but from inspection, it is evident that there is no material 
difference between population and sample based on industry. 
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the next sub-sections, I detail the classification of companies into above three sub-
groups based on nature of compliance with five corporate governance mechanisms as 
recommended by the BCGG-2006: separation of chairman and CEO, board 
independence, audit committee, Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and head of internal 
auditor (HIA). 
5.6.1.1 Separation of Chairman and CEO 
A company is classified as ‘do not comply’ with respect to separation of 
chairman and CEO of the company if CEO duality exists. Using the argument of Lou 
and Chung (2013; Section 2.6.4.1), a company is classified as (1) ‘comply in form 
but not in substance’ with respect to separation of chairman and CEO of the 
company if both the chairman and the CEO are members of a sponsor family or 
sponsor shareholder directors from different families and (2) ‘comply in form and in 
substance’ with respect to separation of chairman and CEO of the company if either 
the CEO of the company is a non-shareholder executive director or the chairman the 
company is not a sponsor shareholder director.  
5.6.1.2 Board independence 
A company is classified as ‘do not comply’ with respect to board 
independence if the company does not appoint at least 10 per cent of board 
membership as independent director subject to a minimum of one (Section 3.6.2.1). 
A company is classified as ‘comply in form but not in substance’ with respect to 
board independence if the company appoints at least 10 per cent of board 
membership subject to a minimum of one independent director on the board and the 
appointed independent director (1) is a shareholder and was shareholder director 
before the introduction of the BCGG-2006; (2) is a current or previous employee of 
the company;  (3) is a relative or descendent by birth or marriage of a member of the 
controlling family or CEO; (4) is a friend or previous colleague of a member of the 
controlling family or CEO; (5) jointly owns a partnership or a private limited 
company with a member of the controlling family or CEO; (6) holds a board position 
in another public limited company with a member of the controlling family or CEO; 
or (7) a professional who provides professional services to the company or other 
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business controlled by a member of the controlling family or the CEO (Sections 
2.6.4.2 and 3.6.2.1). A company is classified as ‘comply in form and in substance’ 
with respect to board independence if the independent director (1) is a representative 
of institutional shareholders but is not nominated director at present or (2) has no 
relationship with the controlling family or CEO. 
5.6.1.3 Audit committee 
A company is classified as ‘do not comply’ with audit committee if the 
company does not appoint an audit committee. In order to classify the companies that 
have an audit committee into ‘comply in form but not in substance’ or ‘comply in 
form and in substance’, I select 16 criteria of audit committee that indicates 
effectiveness of the audit committee according to prior literature (Section 2.6.4.3) 
and best practice recommendations. Following Abbott et al. (2004), I use binary 
coding to calculate the total score for an audit committee of a company.  These 
criteria and the binary coding procedure are detailed in Table 5.4.  
Based on criteria as presented in Table 5.4, an audit committee is assigned a 
score of minimum 0 and maximum 16. If the score of a company is less than or equal 
to eight, the company is classified as ‘comply in form but not in substance’. If the 
score of a company is greater than eight, the company is classified as ‘comply in 
form and in substance’ with the audit committee requirement. 
The BCGG-2006 does not clarify the meaning of expertise in accounting and 
finance. This study, thus, follows BRC (1999), Abbott et al. (2004) and Bédard et al. 
(2004) to define expertise in accounting and finance and regards an audit committee 
chairman or member as an expert in accounting or finance if he or she has either a 
professional qualification in accounting such as FCA, FCMA a PhD in accounting or 
has held senior management position (e.g. Chairman and CEO) with another public 
limited company or financial institution but has not held that position because of 
his/her shareholding. Finally, I regard an audit committee chairman or member as 
financially literate if he or she has at least an undergraduate degree in business; or is 




Table 5.4: Method for classification of companies based the nature on 
compliance with audit committee  
Audit committee characteristics Method of scoring  
Chairman of Board or CEO sits on the audit 
committee (BRC, 1999; Smith, 2003) 
The Chairman of Board or CEO does not sit on 
the audit committee =1; otherwise 0. 
Sponsor family members on audit committee 
(Jaggi and Leung, 2007; Jaggi et al., 2009) 
The number of sponsor family member on audit 
committee is less than 2 =1; otherwise 0. 
Sponsor shareholder directors on audit committee 
(Jaggi et al., 2009; Klein, 2002) 
Number of sponsor shareholder directors on audit 
committee is less than 2 = 1; otherwise = 0. 
CFO is a member of audit committee (BRC, 
1999) 
CFO is not a member of audit committee = 1; 
otherwise 0. 
Audit committee has at least one independent 
director (The BCGG-2006; Klein, 2002) 
Audit committee has at least one independent 
director = 1; otherwise 0. 
Qualification of audit committee chair (The 
BCGG-2006; Bédard et al., 2004; Carcello et al., 
2006) 
Audit committee chair has qualification in 
accounting and finance = 1; otherwise 0. 
At least one member of the audit committee is 
financially expert (Bédard et al., 2004; Carcello 
et al., 2006; BRC, 1999) 
At least one member of the audit committee is 
financially expert =1; otherwise 0. 
Financial literacy of audit committee members 
(Ghosh et al., 2010; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 
2008; BRC, 1999) 
At least two members of audit committee are 
finally literate = 1; otherwise 0. 
Independence of audit committee chairman 
(BRC, 1999; Bédard et al., 2004) 
Audit committee chairman is an independent 
director = 1; otherwise 0. 
Reporting of audit committee activities to board 
of directors (BRC, 1999) 
Audit committee reports its activities to board of 
directors = 1; otherwise 0. 
Reporting of audit committee activities to 
shareholders (BRC, 1999) 
Audit committee reports its activities to the 
shareholders = 1; otherwise 0. 
Audit committee written charter (BRC, 1999; 
Bédard et al., 2004; Abbott et al., 2004) 
Audit committee has a written charter = 1; 
otherwise 0. 
Number of audit committee meeting (Abbott et 
al., 2004; Farber. 2005) 
Audit committee convenes 4 or more meeting = 
1; otherwise 0. 
No. of audit committee members (The BCGG-
2006; Beasley and Salterio, 2001)  
Audit committee has more than 3 members = 1; 
otherwise 0. 
Average number of audit committee members 
present in meeting (Zain and Subramaniam, 
2007) 
On average more than or equal to 3 members of 
the audit committee present in meeting =1; 
otherwise 0. 
Audit committee meeting with external auditors 
(BRC, 1999; Cohen et al., 2007) 
Audit committee meets with external auditors at 
least two times during the year = 1; otherwise 0. 
 
5.6.1.4 Chief financial officer (CFO) 
A company is classified as ‘do not comply’ with provisions related to CFO if 
the company does not appoint a CFO. In order to classify the companies that have 
appointed a CFO into ‘comply in form but not in substance’ or ‘comply in form and 
in substance’, I selected 4 criteria of the CFO that indicates effectiveness of CFO 
according to prior literature (Section 2.6.4.4) and the BCGG-2006. Using binary 
coding, every CFO is scored on a four point scale. These criteria and the binary 
coding procedure are detailed in Table 5.5.  
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Table 5.5: Method for classification of companies based the nature on 
compliance with CFO 
CFO characteristics Method of scoring  
CFO qualification (Aier et al., 2005; Li et al., 
2010) 
CFO is a professional accountant = 1; otherwise 
0. 
CFO attends board meeting (The BCGG-2006) CFO attends board meeting = 1; otherwise 0. 
CFO is  a member of board of directors (Bedard 
et al., 2011) 
CFO is a member of board of directors = 1; 
otherwise 0. 
Experience of CFO (Brochet and Welch, 2011) CFO has experience more than the average level 
of experience of CFO in sample firms = 1; 
otherwise 0. 
The score assigned based on criteria mentioned in Table 5.5 is then used to 
classify firms that appoint CFO into two groups: (1) comply in form but not in 
substance - firms that have a CFO score at best two, and (2) comply in form and in 
substance – firms with CFO score greater than two. 
5.6.1.5 Head of Internal Audit (HIA) 
A company is classified as ‘do not comply’ with provisions related to HIA if 
the company does not appoint a HIA. In order to classify the companies that have 
appointed a HIA into ‘comply in form but not in substance’ or ‘comply in form and 
in substance’, I selected 4 criteria of HIA that indicates effectiveness of HIA 
according to prior literature on HIA (Section 2.6.4.5) and the BCGG-2006 (Section 
3.6.2.3). Using binary coding, every HIA is scored on a four point scale. These 
criteria and binary coding procedure are detailed in Table 5.6.  
Table 5.6: Method for classification of companies based the nature on 
compliance with HIA 
HIA characteristics Method of scoring  
HIA qualification (Prawitt et al., 2009) HIA is a professional accountant = 1; otherwise 0. 
Appointment authority  of HIA (Christopher 
et al., 2009) 
Board of directors/chairman of board/ audit committee 
is the appointing authority of HIA = 1; otherwise 0. 
Reporting authority of (Christopher et al., 
2009) 
HIA report to board of directors, audit committee or 
CEO = 1; otherwise 0. 
Experience of HIA (Griffiths, 1999) HIA has experience more than the average level of 
experience of CFO in sample firms = 1; otherwise 0. 
 
The score assigned based on criteria mentioned in Table 5.6 is then used to 
classify firms that appoint HIA into two groups: (1) comply in form but not in 
substance - firms that have a HIA score at best two, and (2) comply in form and in 
substance – firms with HIA score greater than two. 
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5.6.2 Measurement of firm performance 
Prior research that investigates the association between CG and firm 
performance uses a range of market-based [e.g., Tobin’s Q (La Porta et al., 2002; 
Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2013), stock return 
(Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Core et al., 1999)] and accounting-based [e.g., ROA 
(Bebchuk et al., 2013; Epps and Cereola, 2008; Daines et al., 2010), sales growth 
(Bebchuk et al., 2013), net profit margin (Bebchuk et al., 2013) and ROE (Epps and 
Cereola, 2008)] performance measures. Both market-based and accounting-based 
performance measures suffer from a number of limitations. Accounting-based 
performance measures are (1) subject to manipulation by management; (2) affected 
by choice of accounting policies such as revenue and expenditure recognition, 
depreciation and impairment, inventory valuation, and consolidation method 
(Chakravarthy, 1986). Similarly, market-based performance measures are influenced 
by a number of forces which are beyond the control of management (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein, 1995; Dutta and Reichelstein, 2005). 
This study measures firm performance according to four alternatives. These 
alternatives include two market-based performance measures – Tobin’s Q and stock 
returns, and two accounting-based performance measures - ROA and ROE.  
Following the definition of Tobin’s Q provided by Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997), this study calculates Tobin’s Q as the ratio between the market capitalization 
of equity plus book value of preference shares plus book value of long-term debt, and 
the book value of total assets of a firm. This definition is subsequently used by 
Gompers et al. (2003; 2010), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Brown and Caylor (2006), 
Bebchuk et al. (2009; 2013). Annual stock return is calculated following Bhagat and 
Bolton, (2008) as the ratio between the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal 
year plus dividend minus market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year, 
and the market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. ROA is calculated 
based on Epps and Cereola (2008) as the ratio between operating income and average 
total assets. ROE is also calculated based on Epps and Cereola (2008) as the ratio 
between income before extraordinary items available for common equity dividend 
and the sum of the book value of equity and deferred taxes.  
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An average of five annual measures for each of the four performance measures 
from 2007 – 2011 inclusive is used. This is because the BCGG-2006 was adopted in 
2006 and the survey was conducted at the beginning of 2012. Annual data is used 
because data, especially accounting data, are available on an annual basis only.   
5.7 Measurement of variables related to RQ3 
5.7.1 Measurement of variables for H3.1a and H3.1b 
In order to test H3.1a and H3.1b (Section 4.4), two measures of compliance 
[one for compliance as reported in annual reports (CG_AR) and one for compliance 
as stated in the survey (CG_SR)] with the BCGG-2006 for each company are 
required. The CG_AR and CG_SR are measured using compliance with 20 important 
easily comparable provisions of the BCGG-2006. These 20 provisions include five 
related to the board of directors, nine related to the audit committee and six related to 
the CFO, HIA, external auditors and non-audit services. Compliance with each of 
these 20 provisions is coded by a binary indicator [1 for compliance and 0 for non-
compliance] separately for compliance as reported in annual reports and as stated in 
the survey by each company. The value of binary indicators are added together to 
derive company-specific values of CG_AR and CG_SR. This method of measuring 
corporate governance is regarded as the equally weighted summation method in the 
CG literature (Brown et al., 2011). Consequently, the theoretical minimum and 
maximum value of both CG_AR and CG_SR are 0 and 20 respectively. 
The measurement of a CG index by using the equally weighted summation 
method was pioneered by Gompers et al. (2003) and has been extensively used by 
subsequent researchers (see, e.g., Ammann et al., 2011; Bebchuk et al., 2009; 
Cremers and Nair, 2005; Brown and Caylor, 2006). Alternative methods used for 
measuring a corporate governance index are: assigning unequal weights for different 
mechanisms depending on the importance of the mechanisms (Bhagat et al., 2008); 
and Principal Component Analysis (Larcker et al., 2007). However, the purpose of 
this study is to measure overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual 
reports rather than to measure the strength of CG of companies, implying that 
measuring CG index by assigning unequal weight or using Principal Component 
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Analysis is less appropriate. Hence, measuring corporate governance index by 
assigning weights is avoided.  
5.7.2 Measurement of variables for H3.2a and H3.2b 
In order to test H3.2a and H3.2b (Section 4.4), this study need CG_AR and 
CG_SR as described in Section 5.7.1. In order to test H3.2 for sub-components of 
CG_AR and CG_SR, each of CG_AR and CG_SR is divided into three sub-indices. 
These three sub-indices are: Board, Audit Committee (AC) and other sub-indices. 
Board sub-index consists of provisions related to board size, composition, separation 
of chairman and CEO, defining roles and responsibilities of chairman and CEO and 
minimum number of board meetings and thus, has a theoretical value from 0 to 5. 
The audit committee sub-index includes nine provisions related to audit committee 
formation and its characteristics and thus, has a theoretical value from 0 to 9. I have 
used here the nine specific characteristics of the audit committee recommended in 
the BCGG 2006 for disclosure through a ‘comply box’ in the annual report. These 
nine are a subset of the broader 16 used in section 5.6.1.3. The other sub-index 
consists of six provisions related to CFO, internal control and audit, and external 
audit and thus, has a theoretical value from 0 to 6. 
5.7.3 Measurement of variables for H3.3a1 and H3.3a2 
In order to test whether the pattern of overstatement of compliance in annual 
reports with the BCGG-2006 varies depending on the nature of provisions, the 
aforesaid 20 provisions are classified into observable and less observable. 
Observable provisions are easily verifiable or are subject to strong monitoring by 
regulatory authorities such as the BSEC and the DSE. Observable provisions, thus, 
include nine provisions such as the number of board members, separation of the 
chairman and CEO, formation of an audit committee etc. as well as at least four 
board meetings per year. Board meetings are categorized as an observable provision 
because companies are under an obligation to announce the time, date and venue of 
the meeting before, and the decisions of board meeting after, the meeting is held 
through the DSE website. Less observable provisions are related to the internal 
practices of the company and thus, are relatively less visible to an outside individual 
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or organization. Less observable provisions, hence, include 11 provisions such as 
defining the roles and responsibilities of the chairman and CEO, having a written 
audit committee charter etc.  
After classification, the difference between the proportions of firms that 
report compliance in annual reports and state compliance in the survey with each 
provision is tested using a one-tail two samples test of proportions. Secondly, based 
on the classification of provisions, four composite corporate governance sub-indices 
based on (1) compliance with observable provisions as reported in annual reports 
(observable CG_AR); (2) compliance with observable provisions as stated in the 
survey (observable CG_SR); (3) compliance with less observable provisions as 
reported in annual reports (less observable CG_AR): and (4) compliance with non-
observable provisions as stated in the survey (less observable CG_SR) are 
constructed. In order to provide statistical evidence for hypothesis 3, this study 
calculates overstatement in observable CG (CG_Ob_AR - SR) and overstatement in 
less observable CG (CG_LOb_AR - SR). 
5.7.4 Measurement of variables for H3.3b1, H3.3b2, H3.3c1 and 
H3.3c2 
In order to test H3.3b1, H3.3b2, H3.3c1 and H3.3c2, this study needs to 
measure the extent of overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual 
reports and control by a sponsor family and control by institutional investors.  
5.7.4.1 Overstatement of compliance in annual reports - dependent 
variable 
Measuring the extent of overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in 
annual reports is not straightforward. In the management accounting literature, 
several experimental studies measure dishonesty in reporting managerial 
performance. The measure was pioneered by Evans et al. (2001) and has been 
subsequently used by several researchers (e.g Stevens, 2002; Hannan et al., 2006; 
Church et al., 2012). However, Evans et al.’s (2001) measure of dishonesty measures 
the extent to which managers use the available room for telling lies in order to 
maximize their monetary incentives. Managers with superior performance are often 
regarded as the most dishonest managers. For example, suppose there are a 
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maximum of twenty questions which are worth twenty points in an experimental 
setting. A manager can earn a maximum of twenty points. Now suppose that 
manager ‘A’ earns 19 points but reports 20 points and manager ‘B’ earns 15 points 
but reports 18 points. According to the measure of dishonesty as developed by Evans 
et al. (2001) and followed by others, manager A is 100 per cent dishonest as he has 
the opportunity to use one extra point dishonestly and he fully used that opportunity 
but manager B is 60 per cent dishonest in the sense that he used only three points 
dishonestly out of the five points available. In respect of the current study, firms that 
actually implement most of the provisions of the BCGG-2006 comply better with the 
BCGG-2006. This is because the BCGG-2006 is a ‘comply or explain’ basis code. 
Accordingly, to give credit to the firms that actually comply with a greater 
proportion of provisions of the BCGG-2006, this study calculates an overstatement 
statistic by calculating the difference between CG_AR and CG_SR and then scaling 
the difference by CG_AR. CG_AR is used for scaling the difference between CG_AR 
and CG_SR because this study intends to measure the extent to which the compliance 
reported in the annual reports is overstated. That is, the overstatement statistic is 
calculated as:  
Overstatement statistic = (CG_AR – CG_SR)/ CG_AR expressed as a 
percentage 
Where: 
CG_AR is a CG compliance index of 20 important provisions of the BCGG-
2006 as reported in annual reports;  
CG_SR is a CG compliance index of same 20 important provisions of the 
BCGG-2006 as revealed by a survey. 
In order to validate the measure, this study uses the above overstatement 
statistic to measure the extent of untruthfulness in reporting using an example. 
Suppose that company ‘A’ implemented 19 provisions but reports compliance with 
20 provisions in its annual report while company ‘B’ implemented 15 provisions but 
reports compliance with 18 provisions. 
According to the overstatement statistic calculated in this thesis, company ‘A’ 
is 5 per cent untruthful [(20-19)/ 20] and company ‘B’ is 16.67 per cent untruthful 
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[(18-15)/18]. If the extent of overstatement of compliance leads to suboptimal 
investment and credit decisions, institutional investors and creditors are more likely 
to make suboptimal decisions with respect to company ‘B’ than company ‘A’. If a 
company truthfully reports compliance with the BCGG-2006 in its annual report, it 
will have an overstatement statistic of zero. In contrast, if a firm overstates the level 
of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in its annual reports, it will have a positive 
overstatement statistic. The distribution of the overstatement statistic is truncated at 
the lower bound of zero and is not symmetric.   
5.7.4.2 Control by sponsor family 
Prior literature uses a range of proxies to measure control by sponsor family. 
These measures include more than 10 per cent ownership holding by an individual or 
a family (Chen and Jaggi, 2000), controlling shareholder is a family or an individual 
who holds the position of CEO, honorary chairman, chairman, or vice chairman 
(Maury, 2006); the founder or a member of his or her family by either blood or 
marriage is an officer, a director, or a blockholder of the company (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003); members of the controlling family are appointed in the position of both 
chairman and CEO (Luo and Chung, 2013; Yeh and Woidtke, 2005); percentage of 
sponsor family affiliated directors on board (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005); and number of 
sponsor family affiliated directors on the board (Chrisman et al., 2004). In the case of 
Bangladesh, a sponsor family can maintain excessive control by even limited 
percentage of ownership. Moreover, data on family ownership is not readily 
available. Hence, this study, following Luo and Chung (2013) and Yeh and Woidtke 
(2005), defines control by the sponsor family when sponsor family members being 
appointed to the positions of both chairman and CEO of the company. In additional 
analysis, control by the sponsor family is defined by a sponsor family member is 
appointed in the position of either Chairman or CEO of the company, percentage of 
sponsor family members on the board (Ho and Wong, 2001), and number of sponsor 





5.7.4.3 Control by institutional investors 
  Prior literature uses two proxies to define control by institutional investors: 
percentage of ownership by institutional investors (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Sarkar 
Sarkar, 2000) and concentration of institutional ownership (Hartzell and Starks, 
2003). The calculation of concentration of institutional ownership requires individual 
ownership holding of at least five institutional investors (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). 
This kind of detailed information is not available in the case of Bangladeshi 
companies. Hence, this study defines control by institutional investors by percentage 
of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors at the end of a company’s 
accounting period in 2011.  
5.7.4.4 Control variables 
Following prior literature on the determinants of compliance with CG codes 
and accounting reporting quality, this study includes a number of control variables 
while investigating the association between overstatement of compliance in annual 
reports and a firm’s control characteristics. First, firms with better growth prospects 
are subject to high levels of information asymmetry (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver 
and Gaver, 1993). This high level of information asymmetry affects both internal 
governance structures (Lehn et al., 2009; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008) and 
the quality of accounting disclosures (Chen et al., 2008; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 
2007). Prior literature, however, provides inconclusive evidence on the association of 
firms’ growth opportunities with CG structures (Lehn et al., 2009; Coles et al., 2008; 
Linck et al., 2008; Boone et al., 2007) and accounting disclosure quality (Eng and 
Mak, 2003; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Chua and Gray, 2010). Hence, this study 
controls for the firm’s growth opportunities as measured by market-to-book ratio 
without any directional expectation. 
Second, profitable firms better comply with CG codes and there is a positive 
association between profitability and accounting reporting quality. In respect of 
Bangladesh, Haque et al. (2011) find a positive association between profitability and 
the value of their survey-based CG index. The positive effect of profitability on the 
level of compliance and accounting reporting quality will reduce the extent of 
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overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports. Profitability is 
measured by return on assets (ROA).  
Third, a large body of literature documents a positive association between 
firm size and level of compliance with CG codes (e.g., Werder et al., 2005; Dedman, 
2000; Boone et al., 2007). This literature argues that larger firms suffer lower relative 
compliance costs (e.g., Dedman, 2000) and operational complexity (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Boone et al., 2007) which demands a stronger governance structure. In 
respect of Bangladesh, Haque et al. (2011) find a positive association between firm 
size and the value of their survey-based CG index. Moreover, there is evidence of a 
positive relationship between firm size and the quality of accounting disclosure (e.g., 
Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Ajinkya et al., 2005, Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). That 
is, larger firms not only actually comply better with the BCGG-2006 but also more 
truthfully report the level of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports. The 
size of the firm is measured by the natural log of book value of total assets at the end 
of company’s accounting period following Chen et al. (2008). 
Fourth, prior research reports a positive association of auditor’s quality with 
the quality of CG (e.g. Fan and Wong, 2005; Choi and Wong, 2004) and accounting 
disclosures (e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Kim et al., 2003; Basset et al., 2007; Gul et al., 
2010). In the literature, there are competing arguments for and against positive 
associations: (1) better governed firms appoint quality auditors to credibly 
disseminate information to investors (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Titman and 
Trueman, 1986); (2) quality auditors do not engage themselves in poorly governed 
firms; and (3) quality auditors play an effective governance role in order to protect 
their reputations (DeAngelo, 1981). Similarly, due to the first reason outlined above, 
a large audit firm positively influences accounting reporting quality. Considering the 
evidence together, a negative association between the extent of overstatement of 




Table 5.7: Measurement and data sources for dependent and independent variables 
Variables Explanation  Proxy Measurement Sources of data 
Dependent variable 
OVS_G Overstatement of compliance with 
the BCGG-2006. A higher value 
corresponds to more overstatement. 
Untruthfulness in reporting 
on compliance with the 
BCGG-2006.  
Log (1 + Overstatement statistic)  Comparison of annual reports and 
survey conducted in January to 
March, 2012 
Explanatory variables 
FC Both the Chairman and CEO are 
members of the sponsor family 
Control of the sponsor 
family 
A dummy variable indicating the presence of both 
chairman and CEO from the sponsor family or an 
individual member of the sponsor family holding 
both the position of chairman and CEO; 0 
otherwise. 
Survey  –January to March, 2012 
INS_OWN Institutional investor ownership Control by institutional 
investors 
Percentage of outstanding shares owned by 
institutional investors. 
Survey  –January to March, 2012 
Control variables 
SIZE Natural log of the book value of 
assets 
Firm size Natural log of book value of total assets at the end 
of company’s accounting period in 2011 
Annual Reports released during 
2011 
ROA Return on assets Profitability The ratio of the profit before interest and taxes to 
average total assets of the company at the end of 
company’s accounting period in 2011. 
Annual Reports released during 
2011 
MB Market to book ratio Growth opportunity Ratio of the firm’s market value of common 
equity to book value of common equity at the end 
of company’s accounting period in 2011. Market 
value of equity is calculated by multiplying the 
closing share price by the number of shares 
outstanding on 29.12.11.  
Closing share price and the number 
of shares outstanding on 29.12.11 
are collected from a CD-ROM 
available at the Dhaka stock 
Exchange, Bangladesh. Book value 
of the firm’s common equity is 
collected from annual report of the 
company released during 2011. 
AUDIT Quality of auditor Audit Quality A dichotomous variable indicating that the 
company’s auditor is affiliated with a big-four 
international audit firm; 0 otherwise (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993; Ajinkya et al. 2005). 
Name of auditor is collected from 
annual reports – 2011. The 
affiliation of auditor is gathered 
from website of audit firms. 
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Table 5.7 shows the names, proxies, measurement and sources of data for the 
independent variables used in this section. The data for this study are derived from 
multiple sources. Data on family control structure and institutional ownership are 
collected by the survey as described in Section 5.4. Firms’ annual reports are used to 
obtain data on total assets, amount of long-term debt and auditor. Finally, whether 
the audit firm is affiliated with an international big-four audit firm is collected from 
the websites of the audit firms. 
5.8 Data analysis for RQ2.2 
In order to test P2.2, I use ANOVA on the means and Kruskal-Wallis test on 
the medians of four performance measures: five-year average Tobin’s Q, five-year 
average stock return, five-year average ROA and five year average ROE (Section 
5.6.2). ANOVA is used to test whether there are any significant differences between 
the means of three or more independent groups. ANOVA is a parametric test and 
thus, rests on two assumptions: (1) the dependent variable is normally distributed in 
each group that is being compared in the one-way ANOVA, and (2) the population 
variances in each group are equal. However, ANOVA is robust against violation of 
normality assumption.  I also use Kruskal-Wallis test as an alternative to ANOVA 
because the assumption of homogeneity of variance is not met. 
In order to test P2.2a, P2.2b and P2.2c, I use t-tests on the means and Wilcoxon 
Rank-Sum tests on the medians of four performance measures: five-year average 
Tobin’s Q, five-year average stock return, five-year average ROA and five year 
average ROE. T-test and Wilcoxon Rank Sum test can be used for ‘planned simple 
comparison’ (Sheskin, 2007, p. 885).  Like ANOVA, t-test is a parametric test and 
thus, rests on two assumptions: (1) the dependent variable is normally distributed in 
each group that is being compared by the t-test, and (2) the population variances in 
each group are equal. However, t-test is robust against the violation of normality 
assumption.   
In order to test P2.2d, all the aforesaid tests are performed on the sample of 
local privately-owned companies. The differences in performance among these three 
firm groups are then tested using ANOVA on the means and Kruskal-Wallis test on 
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the medians. Additionally, between groups difference in performance is tested using 
t-tests on the means and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests on the medians.   
5.9 Data analysis for RQ3 
5.9.1 H3.1a and H3.1b 
To test H3.1, the difference between CG_AR and CG_SR (see Section 5.7.1 
for definition and measurement of CG_AR and CG_SR) is tested by using t-test on 
the mean and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test on the median. 
5.9.2 H3.2a and H3.2b 
To test H3.2, Spearman rank correlation between CG_AR and CG_SR is 
tested. The Spearman rank correlation is also calculated between the three sub-
indices (see Section 5.7.2) of CG_AR and CG_SR.  
If compliance with the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports coincides 
with that as stated in the survey, a firm gets an identical rank whether the rank is 
calculated based on CG_AR or CG_SR index. Hence, the null hypothesis for testing 
the significance of the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between CG_AR and 
CG_SR is Ho: ρ = 1.00. Zar (1999, cited in Sheskin, 2007; p. 1364) contends that 
Fisher’s z transformation can be used for testing the significance of a Spearman 
rank correlation coefficient against a hypothesized value of ρ when n ≥ 10 and ρs  < 
0.9. However, Fisher’s z transformation is not possible if the hypothesised value is 
ρ = 1.00 (Zar, 1999, cited in Sheskin, 2007; p. 1243). Hence, the significance of 
correlation coefficients between CG_AR and CG_SR, and their sub-indices are 
tested against a hypothesised value of ρ = 0.95. This testing procedure is also used 
for testing the significance of Spearman rank correlation between the three paired 
sub-indices (see Section 5.7.2) of CG_AR and CG_SR.   
5.9.3 H3.3a1 and H3.3a2 
To test H3.3a, the difference in mean and median between CG_Ob_AR–SR 
and CG_NOb_AR–SR (see Section 5.7.3 for definition of CG_Ob_AR–SR and 
CG_NOb_AR–SR) is tested using t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests respectively. 
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5.9.4 H3.3b1, H3.3b2, H3.3c1 and H3.3c2 
The distribution of overstatement statistic is truncated at the lower bound of 
zero, suggesting that Tobit regression is more appropriate to estimate the cross-
sectional variation in overstatement statistic than ordinary least square (OLS). The 
use of OLS to predict a truncated dependent variable provides inconsistent estimates 
of the parameters (Woolridge, 2002, p. 668). Hence, in order to test H3.3b and 3.3c, 
this study adopts the Tobit model censoring the dependent variable at zero, as 
presented in the following equations
14
, to identify the determinants of the cross-
sectional variation in overstatement statistic.  
OVS_G*
15
   = β0 + β1FC + β2INS_OWN + γi Controls + εi        
OVS_G=0 if OVS_G* ≤ 0 
OVS_G= OVS_G* if OVS_G≥ 0 
OVS_G = ln (1+ overstatement statistic) ………….. (1) 
Where  
FC, a dichotomous variable indicating presence of both chairman and CEO 
from the sponsor family or an individual member of the sponsor family holding both 
the position of chairman and CEO; 0 otherwise;  
INS_OWN, percentage of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors 
at the end of a company’s accounting period in 2011;  
Control variables include the following: 
MB, ratio of the firm’s market value of common equity to book value of 
common equity at the end of company’s accounting period in 2011;  
ROA, the ratio of the profit before interest and taxes to average total assets of 
the company at the end of company’s accounting period in 2011;  
SIZE, natural log of book value of total assets at the end of company’s 
accounting period in 2011;  
AUDIT, a dichotomous variable indicating that a company’s auditor is 
affiliated with a big-four international audit firm; 0 otherwise. 
                                                          
14
 See Wooldridge (2002) pp. 670-71 for an exposition of Tobit regression model. 
15




This chapter has discussed the methodological issues associated with data 
collection, measurement of proxy variables and data analysis. Firstly, I described the 
procedures I have used for collection and analysis of semi-structured interview data 
that will be used for answering RQ1. Secondly, I described the procedure that has 
been applied to collect data by using survey that will be used for answering RQ2 and 
RQ3. Thirdly, as RQ2 and RQ3 are deductive in nature, I described the measurement 
of proxy variables that will be used for testing propositions related to RQ2 and 
hypotheses related to RQ3. One significant challenge I face is measurement of the 
overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports. Finally, 
statistical tests to be used for testing propositions related to RQ2 and hypotheses 
related to RQ3 were discussed. Finally, I presented the Tobit regression model used 
in testing H3.3b1, H3.3b2, H3.3c1 and H3.3c2.  




Impact of the BCGG-2006 on investment and 
credit decisions 
6.1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents and analyses the findings of research question RQ1. Do 
institutional investors and bankers in Bangladesh perceive that the level of 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 by an investee or a borrowing company influences 
the investment and lending decisions respectively? This RQ1 is investigated by 
taking an inductive approach. It is divided into following sub–questions (Section 
4.2):  
RQ1.1a How do the institutional investors and bankers perceive a direct 
impact of a particular corporate governance mechanism of the BCGG-2006 on 
their investment and lending decisions respectively?  
RQ1.1b How do the institutional investors and bankers perceive the impact of 
a particular corporate governance mechanism of the BCGG-2006 on firm 
performance and accounting reporting quality?  
RQ1.2 Which theory of corporate governance explains better the impact of 
corporate governance on investment and lending decisions of institutional 
investors and bankers respectively in Bangladesh? 
Section 6.2 presents findings on RQ 1.1a and RQ 1.1b. In order to answer 
RQ1.1a and RQ1.1b, I present interviewees’ perceptions of: separation of CEO and 
chairman of the board; board size; board independence; audit committee; chief 
financial officer; and head of internal audit. The method of analysis of interviewee’s 
responses with respect to the aforementioned CG mechanisms is described in Section 
5.3.4 Stage1. In order to answer RQ1.2, three main themes are generated from 
interviews by using a grounded theory-based data analysis (Section 5.3.4 Stage 2). 
These themes are: (1) that the rent protection motive of the sponsor families hampers 
the implementation of the BCGG-2006 ‘in form and in substance’, (2) corporate and 
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institutional characteristics of Bangladesh indicate low relative implementation 
efficiency of the BCGG-2006 and thus, discourages sponsor families from 
implementing the BCGG-2006 ‘in form and in substance’, (3) traditional 
characteristics of investment and lending practices. Section 6.3 presents first-order 
codes that indicate the rent protection motive of the sponsor families. Section 6.4 
presents first-order codes that indicate the low relative implementation efficiency of 
the BCGG-2006 emanating from corporate and institutional characteristics of 
Bangladesh and section 6.5 presents the traditional characteristics of investment and 
lending practices. Section 6.6 theorises the impact of compliance with the BCGG-
2006 on investment and lending decisions. Section 6.7 concludes.  
6.2 Perceptions as to corporate governance provisions of 
the BCGG-2006 
This section presents and analyses the findings of research question RQ1.1a 
and RQ 1.1b (Section 6.1). The respondents (Section 5.3.1) include investment 
managers from mutual funds and life insurance companies, and credit rating analysts 
from banks and credit rating agencies. The perceptions of credit rating analysts of 
credit rating agencies are treated as the perception of bankers because both bankers 
and credit raters appraise a company to assess its credit worthiness. 
6.2.1 Perceptions as to separation of the chairman and the CEO 
6.2.1.1 Direct impact of separation of the chairman and CEO on 
investment and lending decisions 
The BCGG-2006 recommends that companies appoint separate people as the 
chairman of the board and the CEO of a company (Section 3.6.2.1). Hence, the 
interviewees are asked:  
How do you perceive the impact of separation of the chairman and the CEO 
on your decisions?           
Table 6.1 presents the perceptions of 28 interviewees on the impact of the 
separation of the chairman and the CEO on the investment and lending decisions. As 
shown in Panel A, 19 out of 28 interviewees (67.85%) state that the separation of the 
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chairman and the CEO has no direct impact on their investment and lending 
decisions.   
Table 6.1: Perception as to direct impact of the separation of the chairman and the 
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Total (B) 1 2 4* 2 9* 
Key: Interviewee Code: MFM = Investment manager of mutual funds; LIC=Investment manager of 
life insurance companies; BANKS = Credit appraisal officer of banks; CRA = Credit rating analysts 
of corporate credit rating agencies; NCB = National Commercial Bank, DCB = Domestic Commercial 
Bank; DIB = Domestic Islamic Bank; FCB = Foreign Commercial Bank. * = interviewee mentions 
multiple reasons for no impact of separation of the chairman and CEO. 
 
Twelve interviewees perceive that the family relationship between the 
chairman and CEO cancels out any impact of the separation of the chairman and the 
CEO. These interviewees are sceptical about the segregation of duties and 
responsibilities between the chairman and the CEO. A typical comment that 
represents the views of this group of interviewees is: 
The separation of the chairman and the CEO does not affect my perception 
much. It is some sort of eyewash, actual segregation of duties between the chairman 
and the CEO is not practiced in most companies. If previously the family key man 
holds both the positions of the chairman and the CEO, now his wife is designated as 
the chairman and he designates himself as the CEO [LIC-3].   
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Five interviewees perceive no direct impact of the separation of the chairman 
and the CEO on their decisions because the sponsor chairman does not delegate 
enough decision-making authority to an outside CEO. According to these 
interviewees, most of the companies in Bangladesh were initiated by an individual 
entrepreneur as a sole proprietorship or by a number of entrepreneurs as partnerships. 
These sole proprietorships or partnerships were later converted into public limited 
companies without changing their internal control structure. Hence, the key sponsor 
still maintains strong control over the affairs of the company and delegates limited 
decision making authority to the appointed CEO. A typical comment is:  
Most of our public limited companies were sole proprietorships or at best 
partnerships in the past. As a result, the sponsors run them as sole proprietorships. 
They [the sponsors] still retain absolute control over these companies. […]. To 
comply with the provision regarding separation of the chairman and the CEO, they 
may appoint an outside professional CEO; but he [the CEO] is delegated only 
limited authority to run the company's day to day operation. As a result, separation 
of the chairman and the CEO does not have much impact on the accountability and 
consequently, on our lending decisions yet [DIB-2]. 
Seven interviewees argue that the name-based and collateral-based lending 
practices of the banks diminish consideration of the separation of chairman and CEO.  
Furthermore, the Credit Risk Grading (CRG) guidelines of the Bangladesh Bank do 
not require banks to consider the separation of the chairman and the CEO while 
appraising a loan proposal. A typical comment is: 
We do not consider it [the separation of the chairman and the CEO] yet. 
Basically, Bangladesh issued CRG guideline 5-6 years ago. Before that, the banks 
practiced name-based and collateral-based lending. You can say that we are still 
practicing some sort of name-based and collateral-based lending [DCB-5]. 
On the other hand, nine out of 28 interviewees state that the separation of the 
chairman and the CEO has a direct impact on their investment and lending decisions 
(Table 6.1, Panel B). Three interviewees perceive that separation of the chairman and 
the CEO has a direct positive impact on their investment decisions because it has a 
positive effect on the internal control systems of the company. A typical comment is: 
If chairman and CEO is the same person, the chairman is the main decision 
maker. This influences our investment decision a lot. We never invest in these 
companies [companies that do not separate the chairman and the CEO]. That man is 
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performing both the operational and strategic decision making roles. He is doing 
everything in the best interest of him and his family (LIC - 2).  
Five interviewees perceive that the separation of the chairman and the CEO 
reduces the problem of succession, a major problem faced by a family-based 
company. A typical comment that represents the views of this group of interviewees 
is: 
Chairman is an honorary post. […]. The main person is the CEO. He is the 
main working person. So, we want to see the both persons differently. We also want 
to know what functions they are doing. This also gives us an idea of succession plan. 
For example, Mr. A appointed his son Mr. B as managing director for one company 
of P Group. So, we feel confident that we will not be in a problem in absence of Mr. 
A [FCB-1]. 
Finally, the following comment indicates that interviewees consider the 
chairman and CEO of the company to be important people in a company:  
[…] we always try to find out that there is a chairman, and there is a CEO 
and both these persons are important. Both are main men [LIC-1]. 
 
6.2.1.2 Indirect impact of separation of the chairman and CEO on 
investment and lending decisions 
Among the perceptions of interviewees who do not perceive a direct impact of 
the separation of the chairman and the CEO on their decisions, 13 indicate that the 
separation of the chairman and the CEO has no impact on the internal control 
structure of the company (Table 6.1).  Hence, the remaining 15 interviewees were 
asked:  
How do you perceive the impact of the separation of the chairman and the 
CEO on firm performance and accounting reporting quality?  
Table 6.2 presents the perceptions of interviewees regarding the impact of the 
separation of the chairman and the CEO on firm performance and accounting 
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Key: Interviewee Code: MFM = Investment manager of mutual funds; LIC=Investment manager of 
life insurance companies; BANKS = Credit appraisal officer of banks; CRA = Credit rating analysts 
of corporate credit rating agencies; NCB = Nationalised Commercial Bank, DCB = Domestic 
Commercial Bank; DIB = Domestic Islamic Bank; FCB = Foreign Commercial Bank. 
Table 6.2 shows that eight out of 15 interviewees perceive that the separation 
of the chairman and the CEO has no impact on firm performance and accounting 
reporting quality. These interviewees reasoned that the family relationship between 
the chairman and the CEO, and the delegation of limited authority to the outside 
CEO, constrain the impact of the separation of chairman and CEO. A representative 
comment from one interviewee of this group is: 
I do not think that the separation of the Chairman and the CEO has much 
impact on the performance and accounting reporting quality. The reason is that the 
ultimate authority remains with a single person – who is the man behind the 
machine: it may be chairman of the company or the managing director. If the 
managing director is an employed professional, he is not given enough authority. So, 
if there is any impact of the separation of the chairman and the CEO, it’s negligible 
[DCB -3].  
However, four out of 15 interviewees perceive a positive impact of the 
separation of the chairman and the CEO on firm performance and accounting 
reporting quality (Table 6.2). According to these interviewees: (1) the knowledge of 
the professional CEO will help to increase the performance of the company and (2) 
the appointment of an outside CEO promotes the development of a formal 
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accountability system which automatically triggers the development of an efficient 
internal accounting system. A typical comment is: 
Well, I think that there is a chance of positive impact on performance and 
accounting reporting quality. For example, if the CEO is a professional and the 
chairman is a sponsor director, the CEO will run the company according to the 
advice of the chairman and use his own professional expertise. The two-way 
communication between the chairman and CEO will automatically trigger the 
development of a good MIS [DCB – 5].  
Finally, three out of 15 interviewees report that they cannot generalise the 
impact of the separation of the chairman and CEO on the performance and 
accounting reporting quality of the company. A typical comment is: 
It depends. I have seen that a dual CEO is running his company very 
smoothly and performing well. The accounting report of the company is also good 
relative to general standard of our country. Again there are companies with separate 
CEO and chairman is running very badly and to conceal their performance issue 
opaque reports [LIC -1].  
  
6.2.1.3 Summary  
The results provide strong evidence that the separation of the chairman and 
the CEO has no direct impact on the investment and lending decisions of institutional 
investors and bankers respectively (Table 6.1, Panel A). There is limited evidence 
that the separation of the chairman and CEO has a direct impact on the investment 
and lending decisions of institutional investors and bankers respectively (Table 6.1, 
Panel B).  
The results presented in Section 6.2.1.2 also provide limited support for the 
perceived impact of the separation of the chairman and the CEO on the performance 
and accounting reporting quality of companies.  
Hence, there is overall, a limited direct or indirect impact of the separation of 
the chairman and the CEO on investment and lending decisions of institutional 
investors and bankers respectively. This is because the sponsors and their families 
invalidate the separation of the chairman and CEO as a CG mechanism by either 
appointing family members to the position of both chairman and CEO or delegating 
limited authority when the CEO is an outside professional. There is also some 
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evidence that bankers do not exert pressure on companies for the separation of the 
chairman and the CEO because bankers are accustomed to name-based and 
collateral-based lending practices.    
6.2.2 Perceptions of Board Size 
6.2.2.1 Direct impact of board size on investment and lending 
decisions  
The BCGG-2006 recommends that companies appoint a board of directors 
having between 5 and 20 members (Section 3.6.2.1). Hence, the interviewees are 
asked:  
How do you perceive the impact of board size on your decisions? 
Interviewees’ perceptions are presented in Table 6.3 which reports that 23 out 
of 28 interviewees (82.14%) state that board size has no direct impact on their 
investment and lending decisions.  
Ten out of 28 interviewees perceive that board size has no direct impact on 
their decisions because the board is dominated by the family members of the key 
sponsor executive director. According to these interviewees, these family board 
members do not have enough involvement in the company’s affairs. Several 
interviewees also state that companies having a majority of sponsor family directors 
do not convene board meetings regularly. One typical comment that represents the 
views of this group of interviewees is: 
We identify the total board. For example, there are six members on the 
board; two directors are key – the chairman and the CEO. Other directors are the 
spouses and the children of the chairman and the CEO. These spouses and children 
are not our concern because they have no involvement with the company’s affairs. 
They often even do not attend board meeting and AGM [DCB – 6]. 
Eight interviewees perceive that the key sponsor executive directors dominate 
the decision making process due to their major shareholdings in the company. Other 
board members cannot play a role as they have minimum shareholdings and the key 
sponsor executive directors do not encourage them to participate in the decision 
making process. A typical comment is: 
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In Bangladesh, the CEO and the chairman are appointed based on major 
shareholdings and ultimately, they dominate the meetings process, and everything at 
80 percent and in some cases at 100 percent level. […]. The remaining board 
members are directors in name only. They generally do not have major 
shareholdings and thus, they do not have that much role in company decision making 
and everything [DCB - 11]. 
Table 6.3: Perceptions as to the direct impact of board size on investment and 
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Key: Interviewee Code: MFM = Investment manager of mutual funds; LIC=Investment manager of life 
insurance companies; BANKS = Credit appraisal officer of banks; CRA = Credit rating analysts of 
corporate credit rating agencies; NCB = Nationalised Commercial Bank, DCB = Domestic Commercial 
Bank; DIB = Domestic Islamic Bank; FCB = Foreign Commercial Bank; * = interviewee mentions 
multiple reasons for no direct impact of board size on their decisions. 
Three interviewees perceive that due to a lack of qualification and 
experience, the board of directors cannot play their decision making role.  A typical 
comment is:  
They are employing their own people to comply with the law. It is not like 
that they offer board position to qualified people and make good decisions through 
thesis and anti-thesis. Basically, authority and responsibility relies to the key person. 
I do not think that the board size has any impact on our decision making [DCB - 7]. 
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Five interviewees argue that they do not consider board size when making 
their decisions because lending practices do not require consideration of the board of 
directors of the borrowing company.  
Basically, we are concerned with ‘the man behind the machine' because in 
our culture, either one or two persons of the total board are active and other board 
members are sleeping members. As a result, we consider key sponsor executive 
directors. For example, in case of S. Ltd, we consider two brothers as a basis. In 
case of G Ltd, we are concerned with Mr. S (DCB - 10). 
 
In contrast, five interviewees perceive a direct impact of board size on their 
decisions (Table 6.3). Four interviewees prefer small boards because they perceive 
that the larger the board, the more the chance of conflict among board members. 
According to them, conflict among board members reduces the efficiency of the 
company. A typical response is: 
My experience is that the larger the board is, the more the chance of conflicts 
in case of our country. We feel comfortable with a small board [DCB-5].  
6.2.2.2 Indirect impact of the board size on investment and lending 
decisions 
The responses of 18 interviewees who do not perceive any direct impact of 
board size as described in Section 6.2.2.1 suggest that the board of directors does not 
play an effective role.  Hence, the remaining 10 interviewees are asked:  
 How do you perceive the impact of board size on firm performance and 
accounting reporting quality?  
Table 6.4 presents the perceptions of interviewees on the impact of board size 
on firm performance and accounting reporting quality. Table 6.4 shows that five 
interviewees perceive no indirect impact of board size on their decisions. According 
to these interviewees, the board comprises family members of the key sponsor 
executive director and thus, the board has limited interest in rectifying the decisions 
taken by the key sponsor executive director. A typical comment is:  
I do not think that board has that much role to influence performance or 
accounting reporting quality in case of our country. The main decision maker is the 
key sponsor director. Other members are his family members who are rarely 
informed about business decisions and thus, they unquestionably ratify the decisions 
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However, six interviewees perceive that board size has an impact on the 
performance and accounting reporting quality of the company (Table 6.4). According 
to these interviewees, a large board negatively affects the performance and 
accounting reporting quality because the larger the board, the more the conflict. This 
conflict among board members negatively affects performance. Furthermore, a large 
board increases internal manipulation because board members in Bangladesh often 
use their directorship to personally benefit themselves. The company often 
manipulates accounting reports to disguise the impact of these personal benefits on 
company profit. A representative comment is: 
[…] in case of our country small board often performs better because it 
suffers from less internal conflicts. It can quickly decide on available investment 
proposals. There are also instances that large board increases accounting 
manipulation. Every director uses his directorship to gain personally. For example, 
in case of banks, each director can recommend some loans. Hence, the more the 
number of directors on board is, the more the amount of recommended loan. S. Bank 
Ltd has eighteen members on board. It sanctions huge loan on directors' requests 
resulting in a significant amount of bad loan. There is a rumour in the market that it 
manipulates the amount of provision for bad loan in the last financial year to 




6.2.2.3 Summary  
The results presented in Section 6.2.2.1 indicate that there is strong evidence 
that board size has no direct impact on investment and lending decisions. However, a 
limited number of interviewees perceive a negative impact of a large board. The 
board of directors may not have an impact on the decisions of the interviewees 
because the family-based structure of the board does not allow it to monitor or advise 
the key sponsor executive directors who are simultaneously the heads of the sponsor 
families. In a hierarchical society (Section 3.5.2), like Bangladesh, it is not possible 
for other members of the family: to advise the family head, the question of 
monitoring is absurd. Furthermore, the key sponsor executive director is often the 
most experienced person among the board members and thus, it is beyond the 
capacity of the board of directors to advise the sponsor executive directors. On the 
other hand, a large board negatively affects the decisions of the interviewees both 
directly and indirectly because a large board increases expropriations and is prone to 
conflict.  This evidence implies that the board of directors is not playing an effective 
CG role in protecting the interest of outside investors and creditors. 
6.2.3 Perceptions as to board composition: independent 
director(s) 
6.2.3.1 Direct impact of independent director on investment and 
lending decisions  
The BCGG-2006 requires companies to appoint at least 10 per cent of board 
membership subject to a minimum of one independent director on the board (Section 
3.6.2.1). So, interviewees are asked:  
How do you perceive the impact of independent director(s) on your 
decisions?   
Table 6.5 summarises the perceptions of interviewees about the direct impact 
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Total (B) 1 1 3 0 5 17.86 
Key: Interviewee Code: MFM = Investment manager of mutual funds; LIC=Investment manager of life 
insurance companies; BANKS = Credit appraisal officer of banks; CRA = Credit rating analysts of 
corporate credit rating agencies; NCB = Nationalised Commercial Bank, DCB = Domestic Commercial 
Bank; DIB = Domestic Islamic Bank; FCB = Foreign Commercial Bank. * = interviewee mentions 
multiple reasons for no direct impact of board size on their decisions. 
As shown in Table 6.5, 23 out of 28 interviewees state that the independent 
director has no direct impact on their decisions.  
Eleven interviewees do not perceive any direct impact of independent 
directors on their decisions because the independent director has a personal or a 
monetary relationship with the key sponsor executive director. Their statements 
imply that the monitoring role of the independent director is substantially eroded. 
One typical comment from an interviewee of this group is:  
Who is appointing the independent directors? - The sponsor directors. So, 
they will appoint their maternal cousin. There may be qualifications. How will you 
determine the qualification? – (1) the independent director must have at least 10 
shares. Ok, sponsor directors will buy 10 shares in his name. (2) The independent 
director must have a Master’s degree. Ok, they will appoint someone who has an 
MBA. Actually, it does not make difference that much (CRA -1). 
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Five interviewees do not perceive any impact of the independent director on 
their investment and lending decisions because the sponsor directors, being the 
majority on the board, do not consider the opinion of the independent directors while 
deciding on major issues in board meetings (Table 6.5). One interviewee comments:  
 Those who are key sponsor directors, they do not follow the independent 
director. There is no role of independent director. Those who are on the board for a 
long time take major decisions without considering the opinion of the independent 
director.  As a result, there is no impact of the independent director on our 
investment decisions [LIC -2]. 
Two interviewees do not perceive any impact of the independent director on 
their lending decisions because the independent director has no connection with the 
company’s affairs (Table 6.5). One of them comments:  
Independent director is just a formality. First of all, independent director has 
no involvement with the company’s affairs in most of the cases. It is just a formality 
and fulfilment of a legal requirement. He has no involvement in company’s decision 
making and he has no power to influence company’s affairs [DCB - 6].  
Eight interviewees state that lending practices reduce consideration of the 
independent director (Table 6.5). According to these interviewees, banks cannot take 
a personal guarantee from the independent director because the independent director 
does not have a significant percentage of shareholding in the company. One typical 
comment is:  
We do not [consider the independent director] because he [the independent 
director] has no shareholding and his [the independent director] net worth is not 
important to us; we cannot take a personal guarantee from him [the independent 
director] [NCB -1] 
On the other hand, five interviewees perceive that the independent director 
has a direct impact on their investment and lending decisions (Table 6.5).  Three 
credit analysts of banks perceive a negative impact of the independent director on 
their lending decisions only if the independent director of the borrower company has 
a bad reputation. One interviewee comments: 
Yes, we see the name [of the independent director]. If it is a bad name, we try 
to reject the loan proposal. But it is not a bad name, I mean, if the independent 
director is not a loan defaulter or a politically affiliated person, then we go forward 




In addition, two investment managers indicated that they consider the 
independent director when making their investment decisions because qualified 
independent directors play an advisory role (Table 6.5).  
We consider the independent director and I think that it is a good initiative. 
[…]. The effectiveness of the independent director depends on his background and 
personality. If the independent director is knowledgeable and has the capacity to 
influence the decisions, it will surely add value [MFM -3].  
  
6.2.3.2 Indirect impact of the independent director on investment and 
lending decisions 
The arguments put forward by 17 interviewees suggest that the independent 
director does not play an effective role. Hence, the remaining 11 interviewees are 
asked:  
 How do you perceive the impact of an independent director on firm 
performance and accounting reporting quality?  
Table 6.6 presents the perception of interviewees on the impact of an 
independent director on firm performance and accounting reporting quality.  
Table 6.6: Perceptions as to the indirect impact of independent director on 
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Key: Interviewee Code: MFM = Investment manager of mutual funds; LIC=Investment manager of life 
insurance companies; BANKS = Credit appraisal officer of banks; CRA = Credit rating analysts of 
corporate credit rating agencies; NCB = Nationalised Commercial Bank, DCB = Domestic Commercial 
Bank; DIB = Domestic Islamic Bank; FCB = Foreign Commercial Bank. 
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Table 6.6 shows that six interviewees do not perceive any impact of 
independent director on firm performance and accounting reporting quality. 
According to these interviewees, the independent director does not have 
independence from the key sponsor director and thus, does not play any role. A 
representative comment is: 
No. there is no impact of the independent director on accounting reporting 
quality. I just want to give an example. Professor M. is the independent director and 
member of the audit committee of A Ltd. He is an FCMA, a professor of accounting 
and was president of ICMAB for two terms. The SEC recently finds out that the 
accounting reports of A Ltd seriously  non-comply with IASs and thus, fines TK 
3,00,000 per director of A Ltd including Professor M. Basically Professor M is the 
friend of Mr B, the sponsor chairman of A Ltd and does not have any interaction with 
the company [DCB -3]. 
However, five interviewees perceive that, in spite of questionable 
independence, a qualified independent director contributes to firm performance and 
accounting reporting quality. A representative comment is:  
When a board of directors includes an independent director, he may not be 
independent, he must be a professional. In general, the perception about him is that 
he is an expert person, and that is why he is independent. So, obviously he will give 
good comments for the betterment of the company performance and improvement of 
accounting reporting quality. Definitely it will have positive impact on performance 
and accounting reporting quality [DCB-8].  
6.2.3.3 Summary 
The results presented in Section 6.2.3.1 strongly suggest that institutional 
investors and bankers do not consider independent directors when making 
investment and lending decisions. There is, however, weak evidence that the bad 
reputation of the independent directors negatively affects the lending decisions of 
banks. It can be argued that the kinds of bad reputation mentioned by the 
interviewees should negatively affect loan granting decisions whether the director is 
independent or not. For example, a bank cannot extend credit to a company with a 
loan defaulter director as it is prohibited by a notification of the Bangladesh Bank 
(Section 3.7). Similarly, a bank may not extend credit to a company with a director 
who is highly politically affiliated because political affiliation increases credit risk. 
The business of politically affiliated directors may badly suffer when the relevant 
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party is not in power due to an antagonistic political culture in Bangladesh (Section 
3.5.3) This evidence suggests that interviewees who perceive a direct negative 
impact of independent directors of bad repute on their decisions consider an 
independent director part of regulatory compliance, not because of the CG role of the 
independent director. Finally, there is only negligible evidence that a qualified 
independent director plays an advisory role.   
The evidence reported in Section 6.2.3.2 again shows that a greater number of 
respondents do not perceive any impact of an independent director on firm 
performance and accounting reporting quality. The reasons put forward by these 
interviewees in favour of their arguments are similar to the reasons reported in Table 
6.5. However, there is some evidence that a qualified independent director plays an 
advisory role.   
The evidence, in sum, strongly suggests that institutional investors and 
bankers do not perceive any direct or indirect impact of an independent director on 
their decisions. This is because the governance role of the independent director is 
constrained by the sponsor shareholder directors, either employing someone as 
independent director who is closely related to the key sponsor executive director or 
disregarding the opinion of the independent director while making major corporate 
decisions. There is only limited evidence that the qualified independent director 
plays an advisory role and contributes to the performance and accounting reporting 
quality of the company. These findings imply that the independent director can do 
little to protect the interests of outside shareholders and creditors.  
6.2.4 Perceptions as to audit committee 
6.2.4.1 Direct impact of audit committee on investment and lending 
decisions  
The audit committee is another important corporate governance mechanism 
introduced by the BCGG-2006 (Section 3.6.2.2). So, interviewees are asked:  
How do you perceive the impact of an audit committee on your decisions?                    
Interviewees’ perceptions about the direct impact of an audit committee on 
their decisions are presented in Table 6.7 which shows 23 interviewees state that the 
audit committee has no direct impact on their investment and lending decisions. 
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Table 6.7: Perceptions as to the direct impact of audit committee on investment 
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Key: Interviewee Code: MFM = Investment manager of mutual funds; LIC=Investment manager of life 
insurance companies; BANKS = Credit appraisal officer of banks; CRA = Credit rating analysts of 
corporate credit rating agencies; NCB = Nationalised Commercial Bank, DCB = Domestic Commercial 
Bank; DIB = Domestic Islamic Bank; FCB = Foreign Commercial Bank; * = interviewee mentions 
multiple reasons for no direct impact of board size on their decisions. 
i
nterviewees perceive positive 
impact of audit committee on their decisions but explanations indicate that audit committee is not 
effective.  
 
Eleven interviewees do not perceive any direct impact of the audit committee 
on their investment and credit decisions because the audit committee is dominated by 
the members of the sponsor family. Their statements imply that the monitoring role 
of the audit committee is substantially reduced due to the presence of the sponsor 
family members on the audit committee. One typical comment from the interviewees 
of this group is:  
 […] A Ltd of Mr. M is a good company in respect of our country. In its 
annual report, it discloses that it has an audit committee. Now the question is who 
the members of that audit committee are. Mr. N, the eldest son of Mr. M, Prof. F, a 
friend of Mr. M and another executive director of the company. Do you think that 
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Mr. N and Prof. F will be interested to disclose something that is against the interest 
of Mr. M’s family? Is it possible or feasible in our culture? [LIC-3] 
Five interviewees do not perceive any direct impact of the audit committee on 
their lending decisions because of the lack of separation between the audit committee 
members and the executives who are responsible for the preparation of the financial 
statements (Table 6.7). A typical comment on the limited separation of duties 
between the audit committee members and the executives is: 
In a company where the board itself has no effectiveness, how can a sub-
committee of that board can be effective? They are the owners of the company, they 
are the directors of the company and they are the chairman and members of the audit 
committee. Basically there is no segregation of the duties. How can an audit 
committee with these characteristics add value? [NCB – 1] 
Three interviewees perceive that the audit committee is not effective because 
its members lack adequate qualifications to perform their role (Table 6.7). One 
investment manager of a life insurance company questions the qualification of audit 
committee chairmen and comments: 
 The chairman of the audit committee of X Bank Ltd is Mr Y, a famous 
terrorist of Bangladesh Chatra League [Student wing of Bangladesh Awami 
League]. He was a student of Islamic History. Somehow he became a director and 
the chairman of audit committee of the Bank. What does he know about accounting 
and the role of audit committee? [LIC -2] 
Six interviewees perceive that the audit committee cannot directly influence 
their decisions because the external auditors are not independent (Table 6.7). Their 
response indicates that the external auditors do not raise issues to the audit 
committees and thus, the audit committee cannot augment accounting reporting 
quality:  
The audit committee has no impact of my decision making. An audit 
committee can only add value if the external auditors are effective. In case of 
Bangladesh, the external auditors are not honest and independent; they are trained 
in such a way so that they can reduce the tax burden of the company. When the 
external auditors’ job is to minimize tax, his audit will not be neutral. Thus, 
observation of audit committee will not be reflected in audited financial statements 
[FCB - 3].   
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Five interviewees perceive that audit committees are not actually appointed 
by companies and thus, there is no direct impact of the audit committee on their 
decisions (Table 6.7). A representative comment is: 
Actually the audit committee or the structure that you are talking about is 
possible only in financial organizations; it does not exist in any corporate house. 
There may be, but I have not met any company yet as my client that has an audit 
committee [DCB - 8].  
Seven interviewees state that they do not consider the audit committee while 
making their lending decisions because it is not required by the lending policy 
manual (Table 6.7). One typical comment from an interviewee of this group is:   
No, I do not think that any bank in Bangladesh consider whether the 
borrower company has an audit committee or not. Again it is not required by the 
CRG guideline of Bangladesh Bank. We cannot ask the client for anything that is 
beyond the Bangladesh Bank's CRG guideline because our market is very 
competitive and there is an unhealthy competition among banks. If as a banker I do 
not extend loan, other bank will do it [DCB - 5]. 
Five interviewees, however, perceive that the audit committee has a direct 
impact on their investment and lending decisions. However, two analysts of credit 
rating agency do not give reasons for their view. Instead, their explanations indicate 
that the audit committee is largely ineffective. One of the analysts makes the 
following comment:  
In a good number of instances we have found that he is the chairman of 
board, he is the chairman of the executive committee and he is the chairman of the 
audit committee. So, in that case this becomes superfluous [sic]. Since the board, the 
executive committee and the audit committee are represented by him, it is very 
natural what is appropriate for the executive committee, is also appropriate for the 
audit committee and the board.  This is a conflict of interest (CRA - 2). 
The explanations provided by the remaining three interviewees indicate that 
the audit committee is performing its CG role (Table 6.7). One interviewee of these 
three comments: 
We also check the effectiveness of audit committee, whether the audit 
committee is only on paper. If it is only on the paper, it will not talk against the 
malpractices of the sponsor directors. If the audit committee is working effectively, 
the company will timely disseminate its quarterly, semi-annual and annual financial 
statements and those reports will have at least a reasonable quality [MFM - 4]. 
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6.2.4.2 Indirect impact of the audit committee on investment and 
lending decisions 
The arguments put forward by 20 interviewees suggest that the audit 
committee either does not exist or is ineffective. Hence, the remaining 8 interviewees 
are asked:  
 How do you perceive the impact of the audit committee on firm performance 
and accounting reporting quality?  
Table 6.8: Perceptions as to the indirect impact of audit committee on 
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Key: Interviewee Code: MFM = Investment manager of mutual funds; LIC=Investment manager of life 
insurance companies; BANKS = Credit appraisal officer of banks; CRA = Credit rating analysts of 
corporate credit rating agencies; NCB = Nationalised Commercial Bank, DCB = Domestic Commercial 
Bank; DIB = Domestic Islamic Bank; FCB = Foreign Commercial Bank. 
Table 6.8 presents their perceptions. It shows that five interviewees do not 
perceive any impact of the audit committee on firm performance and accounting 
reporting quality. According to these interviewees, the audit committee does not have 
sufficient independence from the management of the company and thus, does not 
differ with the decisions taken by the management of the company. A representative 
comment is: 
A typical audit committee consists of two directors from the sponsor family and 
one independent director.  As I said you earlier, the consideration of the opinion of 
the independent director depends on the whim of the sponsor directors. You can 
easily understand that this audit committee has no reason to differ with the executive 
management because the executive management is not separate from the sponsor 
family. So, the decisions taken by the executive management is also the decisions of 
the audit committee [DCB – 5].   
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Three interviewees, however, perceive that the audit committee is playing an 
effective role in increasing firm performance and accounting reporting quality. These 
interviewees, however, state that the positive impact of an audit committee on firm 
performance and accounting reporting quality can only result if the audit committee 
is properly constituted and its members have relevant qualifications. A typical 
comment is:   
[…] it [audit committee] is a check and balance. There is an audit committee 
and the chairman of the audit committee who is not the chairman of the board 
generally. I think by law, it can't be happened. So there is another power point where 
there is a body which works as a check against the board and the management. So 
generally speaking, it helps. As per my experience, it helped a lot in many 
organizations [LIC-1] 
6.2.4.3 Summary 
The evidence reported in Section 6.2.4.1 strongly suggests that institutional 
investors and banks in Bangladesh do not perceive a direct impact of the audit 
committee on their decisions. The domination of the audit committee by the key 
sponsor directors and their family members, and the presence of key executives such 
as CEO and CFO on the audit committee, undermines its independence. The 
interviewees perceive that an audit committee comprising of the key sponsor 
directors and their family members will not do anything that goes against the interest 
of the sponsor family. Furthermore, the presence of the CEO or the CFO on the audit 
committee challenges its ability to assess management and the accounting reports of 
the company.  
There is limited evidence that the lack of adequate knowledge of the audit 
committee members in accounting and financial management reduces the 
effectiveness of the audit committee (Section 2.6.4.3). This lack of expertise of the 
members is plausible given that Bangladesh as a developing country and has a 
limited number of qualified people. Furthermore, the first generation of Bangladeshi 
entrepreneurs are not well-educated (Section 3.3). There is also moderate evidence 
that the audit committee cannot influence accounting reporting quality because 
external auditors are not independent (Sections 3.4.5 and 3.6.3.2). The lack of 
independence of the external auditors reduces the chance of audit disagreement 
between the external auditors and the key sponsor executive directors. As a result, 
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the audit committee has limited scope to reinforce the independence of the external 
auditors and to add credibility to the audited financial statements. This evidence 
suggests that one of the important complementarities for the effectiveness of audit 
committees does not prevail in Bangladesh. 
The evidence further suggests that several non-financial public limited 
companies in Bangladesh do not appoint an audit committee even though the BCGG-
2006 recommends it. The sponsor directors may not appoint an audit committee 
because they are not interested in strengthening the internal CG structure or they 
perceive limited benefits of having an audit committee. Finally, there is a lack of 
pressure from bankers on companies to appoint an audit committee. The banks may 
not consider the audit committee important because they may reduce their 
information risk by some alternative mechanisms.  
6.2.5 Perceptions as to Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
6.2.5.1 Direct impact of CFO on investment and lending decisions  
The BCGG-2006 requires a company to appoint a CFO and properly define 
the roles and responsibilities of the CFO (Section 3.4.2.4). So, the respondents are 
asked: 
How do you perceive the impact of the CFO on your decisions?                    
The perceptions of the respondents are summarised in Table 6.9 which shows 
that seven interviewees do not perceive any direct impact while 21 interviewees 
perceive a direct impact of the appointment of a CFO by an investee or a borrowing 
company on their decisions. This evidence is not consistent with the evidence 
reported in Sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.4. One reason may be that the CFO primarily makes 
direct contact with the institutional investors and banks while raising funds and this 
influences the perception of the interviewees.  
A detailed analysis of the perceptions of the interviewees, however, reveals 
that several of 21 interviewees who perceive a direct impact of the CFO on their 
decisions percieve that the role of the CFO is constrained by several factors. Hence, I 
group the interviewees based on the factors that constrained the role of the CFO in 
Table 6.10 and the roles actually played by the CFO in Table 6.11. 
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Table 6.9: Perceptions as to the direct impact of CFO on investment and 
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Key: Interviewee Code: MFM = Investment manager of mutual funds; LIC=Investment manager of 
life insurance companies; BANKS = Credit appraisal officer of banks; CRA = Credit rating analysts 
of corporate credit rating agencies; NCB = Domestic Development Bank, DCB = Domestic 
Commercial Bank; DIB = Domestic Islamic Bank; FCB = Foreign Commercial Bank. 
According to nine interviewees, the CFO cannot play an adequate role 
because the sponsors delegate limited authority to the CFO (Table 6.10). These 
interviewees state that the CFO plays only a supporting role and does not have any 
decision making authority. One interviewee of this group comments: 
[…] the CFO is still a support staff of the company and just supports the key 
sponsor director by providing information. Otherwise, the key decisions are taken by 
the main sponsor director. There are companies where the CFO is nothing but a 
clerk. He even cannot give us [the bank] a document without the prior permission of 
the key sponsor director. If the CFO adds any value to the company, that's because 
of information quality, not because of his decision making role [DCB 10].  
Table 6.10 also shows that eight interviewees perceive that the CFOs in non-
financial companies have insufficient qualifications to execute their role. 
Interviewees offer two arguments to explain the appointment of a less qualified CFO: 
(1) the sponsors of non-financial companies lack understanding of the return of 
reliable accounting information and (2) non-financial companies cannot afford 
qualified professional as CFOs. One representative statement from this group of 
interviewees is:  
The people who are capable to do the work of the CFO are very much 
professional, they demand huge remuneration; and maximum non-financial 
companies of our country cannot afford that. As a result, companies re-designate the 
posts of general manager of finance, executive director of finance as CFO to comply 
with the Code [DCB – 8].    
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Table 6.10: Factors that constrain the role of the CFO 
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Key: Interviewee Code: MFM = Investment manager of mutual funds; LIC=Investment manager of 
life insurance companies; BANKS = Credit appraisal officer of banks; CRA = Credit rating analysts 
of corporate credit rating agencies; NCB = Nationalised Commercial Bank, DCB = Domestic 
Commercial Bank; DIB = Domestic Islamic Bank; FCB = Foreign Commercial Bank; 
a
 = interviewee 
mentions multiple reasons; 
b
 = interviewee perceives positive impact of the appointment of CFO but 
explains practice that implies that the CFO is not effectively playing its role. 
Table 6.10 further shows that six interviewees perceive that the CFO is not 
appointed by most non-financial companies because the practice has not been 
developed. A typical comment is:  
[…] if there is a CFO, we feel a little bit [of] comfort but it is not a point of 
consideration yet. Things do not develop yet in that level. Gradually it should be 
brought within the purview of analysis. Again the practice of appointment of CFO is 
not much prevalent [DCB -11].  
Finally, two interviewees state that the CFO is often affiliated with the 
sponsor family and thus, does not play a governance role. One representative 
comment is:  
There is a suggestion for appointment of a CFO. But you will often see that 
that CFO is a family member or a close relative of the chairman or the CEO of the 
company. The CFO of S Ltd is the daughter of Mr. A who is the main sponsor of S 
Ltd [CRA -3].  
Table 6.11 summarises the interviewees’ perception about the roles of CFO 
in Bangladesh. The interviewees state that the CFO is important to them because a 
professionally qualified CFO positively influences accounting reporting quality, 
operational efficiency, fund management and budget quality. Table 6.11 shows that 
11 interviewees perceive that a professionally qualified CFO can positively influence 
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the quality of accounting reports. A representative comment of this group of 
interviewees is: 
If the CFO of a company is a professional person especially an accounting 
and finance professional, the report quality of the company is generally better. I have 
seen the difference between the accounting reports prepared by a professional and a 
non-professional CFO. I have a lending relationship with a large export oriented 
company. Recently, it changed its CFO. The new CFO is a professional accountant. 
The report quality has changed dramatically. For example, the fixed asset schedule 
provided by it earlier and fixed asset schedule provided by it now is totally different. 
Current fixed asset schedule is totally clear [FCB - 3]. 
Table 6.11: Roles of the CFO 
Views MFM LIC BANKS CRA Total 
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Key: Interviewee Code: MFM = Investment manager of mutual funds; LIC=Investment manager of 
life insurance companies; BANKS = Credit appraisal officer of banks; CRA = Credit rating analysts 
of corporate credit rating agencies; NCB = Nationalised Commercial Bank, DCB = Domestic 
Commercial Bank; DIB = Domestic Islamic Bank; FCB = Foreign Commercial Bank; 
a
 = interviewee 
mentions multiple reasons for direct impact of the CFO on their decisions; 
b
 = interviewees do not 
perceive any impact of the CFO on his decision but explains benefits of the CFO. 
 
In addition, four interviewees state that a CFO is important to them because a 
qualified CFO is efficient at managing funds and this reduces the chance of default 
and the need for emergency loans from banks (Table 6.11). A representative 
comment is:   
 […] we are very concerned about the qualification and competence of the 
CFO. Basically, the proper fund management of the company depends on the 
qualification and competence of the CFO. […] we feel that a better CFO manages 
fund properly, reduces the need for emergency fund, and prepares more accurate 
budget. We see that companies with less qualified CFOs often ask for loan within two 
days due to fund crisis. This CFO cannot forecast the need of funds accurately. They 
are not good at preparing budgets. That’s why, we often suggest client to properly 
manage fund by employing a qualified CFO [DCB – 6]. 
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Moreover, three interviewees state that they directly assess the quality of the 
CFO while making lending decisions because a qualified CFO can better forecast the 
prospects of the project. Predicted cash flows are highly relevant to lending 
decisions, especially decisions relating to a project loan. A typical comment is:  
We also consider his [CFO] previous business experience as well as 
forecasting power. This forecasting ability of the CFO is essential for smooth 
repayment of loan - the main point of consideration in our lending decisions [DCB - 
4].  
Furthermore, four interviewees state that a qualified CFO can improve the 
operational efficiency of the company. A typical comment is:  
[…] what we want to see is the quality of the CFO. I personally always check 
who the CFO and the auditor of the company are and what people say about them. 
Because at the end of the day, it is the CFO whose quality actually matters, not the 
quality of the CEO or the chairman. If the CFO has a track record, I mean sound 
knowledge in business, and then you can always be 100 per cent certain about the 
quality of the company [LIC -1]. 
Finally, an interesting finding is that six interviewees perceive that the CFO 
helps the sponsors manipulate accounting information, especially if the sponsors lack 
qualification in accounting and finance. A typical comment is:  
Basically accounting reports are prepared by professional accountants such 
as CFO. These professional accountants inform the chairman or managing director 
regarding which part of the reports needs to modify for what purpose [LIC-2].  
6.2.5.2 Indirect impact of the CFO on investment and lending decisions 
Section 6.2.4.1 provides the detailed perceptions of the interviewees 
regarding how the role of the CFO is constrained and how the quality of a CFO can 
help in improving firm performance and accounting reporting quality. Hence, a direct 
question regarding the impact of the CFO on firm performance and accounting 
reporting quality is not asked.  
6.2.5.3 Summary 
The evidence reported in this section shows that 21 interviewees perceive a 
direct positive impact of a qualified CFO on the investment and lending decisions of 
institutional investors and bankers respectively. However, 17 interviewees are 
concerned about the limited authority and poor qualifications of CFOs. In addition, 
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five interviewees state that most of the non-financial companies do not appoint a 
CFO after the adoption of the BCGG-2006 and in order to comply with the provision 
of the BCGG-2006 regarding CFO, these companies designate one of their 
accounting and finance managers as the CFO. Furthermore, two interviewees state 
that the sponsor family appoints one of its members to the position of the CFO. 
On the role of the CFO, the interviewees perceive that the appointed CFO is 
burdened with maintenance of accounting reports, the management of funds and 
preparation of budgets. Prior literature (Section 2.6.4.4) provides evidence that 
accounting reports maintenance, fund management and budget preparation are the 
traditional roles of the CFO. The CFO who performs these traditional roles is 
regarded as a ‘bean-counter’. This literature also reports that in order to be an 
‘action-hero’, the CFO needs to play strategic and operational decision making roles. 
Only three out of 28 interviewees perceive that the CFO in Bangladesh plays an 
important role in increasing the operational efficiency of the company. This evidence 
indicates that the CFO in Bangladesh is still a ‘bean counter’ rather than an ‘action- 
hero’. Hence, the adoption of the BCGG-2006 does not change the role of the CFO 
much in non-financial companies of Bangladesh.  
6.2.6 Perceptions as to head of internal audit (HIA) 
6.2.6.1 Direct impact of HIA on investment and lending decisions  
The BCGG-2006 requires a company to appoint a HIA and properly define 
the roles and responsibilities of the HIA (Section 3.6.2.3). So, the respondents are 
asked: 
How do you perceive the impact of the HIA on your decisions?      
The perceptions of the interviewees are summarised in Table 6.12 which 
shows that 22 interviewees state that the appointment of a HIA by an investee or a 
borrowing company has no direct impact on their investment and lending decisions. 
Seven interviewees perceive that the HIA has limited authority and performs 
responsibilities which are beyond internal audit. Their statements imply that the role 
of the HIA is substantially constrained by the lack of a direct communication channel 
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between the HIA and the audit committee or the board of directors. One 
representative comment from the interviewees in this group is: 
[…] I have seen even in large companies that the HIA has no authority to 
directly communicate with the audit committee or the board of directors. I do not 
want to mention the name of the company. I find that it [a company] has two people 
in the internal audit department and the HIA reports to the head of accounts and 
finance, who is working under the CFO. That is, the internal audit has no access to 
the audit committee or the board of directors. So, I am confused about the role of the 
internal audit [CRA – 4].  
Table 6.12: Perceptions as to the direct impact of HIA on investment 
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Key: Interviewee Code: MFM = Investment manager of mutual funds; LIC=Investment manager of life 
insurance companies; BANKS = Credit appraisal officer of banks; CRA = Credit rating analysts of 
corporate credit rating agencies; NCB = Nationalised Commercial Bank, DCB = Domestic Commercial 
Bank; DIB = Domestic Islamic Bank; FCB = Foreign Commercial Bank. * = interviewee mentions 
multiple reasons for no direct impact of board size on their decisions. 
Table 6.12 also shows that eight interviewees perceive that the structure of 
the board and the audit committee constrained the role of the HIA. According to 
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these interviewees, the HIA has no way to help monitor the key sponsor executive 
director as both the board and the audit committee are dominated by the sponsor 
family members and often the key sponsor executive director sits on both  the board 
and the audit committee. One representative comment from the interviewees of this 
group is: 
Well, the head of internal audit has no impact on our decisions. Under 
current structure of our companies, the internal audit cannot add much value. For 
example, A Ltd has appointed a qualified head of internal audit and followed the best 
practice recommendations. So, under best practice recommendations, the head of 
internal audit will report to the audit committee and audit committee will report to 
the chairman of the board about the execution of decisions by the CEO. The CEO of 
A Ltd is Mr. AR, the son of Mr. AN who is the chairman of the board and the audit 
committee consists of three members of their family and one previous colleague of 
Mr. AN. Do you think that Mr. AR does anything without the consent of Mr. AN? 
Does the head of internal audit have any capacity to report on the misdeeds of Mr. 
AR? So, ultimately it is Mr. AN as long as he is there. After that, it is Mr. AR. 
Whatever the quality of internal audit; it has nothing to do with the interest of the 
general shareholders and the creditors [FCB - 1].   
Table 6.12 further reports that 13 interviewees state that the practice of 
internal audit is not prevalent in non-financial sectors. The opinions of these 
interviewees imply that the consideration of HIA as a criterion for investment and 
lending decisions will reduce the number of investible or bankable companies 
enough to sustain their own operation. A typical comment from an interviewee of 
this group is: 
Most of the companies in Bangladesh do not have an internal audit system in 
place. May be few big corporate houses has it in the organization structure, but I 
don't think it is very efficient. But when we consider cases from our bank’s point of 
view, at this moment we really cannot give much weight on this factor. If we do it, we 
will not be able to run our business [DIB - 2]. 
Two bank credit analysts state that they do not consider the HIA because their 
lending decisions do not depend on audited accounting information supplied by the 
borrowing company. These interviewees are very sceptical about the reliability of the 
audited accounting reports and state that accounting related matters are of little use to 
them. One interviewee comments: 
The thing is that we do not bother about accounting related things. Our 
decisions are not based on accounting reports supplied [by the borrower]. We 
152 
 
collect information directly and make our analysis based on that. So, we have no 
concern about the HIA [DIB -1]. 
Five interviewees state that they do not consider the HIA when making their 
lending decisions because it is not required by the CRG guidelines of the Bangladesh 
Bank. One typical comment from an interviewee of this group is:   
[…] for our decision making, so far I think no bank consider the internal 
auditor in case of granting credit. The lending practices do not require it [DCB - 3].   
Table 6.12 also shows that six interviewees consider the HIA while making 
their investment and lending decisions. However, the explanations of all three 
analysts of credit rating agencies and one credit analyst of a bank indicate that 
internal audit is not practiced by a large number of Bangladeshi companies and if 
practiced, it is largely ineffective.  One of the analysts of a credit rating agency 
comments:  
We consider whether a public limited company has appointed the HIA or not. 
To whom he is reporting? He reports to the CEO. In some places, the HIA reports to 
his senior such as the CFO. The direct reporting to the CEO is more effective than 
reporting to the senior. It would be better if he can directly report to the audit 
committee or the board. But I didn't see any company where the HIA directly reports 
to the audit committee or the board of directors [CRA – 1].  
The explanation provided by one of the remaining two interviewees indicates 
that he considers the presence of compliance officer to be more important than HIA. 
We basically analyse the results. In case of RMG industries, for example, 
there are several regulatory or compliance issues such as whether companies pay 
minimum wages to workers, […] and inspector’s certificate of factory visit. We seek 
all these certificates and when we find that all these certificates are valid, we assume 
that internal audit is very much sound. So, you can say that we by default assess the 
qualities of the HIA [DCB – 6]. 
 
The remaining interviewee states that the internal audit has a direct impact on 
his investment decisions because, according to him, the HIA has the capacity to 
positively influence accounting reporting quality. He comments: 
We try to find out who the HIA [of the investee company] is. Because he [the 
HIA] is a part of the audit team. So, if there is a good internal audit department, we 
take it as a sign of corporate organization. We also try to find out [to whom the HIA 
reports]. This is actually [whether] he [the HIA] reports to the audit committee 
through the chairman [of the audit committee]. So, if there is a good internal audit 
team, it is obviously a plus [for us] [LIC -1]. 
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6.2.6.2 Indirect impact of the HIA on investment and lending 
decisions 
The perceptions of 21 interviewees as described in Section 6.2.6.1 suggest that 
Bangladeshi companies either do not practice internal audit or practice internal audit 
which is ineffective. Hence, the remaining 7 interviewees are asked:  
 How do you perceive the impact of HIA on firm performance and accounting 
reporting quality? 
Table 6.13 presents the perception of interviewees on the impact of the HIA on 
firm performance and accounting reporting quality.  
Table 6.13: Perceptions as to the indirect impact of HIA on investment and 
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Table 6.13 shows that 4 out of 7 interviewees perceive that the appointment 
of a HIA has no impact on firm performance and accounting reporting quality. The 
reasons put forward by these interviewees are similar to the reasons cited in table 
6.12. A typical comment is: 
Truly speaking, the practice of internal audit has not yet developed in our 
non-financial sector. Few companies designate a person as the HIA and most 
companies do not even have that designation in their organogram. In case of 
companies that designate a person as the HIA, you will find that the person is 
basically an assistant of the chief accountant and he cannot do anything without the 
approval of the chief accountant. He has no power to recommend any changes in the 
internal control system of the company [DCB-4]. 
154 
 
However, two interviewees perceive that the internal audit is practiced by 
many companies and the HIA is delegated enough authority by the companies to be 
effective. As a result, the HIA is perceived to positively contribute to firm 
performance and accounting reporting quality. A typical comment is:  
[…] generally speaking, I've seen most of the companies want to have a 
strong internal audit team for their own benefit. So they [companies] delegate a 
reasonable amount of power [to the HIA] so that he [the HIA] can investigate and 
dig out what is out there. I think [that] he [the HIA] is performing more or less well 
[LIC – 1]. 
 
6.2.6.3 Summary 
The evidence reported in Section 6.2.6.1 strongly suggests that institutional 
investors and banks in Bangladesh do not consider the appointment of a HIA when 
making their decisions. Twenty-two opinions indicate that internal audit either (1) is 
not practiced effectively by most of the companies or (2) is not practiced at all. 
According to 15 interviewees, to the extent that internal audit is practiced, its 
effectiveness is mediated by limited authority, role ambiguity, and the structure of 
the board and audit committee.  The authority of internal audit is compromised 
because the HIA is not given an upper level position in the organisational hierarchy 
and does not have direct access to the audit committee or the board of directors. 
Instead, the head of internal audit reports to the CEO or the CFO. This evidence 
implies that the internal audit function in Bangladesh follows traditional reporting 
channels and thus, the internal audit function lacks independence and objectivity.  
Furthermore, the presence of the sponsor family members on the 
management, board and audit committee does not allow the audit committee to work 
as a forum to uphold the independence of the internal audit function. The internal 
auditor also may not raise a matter affecting the CG of the company with the audit 
committee because the interest of the audit committee is fully aligned to that of the 
management and ultimately, with that of the sponsor family. The structure of the 
board and the audit committee needed for safeguarding the independence and 
objectivity of the internal auditor is not present in non-financial companies in 
Bangladesh.   
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Thirteen interviewees state that internal audit is not practiced by most of the 
companies. Due to the direct presence of the sponsor family members on the board 
and on other executive management positions in the company, there is a minimum 
agency conflict between the management and board and thus, the board may not 
need the assurance services of the internal auditor (Section 2.6.4.5). The size of 
Bangladeshi companies is not large enough to generate the operational complexity 
necessary to require the presence of internal audit.  
As accounting information lacks reliability in Bangladesh companies, the 
internal audit function does not influence the decisions of institutional investors and 
bankers. Finally, internal audit is not considered by the banks because the CRG 
guidelines of the Bangladesh Bank do not require it.  
The interviewees who assessed the effectiveness of internal audit also 
perceived that internal audit is not functioning properly in Bangladesh. Only one 
interviewee states that internal audit enjoys appropriate authority and contributes to 
the quality of CG.  
The evidence related to the impact of the appointment of HIA on firm 
performance and accounting reporting quality as reported in Section 6.2.6.2 also 
largely indicates that the sound practice of internal audit has not developed yet in 
Bangladesh. There is very limited evidence that the internal audit is effectively 
contributing to firm performance and accounting reporting quality.    
6.2.7 Summary of Section 6.2 
The results presented in this section strongly indicate that compliance with 
the BCGG-2006 is not considered by institutional investors and bankers when 
making investment and credit decisions respectively. The interviewees’ perceptions 
suggest that the sponsors of companies either do not comply with the BCGG-2006 or 
comply with it in form but not in substance. Consequently, compliance with the 
BCGG-2006 makes limited change in the internal CG structure of companies. A 
contrary view is also evident from the description that lending practices prevent 




The interview evidence suggests that the sponsors impede compliance with 
the BCGG-2006 in substance primarily by employing family members in the 
positions of both chairman and CEO and by creating a family-aligned board of 
directors (Section 6.2.1). The appointment of family members in the positions of 
both chairman and CEO does not allow the chairman to formally monitor and 
appraise the performance of the CEO. In addition, due to family relationships 
between the chairman and CEO, they may jointly serve the interest of the sponsor 
family rather than the interests of outside shareholders. Furthermore, the key sponsor 
director of the company retains key decision making authority when the CEO is an 
outside professional. The board of directors, the most important CG mechanism, is 
excessively populated by sponsor family members (Section 6.2.2). Given the culture 
of Bangladesh (Section 3.5.2), the family relationship between the board members 
and the CEO substantially reduces the monitoring role of the board. Moreover, the 
experience and qualification of these family directors is not beyond question. 
Consequently, the family members may not be able to play an advisory role. The 
newly appointed independent director has either a pecuniary or a personal 
relationship with the key sponsor executive director (Section 6.2.3). Furthermore, the 
independent director is a minority on the sponsor family-concentrated board. Hence, 
the independent director has no capacity to play a monitoring role. There is limited 
evidence that the qualified independent director is playing an advisory role. Overall, 
the evidence indicates that the board of directors as a whole has become a legal 
formality and plays a limited role in protecting the interests of the general 
shareholders and creditors (Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3).  
A natural consequence of largely ineffective boards of directors is that the 
audit committees of companies also become ineffective (Section 6.2.4). As an audit 
committee is comprised of three directors from the board, the audit committee is also 
populated by the sponsor family members. A typical audit committee consists of two 
sponsor directors and one independent director whose independence is questioned by 
the majority of interviewees. As a whole, audit committees do not have minimum 
independence from the sponsors of the company. Furthermore, audit committee 
members lack the necessary qualifications to discharge their responsibilities.  The 
scope of the audit committee is further reduced by the lack of independence and 
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objectivity of the external auditors of the company. In sum, the evidence suggests 
that audit committee characteristics and lack of complementarities reduce the impact 
of the audit committee on the internal CG structure of the companies in Bangladesh 
to a minimum level.   
The internal audit function is not developed and is not practiced by a large 
number of Bangladeshi companies (Section 6.2.6). To the extent that it is practiced, 
the lack of authority and role ambiguity of the HIA reduces the effectiveness of the 
internal audit. The independence and objectivity of the internal audit is constrained 
by the presence of sponsor family members on the managements, boards and audit 
committees of companies.  
The only important CG mechanism among the several mechanisms 
prescribed by the BCGG-2006 that positively influences the investment and lending 
decisions of institutional investors and bankers respectively is the CFO (Section 
6.2.5). The interview evidence suggests that the CFO has both a direct and indirect 
impact on the decisions of institutional investors and bankers. However, there is 
evidence that the sponsors do not delegate enough authority and often employ a less 
qualified CFO. As a result, the CFO mostly plays a traditional ‘bean counter’ role 
and the impact of a CFO on the decisions of the institutional investors and bankers 
mainly result from the CFO’s contribution to the maintenance of accounting reports, 
fund management and the preparation of budgets. That is, the CFO is not playing the 
role of an ‘action hero’ as expected by the Anglo-American model of CG.  
6.3 Rent protection motive of sponsor families  
The process of development of the Bangladesh corporate sector (Section 3.3) 
prompts family-based capitalism in Bangladesh. The perceptions of a number of 
interviewees indicate that control by the sponsor family hampers the effective 
implementation of the BCGG-2006. According to these interviewees, the sponsor 
family maintains its control over the company by one or more of the following 
mechanisms: (1) appointing its members to the positions of both chairman and the 
CEO; (2) delegating limited authority to an outside professional CEO (Section 6.2.1); 
(3) populating the board of directors by its members (Section 6.2.2); (4) appointing 
an independent director who is related to the sponsor directors (Section 6.2.3); and 
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(5) populating the audit committee by the members of the sponsor family (Section 
6.2.4). A typical comment on the role of family control on the implementation of the 
BCGG-2006 is: 
The fact is that 95% of the businesses of our country are owned by few 
families […] the family business becomes a chronic barrier on the way to 
transparency and good corporate governance [LIC - 2].   
Hence, a question arises why the sponsor families are not interested in 
implementing the BCGG-2006 in form and in substance. One reason can be sponsor 
families enjoy private benefits of control and they intend to protect these benefits. 
This is plausible because the control structure of Bangladeshi companies and 
institutional characteristics of Bangladesh suggest that high private benefits of 
control exist (Section 3.4). Hence, if interviewees’ perceptions indicate that sponsor 
families do not implement the BCGG-2006 in form and in substance in order to 
foster the interest of the families, the perceptions are interpreted as evidence of the 
rent protection motive of sponsor families.  
Table 6.14 presents open-codes which indicate that the sponsor families have 
rent protection motives underlying non-compliance or compliance in form but not in 
substance with the BCGG-2006.  
Responses of 13 out of 28 interviewees indicate that the sponsor families 
benefit from unreported related party transactions under the present control structure 
of companies. Two major types of related party transactions reported by the 
interviewees are: (1) transactions with unlisted sister concerns owned by the sponsor 
family and (2) personal transactions with the sponsor directors. One interviewee who 
gives an example of a personal transaction with a sponsor director comments: 
Unfortunately, most of our directors use internal transactions and benefit 
themselves which they do not report in the accounts. For example, recently a large 
corporate house, I do not want to mention the name, bought a piece of land almost at 
double price than the actual market price; later on it was revealed that the land was 
owned by one of the influential directors of the company. It implies that a group of 
directors are actually reaping disproportionate benefits by using the corporate 





Table 6.14: The sponsor family has a rent protection motive behind non-
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Key: Interviewee Code: MFM = Investment manager of mutual funds; LIC=Investment manager of life 
insurance companies; BANKS = Credit appraisal officer of banks; CRA = Credit rating analysts of 
corporate credit rating agencies; NCB = Nationalised Commercial Bank, DCB = Domestic Commercial 
Bank; DIB = Domestic Islamic Bank; FCB = Foreign Commercial Bank. * = interviewee reports more 
than one form of rent -seeking behaviours. 
Responses of 13 out of 28 suggest that the sponsor families expropriate 
minority shareholders’ interest by inflating IPO prices, declaring minimum or no 
dividend and buying shares at low prices from secondary markets through the 
manipulation of market price. In order to justify these expropriations, the sponsor 
family manipulates accounting reports in collaboration with the external auditors (see 
also Sections 6.4.7 and 6.4.8). One interviewee who is an institution-nominated 
director in several companies comments: 
I will say that there are two kinds of companies in our country - both do 
manipulation in respect of accounting reporting and dividend declaration. One 
group shows as usual profit and declares limited percentage of dividend and takes 
the remaining profit in their back pocket. The second group is more dangerous - they 
show no profit and declare no dividend. All profit is back-pocketed by sponsor 
directors [MFM - 1] 
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Perceptions of eight out of 28 interviewees indicate that the sponsor directors 
use their directorship to indirectly gain monetary benefits.  A typical example used 
by this group of interviewees is: 
[…] directors sometimes use their recommendation to serve their monetary 
interest. According to a Bangladesh Bank order, directors of banks cannot take loans 
from their own banks. So what they do, they recommend loan for directors of other 
banks and take loans in exchange from the banks of those directors. So, you know, it 
is a give and take relationship [DCB – 7]. 
Responses of ten interviewees suggest that the sponsor families are not 
interested in implementing the BCGG-2006 because they use the company as a 
source of employment for their family members for reasons which are not easily 
justified. A typical comment is: 
The sponsor directors use the companies as a source of employment for 
themselves and their future generations which is not often legitimate [DCB - 4] 
Finally, perceptions of ten interviewees suggest that the sponsor families 
retain control over their companies by several undesirable means. These include 
stage managed AGMs that restrict the participation of general shareholders in 
decision making, seeking injunction from the courts against reform initiatives of the 
regulatory agencies, appointing family members to bypass the rules regarding 
rotation of directors, and influencing the appointment of top officials of the 
regulatory agencies, especially SEC. One interviewee describes how the sponsor 
directors bypassed the rotation of directors by employing his wife: 
These people keep control in any manner. For example, Bangladesh Bank 
issued a notification regarding rotation of directors in banks. What the sponsors 
directors of banks do to comply with this notification, they appoint their wives as 
directors. Do you think that their wives run the banks? All decisions are taken by the 
sponsor directors; their wives just signed the resolutions. The wives do not 
participate in any board meeting [DCB – 10].  
6.4 Low efficiency in implementation of the BCGG-2006 
Although a rent protection motive is one of the reasons for either non-
compliance or compliance in form but not in substance, prior literature on the 
effectiveness of an Anglo-American model of CG in developing countries (Section 
2.6.3) suggests that the institutional characteristics of developing countries hamper 
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efficient implementation of an Anglo-American model of CG. Hence, it is plausible 
that the existing corporate and institutional characteristics of Bangladesh discourage 
sponsor families from implementing the BCGG-2006 in form and in substance. 
Table 6.15 presents first-order codes that negatively influence the efficient 
implementation of the BCGG-2006. 
6.4.1 Corporate culture of individual-centred management 
Perceptions of 24 out of 28 interviewees indicate that compliance with the 
BCGG-2006 does not make significant changes in the internal CG structure of 
companies. This is because the type of corporate culture required for the efficient 
implementation of the BCGG-2006 is not present in Bangladeshi companies. 
According to these interviewees, each of the local privately-owned listed companies 
of Bangladesh was initiated by a single entrepreneur as a sole proprietorship or as a 
private limited company. Later this sole proprietorship or private limited company 
was converted to a public limited company and then free-floated on the capital 
market. In order to fulfil legal requirements, the board of directors comprises his 
family members and the key sponsor director remained as the key executive director 
of the company. Consequently, decision making authority is confined to this key 
sponsor executive director as previously (see also Section 6.2.1.1). These first 
generation entrepreneurs still run the company. As the company performed well 
under individual-centred management, the key sponsor director does not feel any 
necessity to diversify the board and decentralise the decision making process. One 
typical comment is:  
Every business of our country is started by a single person. For example, if 
you think about B Ltd, it is started by Mr S. Similarly, C Ltd was started by Mr T. 
They are the key man in their organizations. They are still chairman of their 
organizations. The decision making authority is very much centralized to them. They 
tried hard and became successful businessmen. They find no justification to 
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Key: Interviewee Code: MFM = Investment manager of mutual funds; LIC=Investment manager of life 
insurance companies; BANKS = Credit appraisal officer of banks; CRA = Credit rating analysts of 
corporate credit rating agencies; NCB = Nationalised Commercial Bank, DCB = Domestic Commercial 
Bank; DIB = Domestic Islamic Bank; FCB = Foreign Commercial Bank. * = interviewee reports more 
than one form of efficiency-based reasons. 
6.4.2 Size of companies 
Most companies in Bangladesh are small and medium in size (Farooque et al., 
2007). Several interviewees argue that the size of companies is constrained by the 
intense control desire of first-generation entrepreneurs. An interviewee comments: 
They [sponsor directors] do not want to rely on the external management. 
Sometimes we see that directors often do not expand their businesses though there is 
good opportunity. Their tendency is to keep everything under personal control. This 
is one of the reasons that our companies fail to reach at global level [DCB-2] 
The perceptions of eight interviewees suggest that the size of Bangladeshi 
companies hampers effective implementation of the BCGG-2006, especially 
provisions related to internal control and internal audit (Table 6.15). A typical 
comment is: 
Basically the size of our companies is not large enough to accommodate all 
these provisions.  For example, the number of employees needed for the effective 
internal control and internal audit cannot afford by our medium and small-sized 
companies [DCB -4]   
6.4.3 Non-family board lacks trust among members  
A family-concentrated board has been perceived by a number of interviewees 
as the most important factor for the ineffectiveness of compliance with the BCGG-
2006 (Section 6.2 and 6.3). However, responses of 20 out of 28 interviewees (Table 
6.15) indicate that a family-concentrated board is better suited in Bangladesh because 
the members of a non-family board do not trust each other after a certain period, 
especially when the business becomes profitable. One typical comment is: 
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Our bank has investment in several companies where directors were friends 
and neither of them have significant ownership or decision making hegemony. I 
observed that this type of ownership and decision making authority creates problem.  
If the project fails, then they [directors] remain good friends. However, when the 
company starts making profit, then they [directors] start thinking that others are 
taking major portion of the profits whether others actually take major portion of 
profit or not [DIB -1]   
6.4.4 Professional directors lack commitment  
Another reason for the persistence of strong family control of companies is 
the lack of commitment of the outside professional directors, more importantly the 
professional CEOs. The risk of conflict and low commitment of outside professional 
directors refrain the controlling family from appointing outside professional 
directors. A typical comment is:  
I will say that X Ltd failed due to the appointment of a professional CEO. 
This is my personal opinion.  Mr. S is a good entrepreneur. He [Mr. S] started many 
companies simultaneously and offered huge salary to the employed CEOs. […] I 
financed one of his projects but the project did not run well. Similar things happened 
in case of his [Mr. S] other projects. Why did this happen?  I will say that the people 
who were employed as CEOs by Mr. S were over-salaried and did not perform their 
duties with sincerity or their integrity was questionable [DCB - 8]. 
6.4.5 National rules and regulations are anti–corporate 
Seven interviewees perceive that national rules and regulations do not 
encourage corporatisation because they are not corporate friendly (Table 6.15).   
Important laws mentioned by these interviewees are related to tax, copyright, and 
takeover. Interviewees perceive that takeover regulations in Bangladesh eliminate the 
threat of takeover. A typical comment is:  
There is limitation of law; you cannot easily take over a company by buying a 
significant percentage of shares [NCB-1]. 
Furthermore, weakness in copyright laws encourages control by the sponsor 
family because control by the sponsor family helps maintain confidentiality about 
new product development and innovation. A typical comment on the issue of 
copyright regulation is: 
We have issues related to trademark, intellectual properties and other things; 
what happens is that entrepreneurs are fearful that they [entrepreneurs] may not 
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have security to protect their [entrepreneurs’] interest. That also brings inefficiency 
and non-compliance. It has traditionally been going on. [MFM -2] 
6.4.6 A national culture of corruption 
The perceptions of 18 interviewees suggest that rampant corruption in 
Bangladesh leads to non-compliance with the BCGG-2006 (see also Sections 6.4.4 
and 6.4.8). These interviewees perceive that corruption is widespread from the office 
of the prime minister to the lowest level of administration. Companies have leeway 
to escape compliance with any laws by bribing government officials or by using 
political connections with the ruling party. As a result, companies are not interested 
in complying with mandatory rules; the spirit of a ‘comply or explain’ guideline is 
beyond consideration. One representative comment is: 
As you know that in our country if there is a law, there is some way out. You 
can manage anything and everything if you have money and/or political connection.  
When I think about the issue of corporate governance, firstly I have to think about 
the matter of legal compliance. […] If the companies can ignore [sic] legal 
compliance by undue means, they will not bother [to comply with a] comply or 
explain basis [sic] corporate governance code [DCB -11]  
6.4.7 Lack of transparent accounting information 
Twenty-four out of 28 interviewees perceive that audited financial statements 
in Bangladesh are not detailed and transparent (Table 6.15). According to the 
interviewees, the accounting information system has not been developed because the 
sponsor directors are not interested in investing in the development of accounting 
information systems. This is because the sponsor directors lack understanding of the 
benefits of maintaining detailed and transparent accounting information. In order to 
fulfill the legal requirement, the companies prepare a set of statements which does 
not present the true and fair position of the company and hires a low quality auditor 
who certifies the statements without proper verification.  As a result, published 
accounting reports do not provide reliable information. A representative comment is:  
[…] they [the sponsor directors] do not always value the quality of 
accounting. Because if it serves their purpose, then it is ok, they don't think about it 
much. This is a major weakness in our country -particularly the quality of reporting. 
[…].Our owners are top decision makers. Probably they have other priorities. They 
want to sell more, so they want to employ their resources in those areas like 
marketing and production. For accounting, I have hardly seen any organization who 
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takes good accountants willingly. […] May be they do not understand that this is an 
area where it is necessary to have good people. But resource constraint may be one 
factor where they can't always be good people and good systems. Another factor may 
be they don't value good quality reporting because if they value, they have to prepare 
a good accounting system -even bigger organizations. May be there is a value 
problem or perception problem [LIC -1]. 
6.4.8 Lack of accountability of external auditors 
As shown in table 6.15, 25 out of 28 interviewees perceive that except for 
audit firms which are affiliated with international big-four firms, external auditors in 
Bangladesh do not have independence and integrity. Two interviewees of this group 
also raise questions about the independence and objectivity of audit firms affiliated 
with international big-four auditors. The interviewees perceive that the external 
auditors collaborate with the key sponsor directors to manipulate the accounting 
reports in order to minimise tax and dividends
16
, certify different sets of accounting 
reports for a single company to serve different purposes of the company, prepare and 
certify accounting reports for companies without having qualified accountants, 
simultaneously revalue assets and certify the financial statements, and deliver 
artificial audited financial statements for minimum amount of fees. A common 
response about the integrity of the external auditors is: 
[…] there is no accountability of our chartered accounting firms except few 
[large audit firms]. They prepare and certify a set of accounts if a company gives 
them a small sum of money. […]. At this moment, if a company gives TK 10,000 
[£90] to a chartered accounting firm, it prepares and certifies a set of financial 
statements to serve the purpose of the company [DCB -11] 
6.4.9 Lack of market pressure for good CG 
The perceptions of 13 out of 28 interviewees suggest that there is a lack of 
pressure from shareholders as well as from banks for effective compliance with the 
BCGG-2006 (Table 6.15). Two comments – one describing the lack of pressures 
from the shareholder and one describing the lack of pressures from the banks – are: 
   […] shareholders are not aware about corporate governance. I will say that 
there is a little demand for non-financial information from the shareholders' 
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perspective. In many countries there are shareholders awareness program but in 
case of our country, there is nothing such [MFM -2]. 
Bankers lend money to the person behind the corporation, not to the 
corporation. This attitude prevails. […] As banks do not bother about corporate 
culture, companies do not bother about these things [CRA -1]  
6.4.10 Lack of monitoring and enforcement 
The regulatory authority cannot enforce compliance with an Anglo-American 
model of CG as it is a ‘comply or explain’ basis model (Section 2.3). However, 19 
out of 28 interviewees perceive that the lack of monitoring and enforcement by the 
regulatory authorities, especially the BSEC, is one of the important reasons for the 
non-compliance with the BCGG-2006 (Table 6.15). Most of these interviewees 
articulate that corruption of BSEC officials and influence of the interest groups 
including government on the appointment of SEC officials are responsible for the 
impotence of the BSEC. Few interviewees, however, perceive that the BSEC lacks 
an adequate number of skilled personnel to monitor and enforce regulations. This 
again implies that the perceived benefit of compliance with the BCGG-2006 is low. 
One typical comment on the corruption of BSEC officials and interest groups’ 
influence on the appointment of SEC officials is:  
The responsibility for the non-compliance with the BCGG-2006 again goes to 
the BSEC. The BSEC is not independent, neutral.  The BSEC chairman is appointed 
by an interest group to maximize its interest, not the interest of the general 
shareholders. If you consider the current turmoil of our capital market, I will say 
that the BSEC, Bangladesh Bank and Government are responsible for it [the 
turmoil]. […] the BSEC officials are happy with bribes [MFM -1].  
An interviewee who perceives that the BSEC does not have an adequate 
number of skilled officials to monitor and enforce the governance states: 
The BSEC does not have enough and qualified people. The issue department 
is run by seven people only. It is not possible to effectively monitor the companies 
with seven people [MFM – 4].  
6.4.11 High emotional attachment of sponsors to companies 
Although there is evidence that the sponsor families maintain strict control 
over the company in order to protect their private benefits (Section 6.3), 14 
interviewees perceive that the strict control by the sponsor family is a matter of 
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emotion in the sense of belongingness to the company (Table 6.15). According to 
these interviewees, most Bangladeshi companies are still run by first generation 
sponsors. They have invested enormous effort in ensuring the success of their 
initiative. They have an emotional attachment with their companies and they are not 
ready to handover control to an outside professional CEO and appoint an 
independent director who has absolute independence. One typical comment is:   
I do not see anything negative in this lack of good governance because all of 
these entrepreneurs started from very root level and built up their organizations by 
their flesh and blood. So, they do not believe in governance.  Their mind-set is that 
they have made these success stories by themselves and thus, why should they share 
that success with other people? [...] they believe that professional managers will not 
be able to run their businesses properly [CRA -3]. 
6.4.12 Peer companies do not comply 
Table 6.15 also reports that seven interviewees argue that compliance with 
the BCGG-2006 in form and in substance can be competitively disadvantageous for a 
company because compliance is costly and peer firms, especially private limited 
companies, do not comply with the BCGG-2006. A typical comment is: 
The quality of corporate governance is affected by the peer practices. Assume 
that there are two companies- one has appointed a qualified managing director but 
other has not. The company with the qualified managing director may be at 
disadvantaged position unless it can capitalise the quality of managing director 
because of high remuneration paid to its managing director [FCB -2] 
6.4.13 Family-controlled companies do not perform worse than 
others 
The perceptions of 16 out of 28 interviewees suggest that accounting 
reporting quality and the performance of companies that comply with the provisions 
of the BCGG-2006 are not superior to companies that do not comply with the 
provisions of the BCGG-2006. For instance, one interviewee makes the following 
comment when answering the question whether companies controlled by 
professional CEOs have better performance and accounting reporting quality: 
Not necessarily. The performance and accounting reporting quality of SP Ltd 
is better than the performance and accounting reporting quality of BP Ltd. However, 
the SP Ltd is managed by a sponsor family affiliated CEO and the BP Ltd is 
managed by an outside professional CEO [FCB2]. 
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6.5 Investment and lending practices  
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 respectively indicate that the rent-protection motive of 
the sponsor families and the institutional characteristics of Bangladesh hamper 
effective implementation of the BCGG-2006. This ineffective implementation of the 
BCGG-2006 is one of the reasons why institutional investors and bankers do not 
consider compliance with the BCGG-2006 in their decision making processes 
(Section 6.2). Sections 2.2.7.1 and 2.5.3, however, provide an indication that the 
lending practices of banks in developing countries often substitute for institutional 
weaknesses. I do not find any specific literature on the investment decision processes 
of institutional investors in developing country except a general indication that 
financing transactions in developing countries are not at arm’s length (e.g., Singh and 
Zammit, 2006). Like lending practices, the investment practices of institutional 
investors in developing countries may have some characteristics that also substitute 
for institutional void.  
Prior literature on organisational decision making also suggests that decision 
makers are bounded by their cognitive abilities (March and Simon, 1958) and 
typically lock themselves in the system’s dynamics  (Sydow et al., 2009) when the 
outcomes of their past decisions are self-reinforcing (e.g., Davis and Kottemann 
1995). Institutional investors and bankers may lock-in investment and lending 
practices that are typical in developing countries (section 2.5.3). These practices may 
deter consideration of compliance with the BCGG-2006. Table 6.16 presents open 
codes that indicate that investment and lending practices hinder consideration of 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 while making investment and credit decisions. 
6.5.1 Rent seeking behaviour of institutional investors and 
bankers 
The perceptions of 14 out of 28 interviewees suggest that rent-seeking 
behaviour by directors of institutional investment companies and banks hinders 
analysts to rationally appraise a proposal and consider CG. One representative 
comment from a bank credit analyst is: 
According to Bangladesh Bank order, directors of banks cannot take loans 
from their own banks. So what they did, they recommend loan for directors of other 
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bank and take loans in exchange from the banks of those directors. When directors 
recommend a loan, I have no role to play. I may not agree with a proposal but I have 
to sanction the loan as top management already decides to extend the loan [DCB-7] 
Table 6.16: Characteristics of investment and lending practices 
Views MFM LIC BANKS CRA Total 
Number of interviewees 4 3 17 4 28 
Rent seeking behaviour of 








[NCB1, DCB1, DCB3, DCB4, 
DCB5, DCB7, DCB8, 





Rent seeking behaviour of 
politicians (6.5.2) 
- - 8 
[NCB1, DCB1, DCB2, DCB5, 
DCB7, DCB9, DIB2, FCB2]  
- 8 
Name-based lending and 









[NCB1, DCB2, DCB3,  
DCB4, DCB5, DCB6, DCB7, 
DCB8, DCB9, DCB10, 















[DCB1, DCB3, DCB4, DCB5, 
DCB7, DCB8, DCB10, DIB1, 




Preference to family legacy 







[DCB1, DCB2, DCB3, DCB5, 
DCB6, DCB8, DCB11, DIB1, 








lending practices (6.5.5) 
N/A N/A 13 
[NCB1, DCB1, DCB3, DCB4, 
DCB5, DCB6, DCB7, DCB9, 
















[NCB1, DCB1, DCB2, DCB3, 
DCB4,DCB6, DCB7, DCB8, 
DCB9, DCB10, DIB1, DIB2, 






Minimum weight on CG in 
lending and credit rating 
regulations decisions (6.5.7) 
N/A N/A 10 
[NCB1, DCB2, DCB3, DCB4, 





Peer banks and institutional 
investors do not consider 









[DCB1, DCB2, DCB3, DCB4, 






Key: Interviewee Code: MFM = Investment manager of mutual funds; LIC=Investment manager of life 
insurance companies; BANKS = Credit appraisal officer of banks; CRA = Credit rating analysts of 
corporate credit rating agencies; NCB = Nationalised Commercial Bank, DCB = Domestic Commercial 




The following response from a managing director of a credit rating agency 
indicates that his organisation also seeks rent and thus, does not enforce compliance 
with the BCGG-2006.   
Our credit rating guideline which is issued by Bangladesh Bank assigns 10 
marks in management skill or you can say governance. If we follow that guideline 
and want to assign marks for governance, I am sure that most of the companies will 
get zero. So what we do, we give 10 marks in business performance and do not 
bother about governance [CRA-3]. 
6.5.2 Rent seeking behaviour of politicians  
  In Section 6.4.6, 18 interviewees state that rampant corruption in Bangladesh 
negatively affects compliance with the BCGG-2006.  The perceptions of eight bank 
credit analysts indicate that they cannot practice transaction-based lending strategies 
because of political influence on lending decisions. The evidence suggests that 
political influence is more acute in government-owned banks. However, it also 
affects privately-owned banks and subsidiaries of foreign banks. One typical 
comment is: 
There is a culture now – if anybody wants to take a significant amount of loan 
from a state owned bank, he has to approach to ‘Pir-Murshid’ (Politically affiliated 
directors). They [Pir-Murshid’] have strong connection with the prime minister’s 
office. How can we ignore those ‘Pir-Murshid’?[NCB-1] 
6.5.3 Name-based lending and investment practices 
Twenty-two out of 28 interviewees perceive that the characteristics of the key 
person of the borrower or investee company have an important bearing on their 
decisions (Table 6.16). The perceptions of credit analysts of banks and credit rating 
agencies give an indication that name-based lending has traditionally been practised 
by banks due to the absence of CRG guidelines and banks lock-in to a trajectory of 
name-based lending practices (see also Section 6.2.1.1). One typical comment from a 
bank credit analyst is: 
 It is not only my bank; I also know some other banks that do not consider 
whether a prospective borrowing company complies with the BCGG-2006. [It is 
because] banks finance a project based on the business acumen of the main man 
behind the project […]. That practice continues since the emergence of the private 
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sector in 1980s. Now there are rules to do CRG but banks do CRG as a formality 
only [DCB-4].  
The perceptions of several credit analysts of banks also suggest that they are 
so familiar with the key man of in some companies that they do not encourage 
compliance with the BCGG-2006. One typical comment is: 
If I consider them [key men of three giant companies] as prospective 
customers, I will definitely give high score on management skill. On the other hand, 
if I have information that these companies are going to change their chairmen or 
managing directors, I will reduce my weight on management skill [FCB-1] 
The perceptions of two investment managers of a mutual fund company and 
three investment managers of life insurance company also suggest that they 
overvalue the key person behind the company. A representative comment is:    
[…] what I should say the main man or main decision maker is, I mean, 
nothing else can be more critical than this. […] it does not matter to us who are the 
members of board of directors as long as the main man is there [LIC -1]. 
6.5.4 Relationship-based lending and investment practices 
Fifteen interviewees report that they practice relationship-based lending and 
investment strategies (Table 6.16). The perceptions of these interviewees indicate 
that past relationship with a borrower or an investee company introduces irrationality 
into the decision making process and thus, hampers consideration of compliance with 
the BCGG-2006. One typical comment on the impact of a past relationship on 
lending decisions is: 
A company approached to us for an exposure in order to upgrade its raw 
materials. The company believed that this upgraded raw materials will improve the 
quality of the final product. This kind of project must be approved by some sort of a 
technical person, for example, an engineer. But we took the project without 
suggestion of an engineer because we have a past relationship with the company 
[DCB - 3].  
One typical comment on the impact of a past relationship on investment 
decisions and its consequence for considerations of compliance with the BCGG-2006 
is:  
We have blacklisted a number of companies. We even do not look into the 
accounting reports of those companies. But some other people [institutional 
investors] do because of their relationships. If things are done based on 
relationships, rationality does not work. [MFM2]. 
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6.5.5 Preference to the family legacy of the key man 
The perceptions of 17 out of 20 interviewees indicate that they prefer the 
second generation of key persons rather than professional managers to mitigate risk 
arising from succession. This evidence indicates that the interviewees continue to 
rely on the legacy of the key sponsor executive directors.  A credit analyst of a bank 
comments: 
If Mr. NRS is replaced by someone from his family who has worked under 
Mr. NRS for 5-10 years, like his younger brothers – Mr. MRS or Mr. ARS, we feel 
comfortable. It implies that Mr. NRS has a succession plan in his mind. If someone 
who is not a member of S family is appointed as a CEO, we will feel a little bit 
discomfort [FCB-2]. 
The following comment by an investment manager of a mutual fund company 
also suggests preference to family legacy of the key sponsor director: 
If we find someone such as his [the sponsor director] son is already in 
business and gathering experience, we feel comfort [MFM-4] 
6.5.6 Collateral-based and personal guarantee-based lending 
practices 
The responses of 14 credit analysts of banks and one analyst of a corporate 
credit rating agency indicate that collateral-based and personal guarantee-based 
lending practices of banks negatively affect consideration of CG mechanisms 
recommended by the BCGG-2006 (Table 6.16). Sections 6.2.1.1 and 6.2.3.1 also 
provide evidence that the practice of seeking collateral and personal guarantees from 
directors deters banks from considering the separation of chairman and CEO and 
independent directors respectively. One representative comment is: 
More importantly, we check the personal net worth level of the directors and 
take personal guarantee. […] the exposure of my bank may be more than the 
personal net worth of the key sponsor director but we want to ensure that he [the key 
sponsor director] will not take any decision against our interest [DCB – 9].  
6.5.7 Lack of reliability of accounting information 
Section 6.4.7 shows that 24 out of 28 interviewees perceive that audited 
financial statements in Bangladesh lack reliability. A consequence of lack of reliable 
accounting information is that interviewees rely on ‘soft information’ to evaluate the 
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financial condition of the company when making decisions (Table 6.16).  Banks use 
a comprehensive approach to evaluating the financial conditions of the prospective 
borrowers in new loan cases. This comprehensive approach include comparison of 
the audited financial statements with the internal management reports and bank 
statements, use of Credit Information Bureau (CIB) reports, verification of the 
existence of inventory and fixed assets by visiting factory, appraisal of re-valued 
fixed assets by an internal expert of the bank, verification of the market share of the 
company’s major product. One comprehensive comment from a banker in this group 
is: 
Audited accounting report does not show true position of the company and 
thus, we use management report in case of making our analysis and to reduce the 
risk, we downgrade the rating the company. Then we try to cross-check this internal 
management report with some third-party sources of information such as collection 
of revenue reflected on bank statements, international/local price of the major 
products. We compare their industry position with their peer. We take monthly stock 
report and conduct valuation of stock quarterly, semi-annually and annually. We 
check import L/C and outstanding loan with different banks. As the market is small, 
we can easily know how much of a particular product has been imported in last year 
and which company import how much – from different banks we assess it. Assets 
presented in balance sheet are cross-checked during factory visit. In case of fair 
value of assets, we use our internal expert to determine the value of that particular 
asset [FCB -2]. 
The evidence also implies that the approach of comprehensive analysis is 
costly and influences banks to follow name-based and relationship-based practices: 
We basically do relationship banking, we do not involve with a company to 
perform one transaction [FCB-2].  
 
The institutional investors do not explicitly report that they use a 
comprehensive approach to analysis but their responses of the institutional investors 
also indicate that they use some form of internal information when taking their 
investment decisions. Two typical comments from institutional investors are: 
I tell you that the audited financial reports are actually may be, if I say 
correctly, it should not weight more than 30% in decision making. I think the 
remaining 70 % is all what is important. The entrepreneurs, the main men, who are 
the persons behind the organization, what's their future plan, what they have done in 
the past. You will not find these things in audited financial reports [LIC -1]   
 […] we have some internal communication which we use in ranking 
companies [MFM-4]  
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6.5.8 Minimum weight on CG in lending and credit rating 
regulations 
The responses of 10 credit analysts of banks and one corporate credit rating 
analyst indicate that they do not seriously consider the CG mechanisms 
recommended by BCGG-2006 because lending and credit rating regulations do not 
assign sufficient importance to CG (see also Section 6.2.4.1).  
We are not concerned with whether the BCGG-2006 is compiled or not; we 
do not have authority to check this as the Bangladesh Banks’ credit rating guidelines 
(CRG) does not require us to check the strength of corporate governance of the 
borrowers while granting loans [DCB9]. 
6.5.9 Peer banks and institutional investors do not consider CG   
The perceptions of 17 interviewees indicate that they cannot consider 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 because it may reduce their competitive advantage 
(see also Section 6.2.4). The perception of credit rating analysts of banks and 
corporate credit rating agencies indicates that competition in the industry deters them 
from considering compliance with the BCGG-2006. A typical comment is: 
Bank is a business house. It cannot impose condition that it will not extend 
credit if a company does not comply with the BCGG-2006. If it [bank] does, [the] 
customer will not stay with that bank and switch to [another] bank where the 
customer will find [more] liberal requirements. So, if we consider the compliance 
with the BCGG-2006, we will lose our customers [DCB-3]. 
The perceptions of institutional investors also indicate that the profit 
maximization motive deters them from considering CG mechanisms suggested by 
the BCGG-2006:  
If we put weight on whether the role of chairman and CEO is truly separated 
or not, we will not be able to do our business. [MFM-3] 
6.6 Theorising the impact of compliance with the BCGG-2006 on 
investment and lending decisions 
Prior literature uses agency theory to predict and explain the positive impact 
of CG on the investment and lending decisions of institutional investors (Section 
2.5.1) and bankers (Section 2.5.2) respectively. However, agency theory is less 
applicable in developing countries (Section 2.2.1) because the ownership and 
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management structure of companies are distinct from the ownership and 
management structure of companies found in Anglo-American countries. In addition, 
the findings reported in Section 6.2 indicate that a limited number of interviewees 
provide an agency theory-based explanation for consideration of a CG mechanism 
introduced by the BCGG-2006. Therefore, it is apparent that agency theory is not 
sufficient to explain the impact of CG mechanisms suggested by the BCGG-2006 on 
investment and lending decisions of institutional investors and bankers respectively 
in Bangladesh. This section explores whether the theory of path dependence can be 
used as a basis for explaining the attitude of institutional investors and bankers 
towards CG mechanisms suggested by the BCGG-2006. Path dependence refers to 
the persistence of existing business practices (Caron and Turcotte, 2009). Path 
dependence more likely results when organisations cannot depart from existing 
practices because they are embedded in a set of relationships and commitments (Ball, 
2005). Section 6.6.1 explains path dependence on the part of Bangladeshi companies. 
The result of this path dependence is reluctance to implement the BCGG-2006 in 
form and in substance. Section 6.6.2 explains path dependence on the path of bankers 
and institutional investors. The result of this path dependence is the persistence of 
existing lending and investment practices and reluctance to consider the CG 
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6.6.1 Path dependence on the part of companies to implement the 
BCGG-2006 in form and in substance 
The evidence in Section 6.2 suggests that most of the companies either do not 
comply or comply with the BCGG-2006 in form but not in substance. Section 6.3 
presents evidence that sponsor families extract private benefits of control in different 
ways. Section 6.4 presents evidence that the corporate and institutional 
characteristics of Bangladesh hamper efficient implementation of the BCGG-2006. 
Figure 6.1 combines the foregoing evidence and relates it to the theory of path 
dependence of corporate governance as proposed by Bebchuk and Roe (1999). Their 
theory is used to frame figures 6.1 and 6.2 following. 
Figure 6.1 depicts how, since the 1980s, government industrial policy and IFI 
influenced privatisation led to the development of family capitalism in Bangladesh 
(Section 3.3). This family capitalism is reflected in the present ownership and 
management structure of Bangladeshi companies (Section 3.4.1). The evidence in 
Section 6.3 indicates that the existing controlling structure of companies in 
Bangladesh (the control by the key sponsor executive director and sponsor family-
aligned board) permits the sponsor families to extract high private benefits of control 
in different ways. This study thus, argues that the protection of the private benefits of 
control of sponsor families is one of the reasons that motivates sponsor families to 
either not to comply or to comply in form but not in substance with the BCGG-2006 
(Section 6.2).  
The evidence reported in Section 6.4 suggests that present corporate and 
institutional characteristics of Bangladesh hamper the efficient implementation of the 
BCGG-2006. First, sunk adaptive costs are high due to individual-centred 
management style (Section 6.4.1) and the small to medium size of companies 
(Section 6.4.2).  The evidence in Section 6.4.1 suggests that the initial success of 
family-enterprises locks the corporate culture of Bangladeshi companies into a 
trajectory of individual-centred management. The lock-in to the trajectory of sponsor 
family-aligned board and individual-centred management may be further reinforced 
by (1) lack of trust among non-family board members (Section 6.4.3) and (2) lack of 
commitment of outside professional directors (Section 6.4.4). The intention to keep 
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control by sponsors and not to appoint professional management limits the size of 
companies (Section 6.4.2). This suggests that a typical Bangladeshi company will not 
effectively comply with the BCGG-2006 without changing its management structure, 
authority relationships and without appointing qualified and experienced directors, 
internal control and internal audit personnel. 
Second, the institutional characteristics of Bangladesh are not conducive to 
effective implementation of the BCGG-2006.  Lack of trust among non-family board 
members (Section 6.4.3) and a lack of commitment of outside professional directors 
(Section 6.4.4) (which may be the results of high power distance and masculinity 
(Section 3.5.2)) suggest that relaxing family control (e.g., by appointment of outside 
professional CEO) is less efficient in Bangladesh. The anti-corporate rules and 
regulations (Section 6.4.5) and a national culture of corruption (Section 6.4.6) 
suggest that an Anglo-American model which is alternatively called ‘open system of 
CG’ is less efficient. In an environment with the aforementioned characteristics, the 
secrecy ensured by family control is important to safeguarding innovation (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2003) and to managing corrupted government officials (Dyer and 
Mortensen, 2005). In addition, lack of detailed and transparent accounting reports 
(Section 6.4.7) hampers the efficient monitoring of independent directors (Armstrong 
et al. 2010; Aguilera and Jackson, 2010) and the lack of accountability of the 
external auditor (Section 6.4.8) hampers the efficiency of the audit committee. 
Furthermore, lack of market pressures (Section 6.4.9) offers limited incentives to the 
existing controllers to comply efficiently with the BCGG-2006 (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003; Manne, 1965).  Finally, the lack of monitoring and enforcement 
(Section 6.4.10) reduces penalties for non-compliance with the BCGG-2006 (dela 
Rama, 2012; Berglöf and Claessens, 2006).  
Third, endowment effects are high because of the high emotional attachment 
of the first generation entrepreneurs to their companies (Section 6.4.11). The first 
generation entrepreneurs are not ready to handover control to outside professional 
CEOs and appoint a truly independent director.  
Fourth, network externalities are high because of widespread non-compliance 
by other companies (Section 6.4.12) indicating that efficient compliance with the 
BCGG-2006 may become competitively disadvantageous.  
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Finally, the lack of consensus regarding the impact of control structures on 
performance or accounting reporting quality (Section 6.4.13) suggests that there is 
limited additional value from efficient compliance with the BCGG-2006.   
The evidence in Section 6.4 collectively suggests that efficiency in the 
implementation of the BCGG-2006 is low. This study thus, further argues that low 
efficiency in the implementation of the BCGG-2006 is another reason that motivates 
sponsor families to either not to comply or to comply in form but not in substance 
with the BCGG-2006 (Section 6.2).  
6.6.2 Path dependence on the part of institutional investors and 
bankers  
The evidence in Section 6.2 indicates that characteristics of investment and 
lending practices are one of the reasons for the limited impact of CG mechanisms 
recommended by the BCGG-2006. In Section 6.5, I describe the characteristics of 
investment and lending practices.  
Figure 6.2 indicates that government policy and the privatisations of banks 
influenced by the IFIs lead to control over banks by politicians and a few sponsor 
families (Sections 3.3 and 3.7). The sponsor directors of banks (Section 6.5.1) and 
politicians (Section 6.5.2) extract rent by unduly influencing the lending decisions of 
bank credit analysts. There is also limited evidence of rent-seeking behaviour among 
institutional investors and credit rating analysts (Section 6.5.1). This evidence 
suggests that the rent seeking behaviours of politicians and directors of institutional 
investment companies and banks makes the implementation of transaction-based 
lending and investment practices less efficient. The inefficiency of transaction-based 
lending and investment practices negate consideration of CG mechanisms 
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Rent seeking by politicians (6.5.2)  
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Figure 6.2: Banks and institutional investors are reluctant to consider compliance with the BCGG-2006 
(A path dependence-based explanation) 
 
   




In addition, investment and lending decisions are highly influenced by the 
name of the key sponsor directors (Section 6.5.3) and any past relationship with the 
investee or borrower company (Section 6.5.4). The responses of the interviewees, 
especially bank credit analysts, indicate that banks were historically accustomed to 
name-based lending practices due to the absence of any Credit Risk Grading (CRG) 
guideline; they continue name-based lending practices even after the CRG guideline 
has been introduced and conduct CRG analysis as a formality (Section 6.5.3). 
Although institutional investors do not give an indication when and how they start 
name-based and relationship-based practices, it can easily be inferred that 
institutional investors adhered to name and relationship practices in the past. This is 
because in a country with the institutional characteristics of Bangladesh, name-based 
and relationship-based investment and lending are more appropriate than transaction-
based practices (Rajan and Zingales, 2003a; p. 144; Singh and Zammit, 2006). 
Furthermore, there is an indication that both banks and institutional investors do not 
rationally appraise a proposal when there is a past relationship with the borrowing or 
investee company (Section 6.5.4). This evidence indicates that institutional investors 
and bankers lock themselves into a trajectory of name-based and relationship-based 
investment and lending practices. The lock-in to the trajectory of name-based and 
relationship-based investment lending practices is reinforced by a lack of reliable 
accounting information (Section 6.5.7). This is because analysis of a loan or an 
investment proposal based on ‘soft information’ indicates a costly strategy (Section 
6.5.7). The lock-in to the trajectory of name-based and relationship-based investment 
lending practices implies high sunk adaptive costs which hampers the efficient 
implementation of transaction-based investment and lending practices. The following 
comment by of one bank credit analyst indicates the difficulty regarding change of 
trajectory of lending practices:    
It is hard to give up that practices so quickly and follow an internationally 
equivalent lending practice. We have relationship with them and we know about their 
business, repayment capability and behaviour [DCB-4]. 
Furthermore, lack of reliable accounting information hampers the efficient 
implementation of transaction-based investment and lending practices and the lack of 
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weight on CG in CRG guidelines hampers consideration of CG mechanisms 
suggested by the BCGG-2006.  
Finally, network externalities are high because due to competition among 
banks and institutional investors, consideration of CG mechanisms recommended by 
the BCGG-2006 may become competitively disadvantageous.  
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter investigated RQ1. Do institutional investors and bankers in 
Bangladesh perceive that the level of compliance with the BCGG-2006 by the 
investee or borrowing company influences the investment and lending decisions 
respectively? In order to investigate RQ1, three sub-questions (RQ1.1a, RQ1.1b and 
RQ1.2) are answered. The findings related to RQ1.1a and RQ1.1b (Section 6.2) 
strongly indicate that the institutional investors and bankers perceive limited direct or 
indirect impact of CG mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-2006 on their 
investment and lending decisions respectively. This is because (1) the companies 
either do not comply or comply in form but not in substance with the BCGG-2006 
and (2) investment and lending practices do not encourage consideration of the CG 
mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-2006.  
In the course of investigating RQ1.2, it is found that a limited number of 
respondents perceive a positive impact of CG mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-
2006 on their decisions. Furthermore, among this limited number of respondents, 
very few provide explanations in support of their perceptions which are consistent 
with agency theory. Hence, it is evident that agency theory does not provide adequate 
explanations for the impact of CG mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-2006 on 
investment and lending decisions respectively. This chapter then explored (1) why 
non-financial companies in Bangladesh either do not comply or comply in form but 
not in substance with the BCGG-2006 and (2) what are the characteristics of 
investment and lending practices of institutional investors and bankers respectively. 
It was found that non-financial companies in Bangladesh either do not comply or 
comply in form but not in substance with the BCGG-2006 because sponsor families 
extract high private benefits of control under the present control structure (Section 
6.3) and the present corporate and institutional characteristics of Bangladesh do not 
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encourage sponsor families to comply with the BCGG-2006 in form and in substance 
(Section 6.4). This evidence is consistent with the theory of path dependence of 
corporate governance (Section 6.6.1).  
On the other hand, institutional investors and bankers practise name-based and 
relationship-based investment and lending practices respectively. The name-based 
and relationship-based investment and lending practices deter them from considering 
CG mechanisms recommended by the BCGG-2006. The evidence suggests that 
name-based and relationship-based lending have long-been practised, especially by 
bankers due to the absence of CRG guidelines. The move to transaction-based 
practices is deterred by a lack of complementary institutions such as reliable 
accounting information. Further evidence shows that interviewees prefer family 
legacy to professional management control. The characteristics of investment and 
lending practices, in sum, suggest that institutional investors and bankers are also 
locked in the path of name-based and relationship-based investment and lending 
practices which in turn deter institutional investors and bankers from considering the 
CG mechanisms recommended by the BCGG-200.   
In sum, compliance with BCGG-2006 by the companies has limited impact 
on the investment and lending decisions of institutional investors and bankers 
respectively. This is partly because the companies either do not comply with BCGG-
2006 or comply with it ineffectively. The sponsor family finds little justification to 
effectively comply with the BCGG-2006 on the grounds of rent protection of the 
sponsor family and low efficiency in implementation of the BCGG-2006 given the 
present corporate and institutional characteristics of Bangladesh. On the other hand, 
name-based and relationship-based investment and lending practices of institutional 
investors and bankers respectively are also responsible for limited compliance with 
BCGG-2006. As institutional investors and bankers practise name-based and 
relationship-based lending practices, they do not bother about investee’s or 
borrower’s compliance with the BCGG-2006. This in turn exerts limited pressure on 
companies to comply with the BCGG-2006 in form and in substance. This evidence 
highlights an interaction between the weak CG structure of the companies and the 





The nature of compliance with the BCGG-2006 
and its association with firm performance 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the following research questions:  RQ2.1. 
To what extent is the BCGG-2006 implemented in form and in substance? RQ2.2. Is 
there a relationship between the nature of compliance with the CG mechanisms 
recommended by the BCGG-2006 and firm performance?  
With respect to RQ2.1 and RQ 2.2, propositions are developed in Section 4.3. 
In order to provide evidence regarding propositions related to RQ2.1, survey 
responses (Section 5.4) from 91
17
 companies are presented.  The survey covers 
compliance with five CG mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-2006: separation of 
chairman and CEO, board of directors, audit committee, Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO) and head of internal auditor (HIA). Formally a company may choose to 
comply or not to comply with a CG mechanism (e.g., separation of chairman and 
CEO) as the BCGG-2006 is a ‘comply or explain’ basis guideline.  In practice, a 
company that apparently complies with a CG mechanism may comply in form but 
not in substance or it may comply both in form and in substance. Using this 
subdivision of compliance, companies are categorised into three sub-groups: (1) 
companies that do not comply (b) companies that comply in form but not in 
substance and (3) companies that comply both in form and in substance. Using the 
method discussed in Section 5.8, I test the propositions related to RQ2.2.  
Sections 7.2 to 7.6 provide detailed analysis of compliance (RQ2.1) and in 
each case presents the results of statistical analysis relating performance to the nature 
of compliance (RQ2.2). On the face of Tables, I only mention propositions that are 
supported by the evidence. The propositions that are not supported by the evidence 
are mentioned in the text. Section 7.7 concludes. 
                                                          
17
 The sample includes 73 local privately-owned companies, seven government-owned companies and 
11 subsidiaries of foreign-multinational companies. 
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7.2 Separation of chairman and CEO 
The BCGG-2006 recommends companies to separate the position of 
chairman and CEO. Section 7.2.1 reports the survey responses on the separation of 
chairman and CEO.  Section 7.2.2 reports the results of statistical tests on whether 
the performance of companies differs based on the nature of the separation of 
chairman and CEO. Section 7.2.3 provides a summary of this section.  
Table 7.1: Nature of compliance with the provision related to the 
separation of chairman and CEO 
Nature of compliance with the separation of 















Panel A: Do not comply 
The dual CEO is a member of the sponsor 
family. 
18 18 0 0 
Sub-total for Panel A 18 18 0 0 
Panel B: Separate the chairman and CEO in form but not in substance 
Both the Chairman and CEO members of a 
sponsor family 
37 37 0 0 
Both chairman and CEO are shareholder 
directors but there is no family relationship 
between them 
13 11 1 1 
Sub-total for Panel B 50 48 1 1 
Panel A + Panel B 68 66 1 1 
Panel C: Separate the chairman and CEO in form and in substance 
Chairman is a sponsor shareholder director or 
nominee of sponsor but CEO is a non-
shareholder executive director 
21 6 6 9 
Chairman is a institutional director investor and 
CEO is a sponsor shareholder director 
1 1 0 0 
Chairman is a non-executive independent 
director and CEO is a non-shareholder 
executive director 
1 0 0 1 
Sub-total for Panel C 23 7 6 10 
Total number of firms 91 73 7 11 
Key: Sample is 91 firms. Privately-owned companies indicate the companies that are significantly 
owned by Bangladeshi residents and neither the government of Bangladesh nor a foreign individual 
or company has a significant percentage of ownership. Government-owned companies indicate 
companies in which the government has a substantial ownership interest and one of the top two 
positions in management is occupied by a government official. The subsidiaries of foreign 
multinational companies indicate companies in which a foreign parent company has a substantial 




7.2.1 Survey evidence on the separation of chairman and CEO 
(RQ2.1) 
The findings related to the separation of the chairman and the CEO is 
presented in Table 7.1. Table 7.1 shows that 66 out of 73 (90.41%) privately-owned 
companies either do not comply or comply in form but not in substance. This 
evidence supports P2.1a2 but does not support P2.1a1. However, the evidence 
supports P2.1b1 because in 6 out of 7 (85.71%) government-owned companies 
separate the chairman and the CEO both in form and in substance. This is because 
the minister or a senior officer of the ministry which controls a company by virtue of 
designation is appointed as chairman of the company. Finally, consistent with 
P2.1c2, 10 out of 11 (90.91%) subsidiaries of foreign MNCs comply in form and in 
substance.  
7.2.2 Separation of chairman and CEO and firm performance 
(RQ2.2) 
Panels A and B of Table 7.2 present descriptive statistics and the results of 
tests of difference in performance by type of separation of chairman and CEO for the 
total sample and local privately-owned companies respectively. The method used is 
discussed in Section 5.8. Column 4 tests the difference in performance among groups 
of firms that (1) do not separate the position of chairman and CEO, (2) separate the 
position of chairman and CEO in form but not in substance, and (3) separate the 
position of chairman and CEO in form and in substance. Columns 5 – 7 present 
results of tests of difference in performance between groups. For example, column 5 
presents the results of tests of difference in performance between firms that do not 
separate the position of chairman and CEO and firms that separate the position of 







Table 7.2: Test of association between the nature of compliance with 
separation of chairman and CEO and firm performance 
Panel A: Total sample (n=91) 
Perform
ance 







































Mean 1.24 1.75 2.02 0.034** 0.044** 0.003** 0.089* 
Median 1.23 1.54 1.93 0.023** 0.107 0.004** 0.133 









Median 0.42 0.41 0.34 0.776 0.656 0.495 0.669 
S.D 0.72 0.51 0.57     
Avg. 
ROA 
Mean 8.49 9.42 13.24 0.059
c
** 0.529 0.028** 0.025** 
Median 7.65 8.77 10.77 0.163 0.545 0.082* 0.117 
S.D 4.77 6.65 9.32     
Avg. 
ROE 
N 18 47 23     
Mean 9.76 9.58 10.27 0.992 0.971 0.954 0.892 
Median 7.73 8.82 15.11 0.157 0.843 0.227 0.050* 
S.D 26.26 12.47 29.66     
Panel B: Local privately-owned firms (n=73) 




Mean 1.24 1.70 1.50 0.283 0.060* 0.318 0.716 
Median 1.23 1.48 1.49 0.317 0.142 0.607 0.561 




Mean 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.972 0.817 0.505 0.444 
Median 0.42 0.43 0.60 0.594 0.773 0.506 0.301 
S.D 0.72 0.51 0.92     
Avg. 
ROA 
Mean 8.49 9.12 6.94 0.572 0.357 0.782 0.814 
Median 7.65 8.39 6.96 0.538 0.357 0.817 0.836 
S.D 4.77 6.58 4.16     
Avg. 
ROE 
N 18 45 8     
Mean 9.76 9.26 -1.08 0.349 0.919 0.360 0.101 
Median 7.73 8.69 6.68 0.840 0.939 0.697 0.535 
S.D 26.26 12.62 29.91     
Key: Each performance measure is the average of its five annual measures over fiscal years 2007 – 
2011 inclusive. Tobin’s Q is the ratio between the market capitalization of equity plus book value of 
preference shares plus book value of long-term debt, and the book value of total assets of a firm. Stock 
return is the ratio between market value of equity at the end of fiscal year plus dividend minus market 
value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year, and the market value of equity at the beginning of 
the fiscal year. ROA is the ration between operating income and average total assets. ROE is the ratio 
between income before extraordinary items available for common equity dividend and the sum of the 
book value of equity and deferred taxes. Do not comply indicates the presence of a single person holds 
the position of chairman and CEO in a firm; In form only indicates the presence of two separate 
person in the positions of chairman and CEO but they are members of a sponsor family or sponsors of 
a firm; In form and in substance indicates presence of either an outside professional CEO or an 
outside chairman in a firm (see Section 5.6.1.1 for this classification). 
a
p-value of comparison among groups using ANOVA on means and Kruskal-Wallis on medians. 
b
p-value (two-tailed) of comparison between groups using t-tests on the means and Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests on the medians. 
c
p-value (one-tailed) of comparison between groups using t-tests on the means and Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests on the medians 




The evidence presented in Panel A (Table 7.2) is inconclusive for P2.2, 
P2.2a, P2.2b and P2.2c. It indicates that the association between the nature of 
compliance and firm performance depends on the performance measure used. While 
evidence related to Tobin’s Q supports P2.2, P2.2b and P2.2c, the result related to 
stock return does not support P2.2, P2.2b and P2.2c.  A similar type of contradictory 
evidence is provided with respect to ROA and ROE. The different results with 
respect to Tobin’s Q and stock return suggest that market participants are willing to 
pay a higher price for companies that comply in form and in substance but they 
cannot earn an abnormal return using information on the nature of compliance. The 
results related to ROA and ROE may suggest that leverage plays a role. 
The evidence presented in Panel B (Table 7.2), however, supports P2.2d that 
nature of compliance does not have an association with performance in local 
privately-owned companies. 
The comparison of Panel A and Panel B (Table 7.2) suggests that the result in 
Panel A may be due to the inclusion of subsidiaries of foreign MNCs into sub-group 
(3) that comply in form and in substance. Hence, difference in firm performance 
between subsidiaries of foreign MNCs and local privately-owned companies that 
comply in form and in substance is tested using t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. 
The results of tests (not reported) show that average and median Tobin’s Q, average 
and median ROA and median ROE of subsidiaries of foreign MNCs, are 
significantly higher than those of local privately-owned companies at the 0.05 level 
or less. 
7.2.3 Summary 
The survey results show that in local privately-owned companies, sponsor 
family members occupy both chairman and CEO positions in 66 (90.41%) 
companies and either chairman or CEO position in the remaining 7 (9.59%) 
companies. This suggests more intense management control of sponsor families than 
previously evidenced in Haque et al. (2011) who find that roughly 85 per cent of 
their sample firms appointed at least one of the top three executives from the 
controlling families. This is because Haque et al. (2011) do not distinguish between 
local privately-owned, government-owned and subsidiaries of foreign MNCs. The 
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government-owned companies separate the positions of chairman and CEO due to 
government policy rather than the BCGG-2006. The subsidiaries of foreign MNCs, 
except one, appoint professional CEOs and thus, comply with the intent of the 
BCGG-2006. This result is consistent with the theory of path dependence of 
corporate governance rather than agency theory in that sponsor families are reluctant 
to sacrifice their control.   
The univariate analysis in Section 7.2.2 provides inconclusive evidence with 
respect to P2.2, P2.2a, P2.2b and P2.2c but completely supports P2.2d. The result 
indicates that the overall structure of the company is more important for performance 
and a separation of chairman and CEO that is only mechanistic may not increase 
performance. For example, the separation of the positions of the chairman and the 
CEO in the local privately-owned companies makes limited difference in 
performance. This may be because control by sponsor families impedes proper 
segregation of duties and responsibilities between chairman and CEO even though 
these positions are separated. 
7.3 Board of directors 
The BCGG-2006 recommends companies to appoint: (1) a board of directors 
having between 5 and 20 members, and (2) 10 percent of board membership subject 
to a minimum of one, as independent directors (Section 3.6.2.1). Given the above 
recommendation about independent directors, it is possible that the sponsor family 
members represent 90 percent of the board of directors; yet still the company 
complies with the board independence rule. In order to understand the dynamics of 
the board of directors, this study investigates size, composition of total board and the 
appointment of independent directors. Section 7.3.1 presents survey evidence on 
board size, board composition, and board independence and section 7.3.2 tests the 
association of board size and board independence with firm performance. Section 
7.3.3 provides a summary of this section. 
7.3.1 Survey evidence on board of directors [RQ2.1] 
Section 7.3.1.1 presents survey evidence on compliance with the provision 
related to board size, Section 7.3.1.2 presents survey evidence on total board 
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composition and Section 7.3.1.3 presents detailed survey evidence on the nature of 
board independence.  
7.3.1.1 Survey evidence on the size of board of directors [A general 
background for RQ2.1]  
The survey results regarding board size are presented in Table 7.3. The 
average board size as reported in Table 7.3 indicates that the responding firms on 
average comply with the provision related to board size. However, three local 
privately-owned firms appoint fewer than five members, the minimum board size 
recommended by the BCGG-2006. Table 7.3 further shows that the maximum board 
size observed is 19, indicating that no firm exceeds the maximum board size 
recommended by the BCGG-2006.   
The t-tests of difference between the average board size of local privately-
owned companies and that of government-owned companies and subsidiaries of 
foreign MNCs show that both government-owned companies and subsidiaries of 
MNCs have a significantly larger average board size than local privately-owned 
companies. The Wilcoxon rank sum tests also provide similar evidence.  
Table7. 3: Description of size of board of directors 


























Number of firms 91 73 7 11    
Minimum 3 3 7 5    
Mean 7.51 7.26 8.85 8.27 0.116 0.046** 0.095* 
Median  7 7 9 9 0.011** 0.015** 0.045** 
Maximum 19 19 11 12    
Standard deviation  2.34 2.43 1.46 1.85    
Key: Sample is 91 firms. Privately-owned companies indicate the companies that are significantly 
owned by Bangladeshi residents and neither the government of Bangladesh nor a foreign individual 
or company has a significant percentage of ownership. Government-owned companies indicate 
companies in which the government has a substantial ownership interest and one of the top two 
positions in management is occupied by a government official. The subsidiaries of foreign 
multinational companies indicate companies in which a foreign parent company has a substantial 
ownership interest and a representative of the foreign company occupies one of the top two positions 
in management. 
a
p-value (two-tailed) of comparison among groups based on ANOVA on means and Kruskal-Wallis 
on medians 
b
p-value (two-Tailed) of comparison between groups based on t-tests on the means and Wilcoxon 





7.3.1.2 Survey evidence on composition of board of directors [A 
general background for RQ2.1] 
Table 7.4 shows that the board of directors of local privately-owned 
companies is strongly represented by controlling family members, sponsor 
shareholder directors and their family members. Moreover, the average percentage of 
independent directors appointed by local privately-owned companies is just above 
the minimum percentage of independent directors recommended by the BCGG-2006. 
Finally, the board of directors of local privately-owned companies is highly 
represented by interlocking directors, confirming the dominance of a few wealthy 
families in the corporate sector of Bangladesh (see Section 3.3). 























Number of firms 91 73 7 11 





45.39 60.50 4.76 3.03    
Average percentage of 
sponsor shareholders 
and their family 
members/sponsor 
nominated directors 
74.11 75.26 76.21 65.10 0.891 0.087* 0.370 




12.05 12.00 0 17.85 - 0.042** - 




42.93 47.93 16.75 19.28    
No. of companies with 
at least one institutional 
investor director 
21 16 0 5    
Key: Sample is 91 firms. Privately-owned companies indicate the companies that are significantly 
owned by Bangladeshi residents and neither the government of Bangladesh nor a foreign individual 
or company has a significant percentage of ownership. Government-owned companies indicate 
companies in which the government has a substantial ownership interest and one of the top two 
positions in management is occupied by a government official. The subsidiaries of foreign 
multinational companies indicate companies in which a foreign parent company has a substantial 
ownership interest and a representative of the foreign company occupies one of the top two positions 
in management. 
a
Controlling family indicates either a family that owns more than 10 per cent of ownership or a 
family that has highest number of representative on board. 
b
independent directors  indicates a directors who is designated by the survey respondents as 
independent. This director may not be a true independent director.  
c  
interlock directors are directors who sit on board of multiple companies.  
d
p-value (two-Tailed) of comparison between groups based on t-tests on the means and Wilcoxon 
rank-sum tests on board size.  




The board of directors of government-owned companies is also heavily 
dominated by government-nominated directors and completely lacks independence. 
The board of directors of subsidiaries of foreign MNCs is less dominated by sponsor-
nominated directors and more represented by independent directors than the boards 
of local privately-owned companies and government-owned companies. The board 
of directors of subsidiaries of foreign MNCs is also less dominated by interlocking 
directors than the boards of local privately-owned companies.  
This evidence indicates that the board of directors of local privately-owned 
companies and government companies may be less able to play a monitoring role in 
form and substance than the boards of directors of subsidiaries of foreign MNCs. 
This provides general support for P2.1a2, P2.1b2 and P2.1c2 but does not provide 
support for P2.1a1, P2.1b1 and P2.1c1.  
7.3.1.3 Survey evidence on independent director(s) [RQ2.1] 
Prior research on independent directors also indicates that their playing an 
effective monitoring role depends on his level of independence (Section 2.6.4.2). 
Hence, whether an independent director is independent in form and in substance is 
also investigated. Table 7.5 sub-classifies each group of companies into (1) do not 
comply with board independence, (2) comply with board independence in form but 
not in substance, and (3) comply with board independence in firm and in substance. 
Table 7.5 shows that 71 out of 73 (97.26%) privately-owned companies either do not 
comply or comply in form but not in substance with minimum board independence 
provisions recommended by the BCGG-2006. This is consistent with P2.1a2 but not 
with P2.1a1. None of the government-owned companies appoint an independent 
director. This evidence supports P2.1b2 but does not support P2.1b1. With respect to 
subsidiaries of foreign MNCs (Table 7.5, Column 4), five companies (45.45%) 
appoint a person as independent director who has neither a personal nor financial 
relationship with the CEO of the company. Furthermore, four (36.36%) subsidiaries 
of foreign MNCs appoint a professional as an independent director. In sum, with 
respect to subsidiaries of foreign MNCs, the evidence supports P2.1c2 but does not 




Table 7.5 Nature of compliance with board independence 
Nature of compliance  with the provision related 
to  independent directors 















Panel A: Do not comply with the board independence recommendation 
Do not appoint any independent director 19 12 7 0 
Appoint one independent director but do not 
meet the minimum requirement 
4 3 0 1 
Sub-total for Panel A 23 15 7 1 
Panel B: Comply with the board independence recommendation in form but not in substance 
Owns less than 1% of total ownership and was a 
director before the introduction of the BCGG-
2006. 
6 5 - 1 
An existing or a former officer or executive of 
the company 
16 15 - 1 
A relative or descendent by birth or marriage of 
a member of the controlling family or the CEO 
15 15 - - 
A friend or previous colleague of a member of 
the controlling family or the CEO 
21 21 - - 
Jointly owns a partnership or a private limited 
company with a member of the controlling 





Holds a directorship in another public limited 
company with a member of the controlling 
family or the CEO 
18 18 - - 
A professional providing services to the 
company or other business controlled the 
controlling family or the CEO 
17 13 - 4 
Sub-total* for Panel B 60 56 - 5 
Panel A + Panel B 83 71 7 6 
Panel C: Comply with the board independence recommendation in form and in substance 
A representative of an institutional shareholder 2 1 - 1 
Has no relationship with the controlling family 
or the CEO 
5 1 - 4 
Sub-total* for Panel C 7 2  5 
Total number of firms 91 73 7 11 
Key: Sample is 91 firms. Privately-owned companies indicate the companies that are significantly 
owned by Bangladeshi residents and neither the government of Bangladesh nor a foreign individual 
or company has a significant percentage of ownership. Government-owned companies indicate 
companies in which the government has a substantial ownership interest and one of the top two 
positions in management is occupied by a government official. The subsidiaries of foreign 
multinational companies indicate companies in which a foreign parent company has a substantial 
ownership interest and a representative of the foreign company occupies one of the top two positions 
in management. 
*Sub-total of firms Panel B is not equal to sum of numbers in different rows because several firms 




7.3.2 Board of directors and firm performance [RQ2.2] 
Section 7.3.2.1 tests the difference in firm performance based on board size 
and Section 7.3.2.2 tests difference in firm performance based on the nature of 
independence of independent directors. 
7.3.2.1 Board size and firm performance [A general background for 
RQ2.2]  
In order to test the difference in performance based on board size, firms are 
grouped into (1) small size board, (2) medium size board and (3) large size board. 
Using the method described in Section 5.8 and the format in Section 7.2.2, the 
difference in performance among and between groups is tested (results are not 
reported). This evidence provides limited support of a non-linear relationship 
between board size and stock returns. The evidence, however, does not indicate any 
significant association of board size with Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE at 0.05 level. 
This result is consistent whether the sample includes or excludes subsidiaries of 
foreign MNCs. In sum, the evidence casts doubt on whether the board of directors 
plays any role in augmenting the performance of firms.    
7.3.2.2 Board independence and firm performance 
Panels A and B of Table 7.6 present descriptive statistics and the results of 
tests of difference in performance by: (1) companies that do not comply with board 
independence, (2) companies that comply with board independence in form but not 
in substance, and (3) companies that comply with board independence in form and in 
substance for the total sample and local privately-owned companies respectively. The 
testing methodology and format employed are as in Sections 5.8 and 7.2.2 
respectively. The evidence presented in Panel A (Table 7.6) is inconclusive for P2.2, 
P2.2a, P2.2b and P2.2c. The evidence with respect to market-based performance 
measures, however, is not consistent with evidence in Section 7.2.2. Here stock 
return maintains a more significant association with nature of compliance with board 
independence than Tobin’s Q. Even the stock return of firms that appoint an 
independent director in form but not in substance is significantly greater than the 
stock return of firms that do not appoint an independent director. The contradictory 
evidence with respect to ROA and ROE again indicates that leverage may play a 
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role. Hence, further tests after controlling for firm characteristics are required to 
draw any conclusion regarding difference in performance due to the nature of board 
independence. 
The evidence presented in Panel B (Table 7.6) provides strong support for 
P2.2d at the 0.05 level. This may indicate that independent director(s), even with 
independence in form and in substance, do not play an effective role in local 
privately-owned companies. 
The comparison of Panel A and B again suggests that significant results in 
Panel A may be affected by the inclusion of subsidiaries of foreign MNCs in sub-
group (3).   
7.3.3 Summary 
In the case of local privately-owned companies, the percentage of 
directorship occupied by controlling family members is 60.50 per cent and the 
percentage of directorships represented by the sponsor shareholder directors and their 
family members is as high as 75.26 per cent. This evidence again indicates more 
intense control by sponsor families than in previous survey evidence reported by 
Haque et al. (2011) who find that three-fifths of the board members of non-financial 
firms comprise representatives of the sponsor families. As mentioned in Section 
7.2.3, Haque et al. (2011) do not distinguish among local privately-owned, 
government-owned and subsidiaries of foreign MNCs. Haque et al. (2011) collect 
data in 2004-2005 which is before the introduction of the BCGG-2006. Hence, a 
comparison of results of this study and Haque et al. (2011) suggests that control by 









Table 7.6: Test of association between nature of compliance with board 
independence and firm performance 
Panel A: Total sample (n=91) 
Perform
ance 

































Mean 1.84 1.59 2.61 0.039** 0.113 0.176 0.032** 
Median 1.82 1.35 2.57 0.025** 0.071* 0.089* 0.031** 




Mean 0.05 0.33 0.63 0.031** 0.021** 0.023** 0.021** 
Median 0.24 0.48 0.52 0.045** 0.048** 0.034** 0.243 
S.D 0.67 0.51 0.45     
Avg. 
ROA 
Mean 7.91 10.33 17.68 0.012** 0.151 0.005*** 0.021** 
Median 8.87 8.70 21.3 0.150 0.593 0.053* 0.079* 
S.D 6.14 7.04 9.51     
Avg. 
ROE 
N 21 60 6     
Mean 5.49 10.11 21.73 0.244 0.393 0.151 0.161 
Median 8.94 9.42 22.52 0.151 0.762 0.054* 0.068* 
S.D 25.65 19.58 12.92     
Panel B: Local privately-owned firms (n=73) 




Mean 1.85 1.45 2.18 0.175 0.107 0.747 0.247 
Median 1.77 1.26 1.93 0.133 0.072* 0.737 0.284 




Mean 0.17 0.34 0.44 0.581 0.323 0.297 0.412 
Median 0.37 0.47 0.44 0.724 0.425 0.779 0.931 
S.D 0.67 0.59 0.21     
Avg. 
ROA 
Mean 7.37 8.89 12.96 0.311 0.352 0.209 0.259 
Median 9.14 7.76 7.92 0.962 0.989 0.823 0.775 
S.D 5.69 5.61 12.29     
Avg. 
ROE 
N 14 54 3     
Mean 7.09 8.20 14.03 0.854 0.852 0.558 0.616 
Median 8.47 8.40 12.66 0.722 0.820 0.378 0.475 
S.D 19.04 19.76 11.20     
Key: Each performance measure is the average of its five annual measures over fiscal years 2007 – 2011 
inclusive. Tobin’s Q is the ratio between the market capitalization of equity plus book value of preference 
shares plus book value of long-term debt, and the book value of total assets of a firm. Stock return is the 
ratio between market value of equity at the end of fiscal year plus dividend minus market value of equity 
at the beginning of the fiscal year, and the market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. ROA 
is the ration between operating income and average total assets. ROE is the ratio between income before 
extraordinary items available for common equity dividend and the sum of the book value of equity and 
deferred taxes. Do not comply indicates a firm that has not appointed at least 10 percent of independent 
directors on its board. Comply in form indicates a firm that has appointed at least 10 percent of 
independent director but the independent director has a personal or an pecuniary relationship with the 
sponsor family or the CEO of the company. Comply in substance indicates a firm that has appointed at 
least 10 percent of independent director and the independent director has no personal or pecuniary 
relationship with the sponsor family or the CEO of the company (see Section 5.6.1.2 for this 
classification)..  
a
p-value of comparison among groups using ANOVA on means and Kruskal-Wallis on medians. 
b
p-value (two-tailed) of comparison between CEO duality and CEO in form but in substance groups using 
t-tests on the means and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests on the medians. 
c
p-value (one-tailed) of comparison between groups using t-tests on the means and Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests on the medians 
*,and ** respectively indicate significant at less than 10 and 5 percent level. 
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Moreover, 71 out of 73 (97.26%) local privately-owned companies either do 
not comply or comply in form but not in substance with board independence. The 
evidence suggests that there is an extensive tendency in local privately-owned 
companies to appoint a person who is not independent in form and in substance. This 
evidence is not surprising given that (1) the board of directors which prior to the 
BCGG-2006 and until now, is highly dominated by the controlling family members 
and sponsor shareholder directors (Section 7.3.1.2), is entrusted with the 
responsibility to select and appoint the independent directors by the BCGG-2006; 
and (2) general shareholders do not and are not willing to amend the selection of 
directors at the AGM (see Section 3.4.3). In sum, the evidence with respect to 
composition of the board of directors indicates that control by sponsor families is not 
at all altered by the compliance with the BCGG-2006, thus supporting P2.1a2.  
In government-owned companies, government-nominated directors represent 
76.21 per cent of board membership indicating that government officials maintain 
strong control over these companies. There is no independent director on the boards 
of government-owned companies. This evidence supports P2.1b2. 
Although the board of directors of subsidiaries of foreign MNCs is dominated 
by sponsor-nominated directors, the percentage of sponsor-nominated directors on 
the board of these companies is significantly lower than that of local privately-owned 
and government-owned companies. Moreover, subsidiaries of foreign MNCs differ 
from local privately-owned and government-owned companies on two grounds with 
respect to board independence: (1) the subsidiaries of foreign MNCs on average 
appoint more independent directors to the board (Table 7.4), and (2) a 
proportionately higher number of subsidiaries of foreign MNCs appoint at least one 
independent director who is independent in form and in substance (Table 7.5). This 
evidence supports P2.1c2. 
There is limited evidence that market participants earn a significantly lower 
return by investing in firms with a smaller or larger board than firms with medium 
board size (Section 7.3.2.1). However, the evidence also indicates that board size is 
not related to other performance measures. 
With respect to the association between the nature of the independent director 
and firm performance, the results presented in Table 7.6 (Panel A) provide 
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inconclusive support for P2.2, P2.2a, P2.2b and P2.2c. The results in Table 7.6 
(Panel B) show that there is no significant association between the nature of 
independence of the independent director and firm performance at the 0.05 level in 
case of local privately-owned companies. Thus, there is strong support for P2.2d. 
The evidence related to the nature of independence of independent directors and the 
finding of no significant association between nature of board independence and firm 
performance in local privately-owned companies, may indicate that sponsor families 
invalidate the independent director as a CG mechanism. 
7.4 The audit committee and its characteristics 
The BCGG-2006 recommends that companies appoint an audit committee 
with a number of characteristics (Section 3.6.2.2). Prior literature and international 
best practice recommendations also suggest that the effectiveness of an audit 
committee depends on certain characteristics (Section 2.6.4.3). Hence, survey 
respondents were asked questions related to these characteristics of the audit 
committee if a responding firm appointed an audit committee. 
Section 7.4.1 presents survey evidence on the appointment and characteristics 
of the audit committee. Section 7.4.2 presents the results of tests of difference in 
performance of (1) firms that do not appoint an audit committee, (2) firms that 
appoint an audit committee in form but not in substance, and (3) firms that appoint 
an audit committee in form and in substance. Finally, Section 7.4.3 summarises this 
section. 
7.4.1 Survey responses relating to the appointment and 
characteristics of the audit committee [RQ2.1] 
This section presents survey evidence on the appointment and characteristics 
of audit committees. The survey covers a number of audit committee characteristics 
and thus, I provide my final opinion on P2.1a1, P2.1a2, P2.1b1, P2.1b2, P2.1c1 and 




7.4.1.1 Survey responses on appointment, size and composition of the 
audit committee  
Table 7.7 presents information on the appointment and size of the audit 
committees of the sample firms. The average size of audit committee is calculated 
based on firms that state that they have appointed an audit committee. Table 7.7 
(Panel A, Column 1) shows that 31 out of 91 (34.07%) companies do not appoint an 
audit committee. Non-appointment is evident in local privately-owned and 
government-owned companies but not in subsidiaries of foreign MNCs. Moreover, 
the size of the audit committees appointed indicates that a higher percentage of local 
privately-owned companies comply with the words rather than the spirit of audit 
committee regulations than foreign MNCs (Panel B). 












Panel A: Appointment of audit committee  
Do not appoint an audit committee 31 27 4 0 
Appoint an audit committee 60 46 3 11 
Total number of firms 91 73 7 11 
Panel B: Size of the audit committee 
Number of firms with audit committee 60 46 3 11 
2 3 3 0 0 
3 46 40 1 5 
4 11 3 2 6 
Average
a
 3.16 3.02 3.67 3.54 
Key: Sample is 60 firms that appoint an audit committee. Privately-owned companies indicate the 
companies that are significantly owned by Bangladeshi residents and neither the government of 
Bangladesh nor a foreign individual or company has a significant percentage of ownership. 
Government-owned companies indicate companies in which the government has a substantial 
ownership interest and one of the top two positions in management is occupied by a government 
official. The subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies indicate companies in which a foreign 
parent company has a substantial ownership interest and a representative of the foreign company 
occupies one of the top two positions in management. 
a
T-test of government-owned companies have larger audit committee size than local privately-owned 
companies is rejected at 0.01 level (p=0.0023) and t-test of subsidiaries of multinational companies 
have larger audit committee size than local privately-owned companies is rejected at 0.01 level 
(p=0.0001).  
Table 7.8 presents information on the composition of the audit committees of 
the 60 firms that appoint them. Table 7.8 (Panel A) shows that nine companies do not 
claim to appoint an independent director to their audit committee and 46 out 51 
(90.20%) companies (Panel A.1) that claim compliance with audit committee 
independence appoint an independent director who is not independent in form and in 
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substance. All audit committees of government-owned companies completely lack 
independence.  












No. of firms with AC 60 46 3 11 
Panel A: No. of independent director(s) on the audit committee stated by the respondents  
2 3 0 0 3 
1 48 41 0 7 
0 9 5 3 1 
Panel A.1: No. independent director(s) in form but not in substance on audit committee
b
 
2 1 0 0 1 
1 46 40 0 6 
Panel A.2: No. of independent director(s) in form and in substance on audit committee
a
 
2 1 0 0 1 
1 4 1 0 3 
Panel A.1 + Panel A.2 52* 41 0 11* 
Panel B: At least one member of the audit 
committee is an institutional investor 
director  
9 7 0 2 
Panel C: No. of controlling family member(s) on the audit committee 
0 22 9 3 10 
1 18 17 N/A 1 
2 17 17 N/A 0 
3 3 3 N/A 0 
Panel D: No. of sponsor shareholder/sponsor nominated director(s) on audit committee 
0 8 6 0 2 
1 13 12 0 1 
2 32 24 1 8 
3 6 4 2 0 
Panel E: The chairman of the board or CEO 
of the company is a member of the audit 
committee 
21 13 1 7 
Panel F: The finance director or the CFO of 
the company is a member of the audit 
committee 
14 9 1 4 
Key: Sample is 60 firms that appoint an audit committee. Privately-owned companies indicate 
the companies that are significantly owned by Bangladeshi residents and neither the government 
of Bangladesh nor a foreign individual or company has a significant percentage of ownership. 
Government-owned companies indicate companies in which the government has a substantial 
ownership interest and one of the top two positions in management is occupied by a government 
official. The subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies indicate companies in which a 
foreign parent company has a substantial ownership interest and a representative of the foreign 
company occupies one of the top two positions in management. 
b
Panel A.1 and A.2 classify the firms that state that they have appointed independent director(s) 
on their audit committees based on the nature of independence of independent director(s). Hence, 
the total of Panel B.1 and Panel B.2 should be 41 for privately-owned companies, 0 for 
government-owned companies and 10 for subsidiaries of multinational companies. 
*One subsidiary of a multinational company reports that it has two independent directors: one of 
them is a legal consultant and other one is truly independent. Hence, total of subsidiaries of 
multinational companies becomes eleven when independent directors are categorised into 




Compared to local privately-owned companies, the independence in form and 
in substance is more pronounced in subsidiaries of foreign MNCs. A proportionately 
higher number of subsidiaries of foreign MNCs appoint (1) two independent 
directors who are independent in appearance, and (2) at least one independent 
director who is independent in form and in substance on their audit committees. This 
evidence is in line with the evidence on board independence. It once again suggests 
that subsidiaries of foreign MNCs comply better with the BCGG-2006 in form and in 
substance than local privately-owned companies and government-owned companies.   
Panel B (Table 7.8) shows that only nine (seven local privately-owned and 
two subsidiaries of foreign MNCs) out of 60 companies appoint at least one 
institutional investor director on their audit committee suggesting limited influence 
of the institutional investor director in internal decision making as on board of 
directors.  
As the sponsors and their families maintain a strong control over companies 
in Bangladesh (Section 3.4.1), this research further examines the representation of 
controlling family members and sponsor shareholder directors on audit committees. 
Table 7.8 (Panels C and D) shows that the audit committees of local privately-owned 
companies are populated by the members of the controlling families and sponsor 
shareholder directors.  For example, 37 out of 46 (80.43%) privately owned firms 
include at least one member of the controlling family on their audit committees 
(Panel C, Column 2). This evidence suggests that controlling families and sponsor 
shareholders maintain their strong control over audit committee as they do over 
boards of directors.  
The audit committee of government-owned companies is fully controlled by 
government-nominated directors (Table 7.8, Panel D, Column 3). The audit 
committees of the subsidiaries of MNCs are also dominated by parent-nominated 
directors. For example, 8 out of 11 (72.73%) firms appoint two parent nominated 
directors to their audit committees (Table 7.8, Panel D, Column 3). This finding 
implies that even subsidiaries of MNCs do not find it legitimate to have an audit 
committee dominated by independent directors and thus, do not comply with the 
international best practice recommendations in an economy where the local CG code 
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is a lenient one and the audit committees of local privately-owned companies are not 
independent.   
Table 7.8 (Panel E) shows that 21 out of 60 (35%) firms appoint either the 
chairman of the board or the CEO of the company as a member of their audit 
committees. Finally, 14 out of 60 (23.33%) firms include their CFOs or finance 
directors on their audit committees (Table 7.8, Panel F). In proportion, more 
subsidiaries of foreign MNCs than other companies appoint the chairman, CEO and 
CFO or finance director to their audit committee. The appointment of the chairman 
or the CEO and the CFO or the finance director contradicts the best practice 
recommendation about the composition of the audit committee (BRC, 1999; Smith, 
2003). The appointment of the chairman or the CEO and the CFO or finance director 
on the audit committee undermines the segregation of duties and responsibilities.  
7.4.1.2 Background of the audit committee chairman and members  
Table 7.9 presents evidence on the financial expertise and literacy (Section 
5.6.1.3) of the audit committee chairman and members for 60 companies that appoint 
audit committees. Table 7.9 (Panel A, column 1) shows that 34 (15 +19) out of 60 
(56.67%) companies fail to comply with the recommended qualification of audit 
committee chairman, 24 out of 60 (40) companies do not appoint any audit 
committee member who is expert in accounting and finance and 50 (20+22+8) 
companies do not meet the audit committee literacy requirement.  
Table 7.9 further shows that the percentage of non-compliance with financial 
expertise and literacy of audit committee chairman and members is higher in local 
privately-owned companies than in the subsidiaries of foreign MNCs. Although two 
out of three government-owned companies appoint an audit committee chairman 
who is financially expert, the financial literacy of audit committee members of 



















No. of firms with AC 60 46 3 11 
Panel A: Financial expertise* and literacy
γ
 of the audit committee chairman 
Chairman is an expert in Accounting and 
Finance 
26 18 2 6 
Chairman is not an expert in Accounting 
and Finance but a financially literate 
person 
15 13 0 2 
Chairman is neither an expert in 
Accounting and Finance nor a financially 
literate person 
19 15 1 3 
Panel B: No. of audit committee members including chairman with financial expertise* 
3 or more 2 0 0 2 
2 9 4 1 4 
1 25 19 1 5 
0 24 23 1 0 
Panel C: No. of audit committee members including chairman with financial literacy
γ
 
3 or more 10 4 0 6 
2 20 16 1 3 
1 22 19 1 2 
0 8 7 1 0 
Key: Sample is 60 firms that appoint an audit committee. Privately-owned companies indicate the 
companies that are significantly owned by Bangladeshi residents and neither the government of 
Bangladesh nor a foreign individual or company has a significant percentage of ownership. 
Government-owned companies indicate companies in which the government has a substantial 
ownership interest and one of the top two positions in management is occupied by a government 
official. The subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies indicate companies in which a foreign 
parent company has a substantial ownership interest and a representative of the foreign company 
occupies one of the top two positions in management. 
*An audit committee chairman or member is regarded as an expert in accounting or finance if he or 
she has either professional qualification in accounting such as FCA, FCMA and PhD in accounting or 
has held senior management position (e.g. Chairman and CEO) with another public limited company 
or financial institution but has not held that position because of his/her shareholding.   
γAn audit committee chairman or member is regarded as financially literate if he or she has at least 
an undergraduate degree in business; or is an expert in accounting and finance as per the above 
definition of accounting or finance expert. 
7.4.1.3 Frequency and duration of audit committee meetings  
Table 7.10 presents a summary of survey responses related to the frequency 
and duration of audit committee meetings. Table 7.10 (Panel A) shows that 39 out of 
60 (65%) audit committees do not convene meetings as per international best 
practice recommendations. Moreover, the average number of members present at 
audit committee meetings and the average duration of audit committee meetings 
suggest that audit committee members are reluctant to attend and participate. 
Furthermore, 28 out of 60 (46.67%) audit committees do not convene any meetings 
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with the external auditors. This evidence clearly questions the audit committee’s role 
regarding the protection of the independence of external auditors.  
Table 7.10 Description of audit committee meetings  










No. of firms with AC 60 46 3 11 
Panel A: No. of internal meeting of the audit committee per year 
Panel A.1: Do not comply with international best practice recommendations 
1 5 3 0 2 
2 26 24 1 1 
3 8 4 0 4 
Sub-total 39 31 1 7 
Panel A.2: Comply with international best practice recommendations 
4 or more  21 15 2 4 
Panel A.1 + Panel A.2 60 46 3 11 
Panel B: Average number of audit 
committee member present in a 
meeting 
2.87 2.85 3.33 2.81 
Panel C: Average duration per 
meeting in hour 
1:31 1:20 2:10 2:10 
Panel D: No. of meeting of the audit committee with external auditor per year 
0 28 26 0 2 
1 19 13 2 4 
2 or more 13 7 1 5 
Key: Sample is 60 firms that appoint an audit committee. Privately-owned companies indicate the 
companies that are significantly owned by Bangladeshi residents and neither the government of 
Bangladesh nor a foreign individual or company has a significant percentage of ownership. 
Government-owned companies indicate companies in which the government has a substantial 
ownership interest and one of the top two positions in management is occupied by a government 
official. The subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies indicate companies in which a foreign 
parent company has a substantial ownership interest and a representative of the foreign company 
occupies one of the top two positions in management. 
There may be several reasons for the evidence presented in Table 7.10: (1) 
the domination of controlling family members and sponsor shareholder or sponsor 
nominated directors may reduce the motivation of other members of the audit 
committee to attend and participate at the meeting (Section 7.4.1); (2) the BCGG-
2006 is silent about audit committee meeting frequency and the remuneration of 
audit committee members; and (3) audit committee members lack appropriate 
qualifications to contribute at both internal and external meetings with the auditors 
(Section 7.4.2). 
The non-compliance with best practice recommendation on audit committee 
meeting frequency does not differ significantly between privately-owned companies, 
government-owned companies and subsidiaries of foreign MNCs. In addition, there 
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is no significant difference between local privately-owned companies and the 
subsidiaries of MNCs with respect to the attendance of audit committee members at 
meetings. However, subsidiaries of foreign MNCs on average convene more frequent 
audit committee meetings, on average convene meetings for longer periods and on 
average more frequently meet with external auditors than local privately-owned 
companies.  There is little difference between government-owned companies and 
subsidiaries of foreign MNCs in this respect. 
7.4.1.4 Communication of audit committee activities  
Table 7.11 presents a summary of survey responses related to the 
communication of audit committee activities to the board of directors and general 
shareholders. The provisions relating to the communication of audit committee 
activities to the board of directors and general shareholders are described in Section 
3.6.2.2. 












No. of firms with AC 60 46 3 11 
Panel A: Communication of audit committee activities with board of directors 
No formal reporting takes place 7 7 Nil Nil 
Reporting to sponsor chairman or CEO 14 14 Nil Nil 
Reporting to board of directors 39 25 3 11 
Panel B: Communication of audit committee activities with general shareholders 
Audit committee activities are not 
reported to general shareholders 
33 28 1 4 
Audit committee activities are reported to 
general shareholders 
27 18 2 7 
Key: Sample is 60 firms that appoint an audit committee. Privately-owned companies indicate the 
companies that are significantly owned by Bangladeshi residents and neither the government of 
Bangladesh nor a foreign individual or company has a significant percentage of ownership. 
Government-owned companies indicate companies in which the government has a substantial 
ownership interest and one of the top two positions in management is occupied by a government 
official. The subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies indicate companies in which a foreign 
parent company has a substantial ownership interest and a representative of the foreign company 
occupies one of the top two positions in management. 
 
Table 7.11 shows that 21 (7+14) out of 60 (35%) audit committees do not 
report their activities to the board of directors. This may imply that either the board 
of directors or the audit committee does not work effectively in these companies. 
Moreover, 23 out of 60 (38.33%) audit committees do not report their activities to 
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the general shareholders. This disclosure failure may indicate either that the audit 
committees in these companies do not play a credible role that can be disclosed to 
general shareholders, or a general tendency towards the non-disclosure of 
information to general shareholders (Section 3.4.5).   
Table 7.11 further shows that the audit committees of government-owned 
companies and subsidiaries of foreign MNCs establish better communication with 
the board of directors than local privately-owned companies. This may be because 
the board of directors of government-owned companies and subsidiaries of MNCs 
are not subject to family control. Finally, a proportionately higher number of audit 
committees of government-owned companies and subsidiaries of foreign MNCs 
report their activities to general shareholders than local privately-owned companies. 
7.4.2 Audit committee and firm performance [RQ2.2] 
Based on the audit committee characteristics discussed in Sections 7.4.1, this 
study develops a composite score for audit committees and then divides the firms 
into three groups: (1) firms that do not appoint an audit committee, (2) firms that 
appoint an audit committee in form but not in substance, and (3) firms that appoint 
an audit committee in form and in substance (Section 5.6.1.3). Using this 
classification, Panels A and B of Table 7.12 present the results of tests of difference 
in performance by type of compliance with audit committee regulations for the total 
sample and local privately-owned companies respectively. The testing methodology 
and format employed are as in Sections 5.8 and 7.2.2 respectively. 
The evidence in Panel A (Table 7.12) once again provides mixed evidence 
with respect to P2.2, P2.2a, P2.2b and P2.2c. All four propositions are supported if 
Tobin’s Q and ROA are used to measure performance. However, none of these 









Table 7.12: Test of association between nature of compliance with audit 
committee and firm performance 
Panel A: Total sample (n=91) 
Perform
ance 




































Mean 1.54 1.43 2.18 0.009*** 0.367 0.028** 0.005*** 
Median 1.53 1.12 2.00 0.010** 0.359 0.018** 0.006*** 




Mean 0.31 0.39 0.13 0.261 0.573 0.886 0.969 
Median 0.40 0.46 0.28 0.203 0.874 0.088* 0.174 
S.D 0.60 0.48 0.59     
Avg. 
ROA 
Mean 7.71 9.18 13.79 0.002*** 0.348 0.002*** 0.014** 
Median 8.03 7.84 12.85 0.009*** 0.493 0.005*** 0.015** 
S.D 6.43 5.70 8.23     
Avg. 
ROE 
N 29 29 30     
Mean 6.57 7.41 15.24 0.215 0.875 0.062* 0.217 
Median 8.31 5.37 15.54 0.008*** 0.882 0.002*** 0.033** 
S.D 11.64 26.34 21.70     
Panel B: Local privately-owned firms (n=73) 




Mean 1.48 1.40 1.92 0.133 0.473 0.156 0.057* 
Median 1.42 0.94 1.82 0.126 0.399 0.138 0.059* 




Mean 0.33 0.40 0.13 0.308 0.658 0.848 0.939 
Median 0.45 0.48 0.35 0.444 0.762 0.228 0.311 
S.D 0.64 0.50 0.69     
Avg. 
ROA 
Mean 7.48 8.41 11.05 0.138 0.533 0.075* 0.139 
Median 7.51 7.63 10.82 0.151 0.608 0.078 0.105 
S.D 6.06 4.91 6.97     
Avg. 
ROE 
N 26 27 18     
Mean 5.79 5.29 16.13 0.128 0.929 0.010** 0.112 
Median 8.15 4.95 12.66 0.055* 0.957 0.018** 0.055* 
S.D 11.88 26.05 13.50     
Key: Each performance measure is the average of its five annual measures over fiscal years 2007 – 
2011 inclusive. Tobin’s Q is the ratio between the market capitalization of equity plus book value of 
preference shares plus book value of long-term debt, and the book value of total assets of a firm. Stock 
return is the ratio between market value of equity at the end of fiscal year plus dividend minus market 
value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year, and the market value of equity at the beginning of 
the fiscal year. ROA is the ration between operating income and average total assets. ROE is the ratio 
between income before extraordinary items available for common equity dividend and the sum of the 
book value of equity and deferred taxes. Do not comply indicates absence of an AC; Only in form 
indicates an AC having a composite score at best 8 and in form and in substance indicates an AC 
having a composite score greater than 8 on a 16 point scale (see Section 5.6.1.3 for this classification).  
a
p-value of comparison among groups using ANOVA on means and Kruskal-Wallis on medians. 
b
p-value (two-tailed) of comparison between groups using t-tests on the means and Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests on the medians. 
c
p-value (one-tailed) of comparison between groups using t-tests on the means and Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests on the medians 




Panel B (Table 7.12) provides consistent evidence that there is no difference 
among firm groups based on nature of compliance with audit committee related 
provisions in terms of any performance measure at the 0.05 level. There is a 
difference in ROE between firms that do not have an audit committee and firms that 
comply with audit committee related provisions in form and in substance at the 0.05 
level, none of the other differences in performance is significant at the 0.05 level. 
This evidence supports P2.2d. 
7.4.3 Summary 
The evidence provided in Section 7.4.1 indicates the following:  firstly, non-
appointment of an audit committee and non-compliance with several audit committee 
characteristics is more evident in local privately-owned companies. Secondly, 4 
(57.14%) government-owned companies do not appoint an audit committee and 3 
government-owned companies that appoint an audit committee fail to comply with 
several important audit committee characteristics. Thirdly, all subsidiaries of foreign 
MNCs appointed an audit committee. Although the audit committees of subsidiaries 
of foreign MNCs are not in full compliance with the BCGG-2006 and international 
best practice recommendations, they are in better compliance than the audit 
committees of local privately-owned companies and government-owned companies 
in several respects. 
Table 7.13: Classification of firms based on nature of compliance with 
audit committee 















Do not appoint an audit committee 31 27 4 0 
Appoint an audit committee in form but 
not in substance 
30 28 1 1 
Appoint an audit committee in form and 
in substance 
30 18 2 10 
Total 91 73 7 11 
Key: Sample is 91 firms. Privately-owned companies indicate the companies that are significantly 
owned by Bangladeshi residents and neither the government of Bangladesh nor a foreign individual 
or company has a significant percentage of ownership. Government-owned companies indicate 
companies in which the government has a substantial ownership interest and one of the top two 
positions in management is occupied by a government official. The subsidiaries of foreign 
multinational companies indicate companies in which a foreign parent company has a substantial 





In order to provide more objective support for P2.1a1, P2.1a2, P2.1b1, 
P2.1b2, P2.1c1 and P2.1c2, a summary measure of level of compliance with audit 
committee is required.  This study, thus, develops a composite index for audit 
committee based on 16 criteria (Section 5.6.1.3). The composite index takes a 
minimum value of zero and a maximum value of 16. Using the value of this 
composite index, firms in each of local privately-owned, government-owned and 
subsidiaries of foreign MNCs are divided into three sub-groups: (1) firms that do not 
appoint an audit committee, (2) firms that appoint an audit committee in form but not 
in substance, and (3) firms that appoint an audit committee in form and in substance. 
The sub-classification of firms in each group is presented in Table 7.13.  
Table 7.13 shows that non-compliance is pronounced in local privately-
owned companies and government-owned companies but not in subsidiaries of 
foreign MNCs. Furthermore, compliance with audit committee regulations in form 
but not in substance is dominated by local privately-owned companies. On the other 
hand, compliance in form and in substance is proportionally dominated by the 
subsidiaries of foreign MNCs.  Hence, the evidence in Table 7.14 supports P2.1a2, 
P2.1b2 and P2.1c2 but does not support P2.1a1, P2.1b1 and P2.1c1. 
The tests of difference in performance based on nature of compliance with 
the audit committee related provisions provide evidence that the extent of 
compliance makes a difference in Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE in the case of a sample 
including subsidiaries of foreign MNCs,  government-owned companies and local 
privately owned companies. But there is no difference in performance if measured by 
stock returns based on the extent of compliance with the audit committee related 
provisions. This evidence provides mixed support for P2.2, P2.2a, P2.2b and P2.2c. 
However, the level of compliance with provisions relating to the audit committee 
makes almost no difference in performance when the sample includes only local 
privately-owned companies. This evidence provides supports for P2.2d.  
In sum, the findings demonstrate that the audit committee is playing a passive 
role especially in the case of local privately-owned companies because the 
controlling families and sponsor shareholders are reluctant to sacrifice their control 
over the companies. As a result, the extent of compliance with audit committee 
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provisions has little effect on performance in the case of local privately-owned 
companies.  
7.5 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
The BCGG-2006 recommends companies to appoint a CFO and empower the 
CFO to attend board meetings. The BCGG-2006, however, does not specify the 
qualifications of the CFO. Prior research (Section 2.6.4.3) indicates that the board 
position, professional qualification and experience of CFO are positively associated 
with accounting reporting quality and the strength of the internal control system. 
Hence, survey respondents are asked about the appointment, board membership, 
qualifications and experience of the CFO.  
Section 7.5.1 presents results of the survey question relating to the CFO 
provisions. Section 7.5.2 investigates the difference in firm performance based on 
compliance with CFO related provisions. 
7.5.1 Survey evidence relating to the appointment and 
characteristics of CFO 
Table 7.14 (Panel A) shows that 10 out of 91 (10.99%) companies do not 
appoint CFOs. However, 33 out of 81 (40.74%) appointed CFOs who are not 
empowered to attend board meeting (Panel B) and 40 out 81 (49.38%) appointed 
CFOs who do not have a professional accounting or finance qualification (Panel C). 
These results are, however, highly influenced by local privately-owned companies 
and government-owned companies but not by subsidiaries of foreign MNCs. All 
subsidiaries of foreign MNCs appoint CFOs with professional qualifications in 
accounting and empower their CFOs by at least permitting their attendance at board 
meetings. Although there is no significant difference in the average experience of 
CFOs between government-owned companies and subsidiaries of foreign MNCs, the 
average experience of CFOs in local privately-owned companies is less than that of 






Table 7:14: Description of appointment, authority, qualification and 















Panel A: Appointment of CFO 
Do not appoint a CFO 10 10 0 0 
Appoint a CFO 81 63 7 11 
Total number of firms 91 73 7 11 
Panel B: Authority of appointed CFO 
CFO does not attend board meeting 33 31 2 0 
CFO attends board meeting including director 
CFO  
48 32 5 11 
CFO is a member of board 21 12 1 8 
Panel C: Qualification of CFO 
Number of firms 81 63 7 11 
Panel C.1: CFO without professional qualification 
CFO without business related qualification 3 3 0 0 
CFO has an MBA 4 4 0 0 
CFO has Masters in accounting and finance 33 30 3 0 
Sub-total Panel C.1 40 37 3 0 
Panel C.2: CFO with professional qualification 
CFO  has Chartered Accountant (CA) 
qualification 
33 18 4 11 
CFO has cost and management accounting 
(CMA) qualification 
8 8 0 0 
Sub-total Panel C.2 91 26 4 11 
Panel D: Experience of CFO (in years) 13.38 12.77 15.83 15.64 
Key: Sample is 91 firms. Privately-owned companies indicate the companies that are significantly 
owned by Bangladeshi residents and neither the government of Bangladesh nor a foreign individual 
or company has a significant percentage of ownership. Government-owned companies indicate 
companies in which the government has a substantial ownership interest and one of the top two 
positions in management is occupied by a government official. The subsidiaries of foreign 
multinational companies indicate companies in which a foreign parent company has a substantial 
ownership interest and a representative of the foreign company occupies one of the top two positions 
in management. 
 
7.5.2 CFO and firm performance 
Based on CFO appointment and characteristics discussed in Section 7.5.1, 
this study develops a composite score for CFO (Section 5.6.1.4) and then divides the 
firms into three groups: (1) firms that do not appoint a CFO, (2) firms that appoint a 
CFO in form but not in substance, and (3) firms that appoint a CFO in form and in 
substance. Using this classification, Panels A and B of Table 7.15 present the results 
of tests of difference in performance by type of compliance with CFO provisions for 
total sample and local privately-owned companies respectively. The testing 
methodology and format employed are as in Sections 5.8 and 7.2.2 respectively. 
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Table 7.15: Test of association between the nature of compliance with 
CFO and firm performance 
Panel A: Total sample (n=91) 
Perform
ance 



































Mean 1.51 1.47 2.31 0.001*** 0.988 0.012** 0.000*** 
Median 1.71 1.28 2.13 0.001*** 0.662 0.056* 0.002*** 




Mean 0.39 0.32 0.15 0.359 0.700 0.905 0.888 
Median 0.41 0.46 0.28 0.176 0.942 0.203 0.075* 
S.D 0.40 0.61 0.52     
Avg. 
ROA 
Mean 4.20 8.72 15.63 0.000*** 0.029** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Median 5.56 7.92 14.27 0.000*** 0.023** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
S.D 4.34 6.12 7.30     
Avg. 
ROE 
N 10 52 26     
Mean -8.92 10.02 16.56 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.076* 
Median 3.56 8.59 17.60 0.001*** 0.023** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
S.D 27.03 16.82 22.40     
Panel B: Local privately-owned firms (n=73) 




Mean 1.51 1.45 1.99 0.189 0.913 0.128 0.031** 
Median 1.71 1.25 1.70 0.159 0.579 0.321 0.058* 




Mean 0.39 0.34 0.13 0.138 0.781 0.862 0.847 
Median 0.41 0.47 0.28 0.386 0.766 0.352 0.179 
S.D 0.40 0.63 0.64     
Avg. 
ROA 
Mean 4.20 8.42 13.30 0.000*** 0.028** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
Median 5.56 7.64 12.61 0.000*** 0.026** 0.000*** 0.003*** 
S.D 4.34 5.57 5.81     
Avg. 
ROE 
N 10 33 16     
Mean -8.92 9.06 17.85 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.002*** 0.043** 
Median 3.56 8.31 17.12 0.002*** 0.026** 0.000*** 0.003*** 
S.D 27.03 17.11 11.18     
Key: Each performance measure is average of its five annual measures over fiscal years 2007 – 2011 
inclusive. Tobin’s Q is the ratio between the market capitalization of equity plus book value of 
preference shares plus book value of long-term debt, and the book value of total assets of a firm. Stock 
return is the ratio between market value of equity at the end of fiscal year plus dividend minus market 
value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year, and the market value of equity at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. ROA is the ration between operating income and average total assets. ROE is the ratio 
between income before extraordinary items available for common equity dividend and the sum of the 
book value of equity and deferred taxes. Do not comply indicates a firm that has not appointed a CFO. In 
form only indicates a firm that has appointed a CFO and the CFO has a total score at best two on a four 
point scale. In form and in substance indicates a firm that has appointed a CFO and the CFO has a total 
score greater than two on a four point scale (see Section 5.6.1.4 for this classification).  
a
p-value of comparison among groups using ANOVA on means and Kruskal-Wallis on medians. 
b
p-value (two-tailed) of comparison between groups using t-tests on the means and Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests on the medians. 
c
p-value (one-tailed) of comparison between groups using t-tests on the means and Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests on the medians 




Panel A (Table 7.15) does not provide consistent evidence on the association 
between level of compliance with CFO provisions and firm performance. This 
evidence once again suggests that the association between CG and firm performance 
depends on which performance measure is used. For example, if Tobin’s Q is used to 
measure performance, P2.2, P2.2a, P2.2b and P2.2c are supported. On the other 
hand, when ROA is used, P2.2, P2.2b and P2.2c are supported but P2.2a is not 
supported.  
Panel B (Table 7.15) also provides mixed evidence with respect to P2.2d. The 
evidence related to market-based performance measures provides more support 
forP2.2d but evidence related to accounting-based performance measures does not 
support P2.2d. This evidence indicates that firms that appoint a more qualified CFO 
and empower their CFO have a better operating performance than other firms but 
market participants neither offer higher prices for these firms nor earn abnormal 
returns by investing in these firms. This may indicate that market participants do not 
distinguish between local privately-owned firms based on the level of compliance 
with CFO related provisions of the BCGG-2006. 
7.5.3 Summary 
In order to provide more precise evidence for P2.1a1, P2.1a2, P2.1b1, P2.1b2, 
P2.1c1 and P2.1c2, this study develops a composite score for CFO (Section 5.6.1.4) 
and then divides the firms into three groups: (1) firms that do not appoint a CFO, (2) 
firms that appoint a CFO in form but not in substance, and (3) firms that appoint a 
CFO in form and in substance. The results show that consistent with P2.1a2 and 
P2.1b2 respectively, 60 privately-owned companies and four government-owned 
companies either do not appoint a CFO or appoint a CFO in form but not in 
substance. On the other hand, 10 out of 11 (90.90%) subsidiaries of foreign MNCs 
appoint a CFO in form and in substance. This evidence thus provides strong support 
for P2.1c2 but does not support P2.1c1.  
The tests of difference in firm performance (Section 7.5.2) based on nature of 
compliance with the CFO related provisions provide mixed evidence (Table 7.15, 
Panel A). Firms that appoint CFOs in form but not in substance have significantly 
higher accounting-based performance but not market-based performance than firms 
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that do not appoint CFO. Similarly, firms that comply in form and in substance have 
significantly higher Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE but not stock returns than firms in the 
other two groups. Hence, there is lack of complete support for P 2.2, P2.2a, P2.2b 
and P2.2c.  
 The tests of difference in firm performance (Table 7.15, Panel B) based on 
nature of compliance with the CFO related provisions in the case of local privately-
owned firms also provides mixed evidence. Although the accounting-based 
performance of local privately-owned firms that comply with CFO related provisions 
in form and in substance are substantially higher, the market-based performance of 
these firms is not different from the other two groups. This evidence suggests that 
market participants hardly distinguish between local privately-owned companies 
based on quality, empowerment and experience of the CFOs.   
7.6 Head of Internal Audit (HIA) 
The BCGG-2006 recommends that companies appoint a HIA. However, the 
BCGG-2006 does not recommend anything regarding the several characteristics of 
HIA that prior research (Section 2.6.4.5) finds essential for such an appointment to 
be an effective CG mechanism. Using prior literature, survey respondents are asked 
about the appointment, qualification and experience of a HIA, and the appointing, 
removing and reporting authority of the HIA. Section 7.6.1 presents survey evidence 
on this subject.. Section 7.6.2 presents the results of statistical analysis of the 
difference in firm performance based on level of compliance with HIA related 
provisions. Finally, Section 7.6.3 summarises this section.  
7.6.1 Survey evidence relating to the appointment and 
characteristics of HIA 
Table 7.16 presents survey results related to the appointment and 
characteristics of a HIA. Table 7.16 (Panel A) shows that the majority of local 
privately-owned companies are reluctant to appoint and ensure the independence of 
their HIA. For example, 54 local privately-owned companies do not appoint an HIA 
(Table 7.16, Panel A, Column 2) and CEO or chairman of board retain the 
appointment and dismissal authority of the HIA in all privately-owned companies 
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that appoint an HIA (Table 7.16, Panel D, Column 2). This finding indicates that the 
main sponsor retains the sole authority for the appointment and dismissal of the HIA 
and thus, the HIA is not independent of the sponsor families. This evidence supports 
P2.1a2 but does not support P2.1a1. 















Panel A: Appointment of HIA 
Number of firms 91 73 7 11 
Do not appoint HIA 57 54 3 0 
Appoint HIA 34 19 4 11 
Panel B: Qualification of HIA 
Number of firms 34 19 4 11 
Panel B.1: HIA does not have professional qualification 
HIA has not business related qualification 2 1 0 1 
HIA has an MBA 4 2 0 2 
HIA has Masters in accounting and finance 8 3 2 3 
Sub-total 14 6 2 6 
Panel B.1: HIA has professional qualification 
HIA has Chartered Accountant (CA) qualification 16 10* 1 5 
HIA has cost and management accounting (CMA) 
qualification 
5 4* 1 0 
Sub-total 21* 14* 2 5 
Panel C: Experience of HIA (in Years) 8.19 6.28 12.25 10.00 
Panel D: Appointing and dismissing authority of HIA 
Number of firms 34 19 4 11 
CEO 14 9 2 3 
Chairman of board 10 10 0 0 
Board of directors 6 0 2 4 
Audit committee 3 0 0 4 
Panel E: Reporting authority of HIA** 
Number of firms 34 19 4 11 
CFO 15 12 3 0 
CEO 8 2 1 5 
Chairman of board 5 2 0 3 
Audit committee 11 5 0 6 
Key: Sample is 91 firms. Privately-owned companies indicate the companies that are significantly 
owned by Bangladeshi residents and neither the government of Bangladesh nor a foreign individual 
or company has a significant percentage of ownership. Government-owned companies indicate 
companies in which the government has a substantial ownership interest and one of the top two 
positions in management is occupied by a government official. The subsidiaries of foreign 
multinational companies indicate companies in which a foreign parent company has a substantial 
ownership interest and a representative of the foreign company occupies one of the top two positions 
in management. 
*One internal auditor has both CA and CMA qualification. 
**Total does not match as several HIAs report to multiple authorities. 
 
Like local privately-owned companies, 3 out of 7 government-owned 
companies do not appoint an HIA (Table 7.16, Panel A, Column 3). Fifty per cent of 
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government-owned companies that appoint an HIA retain the appointing and 
dismissal authority with CEO (Table 7.16, Panel D, Column 3) and none of these 
firms ensure the access of the HIA to the audit committee or the board of directors 
(Table 7.16, Panel E, Column 3). This evidence supports P2.1b2 but does not support 
P2.1b1.  
All subsidiaries of foreign MNCs appoint an HIA (Table 7.16, Panel A, 
Column 4). In addition, in 8 out of 11 subsidiaries of foreign MNCs, the board of 
directors or the audit committee is the appointing and dismissal authority of the HIA 
(Table 7.16, Panel D, Column 4). Moreover, 9 subsidiaries of foreign MNCs ensure 
the access of their HIA to the board of directors or audit committee (Table 7.17, 
Panel E, Column 4). This evidence supports P2.1c2 but does not support P2.1c1. 
7.6.2 HIA and firm performance 
Based on HIA appointment and characteristics discussed in Section 7.6.1, this 
study develops a composite score for HIA and then divides the firms into three 
groups: (1) firms that do not appoint a HIA, (2) firms that appoint a HIA in form but 
not in substance and (3) firms that appoint a HIA in form and in substance (see 
Section 5.6.1.5).  
Using this classification, Panels A and B of Table 7.17 present the results of 
tests of difference in performance by type of compliance with HIA for the total 
sample and local privately-owned companies respectively. The testing methodology 
and format employed are as in Sections 5.8 and 7.2.2 respectively.  
The evidence in Panel A (Table 7.17) provides mixed support for P2.2, P2.2a, 
P2.2b but no support for P2.2c. The complete lack of support for P2.2c may indicate 
that the firms that appoint a HIA in form but not in substance and firms that appoint 
HIA in form and in substance are very similar in other respects that HIA quality 
makes little difference in performance.  
The content of Panel B (Table 7.17) again provides mixed evidence with 
respect to P2.2d. This evidence is consistent with evidence for CFOs that firms that 
appoint a more qualified HIA and empower their HIA have better operating 
performance than other firms but market participants neither offer higher prices for 
these firms nor do they earn abnormal returns by investing in these firms.  
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Table 7.17: Test of association between the nature of compliance with HIA 
and firm performance 
Panel A: Total sample (n=91) 
Perform
ance 




































Mean 1.95 2.40 2.49 0.0764* 0.137 0.017** 0.308 
Median 1.77 2.11 2.45 0.067** 0.153 0.033** 0.567 




Mean 0.31 0.22 0.23 0.769 0.538 0.693 0.487 
Median 0.45 0.34 0.28 0.459 0.497 0.215 0.959 
S.D 0.58 0.52 0.60     
Avg. 
ROA 
Mean 7.41 13.71 16.33 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.185 
Median 8.03 13.09 14.09 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.456 
S.D 4.76 7.71 9.19     
Avg. 
ROE 
N 55 19 14     
Mean 4.49 20.14 16.63 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.032** 0.670 
Median 6.44 17.48 23.88 0.000*** 0.000** 0.001*** 0.743 
S.D 18.53 12.72 31.06     
Panel B: Local privately-owned firms (n=73) 




Mean 1.93 2.29 2.08 0.546 0.293 0.317 0.612 
Median 1.72 2.07 1.63 0.593 0.302 0.768 0.799 




Mean 0.31 0.40 0.14 0.667 0.650 0.755 0.794 
Median 0.45 0.48 0.28 0.535 0.549 0.342 0.398 
S.D 0.59 0.48 0.87     
Avg. 
ROA 
Mean 7.51 11.62 12.98 0.011** 0.020** 0.005*** 0.365 
Median 7.90 10.18 10.12 0.097* 0.103 0.103 0.735 
S.D 4.65 8.14 8.08     
Avg. 
ROE 
N 53 12 6     
Mean 4.30 19.26 20.70 0.011** 0.013** 0.023** 0.429 
Median 6.44 14.81 18.36 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.031** 0.925 
S.D 18.85 15.37 17.17     
Key: Each performance measure is the average of its five annual measures over fiscal years 2007 – 2011 
inclusive. Tobin’s Q is the ratio between the market capitalization of equity plus book value of 
preference shares plus book value of long-term debt, and the book value of total assets of a firm. Stock 
return is the ratio between market value of equity at the end of fiscal year plus dividend minus market 
value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year, and the market value of equity at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. ROA is the ration between operating income and average total assets. ROE is the ratio 
between income before extraordinary items available for common equity dividend and the sum of the 
book value of equity and deferred taxes. Do not comply indicates a firm that has not appointed a HIA. In 
form only indicates a firm that has appointed a HIA and the HIA has a total score at best two on a four 
point scale. In form and in substance indicates a firm that has appointed a HIA and the HIA has a total 
score greater than two on a four point scale (see Section 5.6.1.5 for this classification).   
a
p-value of comparison among groups using ANOVA on means and Kruskal-Wallis on medians. 
b
p-value (two-tailed) of comparison between groups using t-tests on the means and Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests on the medians. 
c
p-value (one-tailed) of comparison between groups using t-tests on the means and Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests on the medians 





The classification of companies based on the appointment and characteristics 
of a HIA (Section 7.6.2) shows that 66 (90.41%) local privately-owned companies 
and six (85.71%) government-owned companies are classified into the first two sub-
groups while seven (63.64%) subsidiaries of foreign MNCs are classified the third 
group. These findings support P2.1a2, P2.1b2 and P2.1c2 but do not support P2.1a1, 
P2.1b1 and P2.1c1.  
The tests of difference in performance between firms based on extent of 
compliance with HIA provisions suggest that there is a lack of conclusive evidence 
to support P2.2, P2.2a, and P2.2b. However, the evidence does not provide any 
support for P2.2c. Similarly, there is a lack of complete support for P2.2d. Although 
based on no significant difference in market-based performance measures between 
and among sub-groups of local privately-owned firms, P2.2d can be supported; P2.2d 
cannot be supported if accounting-based performance measures are used.   
7.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to investigate (1) whether firms in Bangladesh 
comply with the provisions of the BCGG-2006 in form and in substance and (2) 
whether the nature of compliance with the provisions of the BCGG-2006 is 
associated with firm performance. Using detailed survey responses from 91 
companies on five important CG mechanisms of the BCGG-2006, this chapter shows 
that compliance in form and in substance at its highest is 32.97 per cent in the case of 
audit committees and at its lowest is 7.69 per cent in the case of independent 
directors. In all other cases, the firms either do not comply or comply in form but not 
in substance. This evidence indicates that the majority of companies either do not 
comply or comply in form but not in substance with the BCGG-2006. 
The compliance in form and in substance is less evident in local privately-
owned companies. Here, compliance in form and in substance at its highest is 24.66 
per cent in the case of audit committees and at its lowest is 2.74 per cent in the case 
of independent directors. In all other cases, the firms either do not comply or comply 
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in form but not in substance. This evidence supports P2.1a2 but does not support 
P2.1a1. 
Although 85.71 percent of government-owned companies comply in form and 
in substance with the separation of chairman and CEO; compliance in form and in 
substance by government-owned companies with board independence, audit 
committee, CFO and head of internal audit is not high. For example, none of the 
government-owned companies appoint independent director(s) and compliance in 
form and in substance with respect to an audit committee, CFO and head of internal 
auditor respectively is 28.58, 42.86 and 14.29 percent. This evidence supports P2.1b2 
but does not support P2.1b1. 
In comparison with local privately-owned companies and government-owned 
companies, compliance in form and in substance is more evident in subsidiaries of 
foreign MNCs. The evidence shows that compliance in form and in substance by 
subsidiaries of foreign MNCs at its highest is 90.91 per cent in the case of separation 
of chairman and CEO, audit committee and CFO and at its lowest is 63.64 per cent in 
the case of head of internal audit. This evidence supports P2.1c2 but does not support 
P2.1c1.  
The aforementioned evidence is consistent with the theory of path dependence 
of corporate governance. In Bangladesh, the private benefits of control are high and 
the relative efficiency of an Anglo-American based CG model is low. As a result, a 
significant percentage of companies in Bangladesh either do not comply or comply 
in form but not in substance with the BCGG-2006. Furthermore, the private benefits 
of control are higher in local privately-owned and government-owned companies 
than subsidiaries of foreign MNCs. This variation in the private-benefits of control 
makes a difference in the level of compliance in form and in substance. This 
evidence suggests that local private-owned and government-owned companies are 
more reluctant to comply in form and in substance with the BCGG-2006 in order to 
protect the high private benefits of control. 
With respect to the association between extent of compliance with the 
provisions of the BCGG-2006 and firm performance in the total sample, the evidence 
is inconclusive in relation to all five CG mechanisms tested in this chapter. The 
evidence indicates that the inclusion of subsidiaries of foreign MNCs the sample and 
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the selection of performance measure affects the results of tests. This conflicting 
evidence may indicate the omission of some firm characteristics that mediate the 
association between nature of compliance with the provisions of the BCGG-2006 and 
firm performance. 
The evidence also does not provide conclusive support for P2.2d. Although the 
tests relating to the separation of chairman and CEO, independent director and audit 
committee supports P2.2d, the tests relating to CFO and HIA provide mixed 
evidence. It may indicate that in the case of Bangladesh, internal structure of the 
company rather than the separation of chairman and CEO, board composition and 
audit committee makes a difference to performance. This result may indicate that in 
local privately-owned companies, second-tier management (e.g. CFO and HIA) plays 






Overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-
2006 in annual reports and its determinants 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the following research questions:  RQ3.1. To 
what extent does reported compliance with the BCGG-2006, as reported in annual 
reports, overstate underlying compliance with the BCGG-2006? RQ3.2 Does the 
overstatement of compliance reported in annual reports lead to a different relative 
ranking of a firms’ corporate governance? RQ3.3 What factors influence the 
overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports? 
I developed hypotheses H3.1a and H3.1b with respect to RQ3.1, hypotheses 
H3.2a and H3.2b with respect to RQ3.2 and hypotheses H3.3a1, H3.3a2, H3.3b1, 
H3.3b2, H3.3c1 and H3.3c2 in Section 4.4. This chapter uses survey responses 
(Section 5.4) from 91 companies on compliance with 20 provisions of the BCGG-
2006, together with the annual reports of these 91 companies and trading data from 
the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) as sources. I discuss two measures of compliance 
in Section 5.7.1 [compliance reported in annual reports is denoted (CG_AR) and 
compliance stated in the survey is denoted (CG_SR)]. These are required for testing 
hypotheses H3.1a and H3.1b related to RQ3.1 and hypotheses H3.2a and H3.2b 
related to RQ3.2 (see Sections 5.7.1 and 5.7.2). The method for testing H3.1a and 
H3.1b is discussed in Section 5.9.1.  In order to test H3.2a and H3.2b, Spearman rank 
correlations (Section 5.9.2) between CG_AR and CG_SR and between the three sub-
indices of CG_AR and CG_SR (Section 5.7.2) are calculated. The significance of 
Spearman rank correlations is tested against 0.95 using Fisher’s z transformation 
(Section 5.9.2). The measurement of variables and method required for testing 
H3.3a1 and H3.3a2 are detailed in Section 5.7.3 and 5.9.3 respectively. The 
measurement of variables and method required for testing H3.3b1, H3.3b2, H3.3c1 
and H3.3c2 are detailed in section 5.7.4 and 5.9.4 respectively.  
223 
 
Section 8.2 presents evidence related to H3.1a and H3.1b. Section 8.3 presents 
evidence related to H3.2a and H3.2b. Section 8.4 presents evidence related to H3.3a 
and H3.3b. Section 8.5 presents evidence related to H3.3b1, H3.3b2, H3.3c1 and 
H3.3c2.  Section 8.6 concludes the chapter. 
8.2 Overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in 
annual reports (H3.1a and H3.1b)  
This section presents evidence related to H3.1a and H3.1b. It discusses the 
value of CG_AR and CG_SR, presents comparative distribution of CG_AR and 
CG_SR and then presents the results of statistical test of H3.1a and H3.1b.  
The minimum and maximum values of both CG_AR and CG_SR are 3 and 20 
respectively. One company has a CG_AR value of 3 even though this company does 
not include the ‘comply box’ in its annual report. However, it has a CG_AR score of 
3 because disclosures about the board of directors and external auditors in annual 
reports indicate compliance with three provisions. On the other hand, one other 
company has a CG_SR score of 3. This additional company also does not comply 
with the BCGG-2006 but scores three because it has a board of directors which 
complies with three provisions of the BCGG-2006. With respect to the maximum 
values of CG_AR and CG_SR, eight and five companies have a maximum CG_AR 
and CG_SR score respectively. The CG_AR and CG_SR values of the other 
companies remain within the range of 3 - 20. Although no company has a CG_SR 
score greater than CG_AR, detailed analysis shows that a few companies state 
compliance in the survey only with respect to individual provisions. Further detail on 
the difference between compliance reported in annual reports and compliance stated 
in the survey with respect to each provision is provided in Section 8.4. Figures 8.1 
and 8.2 respectively present the distribution of CG_AR and CG_SR scores.  
Figure 8.1 highlights that the distribution of CG_AR is heavily weighted 
toward the 16 - 20 range while Figure 8.2 shows that relatively few companies have 
a CG_SR score in the 16 - 20 range. The comparison of these two figures clearly 
suggests that the level of compliance with the BCGG-2006 as reported in the annual 
reports does not always represent underlying compliance. The findings that a greater 
number of companies have a CG_AR between 16 to 20 and a fewer number of 
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companies have a CG_SR between 16 to 20 are consistent with the argument that 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 is reported in the annual reports to depict an image 
that companies maintain a sound CG structure that is not implemented in reality.  
Figure 8.1: Distribution of CG index based on compliance as reported in 
annual reports 
 
Key: Sample is 91 firms. Corporate governance compliance index of 20 important provisions of the 
BCGG-2006.  
Figure  8.2: Distribution of CG index based on compliance as stated in 
survey. 
 




Table 8.1 shows that the mean (median) of CG_AR is significantly higher 
than the mean (median) of CG_SR at less than 0.01 level. The results, thus, support 
H3.1b but do not support H3.1a. 
 
Table 8.1: Univariate tests comparing CG index based on annual 
reports and CG index based on survey 
 CG_SR CG_SR P-value 
Mean
a
 16.25 11.04 0.000*** 
Median
b
 17.00 11.00 0.000*** 
S. D 3.46 4.98  
Key: Sample is 91 firms. CG_AR is a corporate governance compliance index of 20 important 
provisions of the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports. CG_SR is a corporate governance 
compliance index of 20 important provisions of the BCGG-2006 as revealed by the survey. 
a
Difference in means is tested by using t-tests with unequal variance. 
b
Difference in medians is tested by using Wilcoxon rank sum tests. 
*** Significant beyond 0.01 levels (one-tail). 
8.3 Impact of overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-
2006 in annual reports on relative ranking of a firm’s CG 
(H3.2a and H3.2b)  
Table 8.2 presents the results of the Spearman rank correlation between 
CG_AR and CG_SR, and between corresponding sub-components of CG_AR and 
CG_SR. The significance of the correlation coefficient is tested against ρ = 0.95 (see 
Section 5.9.2).  
Table 8.2: Spearman Rank Correlation between Reported Compliance 
Indices and Survey Compliance Indices (significance of correlation 
coefficients is tested against ρ = 0.95) 
 CG_AR BD_AR AC_AR O_AR 
CG_SR 0.5750
a
    
BD_SR  0.6228
a
   
AC_SR   0.5546
a
  
O_SR    0.2876
a
 
Key: Sample is 91 firms. Variable definitions: CG_AR is a corporate governance compliance index of 
20 important provisions of the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports. CG_SR is a corporate 
governance compliance index of the same 20 provisions of the BCGG-2006 as revealed by a survey. 
BD_AR is a five point corporate governance index based on compliance with board related provisions 
as reported in annual reports. BD_SR is a five point corporate governance index based on compliance 
with board related provisions as revealed by a survey. AC_AR is a nine point corporate governance 
index based on compliance with provisions related to audit committee as reported in annual reports. 
AC_SR is a nine point corporate governance index based on compliance with provisions related to 
audit committee as revealed by a survey. O_AR is a six point corporate governance index based on 
compliance with provisions related to CFO, internal control and internal audit, and external audit as 
reported in annual reports. O_SR is a six point corporate governance index based on compliance with 
provisions related to CFO, internal control and internal audit, and external audit as revealed by a 
survey. Significance of correlation coefficients between reported score and survey score are tested 
against Ho: ρ = 0.95 using Fisher’s transformation.  
a
correlation coefficient is significantly different from ρ = 0.95 at .01 level. 
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Although all the correlation coefficients are positive, all are significantly 
different from the hypothesised value of ρ = 0.95 at the 0.01 level. The significance 
of all four correlation coefficients is also tested against the hypothesised value of ρ = 
0.99 and the tests yield similar results. The results, thus, support H3.2b but do not 
support H3.2a. These results indicate that when investment and credit analysts use 
compliance reported in annual reports to rank a firm’s CG structure, they will get a 
different ranking than when they use compliance as stated in a survey.  
8.4 The nature of provisions and overstatement of 
compliance in annual reports (H3.3a1 and H3.3a2)  
Having established that the mean and medians of CG_AR are significantly 
greater than that of CG_SR, and that the rank of companies differ when an investor 
or a credit rating analyst uses CG_AR instead of CG_SR, Table 8.3 compares the 
number of companies that report compliance in annual reports with the number of 
companies that state compliance in the survey with respect to each of the 20 
provisions of the BCGG-2006. The provisions of the BCGG-2006 are divided into 
observable and less observable provisions (Section 5.7.3). Column 3 of Table 8.3 
reports the difference between the proportion of firms that report compliance in 
annual reports and the proportion of firms that state compliance in the survey with 
respect to each provision. 
Table 8.3 shows that the number of companies that report compliance with 
each of the 20 provisions of the BCGG-2006 in annual reports is relatively higher 
than the number of companies that state compliance in the survey. The only 
exception is compliance with board size, where there is no difference between the 
numbers of companies. A detailed analysis of annual report disclosures on 
compliance compared to the survey responses shows that companies that state 
compliance with a particular provision in the survey generally report the same in 
their annual reports. For example, 60 firms that state that they have an audit 





Table 8.3: Description of number of companies complied as reported in 
annual reports and as stated in the survey  















of firms in 
(1) and (2) 
 No. of 
firms 
% No. of 
firms 
% 
Board size (Min 5, max 20) Observable 88 96.70 88 96.70 0 
Independent directors (10% with a 
minimum one) 
Observable 77 84.62 68 74.73 9.89** 
Separation of chairman and CEO Observable 77 84.62 73 80.22 4.40 
Define the roles and responsibilities 
of the chairman and CEO 
Less 
observable 
39 42.86 20 21.97 20.89*** 
Board meetings (at least four per 
year) 
Observable 90 98.90 69 75.82 23.08*** 
An audit committee is constituted Observable 81 89.01 60 65.93 23.08*** 
Written charter for audit committee Less 
observable 
42 46.15 22 24.18 21.94*** 
Audit committee size Observable 79 86.81 57 62.64 24.17*** 
Presence of an independent director  
on audit committee 
Observable 73 80.22 51 56.04 24.18*** 
Appointment of the chairman of 
audit committee 
Observable 80 87.91 60 65.93 21.98*** 




79 86.81 26 28.57 58.24*** 
Audit committee meetings (at least 
four per year) 
Less 
observable 
31 34.07 21 23.08 10.99* 
Audit committee reports its activities 
to the board of directors  
Less 
observable 
77 84.62 39 42.86 41.76*** 




59 64.84 27 29.67 35.17*** 




89 97.80 81 89.01 8.79*** 




88 96.70 48 52.75 43.95*** 
System of internal control is sound in 




88 96.70 28 30.77 65.93*** 




81 89.01 34 37.36 51.65*** 
External audit has not been engaged 
in non-audit services 
Less 
observable 
87 95.60 50 54.95 40.65*** 
External auditor is rotated in every 
three years  
Observable 81 89.01 79 86.81 2.20 
Key: Sample is 91 firms. Observable provisions are easily verifiable or are subject to strong monitoring by 
regulatory authorities such as SEC and DSE. Less-observable provisions are related to internal practices of 
a company and thus, are relatively less visible to an outside individual or organization. An audit committee 
chairman has a qualification in accounting or finance if he has either professional qualification in 
accounting such as FCA, FCMA and PhD in Accounting or has held a senior management position (e.g. 
Chairman and CEO) with another public limited company or financial institution but has not held that 
position because of his/her shareholding. 
a
Difference in percentage of firms between (1) and (2) is tested using two sample tests of proportions. 




The only exceptions relate to three provisions. These are (1) defining the roles 
and responsibilities of the chairman and CEO, (2) having a written charter for the 
audit committee, (3) convening at least four meetings of the audit committee per 
year. In respect of defining the roles and responsibilities of the chairman and CEO, 
one company states compliance in the survey but does not report that compliance in 
its annual report. In respect of having a written charter for the audit committee, and 
convening at least four meetings of the audit committee per year, six and five 
companies respectively state compliance in the survey but do not report compliance 
in their annual reports.  
The test of difference between the proportion of companies that report 
compliance in annual reports and the proportion of companies that state compliance 
in the survey is rejected in respect of 17 out of 20 provisions. This result again 
supports the evidence that companies overstate compliance with the BCGG-2006 in 
their annual reports.  Table 8.3 also shows that the test of difference between the 
proportion of companies that report compliance in annual reports and that of 
companies that state compliance in the survey is rejected in the case of all non-
observable provisions. However, the test is rejected in the case of six out of nine 
observable provisions. This evidence provides preliminary support that the difference 
between the proportion of companies that disclose compliance in annual reports and 
the proportion of companies that state compliance in the survey is more pronounced 
in respect of non-observable provisions.  
Table 8.4: Descriptive statistics of observable CG_AR, observable 
CG_SR, non-observable CG_AR, non-observable CG_SR 




Minimum 3.0 2.0 0 0 
Mean 7.99 6.71 8.27 4.41 
Median 9.0 8.0 9.0 4.0 
Maximum 9.0 9.0 11.0 11.0 
S.D 1.73 2.36 2.17 3.21 
Key: Sample is 91 firms. Obs_CG_AR is a corporate governance compliance index of nine important 
provisions of the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports; Obs_CG_SR is a corporate governance 
compliance index of nine important provisions of the BCGG-2006 as stated in survey. Non-
obs_CG_AR is a corporate governance compliance index of 11 important provisions of the BCGG-
2006 as reported in annual reports; Non-obs_CG_SR is a corporate governance compliance index of 




In relation to detailed evidence presented in Table 8.3, this study separates 
CG_AR into observable CG_AR and less observable CG_AR, and CG_SR into 
observable CG_SR and less observable CG_SR (Section 5.7.3). Table 8.4 presents 
descriptive statistics of the aforementioned CG indices.  The mean (median) values 
of observable CG_AR, non-observable CG_AR, observable CG_SR and non-
observable CG_SR indicates that the gap between non-observable CG_AR and 
CG_SR is higher than the gap between observable CG_AR and CG_SR.  
Figure 8.3: Comparison of observable CG_AR with observable CG_SR. 
 
Key: Sample is 91 firms. Obs_CG_AR is a corporate governance compliance index of nine important 
provisions of the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports; Obs_CG_SR is a corporate governance 
compliance index of nine important provisions of the BCGG-2006 as stated in a survey.  
 
In order to focus more on the overstatement of compliance in annual reports 
with respect to observable and non-observable provisions, Figure 8.3 compares the 
distribution of observable CG_AR with observable CG_SR and Figure 8.4 compares 




Figure 8.4: Comparison of non-observable CG_AR with non-observable 
CG_SR 
 
Key: Sample is 91 firms. Non-obs_CG_AR is a corporate governance compliance index of 11 
important provisions of the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports; Non-obs_CG_SR is a corporate 
governance compliance index of 11 important provisions of the BCGG-2006 as revealed by the 
survey. 
 
Figure 8.3 shows that a large number of companies have identical observable 
CG_AR and observable CG_SR. Consequently, the distribution of observable CG_AR 
and the distribution observable CG_SR roughly move together and are heavily 
weighted toward the 8-9 range. However, there is a considerable difference between 
less observable CG_AR and less observable CG_SR (Figure 8.4). While the 
distribution of less observable CG_AR is negatively skewed, the distribution of less 
observable CG_SR is slightly positively skewed. A comparison of Figure 8.3 and 8.4 
suggests that overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports 
mostly results with respect to less observable provisions of the BCGG-2006.  
Now I determine two new distributions: overstatement in observable CG and 
overstatement in less observable CG (Section 5.7.3) using the values of observable 
CG_AR, observable CG_SR, less observable CG_AR, and less observable CG_SR 
as summarised in Table 8.4. The difference in means is tested using a t-test while the 
difference in medians is tested using a Mann-Whitney U-test. The results of tests are 
presented in Table 8.5 showing that the mean and median of overstatement in non-
observable CG are significantly higher than that of overstatement in observable CG 
at the 0.01 level. This evidence provides support for Hypothesis 3.3a2 that 
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overstatement of compliance in annual reports is more pronounced with respect to 
less observable provisions of the BCGG-2006.   
Table 8.5: Descriptive statistics and univariate tests comparing 
overstatement in observable and less observable CG 
 OVS_Less-obs_CG OVS_Obs_CG P-value 
Minimum 0 0  
Mean
a
 3.87 1.27 0.000*** 
Median
b
 3 0 0.000*** 
Maximum 10 6  
S. D 2.89 1.96  
Key: Sample is 91 firms. OVS_Less-obs_CG is the difference between less-observable CG_AR and 
less-observable CG_SR.  OVS_Obs_CG is the difference between observable CG_AR and observable 
CG_SR. Less-observable CG_AR is a corporate governance compliance index of 11 less-observable 
provisions of the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports. Less-observable CG_SR is a corporate 
governance compliance index of 11 less-observable provisions of the BCGG-2006 as revealed by a 
survey. Observable CG_AR is a corporate governance compliance index of nine observable provisions 
of the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports. Observable CG_SR is a corporate governance 
compliance index of nine observable provisions of the BCGG-2006 as revealed by a survey 
a
Difference in means is tested by using t-tests with unequal variance. 
b
Difference in medians is tested by using Wilcoxon rank sum tests. 
*** Significant beyond 0.01 levels (one-tail). 
8.5 Overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in 
annual reports and control by families and institutional 
investors (H3.3b1, H3.3b2, H3.3c1 and H3.3c2) 
8.5.1 The value of the dependent variable 
The dependent variable for testing H3.3b1, H3.3b2, H3.3c1 and H3.3c2 is the 
overstatement statistic (Section 5.7.4.1). The value of the overstatement statistic as a 
percentage is presented in a bar diagram in Figure 8.5. Figure 8.5 shows that 16 firms 
do not overstate compliance in their annual reports and have an overstatement 
statistic equal to zero. However, the remaining 75 companies have a positive 
overstatement statistic. The mean (median) of the overstatement statistic is 31.92 
(31.25) per cent and the standard deviation is 24.87 per cent. This result suggests that 
on average, the level of compliance reported in the annual reports is not a very good 
reflection of actual compliance with the BCGG-2006. The maximum value of the 
overstatement statistic is 82.35
18
 per cent. The distribution of the overstatement 
statistic is truncated at the lower bound of zero and is not symmetric. Hence, for 
                                                          
18
 The overstatement statistic cannot be 1 because it is obvious for firms to report several items of the 
BCGG-2006 such as name of the chairman, CEO and members of board which indicates compliance 
with provisions related to separation of CEO, board size and composition. 
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incorporation in statistical tests, 1 is added to the overstatement statistic in decimal 
form and then log is taken on the resulting variable
19
. This log (1+ overstatement 
statistic in decimal form) (OVS_G) is used as the dependent variable in Tobit model.  
Figure 8.5: Distribution of the overstatement statistic 
 
 
Key: Sample is 91 firms. Overstatement statistic is calculated by scaling the difference between 
CG_AR and CG_SR by CG_AR. CG_AR is a corporate governance compliance index of 20 
important provisions of the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports and CG_SR is a corporate 
governance compliance index of 20 important provisions of the BCGG-2006 as revealed by a survey. 
Table 8.6: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent 
variables 
Variables N Mean S.D. Min Median Max 
OVS_G 91 0.2597 0.1869 0 0.2700 0.5988 
INS_OWN 91 16.54 12.68 0 15.71 61.14 
SIZE 91 21.44 1.62 17.32 21.45 25.41 
ROA 91 6.39 7.14 -12 4.6 29.37 
MB 91 4.44 6.26 -0.77 3.04 55.46 
Dichotomous variables   1 0 
FC 91 55 (60.44%) 36 (39.56%) 
AUDIT 91 24 (26.37%) 67 (73.63%) 
Key: OVS_G is Log (1 + overstatement statistic in decimal form). The overstatement statistic is the 
difference between CG_AR and CG_SR scaled by CG_AR. INS_OWN is percentage of 
outstanding shares owned by institutional investors at the end of a company’s accounting period in 
2011. SIZE is the natural logarithm of book value of total assets at the end of company’s 
accounting period in 2011. ROA is the ratio between net profit before extraordinary items and 
average total assets at the end of company’s accounting period in 2011. MB is the ratio between 
market value and book value of equity at the end of company’s accounting period in 2011. FC is a 
dummy variable indicating presence of both chairman and CEO from the sponsor family or an 
individual member of the sponsor family holding both the position of chairman and CEO; 0 
otherwise.  AUDIT is a dummy variable equals 1 if the audit firm of the company is affiliated with 
international big-four audit firms, 0 otherwise. 
                                                          
19
 See Woolridge (2002) p. 671 on linearization of a truncated distribution.  
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Table 8.6 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables used for testing H3.3b1, H3.3b2, H3.3c1 and H3.3c2.  
Table 8.7: Difference in the value of explanatory variables between 
firms with higher and lower OVS_G 





FC 91 1 = 38 1= 17  χ
2 
= 19.12*** 
0 = 8 0 = 28   
INS_OWN 91 μ = 17.93 μ = 15.20 Z = 1.056  
σ = 12.50 σ = 12.38   
SIZE 91 μ = 20.62 μ = 22.28 Z = 5.03***  
σ = 1.36 σ = 1.43   
ROA 91 μ = 4.32 μ = 8.51 Z = 3.31***  
σ = 5.78 σ = 7.83   
MB 91 μ = 5.04 μ = 3.83 Z = 0.556  
σ = 8.45 σ = 2.55   
AUDIT 91 1 = 2 1= 22  χ
2 
= 23.25*** 
0 = 44 0 = 23   
Key: OVS_G is log of (1 + overstatement statistic in decimal form). The overstatement statistic is 
the difference between CG_AR and CG_SR scaled by CG_AR. FC is a dummy variable indicating 
presence of both chairman and CEO from the sponsor family or an individual member of the 
sponsor family holding both the position of chairman and CEO; 0 otherwise.  INS_OWN is 
percentage of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors at the end of a company’s 
accounting period in 2011.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of book value of total assets at the end of 
company’s accounting period in 2011. ROA is the ratio between net profit before extraordinary 
items and average total assets at the end of company’s accounting period in 2011. MB is the ratio of 
the firm’s market value of common equity to book value of common equity at the end of company’s 
accounting period in 2011. AUDIT is a dummy variable equals 1 if the audit firm of the company is 
affiliated with international big-four audit firms, 0 otherwise. 
*** = Statistically significant at less than 0.01 level. 
8.5.2  Univariate Analysis – means and medians 
Table 8.7 reports descriptive statistics on the explanatory variables under 
analysis across the OVS_G for both firms with an OVS_G value higher than the 
median and those with an OVS_G lower than the median. To assess the difference 
between firms with an OVS_G value higher than median and those with an OVS_G 
lower than median, a Komolgorov-Smirnov z test is performed on the continuous 
variables to test for the normality of the distribution. None of the continuous 
variables are distributed normally. Therefore, differences between the groups of 
firms are tested using a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test for these variables. 
Chi-square tests were used for dummy variables. Table 8.7 reveals statistically 
significant differences for FC, SIZE, ROA and AUDIT between companies with an 
OVS_G value higher than median and those with an OVS_G lower than median. 
However, there is no statistically significant difference between firms with higher 
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than the median and firms with lower than the median OVS_G with respect to 
INS_OWN and MB. 
Table 8.8: Pearson and Spearman correlation between variables 
 
OVS_G FC INS_OWN SIZE ROA MB AUDIT 
        OVS_G 
 
0.478*** -0.121 -0.616*** -0.481*** -0.019 -0.638** 
FC  0.486*** 
 
0.203* -0.303*** -0.302*** -0.030 -0.230** 
INS_OWN -0.1186 0.206* 
 
-0.098 -0.100 0.037 0.056 
SIZE -0.612*** -0.328*** -0.088 
 
0.293*** -0.240** 0.388*** 
ROA -0.407*** -0.232** 0.061 0.353*** 
 
0.20* 0.369*** 
MB 0.101 0.122 -0.051 -0.262 -0.194* 
 
0.258** 
AUDIT -0.629*** -0.229** 0.054 0.361*** 0.311*** 0.042 
 
 
Key: OVS_G is log of (1 + overstatement statistic in decimal form). The overstatement statistic is the 
difference between CG_AR and CG_SR scaled by CG_AR. FC is a dummy variable indicating presence of 
both chairman and CEO from the sponsor family or an individual member of the sponsor family holding both 
the position of chairman and CEO; 0 otherwise. INS_OWN is percentage of outstanding shares owned by 
institutional investors at the end of a company’s accounting period in 2011.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
book value of total assets at the end of company’s accounting period in 2011. ROA is the ratio between net 
profit before extraordinary items and average total assets at the end of company’s accounting period in 2011. 
MB is the ratio of the firm’s market value of common equity to book value of common equity at the end of 
company’s accounting period in 2011. AUDIT is a dummy variable equals 1 if the audit firm of the company is 
affiliated with international big-four audit firms, 0 otherwise. 
***, **, * = Statistically significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level. 
 
8.5.3 Bivariate Analysis - correlations 
Table 8.8 presents the correlation coefficients between variables. OVS_G is 
positively correlated with FC and the correlation coefficient is significant at the 0.01 
level. This result provides initial evidence for H3.3b2. OVS_G is not significantly 
correlated with INS_OWN at the 0.10 level. This evidence provides primary support 
for H3.3c2. SIZE, ROA and AUDITOR are negatively correlated with OVS_G and 
all coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level except coefficient between OVS_G 
and AUDIT which is significant at the 0.05 level. MB does not have any significant 
correlation with OVS_G. FC is significantly positively correlated with INS_OWN.  
It may indicate that institutional investors take part in private benefits of control 
through their relationships with sponsor families in a country with weaker market 
and legal institutions (Belev, 2003; Rajan and Zingales, 2003a). FC is negatively 
correlated with SIZE, ROA and AUDIT. This is in line with prior research and 
suggests that family-controlled firms are on average small in size, less profitable 
(Faccio et al., 2001) and appoint a less qualified auditor (Niskanen et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, there are significant correlations between ROA and SIZE, ROA and 
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AUDIT, and SIZE and AUDIT which is consistent with prior studies (Abbott and 
Parker, 2000; Johansen and Petterson, 2013). However, none of the coefficients 
between the independent variables is greater than (the absolute value of) 0.40. This 
indicates that multicollinearity is not a serious issue here (Hooghiemstra, 2012).   
8.5.4 Multiple regression 
In order to test H3.3b1, H3.3b2, H3.3c1 and H3.3c2, five different versions of 
equation (1) (see Section 5.9.4) with varying explanatory variables are estimated. 
The results are shown for Models (1) to (5) in Table 8.9.  
The results in Model 1 show that the coefficient of FC is positive and significant 
at less than the 0.01 level, indicating that control by the sponsor family as measured 
by sponsor family affiliated chairman of the board and CEO is positively associated 
with the overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports. This 
result provides support for H3.3b2 but does not provide support for H3.3b1.  
In Model 2, the coefficient of INS_OWN is negative but not significant at less 
than the 0.10 level. This result indicates that institutional investors do not play a 
monitoring role to reduce overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in 
annual reports. This evidence supports H3.3c2 but does not support H3.3c1. 
In Model 3, when both FC and INS_OWN are included, the coefficient of FC 
has positive sign and remains significant at the 0.01 level. However, the coefficient 
of INS_OWN surprisingly becomes significant at the 0.05 level although INS_OWN 
does not differ significantly between companies with an OVS_G value higher than 
median and companies with an OVS_G lower than median (Table 8.7) and 
INS_OWN is not significantly correlated with OVS_G (Table 8.8). The significant 
coefficient of INS_OWN may be the result of a significant positive correlation 





Table 8.9: Tobit regression results using OVS_G* as the dependent variable 
Model 1: OVS_G* = β0 + β1i.FC + ε                                                                                     
Model 2: OVS_G* = β0 + β2i.INS_OWN + ε                                                                    
Model 3: OVS_G* = β0 + β1i.FC + β2i.INS_OWN + ε                                                                                                                   
Model 4: OVS_G* = β0 + β1i.FC + β2i.INS_OWN + γ3MB + γ4iROA + γ5SIZE + ε                                        
Model 5: OVS_G* = β0 + β1i.FC + β2i.INS_OWN + γ3MB + γ4ROA + γ5SIZE + γ6i.AUDIT +ε     
 
 





Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t 
Constant  0.115*** 3.48 0.274*** 7.19 0.168*** 4.39 1.595*** 6.59 1.267*** 5.96 
FC + 0.209*** 4.97   0.229*** 5.51 0.146*** 4.26 0.125*** 4.28 
INS_OWN -   - 0.002 - 1.12 -0.004** - 2.42 -0.004*** - 3.34 -0.003*** -3.08 
MB ?       -0.005* -1.95 -0.003 -1.16 
ROA -       -0.007*** -3.08 -0.005** -2.35 
SIZE -       -0.061*** -5.54 -0.044*** -4.57 
AUDIT -         -0.199*** -5.78 
Pseudo R
2
  1.059 0.060 1.334 3.425 4.859 
LR chi-square 
statistics 
 22.05*** 1.25 27.77*** 71.31*** 101.17*** 
Key: FC is a dummy variable indicating presence of both chairman and CEO from the sponsor family or an individual member of the sponsor family holding 
both the position of chairman and CEO; 0 otherwise.  INS_OWN is percentage of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors at the end of a company’s 
accounting period in 2011.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of book value of total assets at the end of company’s accounting period in 2011. ROA is the ratio 
between net profit before extraordinary items and average total assets at the end of company’s accounting period in 2011. MB is the ratio of the firm’s market 
value of common equity to book value of common equity at the end of company’s accounting period in 2011. AUDIT is a dummy variable equals 1 if the audit 
firm of the company is affiliated with international big-four audit firms, 0 otherwise. 





  In Model 4, MB, ROA and SIZE are included in addition to FC and 
INS_OWN. The coefficient of FC continues to have a positive sign and remains 
significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient of INS_OWN continues to have negative 
sign and becomes significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient of MB is surprisingly 
significant at the 0.10 level although MB does not differ significantly between 
companies with an OVS_G value higher than median and companies with an 
OVS_G lower than median (Table 8.7) and MB is not significantly correlated with 
OVS_G (Table 8.8). Hence, the significant coefficient of MB may be the result of a 
significant negative correlation between ROA and MB (Table 8.8). However, the 
significant correlation between ROA and MB does not indicate a problem of 
multicollinearity as the correlation between ROA and MB is -0.194 (see Section 
8.5.3). The coefficient of ROA is negative and significant at the 0.01 level. This is 
consistent with previous evidence that profitable firms have a better CG structure in 
place (Linck et al., 2008; Coles at al., 2008) and better accounting reporting quality 
(Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). The coefficient of SIZE is negative and significant at 
the 0.01 level. This is not surprising given a large body of prior literature that 
documents that both the quality of CG (Lehn et al., 2009; Boone et al., 2007) and 
accounting disclosure (e.g. Ajinkya et al., 2005, Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) are 
positively associated with firm size.  
In Model 5, after inclusion of AUDIT in the model, the sign and significance 
level of coefficients of FC and INS_OWN do not change. The coefficient of AUDIT 
has the expected sign and is significant at the 0.01 level. This is consistent with prior 
evidence that large audit firms play strong CG role (e.g., Gul et al., 2010) and quality 
of auditor is positive related with the quality of accounting disclosure (e.g., Basset et 
al., 2007). This is, however, not consistent with Ajinkya et al. (2005). There is no 
change in the sign and significance level of coefficient of SIZE. However, the 
coefficient of ROA is now significant at the 0.05 level and the coefficient of MB is 
no longer significant. Table 8.8 shows that MB and ROA are significantly positively 
correlated with AUDIT. It is possible that the correlation of AUDIT with MB and 
ROA affects the significance level of MB and ROA although the magnitude of 
correlation of AUDIT with MB and ROA does not indicate a problem of 




Table 8.9, in total, indicates that MB does not have a significant relationship with 
OVS_G. This evidence is consistent with previous evidence that MB is not 
significantly related with the firm’s CG structure (Coles et al., 2008; Lehn et al., 
2009) and accounting reporting quality (Chua and Gray, 2010; Ajinkya et al., 2005; 
Eng and Mak, 2003). 
 
The results in Tables 8.7, 8.8 and 8.9, in sum, indicate that FC is positively 
significantly associated with OVS_G. These results provide support for H3.3b2 but 
do not provide support for H3.3b1. Moreover, the results in Tables 8.7, 8.8 and 
Model 2 of Table 8.9, in total, indicate that INS_OWN does not have a significant 
relationship with OVS_G. These results provide support for H3.3c2 but do not 
provide support for H3.3c1.  
8.5.6 Sensitivity analysis for H3.3b1, H3.3b2, H3.3c1 and H3.3c2 
The robustness of the results presented in Table 8.9 is tested for alternative 
measurement of dependent variable and independent variables, and alternative 
estimation methods. First, the independent variables of Model 5 are regressed on the 
overstatement statistic without linearization. The result is presented in Model 6 in 
Table 8.10. Second, control by sponsor family is measured by three alternative 
variables: either the chairman of the board or the CEO is a member of the sponsor 
family (F_CH/CEO), percentage of sponsor family directors on board (PFD) and the 
number of sponsor family directors on board (NUMFD). Model 7, 8, and 9 are run 
by using these three alternative measures of control by sponsor family respectively. 
The results are presented in Table 8.10. Finally, Model 5 is estimated by OLS 




Table 8.10: Regression results using OVS_G and overstatement statistic as the dependent variable 
Model 6: OVS_G_RAW = β0 + β1FC + β2INS_OWN + β3MB + β4ROA + β5SIZE + β6AUDIT +ε 
Model 7: OVS_G* = β0 + β1 F_CH/CEO  + β2INS_OWN + β3MB + β4ROA + β5SIZE + β6AUDIT +ε 
Model 8: OVS_G* = β0 + β1PFD + β2INS_OWN + β3MB + β4ROA + β5SIZE + β6AUDIT +ε 
Model 9: OVS_G* = β0 + β1NUMFD + β2INS_OWN + β3MB + β4ROA + β5SIZE + β6AUDIT +ε   
Model 10: OVS_G = β0 + β1FC + βINS_OWN + β3MBi + β4ROAi + β5SIZEi + β .AUDIT +ε  
     
 Model 6 (Tobit) Model 7 (Tobit) Model 8 (Tobit) Model 9 (Tobit) Model 10(OLS) 





Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 
Constant  1.74*** 6.03 1.33*** 5.72 1.359*** 5.95 1.44*** 6.43 1.216*** 6.53 
FC + 0.171*** 4.30       0.114*** 4.39 
F_CH/CEO +   0.108** 2.65       
PFD +     0.133** 2.57     
NUMFD +       0.013** 2.37   
INS_OWN - -0.005*** -3.11 -0.003** - 2.24 -0.002* -2.04 -0.002* -1.91 -0.003*** -3.12 
MB ? -0.003 -1.09 -0.002 - 0.77 -0.002 -0.96 -0.002 -0.93 -0.001 -0.72 
ROA - -0.006** -2.14 -0.005** - 2.43 -0.004* -1.92 -0.005** -2.06 -0.003 -1.60 
SIZE - -0.063*** -4.80 -0.048*** - 4.68 -0.049*** -4.80 -0.052*** -5.07 -0.042*** -4.99 
AUDIT - -0.250*** -5.36 -0.194*** - 5.13 -0.203*** -5.48 -0.214*** -5.76 -0.160*** -5.39 
Pseudo R
2
  1.593 4.439 4.37 4.33 R
2 
= 67.45 
LR chi-square   99.05*** 91.54*** 91.00*** 90.12*** F     =     29.02*** 
Key: OVS_G_RAW is overstatement statistic. OVS_G is log of (1+ overstatement statistic in decimal form). The overstatement statistic is the difference between 
CG_AR and CG_SR scaled by CG_AR. FC is a dummy variable indicating presence of both chairman and CEO from the sponsor family or an individual member 
of the sponsor family holding both the position of chairman and CEO; 0 otherwise. F_CH/CEO is a dummy variable indicating the presence of either chairman or 
CEO is a member of sponsor family; 0 otherwise. PFD is the percentage of sponsor family directors on board. NUMFD is the number of sponsor family directors 
on board.  INS_OWN is the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of book value of total assets at the end of 
company’s accounting period in 2011. ROA is the ratio between net profit before extraordinary items and average total assets at the end of company’s accounting 
period in 2011. MB is the ratio of the firm’s market value of common equity to book value of common equity at the end of company’s accounting period in 2011. 
AUDIT is a dummy variable equals 1 if the audit firm of the company is affiliated with international big-four audit firms, 0 otherwise. 




The results of different models in Table 8.10 generally support the results in 
Model 5 as presented in Table 8.9. The only difference is that the coefficients of control 
by sponsor family in Models 7, 8 and 9 are significant at the 0.05 level. This is 
consistent in the sense that as the control by a sponsor family is gradually reduced, the 
strength of association between control by the sponsor family and the overstatement of 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 is lessened. 
To summarise, with respect to control by the sponsor family, the results of the 
sensitivity checks provide support for H3.3b2 but do not provide support for H3.3b1. 
With respect to control by institutional ownership, the results provide support for H3.3c1 
but do not provide support for H3.3c2. This is, however, surprising given the evidence 
provided in Tables 8.7, 8.8 and Model 2 of Table 8.9. 
8.6 Summary and concluding remarks 
This chapter has focused on the overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-
2006 as reported in annual reports and the association between the extent of this 
overstatement and firms’ control characteristics. The results reported in this chapter find 
that compliance with the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports is significantly 
higher than the compliance as stated in the survey. In addition, this chapter finds that 
outsiders in general, and investors and credit analysts in particular, get a different 
ranking of a firm for its CG structure if compliance reported in annual reports is used 
instead of underlying compliance. 
Moreover, this study finds that the overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-
2006 in annual reports is more pronounced with respect to non-observable provisions 
than observable provisions. This is probably because firms cannot easily change their 
internal authority relationship but are aware of the consequences of disclosure of non-
compliance such as loss of reputation and decline in share price. The results indicate that 
firms overstate compliance with the BCGG-2006 because the benefits of compliance are 
low but there is institutional pressure on firms for compliance. Thus, users cannot rely 




companies are actually complying with the provisions of the BCGG-2006 and have a 
sound CG structure in place. 
Furthermore, this study finds that overstatement of compliance in annual reports 
is positively associated with control by the sponsor family. These results hold after 
taking into consideration a number of control variables, under alternative definitions of 
control by the sponsor family and control by the institutional investors and under an 
alternative estimation method. The firms under control of sponsor families may find it 
legitimate not to comply with specific provisions of the BCGG-2006 on the grounds of 
‘rent protection’ as discussed in Sections 2.2.7.1 or low ‘relative efficiency’ of the 
BCGG-2006 as suggested by the institutional characteristics of Bangladesh discussed in 
Sections 3.4 and 3.5. However, in order to avoid undesirable consequences (e.g., 
delisting from stock exchanges, loss of reputation, decline in share price) of non-
compliance, firms under the control of sponsor families report compliance with the 
provisions of the BCGG-2006 in their annual reports. The positive association between 
overstatement of compliance in annual reports and control by sponsor family is in line 
with previous findings that family controlled companies maintain a weaker CG structure 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Chen et al., 2008; Chen and Nowland, 2010).  
Finally, this study finds that overstatement of compliance in annual reports is not 
significantly associated with institutional ownership. This result is consistent with prior 
research on institutional investors in developing countries (Hamdani and Yafeh, 2013; 
Belev, 2003; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000) but is in contrast with prior research on 
institutional investors in developed countries (Elyasiani and Jia, 2010; Solomon and 
Solomon, 2006; Hartzell and Starks, 2003). In respect of Bangladesh, this result supports 
Farooque et al. (2007) that institutional ownership is not associated with firm 
performance. 
The results of this chapter, in total, are consistent with the theory of path 





Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis has aimed to investigate the main research question: Does a corporate 
governance reform based on an Anglo-American-based corporate governance model 
accomplish its intended objectives in a developing country? and related sub-questions as 
introduced in Section 1.2. These research questions merit investigation as indicated by 
gaps in the prior literature on CG (Chapter Two, more specifically Sections 2.5; 2.6 and 
2.7). These research questions are also timely to investigate given the wide-spread 
adoption of Anglo-American-based CG codes in developing countries due to the 
influence of international financial institutions (IFIs) and because these countries are 
expending a significant amount of scarce funds on CG reform.  
In order to investigate the research questions, I developed propositions and 
hypotheses in chapter 4 based on agency theory and neo-institutional theory, prior 
literature and characteristics of Bangladesh. The research methods were discussed in 
chapter 5. Chapters 6 to 8 presented the results to RQ1, RQ 2 and RQ3 respectively. 
Hence, this chapter aims to relate the findings of this study with prior research (Section 
9.2), discuss the theory-based and the policy-based contributions of this thesis (Section 
9.3), discuss some of the limitations of this study (Section 9.4) and offer suggestions 
about future research (Section 9.5).  
9.2 Discussion of key results 
9.2.1 Impact of corporate governance mechanisms recommended by 
the BCGG-2006 on investment and lending decisions  
This study finds that institutional investors and bankers do not consider CG 
mechanisms recommended by the BCGG-2006 while making their investment and 




research in developing countries (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000; World Bank, 2005). 
However, this evidence is in contrast with prior research in Anglo-American countries 
(Chung and Zhang, 2011; Bushee et al., 2009; Khurshed et al., 2011) and at the 
international level (Leuz et al., 2009; McKinsey and Company, 2002; McCahery et al., 
2010; Ge et al., 2012). Institutional investors and bankers perceive limited impact of the 
CG mechanisms recommended by the BCGG-2006 on their decisions because (1) they 
perceive that CG mechanisms are not implemented in form and in substance, and (2) 
they practise name-based and relationship-based investment and lending.  
Analysing the reasons put forward by interviewees for non-implementation of  
CG mechanisms in form and in substance, this study shows that family controlled 
companies do not comply effectively with CG mechanisms because the controlling 
families intend to protect their high private benefits of control (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; 
Rajan and Zingales, 2003; 2003a; Rosser, 2003), and the institutional characteristics of 
Bangladesh makes the implementation of the BCGG-2006 ineffective (Doidge et al., 
2007; Wanyama et al., 2007; Paredes, 2004; dela Rama, 2012; Okike, 2007).  
On the other hand, institutional investors and bankers lock-in to the path of name-
based and relationship-based investment and lending practices respectively. This 
evidence is consistent with prior research on investment and lending practices in 
developing countries (Koford and Tschoegl, 1999; La Porta et al., 2003; Singh and 
Zammit, 2006; Selmier, 2013). The lock-in to the path of name-based and relationship 
based investment and lending practices leads to non-consideration of the CG 
mechanisms recommended by the BCGG-2006. This evidence confirms arguments of 
prior researchers (Nam et al., 2001; Nenovsky, 2003; Ahunwan, 2002; Rajan and 
Zingales, 2003; Belev, 2003; Black and Coffee, 1994) that relationship-based and 
collateral-based lending practices make institutional investors and banks reluctant to 
monitor the CG structure of borrower companies.  
In sum, the interview evidence suggests that path dependence occurs both on the 
part of the sponsor families of non-financial companies and on the part of incumbent 




9.2.2 Nature of compliance with the BCGG-2006 and the association 
between the nature of compliance with the BCGG-2006 and 
firm performance 
The results regarding the nature of compliance with the BCGG-2006 indicates 
that most of privately-owned and government-owned companies either do not comply 
with the BCGG-2006 or comply with the BCGG-2006 in form but not in substance. This 
evidence is consistent with the argument that (1) sponsor families of the privately-owned 
companies (Arcot et al., 2010; Krambia-Kapardis and Pasros, 2006) and managers of 
government-owned companies (Kochanek, 1996) impede compliance with the BCGG-
2006 in order to protect their private benefits of control,  and (2) the institutional 
characteristics of Bangladesh lead to inefficient implementation of the BCGG-2006 are 
more pronounced in the case of the privately-owned and government-owned companies. 
In contrast, most of the subsidiaries of foreign MNCs comply with the BCGG-2006 both 
in form and in substance indicating that (1) the managers of subsidiaries of foreign 
MNCs have limited opportunity to extract rent due to sharing institutions and CG 
practices from their headquarters, and (2) sharing of institutions and CG practices makes 
implementation of the BCGG-2006 more efficient. The survey evidence substantiates 
interviewees’ perceptions regarding the ineffectiveness of CG mechanisms 
recommended by the BCGG-2006. The survey evidence is, however, in contrast to 
Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau (2009) who argue that pro-market reform reduces agency 
conflicts more in privately-owned and government-owned companies than in the 
subsidiaries of foreign MNCs. 
The results regarding the association between the nature of compliance with CG 
mechanisms recommended by the BCGG-2006 and firm performance are mixed and 
confirm findings of prior research (Section 2.6.4) in the case of the total sample. 
However, this study finds that in the case of local privately-owned companies, there is 
no association between the nature of compliance with CG mechanisms and firm 
performance (namely, separation of CEO and chairman, board independence and 
appointment of an audit committee). This evidence confirms the argument of Bebchuk 




agency problems of companies in Anglo-American countries are not effective for 
companies with concentrated ownership and control in developing countries. 
9.2.3 Overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual 
reports and its determinants 
This study finds that companies in Bangladesh on average overstate compliance 
with the BCGG-2006 in their annual reports.  This evidence supports the suspicion of 
prior researchers (Arcot et al., 2010; v. Werder et al., 2005; Akkermans et al., 2007) who 
doubt that companies overstate compliance with CG code due to perceived institutional 
pressures. One interpretation of this result is that the institutional characteristics of 
Bangladesh offer high private benefits of control to the present controllers of companies 
and thus, make them reluctant to implement the CG mechanisms recommended by the 
BCGG-2006. A related interpretation is that the institutional characteristics of 
Bangladesh make implementation of the CG mechanisms recommended by the BCGG-
2006 ineffective.  This study also finds that overstatement of compliance with the 
BCGG-2006 leads to different ranking of firm’s governance compared to ranking of 
firm’s governance based on underlying CG. This implies that the ranking of firm’s 
governance as calculated by IFIs (e.g., World Bank, 2009) based on compliance reported 
in annual reports may not represent a true ranking of a firm’s governance.  
This study further finds that overstatement of compliance is more pronounced 
with respect to less observable CG provisions. This evidence may imply that firms 
cannot quickly change their internal structures due to high sunk adaptive costs 
(Gedajlovic et al., 2004; Khanna et al., 2006; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). 
Furthermore, overstatement of compliance is positively related with control by sponsor 
family. This evidence may indicate that family sponsors are reluctant to comply with the 
BCGG-2006 but report compliance due to institutional pressures. The explanation is 
either that they seek to protect their rent or that they perceive high sunk adaptive costs 
and endowment effects. Finally, overstatement of compliance is not associated with 
institutional investors.  This may indicate either that institutional investors are reluctant 




control with the sponsor families (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). The evidence on 
overstatement of compliance in annual reports, in total, points toward the theory of path 
dependence (Bebcuck and Roe, 1999) more than agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). 
9.3 Contributions 
9.3.1 Theoretical contributions of this study 
First, the results of the interviews are consistent with the findings of prior 
practice-based studies on the impact of CG on investment decisions of institutional 
investors in developing countries (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000; World Bank, 2005). 
However, this study extends that research by showing that the theory of path dependence 
rather than agency theory dominates the behaviour of controllers of companies and 
financial incumbents with respect to compliance with the BCGG-2006. This study 
shows that path dependence occurs both on the part of the controlling families of non-
financial companies regarding compliance with the BCGG-2006 and on the part of 
institutional investors and bankers regarding investment and lending practices. 
Consequently, CG mechanisms recommended by the BCGG-2006 do not have an 
impact on the investment and credit decisions of institutional investors and bankers 
respectively.  
Second, by providing the reasoning for no impact of CG on investment and 
lending decisions in Bangladesh, this study opens up the black box of contradictory 
findings (Section 2.5.3) in developed and developing countries (cf Eisenhardt 1989b; p. 
546). The findings of this study suggests that in explaining the behaviour of controllers 
of companies and financial incumbents with respect to CG practices in developing 
countries, researchers should take an ‘open-system’ approach as suggested by Aguilera 
et al., (2008) and they should not mechanically apply agency theory which is more 
relevant to Anglo-American countries. 
Third, the analysis of the survey responses contributes to understanding how the 




and control (Bebchuk and Hamdani, 2009; Claessens, 2006; Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). 
This is because the nature of ownership and control not only dictates the path of existing 
CG practices but also affects the efficiency with which CG practices are implimented. 
For example, local privately-owned companies, being significantly owned and 
controlled by sponsor families, have a family affiliated CEO and chairman, a family 
dominated board and a family dominated audit committee. The presence of family 
members at three important levels may reduce the efficiency of the board and the audit 
committee. 
Fourth, the findings regarding the association between the nature of compliance 
with CG mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-2006 and firm performance suggest that 
CG researchers in developing countries need to consider privately-owned companies, 
government-owned companies and the subsidiaries of foreign MNCs separately when 
conducting archival studies. This is because the inclusion of subsidiaries of foreign 
MNCs can significantly affect the findings. Moreover, the findings regarding the 
association between the nature of compliance with CG mechanisms introduced by the 
BCGG-2006 and firm performance in the case of local privately-owned companies 
suggest that CG researchers in developing countries need to include the effectiveness of 
second-tier management (e.g., CFO and HIA) when measuring CG variables or index for 
privately-owned companies because the quality of second-tier management may make a 
difference in the operating performance of firms.  
Fifth, this study uses an innovative research design to investigate compliance 
with the BCGG-2006 by comparing disclosure on compliance in annual reports with 
disclosure on compliance in a survey. This study thus sheds light on the suspicions of 
prior researchers (Arcot et al., 2010; v. Werder et al., 2005; Akkermans et al., 2007) that 
companies might overstate compliance with CG codes due to perceived institutional 
pressures. This study, thus, questions the validity of prior research that measures CG 
variables based on annual report disclosures either to measure compliance only or to test 




Sixth, this study develops a measure of overstatement of compliance in annual 
reports. This measure can be a tool for future CG and accounting disclosure researchers 
to investigate congruity between underlying practices and accounting disclosure.  
In sum, this study shows that change in CG practices in a developing country is 
hindered by the rent-seeking behaviour of the controllers of companies, institutional 
investors and bankers and institutional characteristics. This study theoretically 
contributes to a prior stream of CG literature that contends that importing a CG code 
does not produce radical change in national CG practices (Paredes, 2004) and that such 
practices persist because of its strong path dependence (Bebchuk and Roe, 2009).  
9.3.2 Policy-based contributions of this study  
CG reform in developing countries has become widespread and involves a large 
amount of scarce resources which is often borrowed from IFIs (Section 3.6.1). Such 
reform is initiated with the expectation that it will strengthen the CG of firms and better 
CG will ensure better investment and credit decisions and firm performance (Section 
1.1). The findings of this thesis indicate that CG mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-
2006 have a limited impact on the investment and credit decisions of institutional 
investors and bankers respectively. The perception of institutional investors and bankers 
regarding the ineffectiveness of CG mechanisms of the BCGG-2006 is substantiated by 
the survey results which indicate that privately-owned and government-owned firms (as 
the main targets of CG reform) do not implement the CG mechanisms introduced by the 
BCGG-2006, or implement them in form rather than in substance. Furthermore, the 
performance of privately-owned firms whose survey response indicates that CG 
mechanisms are implemented in form and in substance is not different from that of firms 
that state that they do not implement the CG mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-2006 
or implement them in form rather than in substance. This evidence indicates that due to 
some underlying constructs of privately-owned firms, CG mechanisms of the BCGG-
2006 fail to contribute to performance. Finally, there is a concern regarding the 
authenticity of compliance with the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports. These 




Anglo-American model in developing countries should take the initiative to educate 
sponsor families about the value of CG rather than emphasising solely the monitoring 
role of CG. They should also take the initiative to address institutional characteristics 
(e.g., corruption) before committing scarce resources to CG reform.  
9.4 Limitations 
9.4.1 Limitations of interviews 
With respect to interviews, three limitations are noted. Firstly, 17 interviewees 
did not approve the recording of the interview. The researcher tried to minimise the 
threats to reliability and validity of these interview data (Section 5.3.2) by immediate 
revision of field notes (Ryan et al., 2002; pp. 155-156) and by emailing the revised field 
notes to the respective interviewees for modification of any part with which they do not 
agree (Annisette and Trivedi, 2013). Secondly, a number of interviewees used a mixture 
of English and Bengali
20
 in answering questions even though the questions were asked 
in English. The researcher, being fluent in both languages, translated the Bengali portion 
of responses into English verbatim. In the cases where the researcher did not find a 
suitable word in English to express the meaning of a Bengali word, he expresses the 
Bengali word using English (Latin) alphabet (see Section 6.5.2 ‘Pir-Murshid’). Finally, 
one interviewee per organisation was selected because of the difficulty in gaining access 
and identifying multiple knowledgeable respondents in each organisation. For example, 
the researcher was seeking to interview an analyst from MFM-2 and CRA-3. However, 
the contact persons recommended interviewing the CEOs of MFM-2 and CRA-3. 
Having interviewed the CEOs, the researcher did not believe that additional insight 
could be derived from interviewing other people (analysts) in these same organisations.  
Apart from these issues, there is relatively little concern about the reliability and 
validity of interview data and findings. The researcher attempted to minimise threats to 
the reliability and validity of interview data (Section 5.3.2) by asking probe and follow-
up questions (McKinnon, 1988), by the immediate transcribing of audio-tapes and field 
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notes when tape-recording was not permitted (Ryan et al., 2002; pp. 155-156), and by 
emailing the transcripts to the interviewees for modification (Annisette and Trivedi, 
2013). The threats to reliability and validity were further reduced by selecting 
interviewees from four different groups of financial incumbents and asking questions 
related to CG mechanisms, consistently to each respondent (Miles and Huberman, 1994; 
p.29; McKinnon, 1988). The validity and reliability of data analysis was maintained by 
reading every sentence of responses, moving back and forth between interview data, 
relevant literature and CG theories, and by seeking consistency among interviewees 
(Section 5.3.4). The validity and reliability of interview findings were partially 
supported by the survey findings that CG mechanisms recommended by the BCGG-
2006 have not been implemented in form and in substance, especially in local privately-
owned companies and government-owned companies (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 
36). 
9.4.2 Limitations of the survey 
This study may suffer from a number of limitations introduced by the survey 
method. First, the sample size is 91 companies. This is small because the number of non-
financial listed companies in Bangladesh is small. The response rate (66.91%) of the 
survey is above the average response rate (55%) in other accounting studies (Van der 
Stede et al., 2005).  Second, the survey method is generally criticised for response bias 
(Zimmerman, 2001).  The sample of the survey represents the distribution of the 
underlying population with respect to industry, market capitalisation and total assets, 
indicating that there is minimal concern about response bias (Section 5.4.2). A final and 
an important concern is the reliability of data obtained in the survey (Young, 1996). 
With respect to this research, some respondents may state over-compliance in the 
survey. This was, however, reduced by pre-testing the survey instrument with two 
company secretaries and by the assurance that the outcome of this research will never be 




9.4.3 An analysis of endogeneity issue with respect to RQ3 
An important limitation of the results showing an association between 
overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 and control by sponsor family is the 
likely endogeneity of control by the sponsor family. This study does not address the 
issue of causality directly because it uses survey data. Survey data by nature are cross-
sectional (Van der Stede, 2013). Hence, several econometric tests of causality (e.g., the 
effect of change in control by sponsor families on change in overstatement of 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports (Woodward, 2003, pp. 35-36) cannot 
be performed. Furthermore, there is no plausible instrument for control by sponsor 
families. However, control by the sponsor families is unlikely to be endogenous because 
family control is a general pattern of control in Bangladesh (Haque et al., 2011). 
Moreover, the BCGG-2006 was introduced in 2006, indicating that overstatement of 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports is not the cause of control by sponsor 
families. With respect to the association between overstatement of compliance with the 
BCGG-2006 and control by institutional investors, this study does not find any 
significant association. Thus, the issue of endogeneity does not arise. 
9.4.4 A limitation with respect to theory 
This study cannot disentangle the relative role of the rent protection desire of the 
existing controller and financial incumbents, and relative inefficiency in the 
implementation of the BCGG-2006 and transaction-based lending practices resulting 
from lack of complementary institutional characteristics in Bangladesh.  
9.5 Future Research 
Future research on the subject of this thesis could explore a number of themes.. 
Firstly, a board-based survey of institutional investors and bankers can investigate the 
impact of CG mechanisms on investment and lending decisions in line with the theory of 




A detailed interview or case based study might disentangle the relative role of the 
rent protection desire of the existing controller or the relative efficiency of Anglo-
American CG codes behind non-compliance or compliance in form rather than substance 
with the BCGG-2006. Researcher might target interviewees who are internal 
professional (e.g., CFO), not the members of the sponsor families because they may not 
disclose their rent protection desires. 
A more detailed measure of compliance in form and in substance with the CG 
code is essential. This, of course, requires a more detailed survey with respect to each of 
the five mechanisms tested here. Alternatively, future research might investigate 
compliance with only one mechanism such as the audit committee and test the difference 
in performance among firms with respect to nature of compliance with the mechanism.  
In order to shed further light on overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-
2006, future research might collect data from alternative sources such as credit rating 
reports, prospectuses issued for rights issues and identify gaps in compliance as reported 
in annual reports and as reported in the aforementioned alternative documents.  
Finally, BSEC recently introduced an updated version of the BCGG-2006 and 
Bangladesh Corporate Governance Guidelines- 2012 (the BCGG-2012) is mandatory. A 
comparative study may help our understanding of whether the imposition of mandatory 
guidelines increases or reduces firms’ motivation to comply and financial incumbents’ 
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Appendix 2.1: Summary of theory-based corporate governance models 
The principal- agent or finance 
model 
The myopic market model The abuse of executive power model The stakeholder model 
Agency theory Myopic market theory Managerial hegemony theory Stakeholder theory 




Patton and Baker, 1987; Hutton (1995); 
Kay and Silberston (1995) 
Freeman (1984); Clarkson (1994); 
Blair (1995) 
Maximisation of shareholder wealth 
in short- term  
Maximisation of shareholder wealth 
in long - term 
Maximisation of total wealth of 
shareholders and society 
Maximisation of total wealth of 
corporation 
Agency conflicts Managers emphasise on 
maximisation of short-term rather 
than long term profitability and 
return on investment. 
Abuse of power by corporate elites 
such writing compensation contracts 
themselves, appointing directors based 
on social ties.  
The interest of one group of 
stakeholder can be compromised to 
that of another 
* Separation of control from 
ownership 
* Shareholders cannot directly 
observe the effort of managers 
*Shareholders and managers have 
different attitudes towards risks 
* Institutional investors invest in 
short-term and do not play corporate 
governance role 
* Managers concentrate more on 
short-term profitability and return. 
* Managers have excessive power due 
to structure of corporation 
*Stakeholders’ interest is not 
protected by the current system of 
corporate governance 
*Managers act opportunistically to 
maximise their own interest before 
shareholders 
*Markets for capital, labour and 
corporate control are efficient  
* Stock market undervalues long-
term investment 
* Threat of takeover leads managers 
to maximise short-term profitability 
 
*Managers bias nomination and 
selection, and restrict the role of non-
executive directors. 
*Non-executive directors lack expertise 
and incentive to monitor managers. 
All stakeholders who contribute 
special inputs in company have 
interest identical  with that of 
shareholders  
Any external intervention in market 
mechanisms 
Governance through market 
mechanisms 
Current systems of board, audit process 
and role of market for corporate control 
Shareholders’ primacy over other 
stakeholders 
* No interference in markets 
* Aligning managerial incentives 
* Introduction of a voluntary code  
* Increasing shareholder loyalty and 
voice  
* Increasing barriers to reduce exit of 
shareholders 
* Encouraging shareholders and 
managers to maximise wealth in 
long-term  
* Introduction of mandatory 
governance code 
* Fixed four-year term of CEO 
* Nomination of independent directors 
by regulators 
* Increase authority of non-executive 
independent directors  
* Developing trust and long-term 
relationship between firm and its 
stakeholders. 
* Employee’s participation in 
strategic decisions. 
* Introducing code of ethics  
Source: Based on Keasey et al. (1997), Blair (1995). 
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Appendix 2.2: OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
Principle  Explanation  
(1) Ensuring the Basis for an Effective CG 
Framework 
The corporate governance framework should 
promote transparent and efficient markets, be 
consistent with the rule of law and clearly 
articulate the division of responsibilities among 
different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities. 
(2) The Rights of Shareholders and Key 
Ownership Functions 
The corporate governance framework should 
protect and facilitate the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights. 
(3) The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders The corporate governance framework should 
ensure the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, including minority and foreign 
shareholders. All shareholders should have the 
opportunity to obtain effective redress for 
violation of their rights. 
(4) The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate 
Governance 
The corporate governance framework should 
recognise the rights of stakeholders established 
by law or through mutual agreements and 
encourage active co-operation between 
corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, 
jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises. 
(5) Disclosure and Transparency The corporate governance framework should 
ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is 
made on all material matters regarding the 
corporation, including the financial situation, 
performance, ownership, and governance of the 
company. 
(6) The Responsibilities of the Board The corporate governance framework should 
ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the 
effective monitoring of management by the 
board, and the board’s accountability to the 
company and the shareholders. 




Appendix 2.3: A summary of studies on impact of corporate governance on investment decisions of 
institutional investors 
Study Theory Data 
sources 
Method Sample Dependent 
variable 
Independent variable Main results Argument behind 





















GOV SCORE1 +*** Institutional investors invest 
in companies with good 
governance to meet fiduciary 
responsibilities; Good 
corporate governance 
reduces monitoring on the 
perspective of institutional 
investors and reduces 
information asymmetry. 
GOV SCORE2 +*** 
Board independence  +** 
Insider ownership +** 
Dual class shares -** 
 2SLS indicates that 
association depends 








Tobit 674, 577, 
and 569 U.K 
firms for 
1996, 1999 




Directors’ ownership -*** High directors’ ownership 
makes them entrenched 





















All these criteria are 








reduce agency conflicts 
between mangers and 
shareholders as well as 
between large and small 
shareholders. 
Board independence 
High free float 
Transparency of large 
shareholders’ ownership 
Management ownership 



















Dual-class share -*** Fiduciary duties of 
institutional investors lead 
them to investment in better 
governed firms. 
Insider ownership -*** 
Board size -*** 
Board independence +*** 
CEO duality insignificant 
The magnitude of affect differs across type of 
institutional investors.  














GINDEX insignificant offset monitoring costs of 
institutional investors; 
Corporate governance 
positively affect firm 
performance;  
Fiduciary duties of 
institutional investors lead 
them to investment in better 
governed firms; 
Strong corporate governance 
reduces high exit costs; 
Political motivation 
Tobit  8992 firm 
year 
observations 















Board  index insignificant 
GINDEX +*** 
Cannot establish causality 










holding by US 
institutional 
investors 
Insider ownership Significant negative 
relationship in 




not English common 
law and low anti-
director index. 
Firm level governance matter 
more in countries with weak 
disclosure requirement, low 
securities regulation, not 
English common law and 










Probit  354 Swedish 
companies 







Ratio of control to cash 
flow rights 
insignificant Investors who only get 
security benefits avoid risk 
of expropriation while 
making investment. 






Ratio of control to cash 
flow rights 
+*** 


















Main findings:  
Investors put corporate governance on a par with 
financial indicators; 
Majority of investors are prepared to pay a 

























Most institutional investors are dormant and does 
not play CG role;  
Most institutional investors consider neither the 
presence of independent directors nor the 
appointment of audit committee as important 
factors in their investment decision.  
No explanation 
Key: OLS = Ordinary Least Square; 2SLS = 2 Stage Least Square;  





Appendix 2.4: A summary of studies relating impact of corporate governance on lending decisions of 
banks 
Study Theory Data 
sources 
Method Sample Dependent 
variable 
Independent variable Main results Argument behind 
hypothesis  



















Firm-level evidence on the effect of GOV on loan characteristics 
with control for country characteristics 
Better governance reduces 
information and agency 
risks. However, better 
governance may exacerbate 
agency conflicts between 
shareholders and bankers as 
better governance ensures 
more protection of 
shareholders’ wealth.  
Loan spread GOV -** 
Maturity GOV +*** 
Loan size GOV +** 
Collateral GOV Insignificant 
Covenants GOV -** 
Firm-level evidence on the effect of component of GOV on loan 
characteristics with control for country characteristics 
Loan spread Board insignificant 
Anti-takeover index +* 
Audit -** 




Anti-takeover index insignificant 
Audit +** 
Compensation and ownership +* 
Loan size Board insignificant 
Anti-takeover index insignificant 
Audit +*** 
Compensation and ownership insignificant 
Collateral Board insignificant 
Anti-takeover index +* 
Audit insignificant 
Compensation and ownership -* 
Covenants Board Insignificant 





Compensation and ownership -* 
Lin et al. 
(2011) 
Agency theory Dealscan 
database; 








OLS 13,331 bank 
loans made 
to 3,468 




Cost of bank 
loan 
Control-ownership wedge +*** Higher divergence between 
control rights and cash flow 
rights increases risk of 
creditors due to tunnelling by 
controlling owners. 
Cash-flow rights -** 
Family firm +** 
Family CEO +** 




The positive association between the control-
ownership wedge and loan spreads is weakened 
for firms in environments with strong creditor and 















1998 - 2006. 
Loan spread Board independence -*** Good corporate governance 
reduces information 
asymmetry and agency costs 
and lower information 
asymmetry and agency costs 
positively affect debt 
contract terms. 
Board size -*** 
CEO duality insignificant 
Directors’ interlock insignificant 
AC independence -** 
AC size -* 
AC financial expertise -** 
Directors’ shareholding insignificant 
Conclusion Most of the governance variable has no relation 










opacity,  risk 






















Cost of bank 
loan 
% of institutional ownership   -*** Presence of institutional 
investors increases 
monitoring and agency 
conflicts between 
shareholders and banks. 
 % of institutional holdings 
squared 
+*** 
Anti-takeover index -*** 
Conclusion A U shape relationship exists between loan spread 













Loan grant Board strength +** Board of directors provide an 
interface between company 
and resource providers and 
reduce opportunistic 
Board independence insignificant 
Board qualification  +* 








Agency theory Several 
databases 





1990 - 2004 
Loan Spread Takeover index +*** Vulnerability to takeover 
increases risk of banks as 
creditors. 
Conclusion Firms with higher vulnerability to takeovers pay 
higher bank loan spread. 

















Board independence insignificant Good corporate governance 
can help reduce credit risks 
by mitigating the agency 
problems between 
shareholders and managers 
and also by improving 
corporate transparency and 





CEO experience +*** 
CEO ownership +*** 
CEO compensation +*** 
Loan size Board independence +*** 




CEO ownership insignificant 




Governance attributes have no effect on access to 
bank finance or loan size in case of small firms. 
Key: OLS = Ordinary Least Square; 2SLS = 2 Stage Least Square;  









Appendix 2.5: A summary of studies relating corporate governance and firm performance in developing countries 






Main results Argument behind hypothesis or 
























ROA of firms 
with family 
ownership > ROA 
of non-family 
firms. 
ROA of firms 
with family 
ownership and 
strategic control > 
ROA of firms 
with family 
ownership. 
 ROA of firms 
with family 
ownership and 
strategic control > 






Combined family ownership 
and strategic control fills 
institutional void. 
Outside operational control 










Black et al. 
(2012) 







Tobin’s q CG index +*** Independent directors are 
minority on board, no 






































reform related to 
Board independence and audit 













board and audit 
committee is 





















Governance in substance matter 




Board size insignificant 
Chen et al. 
(2011) 
No theory Public 
database 
OLS 1164 group 
Chinese 
companies 
ROA CEO Duality insignificant Controlling shareholders control 
board and makes board a rubber 
stamp 














47 firms from 
Hong Kong, 




and 48 firms 
from Taiwan 
for 1998-2004 
Tobin’s q CEO duality -* (Family firms) 
-*** (Non-family 
firms) 
Board monitoring brings less 
benefits but more costs in 
family business. No justification 
is provided for insignificant 
relationship between 
performance and governance in 
non-family firms 




















Tobin’s q Board 
independence 
insignificant Independent directors are not 
independent enough 
Audit committee insignificant 



















-** Independent director reduces 
opportunistic related party 
transaction 
Audit committee insignificant These governance mechanism 






























61 firms in 
Indonesia, 75 
in Malaysia, 
111 in S. 
Korea and 61 










The impact of corporate 
governance on performance 
varies depending on 
performance 
CEO duality +** (OLS 
regression) 


















ROA Board size insignificant Independent directors lack in-
depth knowledge, fail to 
understand the value of 
coordination among affiliated 
firms and interrupt the working 










3SLS 180 firm 
observations 
from India in 
2005-06 
ROA and 
Tobin’s q  
Outside director Insignificant 
(ROA), 
+*(Tobin’s q) 
Study is expletory, family 
business need further study 
CEO Duality insignificant 
Board size Insignificant 
(ROA), 
+**(Tobin’s q) 








OLS 27 banks in 
Turkey for 
2001–2004 
ROA  Board 
independence 
--** /insignificant Outside directors does not play 
role or many of outside directors 




Board size insignificant possible to detect by public data 
Board size Insignificant in all 
countries 
Lefort and 














































Board size +** Small board, more independent 
directors and CEO non-duality 






















MTB, ROE  
 
CGI +** Corporate governance improves 
















Choi, Park and 











Tobin’s q Outside directors +** Independent directors play 






























Too early to determine the 
effectiveness of outside 
directors 
Black and 


























than small firms 
investors expected the Clause 49 
reforms to benefit 
large firms, and likely also 
medium-sized firms 
















CEO Duality insignificant There is no monotonic 
relationship between CEO 
duality and corporate 
performance. 
Board Size insignificant 





OLS 127 listed 
Indian large 
firms in 2003 
 
ROA, ROE, 





Tobin’s q  






















CGI +*** corporate governance is an 
important 
factor in explaining the market 





Key: OLS = Ordinary Least Square; 2SLS = 2 Stage Least Square; 3SLS = 3 Stage Least Square ROA = Return on Assets; ROE= Return on Equity; MTB = Market to Book 
Ratio; MTS = Market to Sales Ratio; ROS = Return on Sales; MAR = Market Adjusted Return; CAR = Cumulative Adjusted Return 






Appendix 2.6: A summary of studies relating corporate governance and accounting reporting quality in 
developing countries 






Main results Argument behind 











104 firms in 
Singapore  for 
1998 and 2000 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
Board size insignificant  











OLS 158 Singapore 











































OLS 87 Hong Kong 































Board size insignificant No explanation for 
insignificance results Outside directors insignificant 
CEO Duality insignificant 























CGI -*** Corporate governance deter 
earnings management 
Sarkar et al. 
2006 
No theory Prowess 
database 
OLS 500 Indian 












Board busyness +*** 
Board diligence -*** 
CEO duality -** 
Promoter influence +* 











from China for 




CEO Duality insignificant There is limited variation 
in CEO duality in sample 
firms; Outside directors 
reduce tunnelling 









2SLS ~ 400 listed 








-*** a higher proportion of 
INEDs is likely to deter 
earnings manipulation; the 
monitoring effectiveness of 
INED’s is reduced by 
family control 
Board size insignificant 
CEO Duality Insignificant 








OLS 139 Malaysian 
companies for 




Outside directors -** No explanation 
















Insignificant Independent director does 
not play role. No 
explanation about audit 
committee 

















CGI -** effective corporate-
governance 













64 listed firms 
from Malaysia 




























N/A N/A Respondents 
recognise the 
ceremonial roles of 
audit committee but 
do not appreciate 
substantial roles. 
The characteristics 
of audit committee 




Key: OLS = Ordinary Least Square; 2SLS = 2 Stage Least Square 





Appendix 2.7: A summary of studies relating level of compliance with corporate governance codes 






















* Very high compliance amongst certain provisions of the 
code in the region of 95% and above in 2004. 
* On average, less than 10% of all firms were not compliant 
with a given single provision. 
* Companies do not use the flexibility of the Code to fine-
tune their governance to their changing circumstances, 
possibly due to the existence of enforcement and monitoring 
issues. 
*Firm size is positively associated with level of compliance. 
*Lagged poor performance positively affects compliance. 
*Firms with a dominant shareholder comply less. 
* Use of standard explanations in case of non-compliance. 
* Minority shareholders have limited enforcement powers 
reducing managers’ motivation to justify non-compliance.  
* The difference in stock return between compliant and non-






(e.g. related to 
the judgment of 
director 
independence), 
while in fact 
they are not, 
which could 
explain the 




















Firms comply with 82 per cent of provisions and provide 





















* Among the sample companies, 96.81 per cent on average 
comply with 90.64 per cent provisions. 
*Different companies provide identical explanation to 
justify their non-compliance with neuralgic code 
recommendations. 
*Large firm comply better with the provisions of code.  
*Firms with growth potential comply more with the 
provisions of code. 













































*Mean compliance rate is 81.71 per cent of total 
recommendations and 57.89 per cent of total suggestions. 
* The kind of conformity with the GCGC bears similarities 
across different firms. 
*the size of supervisory board is positively related to level 
of compliance 
*Firms with similar size are clustered into different groups. 
*Governance performance studies should consider pattern 
of compliance rather than overall level of compliance.  
*Governance 
prediction 




















* Compliance with the code is generally high. 
*Larger firms comply significantly more with provisions 
than smaller companies 
*There is minor difference between survey responses and 
public disclosure.  
*Local companies on average comply better with the code. 
*Non-compliance are remarkably similar across companies 
*Symbolic adherence with the code 
*Compliance 


































matter if they 
play major role 
in committee 
Industry Mixed 
Board independence insignificant 
Minority directors Mixed 
AC independence Significant 
Family control Insignificant 
State ownership Insignificant 
Institutional investors attend GMS Significant 
Shareholdings by institutional investors insignificant 
Hooghiemstra 















* Larger firms comply significantly more with provisions 
than smaller companies 
* Ownership concentration and interlocked director are not 




















*Explanation justifying non-compliance is uninformative. 
*investors do not bother about non-compliance when 
performance of the company is good. 








Appendix 3.1: Credit Risk Grading Score Sheet 
Borrower Details Aggregate Score Risk Grade 
Number Grading Short Score 
1 Superior SUP Fully cash secured, secured by 
Government/International Bank 
Guarantee 
2 Good GD 85+ 
3 Acceptable ACCPT 75-84 
4 Marginal/Watchlist MG/WL 65-74 
5 Special Mention SM 55-64 
6 Substandard SS 45-54 
7 Doubtful DF 35-44 
8 Bad/loss BL <35 
Criteria  
A Financial Risk Weight = 50% 
Financial ratios Maximum score 
1 Leverage  15 
2. Liquidity 15 
3.Profitability  15 
4 Interest coverage 5 
Total Score–Financial Risk 50 
B. Business/Industry Risk Weight =15% 
1. Size of Business 5 
2. Business Outlook 3 
3. Industry Growth 3 
4. Market Competition 2 
5. Entry/Exit Barriers 2 
Total Score-Business/Industry Risk 15 
C. Management Risk Weight = 15% 
1. Experience 5 
2. Second Line/ Succession 5 
3. Team Work 5 
Total Score-Management Risk 15 
D. Security Risk Weight = 10% 
1. Security Coverage 4 
2. Collateral Coverage 4 
3. Support (Guarantee) 2 
Total Score- Security Risk 10 
E. Relationship Risk Weight = 10% 
1. Utilization of Limit 3 
2. Account Conduct 3 
3. Compliance of Covenants/Conditions 2 




Grand Total- All Risk 100 




Appendix 5.1: Details of interviewee qualification and experience 



























 MFM1 Mutual Fund Company 
(Nationalised) 
GM 32 years 3 months M.Com, FCA 07.03.12 11:00 am - 2:00 pm Note taking 
MFM2 Mutual Fund Company 
(Domestic - Private) 
CEO 25 years  MBA 22.03.12 11:00 am - 12:45 pm Tape recording 
MFM3 Mutual Fund Company 
(Domestic - Private) 
FAVP  8 years 10 months MBA 21. 03.12 11:00 am to 11:42 am Note taking 
MFM4 Mutual Fund Company 
(Foreign) 
SVP 12 years 9 months CFA 10.03.12 10:00 am to 12:12 pm tape recording 
LIC1 Life Insurance Company 
(Private-Traditional) 
EVP 16 years MBA 18.01.12 2:45 pm to 3:58 pm tape recording 
LIC2 Life Insurance Company 
(Private-Islamic) 
CFO 28years 8 months FCA 25.01.12 2:15 pm to 3:35 pm Note taking 
LIC3 Life Insurance Company 
(Private-Traditional) 






































NCB1 Nationalised Commercial 
Bank  




2:00 pm to 3:05 pm Note taking 










2:15 pm to 3:40 pm Note taking 





9 years M.Com 
Accounting 
20.02.12 4:00 pm to 7:30 pm Note taking 
DCB3 Domestic Commercial 
Bank (Private) 
Head of Credit, 
Wholesale 
Banking 
12 years 4 months MBA 09.01.12 11:30am to 1:30 pm Note taking 
DCB4 Domestic Commercial 
Bank (Private) 
SAVP 15 years M.Com, MBA 24.01.12 
 
2:00 pm to 4:05 pm Note taking 
DCB5 Domestic Commercial 
Bank (Private) 
EVP and Head 
of Credit   
20 years 6 months MSc Statistics 30. 01.12 
 
3:15 pm to 4 pm  Note taking 
DCB6 Domestic Commercial 
Bank (Private) 
AVP 8 years 2 months MBA 29. 02.12 6:00 pm to 7:45 pm tape recording 





DCB8 Domestic Commercial 
Bank (Private) 
VP and Head of 
Credit 
17 years MBA 19. 01.12 
 
11:15 am to 12:01 pm Tape recording 
DCB9 Domestic Commercial 
Bank (Private) 
SVP 15 years 6 months MBA 28. 03.12 
 
12:10 pm to 1:00 pm tape recording 
DCB10 Domestic Commercial 
Bank (Private) 
VP and In 
Charge, Credit 
18 years 5 months MBA 01. 03.12 10:15 am to 11:35 am Note taking 
DCB11 Domestic Commercial 
Bank (Private) 
VP 12 years 4 months Masters, 
sociology 
07. 03.12 11:00 am to 12:25 pm Tape Recording 
DIB1 Domestic Islamic Bank 
(Private) 
VP 10 years 2 months MBA 15. 02.12 
 
11:05 am to 12:09 pm Tape recording 
DIB2 Domestic Islamic Bank 
(Private) 
SEVP 27 years 3 months M.Com 25. 01.12 11:30 am to 12:10 pm Tape recording 
FCB1 Foreign Commercial Bank Senior GM 47 years 8 months M.Com 14.03.12 11:25 am to 12:10 pm Note Taking 
FCB2 Foreign Commercial Bank FAVP 8 years 2 months MBA 17. 01.12 11:30 am to 12:45 pm Note taking 
FCB3 Foreign Commercial Bank Senior manager 10 years MBA 12. 02.12 3:30 pm to 4:33 pm Note taking 
CRA1 Credit Rating Agency VP and Head of 
Rating 
11 years 6 months MBA 13.02.12 11:40 am to 12:18 pm Tape recoring 
CRA2 Credit Rating Agency VP and Chief 
Rating Officer 
10 years and 4 
months 
MBA 16.02.12 2:00 pm to 3:30 pm Note Taking 
CRA3 Credit Rating Agency CEO 24 years Masters 22.03.12 11:40 am to 12:20 pm Note taking 
CRA4 Credit Rating Agency Senior rating 
analysts 




Appendix 5.2: Introductory letter to the interviewee 
                                                                                                        Md. Abdus Sobhan 
                                                                PhD Student, Accounting and Finance Group 
                                                                      University of Edinburgh Business School 
                                                                      29 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9JS 
                                    Cell: +44(0)7580473146, Email:M.A.Sobhan@sms.ed.ac.uk 
Date: 14.01. 2012 
Credit Analyst of Bank 
United Commercial Bank Limited, 
Bangladesh  
 
Subject: Request to be an interviewee for a PhD research project. 
Dear Sir, 
I am Md. Abdus Sobhan, Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting and Information Systems, 
University of Dhaka. Currently, I am studying PhD in the University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom 
under the supervision of Professor Bill Rees and Professor Pauline Weetman. My research topic is 
corporate governance reform in the non-financial sector of Bangladesh. As part of the project, I want 
to investigate how the state of a publicly listed company’s corporate governance influences a bank’s 
lending decision to it. The broad questions I want to discuss are as follows: 
1. What factors do you consider in assessing how the directors manage the company?  
2. How do you evaluate the accounting reporting quality of a prospective corporate borrower? 
3. Do you see any relationship between how the directors manage the company and the 
accounting reporting quality of a company? If yes, what kind of association do you observe? 
4. How do you perceive the impact of recent corporate governance reform in Bangladesh on 
how the directors manage the company and accounting reporting quality? The reform 
recommended separation of chairman and CEO, appointment of an independent director, an 
audit committee, CFO and head of internal audit (HIA) etc. 
5.  How do the unique characteristics of the Bangladesh corporate sector affect your 
assessment of how the directors run the company and of the accounting reporting quality of a 
company? The unique characteristics include family ownership and control of companies, 
political affiliation of sponsor shareholder directors, corruption etc. 
All the information collected will be kept confidential and the PhD thesis and any research publish 
from it in future will analyse your comments anonymously without mentioning your and your 
organisation’s identity. I will send a summary of interview for your kind consideration by email and if 
you disagree with any part of the summary, you can amend accordingly.  
 
Thank you in advance for your time and effort.  
 
Yours Sincerely, 






Name of the Bank: ...................................... 
Interviewee Name: .........................................   
Gender: M          F   Age: ............. years 
Maximum Level of Education Achieved:...........................................Discipline:...................  
Designation: ................................... 
Experience in current position: ................years.....................months 
Experience in corporate lending: ..............years......................months 
Number of Banks served in career: ............................ 
Approximate percentage of market share of your bank in corporate credit: ......................percent 
Major industrial sectors financed by your bank (may be more than one): 
...................................................................................................................................................  
Estimated time: 1:00 -1:30 hours 
Interview Time started: ...................... 
Time Finished: ............................ 





Appendix 5.3: Semi-structured interview card 
 
Introductory explanation------introduction, objective of the research project explain,  
confidentiality and anonymity explained,     seek 
permission to tape record and work experience of   
interviewee 
Appraisal of a corporate  
loan application------------------assessment of performance and accounting report  
quality of borrowers 
Board of Directors--------------CEO and Chairman Duality, Family versus non- 
family relationship between CEO and Chairman of 
Board, Board size, Family control over board, 
Independent director, background of directors, 
professional and academic qualification of directors, 
association of board characteristics with firm 
performance and accounting quality 
Audit committee ---------------Composition, Chairman of audit committee,  
independence vs. non Independence of chairman of 
audit committee, accounting and finance qualification 
of audit committee chairman and members, association 
of audit committee with firm performance and 
accounting quality 
Chief Financial Officer -------Appointment and qualification of CFO,  
board membership and reporting authority, association 
of quality of CFO with firm performance and 
accounting quality 
Head of Internal Audit --------Appointment and qualification, reporting authority,  
association of quality of internal audit with firm 
performance and accounting reporting quality 
Institutional characteristics -------Family ownership and control, political affiliation  
of directors, corruption, impact of these on firm’s 
corporate governance and lending decisions 






Appendix 5.4: Research Ethics 
  
University of Edinburgh Business School  
Level 1 and 2 Research Ethics Applications  
 
Title of Proposal: Corporate Governance Reform in a Developing Country – The 
Case of Bangladesh. 
Please provide a brief outline of the research aims and the proposed methodology, 
highlighting any anticipated ethical issues (on separate sheet if necessary):  
 
The interviewees, aged between 30- 72 years, are mid and senior level 
corporate credit analysts of banks and credit rating agencies and investment 
managers of life insurance companies and mutual funds who have no physical or 
mental vulnerability. The research issue is not a sensitive topic (Lee, 1993) and does 
not require interviewees disclose governance information of any particular borrower 
(Mason, 2002; p. 79).  Thus, there are minimum ethical issues. In spite of that, I 
explain confidentiality and anonymity as well as take voluntary consent as described 
below.  
I explain that except the researcher and his supervisors, no other person will 
have access to the data as part of confidentiality. I also explain anonymity by 
clarifying that in case of writing thesis or further publications, I will quote their 
response without the name of the interviewees and their banks. Finally, I explain that 
full confidentiality may not be ensured (Mason, 2002; p. 80) through restrictive 
access to data and anonymity because Bangladesh has limited number of banks, 
credit rating agencies, life insurance companies and investment management 
companies and a determined investigator can easily associate the comments to a 
particular bank based on some description of banks.  
Voluntary consent is initially achieved when they agree to be interviewed 
because I send a consent form with the introductory letter. I again ensured it by 
using the same consent form which the interviewee filled and signed during 




the research at any time and to make any amendments that they felt were necessary 
(Mason, 2002; p. 80). Voluntary consent is finally ensured by giving them 
opportunities to make amendments to transcripts which I send them by email after 
transcription (Hagens et al. 2009).  All interviewees replied that they do not find any 
significant discrepancy between interview and transcript. This approval of 
transcripts also increases validity of data (Hagens et al. 2009).    
 
I have read the Business School Research Ethics Policy and agree to abide by it.  
In the case of human subjects in research: (delete as 
necessary) Participants will be told about the objectives of 
the study.  
Yes/No  
Any hazards will be explained to them.  Yes/No  
Participants will be informed they are participating of their 
own free will and consent.  
Yes/No  
They will be informed that they are free to withdraw at any 
point should they wish to.  
Yes/No  
Information will be held in confidence and any information 
used will be used anonymously unless consent has been 
given otherwise  
Yes/No  
I confirm that this study does NOT involve children (under 
18), institutionalised people; or other individuals who are 
vulnerable or unable to give consent.  
Yes/No  
I have considered the risks of physical or psychological 
harm to research participants (including the researchers) and 






Appendix 5.5: Survey questionnaire 
 
The Company Secretary, 
Aramit Cement Ltd 
 
Dear Sir, 
I am inviting you to participate in a survey. I am studying the current state of corporate 
governance of non-financial companies of Bangladesh as part of a PhD project in 
University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom, under supervision of Professor Bill Rees and 
Professor Pauline Weetman. 
Along with this letter, I enclosed a questionnaire that asks a variety of questions about 
the governance structure of your company. I am requesting you to complete the 
questionnaire and return it to me.  
As a company secretary, you have valuable insights into the underlying governance 
structure of your company. I believe that your opinion could be extremely valuable for 
the development of the current state of governance structure.  If you would like to share 
your views further, please contact me at M. A. Sobhan@sms.ed.ac.uk.  
 
The results of this project will primarily be used for writing a PhD thesis. I guarantee 
that your identity will be kept absolutely confidential to me and my supervisors and the 
outcome of this research will never be published in Bangladesh. If you like to receive a 
summary of my initial findings, please fill in your details at the end of the questionnaire.   
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to assist me in this research. 
Yours Sincerely, 





PART A: Ownership Structure 

















           
*Blockholders means any shareholders owning at least 10% of ownership of the company. 
 
PART B: Board of Directors 
1. Profile of Board 































































































































































































          
          
          
          
          
          
          
*Executive Director: A person who is a director and officer of the company 
**Non-executive: A person who is a director but not an officer of the company 
¥
Independent director: A director with less than 1% of share ownership and not an executive director 
Ψ
BEI: Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, the private sector research organization that issued first corporate governance code in Bangladesh 






2. Chairman and CEO Duality: 
Is the CEO of your company a different individual from the Chairman of the board? 
[a] Yes  [b] No 
If yes, is there a family relationship between the Chairman and the CEO? 
 [a] Yes  [b] No 
 
5. If Chairman and CEO are different people, does your company specify their duties and 
responsibilities in written form? 
[a] Yes  [b] No 
 
6. Board Independence: (Please complete if your company appoints independent director(s), 
otherwise go to question 4) 
a. The primary reason for appointing independent director on the board 
(Please tick (√) final column) 
To ensure compliance with Bangladesh Corporate Governance Guideline 2006   
To build reputation that firm maintains strong governance  
To ensure that management activities are targeted to wealth maximization of shareholders  
To get access to expertise that is not available from executive and shareholders directors  
To ensure external connection of the firm through network of independent director   
Anything else (Please mention)……………………….  
b. Description that describes the identity of the independent director(s) of your company [Multiple answer 
can be selected]: 
(Please tick (√) final column) 
 ID 1 ID 2 
A shareholder director owns less than 1% of total ownership   
A representative of minority shareholders   
A representative of an institutional shareholder   
A former officer or executive of the company   
A person who is a relative or descendent by birth or marriage of a member of the 
controlling family  
  
A person who is a friend or previous colleague of a member of the controlling family   
A person who jointly owns a partnership or a private limited company with a member of 
the controlling family 
  
A person who holds a board position in another public limited company with a member of 
the controlling family 
  
A professional who provides professional services to the company or other business 
controlled by a member of the controlling family or to the family itself 
  
None of the above (please specify)…………………………………… 
 
c. How often does the independent director(s) of your company dissent the decision taken by executive 
directors 
            Very frequently           Frequently             Occasionally            Rarely           Never 
 




Please provide details for first three columns and tick (√) yes or no for last two columns  
Number of Board 




present in each 
board meeting  
Approximate 




(please tick (√))  
Recording  of 
voting outcome 
(please tick (√)) 
Yes No Yes No 
       
 
PART C: Board Committees:  
8. Please tick (√) appropriate (yes or no) column for the following items: 
 Yes No 
An Audit Committee exists   
An audit committee constitution or charter or bylaw exists to govern the operation of 
audit committee  
  
Audit committee presents a separate audit committee report to shareholders annually   
A management committee exists   
A management committee constitution or charter or bylaw govern the operation of 
management committee  
  
 
9. A. If an audit committee exists, please fill up following details about audit committee members  
Name of director  Designation on audit committee 
(chairman or member)  
Academic/ professional 
qualification with discipline 
   
   
   
   
 
B. If an audit committee exists, please provide following information regarding audit committee meeting: 
Number of meeting 
held in 2010 
Minimum No. of members 
present in  a meeting 
Approximate duration of a 
meeting 
Number of meetings 
with external auditor 
    
 
C. To whom does the audit committee report within the company?  
                    Board of Directors          Chairman of the Board           CEO/ Managing Director  
Any other (please mention) ……………………………….. 
 
PART D: Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
10. Does your company employ a CFO?  
 Yes  No 
 
If yes, please provide following details about CFO:  




qualification of CFO 
Working experience 
as CFO in years  
Previous CFO of 
another company  
CFO is also 
director  






Yes No Yes No Yes No 
        
 
PART E: Internal Audit Department and Head of Internal Auditor (HIA) 
11. Does your company establish a separate internal audit department? 
 Yes  No 
12. Does your company employ a HIA?  
 Yes  No 
 
 
If yes, please provide following details about HIA:  







experience as HIA 
in years  
Previous HIA in 
another company  
HIA is also director  HIA, not director, 
attends board 
meeting 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
        
13. Who does appoint and remove the HIA? 
Chairman of the Board  CEO 
 CFO                Audit committee    Board of Directors 
 
14. To whom does the HIA report? 
Chairman of the Board  CEO 
 CFO                Audit committee    Board of Directors 
 
PART F: External Auditor 
15. In your company, who does nominate the external auditor? 
Chairman of the Board  CEO                                                                                         
CFO                Audit committee    Board of Directors 
 
16. Does your company purchase any non-audit services from your present external auditor? 
 Yes  No 
If yes, what is the percentage of non-audit service fees to total auditor’s fees in 2010? 
Answer:…………………. 
 
17. Who does receive the external auditor’s recommendation to management regarding accounting 
and audit practices? 
Chairman of the Board  CEO                                 CFO                                                                                





18. A. Does your company last change the external audit firm within last three years? 
 Yes  No 
B. what was the reason for changing the external auditor? 
To comply with SEC pronouncement about the rotation of auditor 
Auditor went out of business 
Disagreement over audit fees 
Disagreement over accounting policy 





Details of Respondent:  
(Only required to fill-in if you are interested to receive a copy of initial findings of this study) 
 
Name of the Company: ...................................... 
Name of the Respondent: .........................................   
Maximum Level of Education Achieved:...........................................Discipline:...................  
Designation: ................................... 
Email:………………………………………………. 
Experience in current position: ................years.....................months    
  
Thank you very much 
 
 
 
